

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

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DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT

DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Guidance

This strategic communication guidance (attached) provides a foundation for coordinating Department of Defense (DoD) efforts before, during, and after U.S., allied, and coalition personnel, or private citizens are illegally detained, held hostage, or otherwise isolated from friendly control.

To support efforts to communicate accurate information in event of a personnel recovery situation, DoD leaders are requested to review and be familiar with the guidance contained therein.

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office can assist you in this effort. The point of contact is Colonel Glenn Hecht, Glenn.Hecht@osd.mil, (703) 699-1259.

Attachment:

As stated.

Dodn England





PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE

- I. <u>Purpose</u>. This strategic communication guidance supports national personnel recovery policy, currently in draft, by providing a foundation for coordinating Department of Defense (DoD) efforts before, during, and after U.S., allied, and coalition personnel, or private citizens are illegally detained, held hostage, or otherwise isolated from friendly control.
 - 1. National personnel recovery policy, as stated in ANNEX 1, *United States Policy on Personnel Recovery and Prevention of Hostage Taking Abroad and other Isolating Events* (Draft) to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-12, *United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad*, will enable the USG to prevent, prepare for, and respond to such situations in a unified manner at the national level. The goal is to safeguard U.S., allied, and coalition interests, personnel, and citizens.
 - 2. This guidance considers the synergistic capabilities of public diplomacy, information operations, public affairs, and international broadcasting with the diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of national power in order to achieve the following objectives:
 - a. Reduce the probability of the capture, detention, and illegal seizure of U.S., allied, and coalition personnel and citizens.
 - b. Mitigate the effects of attempts by adversaries to exploit isolated persons as part of their larger strategic communication campaign.
 - c. Increase the survivability of those held in captivity, detained, or illegally seized.
 - d. Directly support the National Security Strategy by protecting the lives and livelihoods of U.S. citizens, and indirectly by severing support to terrorist networks.

II. Key Definitions.¹

- 1. **Personnel Recovery:** The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.²
- 2. **Isolated Personnel:** U.S. military, DoD civilians, and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a U.S.-sponsored military activity or mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.³
- 3. **Strategic Communication:** Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.⁴
 - a. According to the 2004 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, strategic communication is composed of four core instruments: public diplomacy, public affairs, information operations, and international broadcasting.⁵
 - b. Strategic communication can also be envisioned as the synchronized coordination of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and other activities, *reinforced by political, economic, military, and other actions*, to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.⁶

¹ For the purpose of this guidance, the terms "personnel recovery" and "isolated personnel" apply to USG personnel, including U.S. Government contract employees, government-sponsored family members, who are authorized by the U.S. Government to travel overseas, and any other as designated by the President or Secretary of Defense.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: GPO, September 14, 2007) under "Personnel Recovery." Cited hereafter as JCS, Joint Pub 1-02.

³ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Isolated Personnel."

⁴ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Strategic Communication."

⁵ Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: DSB, September 2004), 12-13. Cited hereafter as DSB, Strategic Communication.

⁶ Jeffery B. Jones, "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the Unites States," *Joint Force Quarterly* 39, (2005): 108-109.

- III. <u>Critical Vulnerability</u>. Captivity, detention, and illegal seizure of U.S., allied, and coalition personnel and citizens for exploitation purposes is a relentless and increasing threat to our collective security. The threat stems from adversaries who capitalize on these activities to attack a critical vulnerability of USG operations overseas, which begins the moment a person becomes isolated. Adversaries bolster their credibility and cause by placing a premium on personnel and citizens from the U.S., its allies, and coalition partners to gain strategic advantages in the info-centric and globalized nature of today's world. The adversaries' desired effect is to:
 - 1. Gain strategic advantage from a tactical event by weakening our national will and adversely affecting our free and open society.
 - 2. Influence international partners to withdraw from U.S.-backed coalitions and make concessions for the return of captive, detained, or illegally seized personnel or citizens.
 - 3. Degrade the U.S. international and domestic image by creating a sense of weakness and inability to resolve the crisis, in turn increasing the adversary's image of strength and legitimacy of cause.
 - 4. Affect operational resources by diminishing human capital and the will to fight, while limiting freedom of travel and access.
 - 5. Raise the risk of USG crisis response and limited contingency operations to increase the operational cost and deter U.S. involvement in operations abroad.

