

**COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
OF THE U.S. SIDE
OF THE U.S. - RUSSIA
JOINT COMMISSION ON
POW/MIAS**



JUNE 17, 1996

#865

EDITORIAL NOTE

Working under the direction and guidance of the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, the Joint Commission Support Directorate of the Defense POW-MIA Office, International Security Affairs, Office of Secretary of Defense prepared this document.

The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs was established in 1992 by the Presidents of the United States and Russia (President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin). The Joint Commission serves as a mechanism by which both the United States and Russia seek to aid each other in gaining a fuller accounting of the fates of their respective unaccounted for servicemen.

The views expressed in this report are those of the U.S. side of the Presidential Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense.

In the interest of protecting the privacy of some individuals named, this report has been redacted under provisions of the McCain Bill, Public Law 102-190, Section 1082 and the Privacy Act, 552 of Title 5 United States Code.

COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
OF THE U.S. SIDE OF THE
U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs ("the Commission") was established on 26 March 1992 under the aegis of the Presidents of the United States and Russia. Ambassador Malcolm Toon was appointed by President George Bush, and reconfirmed by President William J. Clinton, to serve as the American Co-chairman. General-Colonel Dmitrii Volkogonov was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin and served as the Russian Co-chairman until his death on 6 December 1995. In January 1996 General-Major Vladimir Zolotarev was appointed by President Yeltsin to succeed General Volkogonov.

The nine commissioners who comprise the U.S. side of the Commission include two members of the United States Senate: John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) and Robert Smith (R-New Hampshire); two members of the U.S. House of Representatives: Sam Johnson (R-Texas) and Pete Peterson (D-Florida); two senior executives from the Department of Defense: A. Denis Clift (President, Joint Military Intelligence College) and James Wold (Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs); two senior executives from the Department of State: Kent Wiedemann (Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) and John Herbst (Principal Deputy Coordinator, Russia and the Caucasus), and a senior executive from the U.S. National Archives: Michael McReynolds. The executive secretary of the U.S. side of the Commission is Norman Kass of the Defense POW/MIA Office. The Russian side of the Commission includes officials from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, the Russian State Archives, the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Russian Presidential Commission on POWs, Internees and Missing in Action. Colonel Sergei Osipov of the President's Office serves as the executive secretary of the Russian side of the Commission. In addition, the Commission has benefited from the service of numerous archivists, military historians, analysts, linguists and professional military personnel from both the American and Russian sides.

The Commission's inaugural meeting was held in Moscow in March 1992. In the ensuing four years the Commission has met in plenary session an additional eleven times - nine in Moscow and two in Washington. In addition to the plenary sessions, two other high-level meetings between U.S. and Russian commissioners have been held in Washington. Between plenary sessions, working-group-level technical talks have supported the work of the Commission. Commission members have traveled throughout Russia, as well as to the newly independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan and to Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In each country the Commission has sought assistance in obtaining information about U.S. POW/MIAs. Meetings with high-ranking government officials have been conducted, and appeals to local citizens for information have been issued through the print and broadcast media.

During meetings of the Commission in the United States, POW/MIA family members have been afforded a unique opportunity to present their concerns and questions directly to General Volkogonov and other Russian members of the Commission. In conjunction with two technical-level meetings held in Washington, Russian members of the Commission have visited the Defense POW/MIA Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory, the National Archives and Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Russian members of the Commission and Russian forensic specialists have also visited the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, where they were briefed by U.S. specialists on the most up-to-date scientific techniques and methods for identifying human remains.

The work of the U.S. side of the Commission was initially supported by Task Force Russia, an organization created by the Secretary of the Army at the request of the Secretary of Defense and responsible for research, analysis and investigation into issues identified by the Commission. In July 1993, the mission, functions and many of the personnel of Task Force Russia were incorporated into the Office of the Secretary of

Defense in the newly created Defense POW/MIA Office. The Commission continues to receive research, analytical and investigative support from the Joint Commission Support Directorate of the Defense POW/MIA Office.

Information of value to the work of the Commission is gained primarily through access to archival records and through interviews of veterans, government officials and other knowledgeable Russian and American citizens. Archival research and interviews are conducted in the former Soviet Union and in the United States.

The Commission has received more than 12,000 pages of Russian documents, many of which were once highly classified. Initially the documents are screened by U.S. analysts to determine their pertinence and significance to the work of the Commission. Those determined to be pertinent are translated into English for further analysis. To date, more than 4,000 pages have been translated into English and analyzed in detail. Copies of the original documents, screening reports and translations are forwarded to the Library of Congress and to the National Archives. Documents directly related to the fate of specific unaccounted-for American servicemen are also forwarded through the appropriate service casualty office to family members.

Through the research efforts of the Russian side, the Commission has gained access to important archival information. At this stage in its work the Commission believes that more archival information remains. Archival searches continue in both countries. The Russian side is currently considering requests by the U.S. side for specific documents and for additional Russian archival searches of Presidential, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Foreign Intelligence, Security Service and Border Guards archives.