IV. Scope of this Guidance.

- 1. This guidance frames DoD's effort required to harness the full potential of strategic communication before, during, and after a personnel recovery response. It shapes the Department's and USG's planning, preparation, and execution of strategic communication efforts in support of Chiefs of Mission and Combatant Commanders by:
 - a. Demonstrating how personnel recovery influences the strategic environment as it relates to national, international, and operational decision-makers.
 - b. Outlining common terms of reference in the strategic communication domain.
 - c. Explaining the methodology for developing strategic communication supporting plans, activities, and effects at the Chief of Mission and Combatant Commander level.

- d. Directing the establishment of a Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Working Group (PRSCWG).
- 2. This guidance uses strategic communication principles to support personnel recovery preparation and response by outlining the methodology to:
 - a. Target potential adversaries with focused strategic communication campaigns that disrupt attempts to exploit isolated personnel and citizens.
 - b. Promote dialogue with local leaders and the general public in specific areas to segregate adversaries from their potential support base and assist in personnel recovery responses.
 - c. Establish the conditions to prepare for, recover, and reintegrate or repatriate those who become isolated from friendly control.
- 3. This guidance elaborates how the principles of strategic communication can be tailored to support personnel recovery preparation and response, which in turn requires:
 - a. Analysis by all USG departments and agencies on how to protect their people and U.S. interests abroad.
 - b. A unified, collective response that supports Chiefs of Mission, Combatant Commanders, and other leaders who must manage activities surrounding an isolating event.

V. Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Working Group (PRSCWG).

- 1. Upon final approval of this guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish the PRSCWG. The function of this group is to:
 - a. Assist the National Security Council's Personnel Recovery Working Group (described in ANNEX 1 (Draft) to NSPD-12) to shape a unified position among the USG departments and agencies on strategic communication issues specific to personnel recovery.
 - b. Identify vulnerabilities specific to USG foreign engagements and make recommendations to protect U.S., allied, and coalition personnel and citizens through strategic communication and personnel recovery efforts.
 - c. Review and coordinate DoD personnel recovery strategic communication initiatives.

- d. Provide enduring strategic communication guidance before an isolating event occurs and forward specific recommendations to Combatant Commanders and Chiefs of Mission during and after an isolating event.
- 2. This working group is responsible to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for POW/ Missing Personnel Affairs (DASD(POW/MPA)) and the Joint Staff J-3 Deputy Director for Special Operations (DDSO).
 - a. Both the DASD(POW/MPA) and the DDSO will report working group activities to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively, to keep both offices informed on the working group's activity.
 - b. The working group will submit all recommendations to the DASD(POW/MPA) and DDSO, who may then forward the recommendations to other DoD offices, components or USG departments and agencies as necessary through established channels.
 - c. Requests made of the PRSCWG will be submitted through the DASD(POW/MPA) or DDSO.
- 3. The PRSCWG will coordinate initiatives with the DoD Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG), as necessary.
- 4. The working group's membership should include, as appropriate, the following organizations or elements, with responsibilities noted:

Office of the Secretary of Defense

- a. <u>Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office</u>: Communicate this personnel recovery strategic communication guidance throughout the Department of Defense and other USG departments and agencies, as necessary, in coordination with the DDSO. Responsible for personnel recovery policy and oversight within the Department of Defense on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
- b. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-Support to Public Diplomacy: Provide DoD public diplomacy input into strategic communication initiatives for personnel recovery.
- c. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs: Provide DoD public affairs input into strategic communication initiatives for personnel recovery.
- d. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities: Advise the

working group on special operations issues, including the capability and capacity to integrate and execute strategic communication initiatives.

- e. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs: Support strategic communication initiatives by (1) identifying key committees and members of the legislative branch who can advocate for the needs and purpose of personnel recovery; and (2) establish reliable lines of communication with Congress to keep the working group informed of legislative concerns; and (3) assist the working group on how best to advise the DASD(POW/MPA) and DDSO to engage Congress on issues unique to personnel recovery.
- f. <u>Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel:</u> Support strategic communication initiatives by providing legal analysis of the working group's initiatives and procedures, and develop ways to incorporate legal requirements into strategic communication planning for personnel recovery.
- g. Regional Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Offices: The PRSCWG may request support from the various regional offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense as required. These regional offices will provide subject matter experts to enable the working group to deliver sound recommendations to the DASD(POW/MPA) and DDSO.