Hundreds of interviews with Russian and American veterans, current and former government officials and other individuals have been conducted to further the work of the Commission. Initially, interviews in Russia were conducted jointly by

Russian and American staff members. As the scope of the interview program expanded, the U.S. side was granted permission to travel throughout Russia to conduct interviews. In the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, interviews have been conducted with the consent and support of the host governments. To date, important witnesses to and participants in the Korean War, the Cold War and the Vietnam War have been interviewed. Information gained in the interviews is analyzed and collated with information from archival sources and from other interviews to form the basis for broad-based analysis and to suggest leads for further investigation.

In pursuit of information on unaccounted-for Americans, the U.S. side's representatives in Moscow have visited psychiatric hospitals, prisons and prison camps. Card files and other relevant hospital and prison records have been reviewed for evidence of unaccounted-for Americans. The Commission continues its efforts to identify and visit psychiatric hospitals and prison facilities.

To facilitate its work, the Commission established permanent working groups on World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War and the war in Vietnam. The work of the Commission and its four working groups was summarized in an interim report signed on 25 May 1995 by Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov. The report, prepared jointly in English and Russian, was presented to President Clinton and President Yeltsin. Since that time the Commission has continued its work. The 12th Plenary session was held in Moscow from 28-30 August 1995. Following the death of the Commission's Russian Co-chairman, General Volkogonov, the plenary session scheduled for December 1995 was postponed. In February 1996 technical-level talks, at which the new Russian Co-chairman was introduced, were held in Moscow. Throughout this transitional period research, analysis and investigation have continued in Russia and the United States.

In its work the Commission has focused on three primary objectives. The first objective has been to determine whether any American POW/MIAs are still being held

in the former Soviet Union against their will. In his testimony to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on 11 November 1992, General Volkogonov presented a statement from Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin which stated, in part: "As a result of the work done, one may conclude that today there are no American citizens held against their will on the territory of Russia." In a written statement to the Committee, General Volkogonov further said that:

"No U.S. citizens are currently being detained within the territory of the former USSR. This conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and on-site inspections of possible American housing sites."

Representatives of the Russian Federation's Federal Security Service and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have provided similar statements. The archival research and interviews conducted by the Commission to date have produced no information which disputes General Volkogonov's statement. The Commission has investigated numerous reports of live Americans in the former Soviet Union and will continue to pursue any new information which arises concerning possible live American POWs or MIAs.

The second objective of the Commission has been to determine the fate of unaccounted-for members of the U.S. Armed Forces who were located on the territory of the Soviet Union or about whom the Russian government may have information. The Commission records uneven progress towards this objective as discussed below by each working group. One of the Commission's most significant accomplishments in this regard has been the repatriation of the remains of U.S. Air Force Captain John Dunham, lost in a shoot-down incident in the Soviet Far East in 1952.

The Commission's third objective has been to clarify facts pertaining to Soviet personnel missing from the war in Afghanistan and from Cold War-era loss incidents. Issues related to this objective have been included in the work of the Cold War Working Group and are summarized below in that working group's summary. The work of the Commission has also included resolving the fates of missing Soviet military personnel and "displaced persons" from World War II. Highlights from the Commission's work

towards this objective are set forth under the World War II Working Group section below.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

WORLD WAR II WORKING GROUP

The World War II Working Group (WWII WG) has conducted extensive research into the measures undertaken by both the Soviets and Americans in 1944 and 1945 to plan for, document and account for prisoners of war liberated by each side. The efforts of the working group have been based almost entirely on historical records which have been found in Russian and American archives. Thousands of pages of documents have been exchanged by the two sides of the working group.

The principal focus of the U.S. side of the working group has been to research and analyze the wartime experience of American prisoners of war liberated from German POW camps by the Soviet Red Army. In its comprehensive report, the U.S. side of the WWII WG provides a detailed analysis of the historical record regarding the numbers of U.S. POWs freed from the German camps in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany.

Research completed thus far by the WWII WG confirms that over 28,000 U.S. prisoners of war were repatriated under extremely chaotic and stressful circumstances from Soviet occupied territory during the final months of World War II. Information collected to date by the working group indicates that American servicemen were not held against their will as a matter of Soviet policy. However, as General Volkogonov noted on several occasions, at the end of World War II the repatriation of some American servicemen with Slavic, Baltic or Jewish names was delayed because of their

ethnic origin. The U.S. side has received no documentary information to support General Volkogonov's statements.

The prime issue of concern to the Russian side of the working group has been to account more fully for more than 450,000 Soviet citizens who were located in displaced persons camps in the American and British zones of occupation at the end of World War II. The U.S. side provided more than 5,500 pages of archival documents which shed light on the fates of more than 300,000 former Soviet POWs and displaced persons. The Commission's efforts to clarify the "displaced persons" question were lauded at celebrations in Moscow commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe.