Joint Staff

- h. <u>J-3</u>: Incorporate policy and operational aspects of strategic communication for personnel recovery developed by the working group into operational planning.
- i. <u>J-3-Information Operations</u>: Provide information operations input into strategic communication initiatives for personnel recovery.
- j. <u>J-2</u>: Serve as the link between the personnel recovery strategic communication working group and DoD's intelligence infrastructure to provide required analysis and situational awareness to planning initiatives.
- k. <u>J-5:</u> Synchronize DoD contingency planning for personnel recovery with strategic communication initiatives and concepts developed by the working group.
- 1. <u>Joint Staff Public Affairs</u>: Provide DoD public affairs input into strategic communication initiatives for personnel recovery.
- m. <u>Joint Staff Legislative Affairs</u>: Support strategic communication initiatives by (1) identifying key committees and members of the

legislative branch who can advocate for the needs and purpose of personnel recovery; and (2) establish reliable lines of communication with Congress to keep the working group informed of legislative concerns; and (3) assist the working group on how best to advise the DASD(POW/MPA) and DDSO to engage Congress on issues unique to personnel recovery.

n. <u>CJCS Legal Counsel:</u> Support strategic communication initiatives by providing legal analysis of the working group's initiatives and procedures, and develop ways to incorporate legal requirements into strategic communication planning for personnel recovery.

Additional Members and Organizations

- o. Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM): As stated in DoD Directive 2310.2, the CDRUSJFCOM is the DoD executive agent for personnel recovery, less policy. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is the office of primary responsibly to execute the CDRUSJFCOM's executive agent responsibilities. JPRA provides personnel recovery subject matter expertise to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, and ensures strategic communication principles/equities are incorporated into education, training, and doctrine development within DoD's personnel recovery system.
- p. <u>Subject matter experts</u>, as required: Strategic communication experts from various fields and backgrounds including private enterprise, academia, and think tanks who can advise the working group on strategic communication principles and best practices.
- q. DASD(POW/MPA) and the Joint Staff J3-DDSO may invite additional members as necessary.

VI. Tasks to Department of Defense Organizations.

- 1. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - a. Develop a supporting institutional communication plan that:
 - Cultivates joint/interagency/international personnel recovery systems to increase interoperability, knowledge, and capability of the United States to recover isolated persons throughout the full spectrum of operations.
 - Incorporates personnel recovery fundamentals into the general military/civilian force structure of the DoD to increase awareness of

the risks and the responsibilities of those serving in conventional and asymmetric environments.

- Facilitates cooperation with allies and coalition partners to create a focused strategic communication campaign that encourages and enables countries to achieve U.S. security cooperation goals.
- b. Develop a supporting promotional communication plan that:
 - Advocates and promotes personnel recovery issues to those who may not be aware of the strategic value of personnel recovery.
 - Demonstrates the necessity of a robust and integrated personnel recovery capacity that functions collectively across the USG.
- c. Leverage the PRSCWG in the development of the promotional and institutional communication plans.

2. Geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs)

- a. Incorporate strategic communication initiatives into current and future personnel recovery planning in accordance with the synchronization methodology outlined in ANNEX C to this guidance.
- b. Develop a plan of action that supports this strategic communication guidance and enables subordinate commanders to synchronize strategic communication effects (themes and activities) with those in the USG who have influence on the situation.

3. All DoD Components

- a. Ensure DoD personnel (military, civilian, and contractors) receive personnel recovery training commensurate with their level of risk for becoming isolated or exploited. Ensure commanders, staffs, and forces receive training according to their assigned position when managing affairs surrounding a personnel recovery response.
- b. Develop and implement comprehensive strategies to address personnel recovery requirements for DoD personnel at risk of becoming isolated and being exploited.
- c. Ensure DoD leadership and associated public affairs offices are aware of current policy and guidance for personnel recovery. Specifically:
 - NSPD-12, ANNEX 1 (Draft)

- Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) and Code of Conduct training
- Conventional and non-conventional recovery
- Reintegration, decompression, and debriefing
- COCOM or Chief of Mission theater/country personnel recovery and SERE training requirements
- COCOM or Chief of Mission supporting personnel recovery strategic communication plans
- d. Ensure Public Affairs Officers are prepared to coordinate efforts with all government agencies as required upon notification of an isolating event.
- VII. <u>Essential Tasks of Strategic Communication in Personnel Recovery</u>. Every facet of strategic communication planning and execution must be directed toward:
 - 1. Striking the center of gravity of adversaries who hold captive, detain, or illegally seize U.S., allied, and coalition persons.
 - 2. Preventing adversaries from achieving their strategic goals by mitigating the effects from exploiting captive, detained, or illegally seized personnel.
 - 3. Reinforcing the USG position on "No Concessions" as described in NSPD-12.
 - 4. Encouraging the humane treatment of isolated personnel should they become captured, detained, or illegally seized.
 - 5. Ensuring all diplomatic, military, and civil efforts in a personnel recovery response are coordinated across the USG.
 - 6. Unifying education and prevention efforts among all USG departments and agencies.
- VIII. <u>Guiding Principles</u>. USG preparation and response efforts to recover isolated personnel will be guided by the following principles, which should also shape the messages and actions when the USG responds to the captivity, detention, and illegal seizure of U.S., allied, and coalition personnel and citizens.
 - 1. The U.S. is a sovereign nation. The USG retains the right and the obligation to safeguard the well-being of its citizens serving abroad on its behalf.
 - 2. <u>Mission First, People Always.</u> Every practical effort will be made to recover those who become isolated in the course of serving the USG, and these efforts

will be sustained over the long term. Even so, we must evaluate personnel recovery response options in the context of the USG's overall operational purpose within a given area, so that the response does not adversely affect accomplishments already attained. The goal is to negate the strategic effects adversaries achieve through captivity, detention, and illegal seizure of U.S., allied, and coalition personnel and citizens and force them to find alternative means to achieve their strategic goals.

- 3. Actions speak louder than words. Actions can either support or discredit the messages the USG conveys to a selected audience. Strategic communication campaigns must synchronize all elements of national power in order to ensure deeds and words support one another. Personnel recovery responses, both kinetic and non-kinetic, should attack the adversary's center of gravity through its critical vulnerabilities, and limit to the maximum extent possible negative effects that could adversely impact USG efforts to achieve national security objectives.
- IX. <u>The U.S. Desired Effect.</u> Adversaries are unable to advance their strategic goals through the exploitation of captive, detained, or illegally seized U.S., allied, and coalition personnel and citizens.

X. Audience.

- 1. A detailed examination of audiences requires a thorough cultural intelligence analysis in the area of interest. This analysis should be conducted before, during, and after an isolating event. In general, key audiences include:
 - a. Adversaries.
 - b. Local populace in an area of interest.
 - c. Key international leaders.
 - d. U.S. leaders.
 - e. U.S. public.
 - f. USG personnel.
- 2. These groups include sub-groups that must be examined separately. Additionally, each group is unique in how it receives and internalizes information.
 - a. Laws and regulations must be adhered to when developing approaches for achieving effects with each of these audiences. From an international and domestic legal perspective, sovereign state borders do exist in the global

- information environment. Therefore, the careful application of U.S. law and DoD regulations must be practiced, particularly when developing approaches to communicating with audiences within the United States.
- b. From a practical standpoint, the flow of open-source information is not usually constrained or contained by political boundaries meaning that no one group can be addressed in isolation. Therefore, planners must ensure that public affairs, public diplomacy, information operations, and international broadcasting initiatives are synchronized with all necessary elements of national power in order to achieve effects with a selected audience, while complying with applicable laws and regulations.

XI. Key Assumptions.

- 1. Adversaries initiate and exploit isolating events as a part of their strategy.
- 2. Adversaries will continue isolating and exploiting personnel serving abroad in order to compel concessions from the U.S., allies, and coalition partners.
- 3. In the areas of highest threat, the leadership and the local population may have anti-U.S. sentiments.
- 4. U.S. service members will resist capture, exploitation, and survive isolation to the best of their ability and training.
- 5. The USG will not make concessions to secure release.
- 6. USG leaders, other prominent figures, family members, and allies will make statements or take actions that will affect USG personnel recovery policies and actions.
- 7. The USG may not know who (state or non-state actors) is holding U.S. personnel or citizens hostage, or if those persons are alive.
- 8. Private organizations and/or persons, as well as many foreign governments, are inclined to pay ransom to secure the release of their personnel or citizens.
- XII. Obstacles and Constraints. Obstacles can be mitigated or overcome through deliberate planning and execution. Constraints cannot be overcome, yet must be addressed before, during, and after an isolating event.
 - 1. Obstacles.
 - a. <u>Pressure for action.</u> Public pressure spurred by media coverage of an isolating event can place tremendous strain on decision-makers to appear as if they are in total control of the situation. This may influence decisions

during the crisis and result in actions not in the best interest of the isolated person, the United States, allies, or coalition partners.

- b. <u>Inconsistencies in national personnel recovery policies and practices among the United States, allies, and coalition partners.</u> Governments of other countries may not follow the same policies when responding to an isolating event. For example, some may choose to grant concessions to resolve the crisis. Such inconsistencies endanger unity of effort and may create seams for the adversary to exploit.
- c. Adversary strategic communication effects, intentional or not.

 Adversaries may employ strategic communication strategies that seek to exploit vulnerabilities within the mission of the United States and/or allies and coalition partners. Many adversaries have proven adept in using modern technology to achieve effects within local populations, among their own constituencies, and across Western audiences.
- d. <u>Initial reporting on an isolating event may not be accurate or contain all</u> the necessary facts and details surrounding the situation. Early opensource and classified intelligence reporting may not reflect the realities of an isolating event. In fact, open-source and intelligence reporting may be contradictory, which has the potential to affect the initial situational awareness of decision-makers and, in turn, influence decision-making, communication, and action at all levels. Planners must develop strategic communication initiatives that adapt to time delays and inconsistencies in initial reporting.

2. Constraints

- a. <u>International law, domestic law and host-nation sovereignty</u>. A nation's adherence to domestic and international law, as well as respect for other nations' sovereignty and the rights of others, are essential to maintaining credibility around the world. National policies regarding international matters can be adjusted relatively quickly, yet changes to applicable law can be more difficult and take more time. Personnel recovery preparation and response must carefully balance the pressure for action and the constraints of law and local sovereignty to avoid the perception that the United States will disregard applicable law when expedient.
- b. <u>Internet and press access to adversaries, families, and other select audiences.</u> The USG has neither the ability nor the inclination to control information flow throughout the global information environment. A free press and an open communication system are essential to a free society. The combination of modern communication technology, a determined and able media, and the appetite of the general populace for information results in a global information system beyond the control of the USG.

Therefore, the USG must determine the best way to communicate messages and intentions with selected audiences before, during, and after isolating events occur.

- c. <u>USG will make every effort to recover its personnel and citizens.</u> The USG is committed to recovering all isolated personnel with the understanding that this commitment gives adversaries an avenue to exploit. The USG will nonetheless make every effort to bring isolated personnel home, abiding by the guiding principle of "Mission First, People Always."
- XIII. Messages. An isolating event can occur anywhere in the world, at any time, making it necessary for the lead federal authority to deliver messages that are tailored to a select audience. Strategic communication for personnel recovery is conducted before, during, and after an isolating event, requiring planners to account for an audience's varying receptiveness to ideas, cultural environment, political realities, unfolding events, etc. All messages must account for cultural sensitivities and align with action taken by the USG.
 - 1. Accounting for cultural sensitivities should be based on an informed and detailed analysis (country, region, or operation specific) that accommodates the span of environments in which U.S. personnel or citizens are at risk of becoming isolated.
 - 2. Although messages must directly support the requirements of a personnel recovery response, specific fundamental themes in U.S. policy need reinforcement before, during, and after an isolating event. They are:
 - a. The USG holds those who capture, detain, or illegally seize U.S. personnel or citizens directly responsible for their safety and security.
 - b. The USG will not make concessions to individuals or groups holding U.S. personnel or citizens hostage. It is USG policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or other acts of concession.
 - c. The USG will do everything practical to recover and/or secure the release of its personnel or citizens through diplomatic, military or civil means.
 - d. The seizing of hostages is a violation of international and domestic law.
 - e. The USG will work with its allied and coalition partners to address the threat of hostage-taking that threatens our collective security.

ANNEXES:

ANNEX A - Common Terms of Reference.

ANNEX B - Supported Strategies.

ANNEX C - Personnel Recovery Synchronization Methodology.

ANNEX D - National Capital Region Decision-Maker Response Guidance.

ANNEX E - Points of Contact:

Annex A- Common Terms of Reference¹

- 1. **Hostage:** A person held as a pledge that certain terms or agreements will be kept.²
- 2. **Hostage Rescue:** A personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages.³
- 3. **Hostage Taking:** Unlawful abduction and holding of persons against their will for financial or political gain.⁴
- 4. **Information Operations:** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.⁵
- 5. **International Broadcasting:** International broadcasting services are funded by governments to transmit news, information, public affairs programs, and entertainment to global audiences via AM/FM and shortwave radio, satellite television, and web-based systems.⁶
- 6. **Isolating Event:** Incident wherein personnel become separated, or isolated, from friendly support and are forced to survive, evade capture, or endure being held against their will. ⁷

¹ For the purpose of this guidance, the terms "personnel recovery" and "isolated personnel" apply to USG personnel, including U.S. Government contract employees, government-sponsored family members, who are authorized by the U.S. Government to travel overseas, and any other as designated by the President or Secretary of Defense.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 September 2007) under "Hostage." Cited hereafter as JCS, Joint Pub 1-02

³ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Hostage Rescue."

⁴ (U) U.S. President, National Security Presidential Directive -12, "(U) United States Citizens Held Hostage Abroad," CONFIDENTIAL, 18 February 2002, ANNEX 1 (DRAFT), "(U) United States Policy on Personnel Recovery and Prevention of Hostage Taking Abroad and other Isolating Events," CONFIDENTIAL, 2. Cited hereafter as U.S. President, CONFIDENTIAL NSPD-12, ANNEX 1 (DRAFT.

⁵ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Information Operations."

⁶Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: DSB, September 2004), 12. Cited hereafter as DSB, Strategic Communication.

⁷ (U) U.S. President, CONFIDENTIAL NSPD-12, ANNEX 1 (DRAFT), 2.

- 7. **Isolated Personnel:** U.S. military, DoD civilians, and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a U.S.-sponsored military activity or mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. 8
- 8. **Kidnapping:** Unlawful holding of persons against their will for personal, financial, or political gain.⁹
- 9. Missing: A casualty status for which the United States Code provides statutory guidance concerning missing members of the Military Services. Excluded are personnel who are in an absent without leave, deserter, or dropped-from-rolls status. A person declared missing is categorized as follows. a. beleaguered -The casualty is a member of an organized element that has been surrounded by a hostile force to prevent escape of its members. b. besieged — The casualty is a member of an organized element that has been surrounded by a hostile force, compelling it to surrender. c. captured — The casualty has been seized as the result of action of an unfriendly military or paramilitary force in a foreign country. d. detained — The casualty is prevented from proceeding or is restrained in custody for alleged violation of international law or other reason claimed by the government or group under which the person is being held. e. interned — The casualty is definitely known to have been taken into custody of a nonbelligerent foreign power as the result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged. f. missing — The casualty is not present at his or her duty location due to apparent involuntary reasons and whose location is unknown. g. missing in action — The casualty is a hostile casualty, other than the victim of a terrorist activity, who is not present at his or her duty location due to apparent involuntary reasons and whose location is unknown.10
- 10. **Personnel Recovery:** The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.¹¹
- 11. **Prisoner of War:** A detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the

⁸ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Isolated Personnel."

⁹ (U) U.S. President, CONFIDENTIAL NSPD-12, ANNEX 1 (DRAFT), 2.

¹⁰ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Missing."

¹¹ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Personnel Recovery."

capturing state for warlike acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces. Also called POW or PW. 12

- 12. **Public Affairs:** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. ¹³
- 13. **Public Diplomacy:** Those overt international public information activities of the U.S. government designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. ¹⁴
- 14. **Strategic Communication:** Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.¹⁵
 - a. According to the September 2004 Defense Science Board Task Force Report, strategic communication is composed of four core instruments: public diplomacy, public affairs, information operations, and international broadcasting. ¹⁶
 - b. Strategic communication can also be envisioned as the synchronized coordination of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and other activities, *reinforced by political, economic, military, and other actions*, to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.¹⁷

¹² JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Prisoner of War."

¹³ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Public Affairs."

¹⁴ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Public Diplomacy."

¹⁵ JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, under "Strategic Communication."

¹⁶ DSB, Strategic Communication, 12.

¹⁷ Jeffery B. Jones, "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the Unites States," *Joint Force Quarterly* 39, (2005): 108-109 (emphasis added).

ANNEX B - Supported Strategies

This personnel recovery strategic communication guidance is designed to support several key existing national security documents. This annex highlights just a few that are relevant to personnel recovery issues and strategic communication principles.

I. 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS).

- 1. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the United States and Allies and friends.
- 2. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.
- 3. Strengthen our public diplomacy, so that we advocate the policies and values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a watching and listening world.

The Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Guidance (PRSCG) supports the NSS by outlining strategic communication interests in, a) targeting a potential adversary with a focused strategic communication campaign, b) creating a dialogue with local leaders and the general public of a selected area, and c) establishing the conditions necessary to recover those who become isolated in harm's way during operations.

II. NSPD 12 - United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad, Annex I (Draft) – United States Policy on Personnel Recovery and Prevention of Hostage Taking Abroad and other Isolating Events.

- 1. Support an international campaign and comprehensive public diplomacy strategy to delegitimize and demoralize the practice of hostage taking.
- 2. Deter practice of hostage taking by eliminating value and countering other motivating factors.
- 3. Strengthen and further integrate existing personnel recovery response mechanisms.
- 4. In support of the Deputies Committee (NSC), develop and coordinate a strategic communication plan with lead Federal authorities to provide for a unified delivery of message and public awareness in cases involving isolated persons.

The PRSCG supports the implementation of NSPD-12 by using strategic communication principles in concert with diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial,

PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE

intelligence, and law enforcement elements of national power. It is written to support directly existing personnel recovery doctrine, policy, systems, and organizations and serve as an enabler to Annex 1 to NSPD-12.

III. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):

- 1. Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication by the United States and its international partners.
- 2. The Department (DoD) must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture, developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government's overall strategic objectives.

The PRSCWG directly supports the goals outlined in the 2006 QDR. The group will provide enduring strategic communication guidance before an isolating event, will develop specific recommendations to the lead authority (through the DASD(POW/MPA) and the DDSO) during an isolating event, and will assist in shaping a unified position on strategic communication issues specific to personnel recovery.

IV. 2004 National Military Strategy:

- 1. Commanders must ensure military activities are integrated effectively with the application of other instruments of national and international power to provide focus and unity of effort.
- Combatant Commander participation is critical in developing a strategic communication plan that conveys U.S. intent and objectives, and ensures success of the plan by countering adversary disinformation and misinformation. Such strategic communication can help avoid conflict or deescalate tensions among adversaries.

This strategic communication guidance is designed to support personnel recovery before, during, and after an isolating event. It supports the goals listed above by outlining strategic communication methods to protect U.S. Government personnel serving abroad and enhance personnel recovery capacity by achieving unity of effort. It also outlines a methodology for directly targeting the adversary's center of gravity using all elements of national power.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE ANNEX C - Personnel Recovery Operational Strategic Communication Synchronization Methodology

	Adversary Ce.	Adversary Center of Gravity (CO	:00:		I = lask	Prior to developing	1 / F/M/E tor each of	the Lines of Operat.	Prior to developing 1/P/M/E for each of the Lines of Operation, a center of gravity analysis must be completed
Determine Critical Capabilities:	ties:				P = Purpose	on the adversary.	Authority to direct or	influence some Line	on the adversary. Authority to direct or influence some Lines of Operation may fall outside of the lead
Determine Critical Requirements:	ments:				M = Method	as necessary and	only directing the rect coordinated for throu	overy or the isolated gh the interdepartm	command or authority directing the recovery or the isolated persont(s). Regardiess, each must be addressed, as necessary and coordinated for through the interdepartmental or interagency process. The several types of
Determine Critical Vulnerabilities	bilities:				E = Effect	isolating incidents	isolating incidents demand separate analysis for each	alysis for each.	
Lines of Operation	Be	Before			During			After	Additional Considerations
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Public Affairs	i d	ii d	≓ á	i d	≓á	Ë	: id	ii d	Does the adversary have the influence to
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ANNEX-C

Methodology Instructions

under the Combatant Command or Chief of Mission to develop his or her strategic communication plan before, during, or after an Annex C is not designed to be used as a worksheet. It is meant to illustrate the methodology used by the lead agent authority isolating event.

Appendix 1 ANNEX C - Personnel Recovery Operational Strategic Communication Synchronization

The Before, During, and After phases of Annex C are further divided into the phases commonly recognized by personnel recovery planners. The phases are not necessarily sequential. Although a Line of Operation may not have a role to serve in a particular phase, it should be deliberately considered to gauge its usefulness.

Follow the steps below when developing the plan.

Step:

1) Conduct Center of Gravity (COG) Analysis	COG analysis can be described as the detailed analysis of the adversary's critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), and critical vulnerabilities (CV). "Critical" in this sense is defined as those systems that are required for the survival of a state or non-state actor. Once CC, CR, and CV have been identified and understood, all efforts should be directed at targeting the adversary's CV. CVs are those CRs that are vulnerable for exploitation or attack.	is of the adversary's critical capabilities (CC), CV). "Critical" in this sense is defined as those non-state actor. Once CC, CR, and CV have irected at targeting the adversary's CV. CVs are t.	
2) Develop Task, Purpose Method,	Task= What?	Develop T,P,M,E, for all lines of operation	

ANNEX-C, APPENDIX 1

What?	Why?	Method= How? Who? With what resources?	The desired result, outcome, or
Task=	Purpose= \	Method=	Effect=
2) Develop Task, Purpose Method, Task=	Effects (T,P,M,E) for each Line of	Operation by phase as necessary	

consequence of the action.

Operation. This allows the lead authority to be ready to ask for assistance when required. regardless if a command or other entity is directly responsible for a given Line of

- Develop Measures of Effectiveness Ensure T,P,M,E, for each Line of Operation supports one another
 - Develop Measures of Performance 4) Develop Measure5) Develop Measure6) Implement Plan

PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE

ANNEX D-Quick Reference Guide for National Capital Region Decision-Makers During an **Isolating Event**

Goals:

- . Safe return of isolated personnel.
- communication approach that limits the exploitation 2. Prevent adversary from achieving strategic goals by leveraging a comprehensive value of U.S. isolated persons.

Key Questions:

Who is the lead agent responsible for recovery? Who else needs to know about this? Who are the isolated personnel? What geographic area? Who knows about this? Who is the adversary? Why were they there? What is their status?

General Talking Points:

- llegally seize U.S. citizens directly responsible for a. The USG holds those who capture, detain, or their safety and security.
- It is USG policy to deny hostage takers the benefits ndividuals or groups holding U.S. citizens hostage. of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or b. The USG will not make concessions to other acts of concession.
- and/or secure the release of our personnel through c. The USG will do everything practical to recover diplomatic, military or civil means.
- d. The seizing of hostages is a violation of international law.

Guiding Principles:

- 1) The U.S. is a sovereign nation that has the right and the obligation to safeguard its citizens who serve on behalf of the government abroad
- 2) Mission First, People Always. Personnel recovery efforts will happen concurrent with primary mission.
- Actions speak louder than words. Ensure deeds and words compliment one another. Deeds will nave a more lasting effect.

Five Phases of Personnel

Recovery: 1) Report

- Lines of Operation to
 - nformational ntelligence Diplomatic
- Public Diplomacy --Public Affairs --International
- **Broadcasting** Military

4) Recover 5) Reintegrate

2) Locate 3) Support

Economic & Financial Law Enforcement --non-Kinetic --Kinetic

S

Initial Tasks:

1) Provide appropriate National Command Authority Notification.

ANNEX-D

- 2) Ensure a clear unity of command and effort is in place to orchestrate a unified USG ecovery effort.
- offices, are aware of current policy and guidance Ensure DoD leadership, and associated PA for PR:
- --NSPD-12, Annex 1 (Draft), -Code of Conduct training,
- -- COCOM or CoM theatre/country entry
- requirements for personnel recovery training,
- --- COCOM or CoM personnel recovery strategic communication plan.
- agencies are in contact and ready to Ensure PA offices for all government coordinate PA guidance.

USG Public Response Guidelines:

- 1) The messenger may have as much impact as escalation, choose spokespersons closest to the eaders within the NCR should limit their public response mechanism. Other than the general talking points outlined to the left, senior USG the message itself. To avoid unnecessary footprint regarding the isolating event.
- 2) Public notification will only occur after family of isolated person has been notified by the affected service and the lead agent authority (COCOM or CoM) has approved release of the information.
- The lead agent of the recovery is responsible for public releases of information. All inquiries on the isolating event should be deferred to the lead

PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE

ANNEX E- Points of Contact

OUSD/Policy Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office	(703) 699-1198
DoD Strategic Communications Secretariat	(703) 692-2877
OUSD/Policy Support to Public Diplomacy	(703) 696-5700
Office of General Counsel	(703) 695-2604
OASD/Public Affairs	(703) 697-5134
OASD/Legislative Affairs	(703) 571-2722
OASD/ Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict	(703) 697-2966
Joint Staff (J-2)	(703) 614-7816
Joint Staff (J-3) DDSO	(703) 614-0417
Joint Staff Legal Counsel	(703) 697-1137
Joint Staff Legislative Affairs	(703) 614-1777
Joint Staff Public Affairs	(703) 697-4272
Navy	(703) 697-7391
Marine Corps	(703) 614-1494
Air Force	(703) 697-2524
Army	(703) 693-5591
USJFCOM J7	(757) 203-7004
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency	(703) 704-2509