There are a number of ongoing issues of concern to the U.S. side of the WWII WG and the Commission. They deal primarily with details on the fates of individual American servicemen. Requests for additional information from the Russian side have been made. Research to clarify details related to the fates of these servicemen continues in U.S. archives.

KOREAN WAR WORKING GROUP

The Korean War Working Group (KWWG) has engaged in a concerted effort to clarify the fates of American servicemen missing from the Korean War. In the course of their work, Russian and American researchers have interviewed more than one hundred people and have obtained several hundred pages of documentation from Russian and American archives. In addition, investigators have visited numerous camps, prisons and psychiatric hospitals in the former Soviet Union in pursuit of investigative leads.

Based on a thorough and ongoing comparison of U.S. and Soviet records, the KWWG has developed specific information on the circumstances surrounding the loss of 23 American servicemen. In these 23 cases the American servicemen are listed as missing in action. Based on the work of the KWWG, a significant amount of information now exists that indicates that these men perished. The KWWG has also developed information on the fates of another 54 missing-in-action servicemen. The working group believes that continued and coordinated inquiries into the holdings of the Russian Ministry of Defense archives will yield further clarification regarding the fate of individual American POW/MIAs.

The primary focus of the work of the KWWG has been its efforts to determine the facts concerning Soviet involvement with and the transfer of U.S. POWs from the Korean Theater of Operations to the Soviet Union. In the Interim Report of May 1995, the KWWG stated,

“The Commission has received information concerning statements of former Soviet officers asserting that there were cases of transferring American POWs to places of confinement on the territory of the former Soviet Union as well as cases of interrogation of American POWs who were transferred to Soviet territory for this purpose.”

In the last year the Commission has heard additional statements from former Soviet servicemen and others who assert that American servicemen were transferred to the Soviet Union. The KWWG attaches great importance to continued efforts to research the issue of the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. It will continue to interview Russian, formerly Soviet, and American veterans and other citizens in pursuit of the facts surrounding this issue.

Central to the continued efforts of the KWWG is further access to Russian archives, particularly those of the Russian Ministry of Defense. At technical talks held in February 1996 in Moscow, the Russian side pledged to provide a large number of potentially relevant documents to the U.S. side. The U.S. side continues to wait for these documents.

COLD WAR WORKING GROUP

The work of the Cold War Working Group (CWWG) has focused on ten specific incidents of U.S. aircraft lost from 1950-1965. These incidents were selected in light of the fact that they occurred on or near the territory of the former Soviet Union and resulted in missing American servicemen. The working group has developed an extensive body of knowledge on certain of these incidents. In its work the CWWG has also addressed the Russian side's requests for information on its servicemen missing from the conflict in Afghanistan and from incidents which occurred during the Cold War era.

As a result of the work conducted to date the CWWG has acquired more than 80 primary Soviet source documents which contain some 200 pages of information of the highest authority relating to the U.S. aircraft loss incidents. Scores of interviews with Soviet pilots who participated in the shootdowns as well as with other participants, witnesses and knowledgeable individuals, have been conducted. The combination of primary-source documentation and witness testimony related to the loss of a USAF RB-29 on 7 October 1952 led to the location, recovery and repatriation of the remains of Captain John Robertson Dunham, USAF.

The Commission has undertaken field trips across the former Soviet Union. The Commission conducted a field investigation of the 2 September 1958 loss of a C-130 near Yerevan in the then-Soviet Republic of Armenia. Commission representatives visited the crash site in August 1993, interviewed witnesses and coordinated a detailed investigation by forensic anthropologists from the U.S. Army. Field investigations continue.

Based on the synthesis of information obtained from U.S. and Russian archives and from interviews conducted with American and Russian veterans and others, the

CWWG has developed a detailed account of the circumstances of loss in several cases. In other cases, the details are less clear. The CWWG cites, in this regard, three examples where further clarification is sought. In the 29 July 1953 loss of a U.S. RB-50, shot down by Soviet fighters near Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East, the co-pilot of the plane survived the crash and was subsequently rescued by the U.S. Navy. Circumstantial evidence has been obtained that additional crew members may have survived. In another case, information has been received that surviving crew members from a plane shot down on 4 July 1952 were interrogated in detail about a crew member missing from an RB-29 shot down by the Soviets near Vladivostok on 13 June 1952. In a third case, the CWWG has information that the remains of a U.S. crew member from a plane shot down in the Barents Sea on 1 July 1960, were recovered by the Soviets. To date, the location of these remains has not been ascertained. Work continues to clarify the details of these and other questions related to each of the Cold War loss incidents.

At this time the CWWG considers increased access to Russian archives of primary importance to furthering the goals of the Commission. The U.S. side has repeatedly pressed for access to Russian Border Guards archives in the belief that the Border Guards units would have played a role or, at least, been fully aware of the circumstances surrounding each of the incidents. The U.S. side has identified relevant documents in the Russian Central Naval archives and has asked the Russian side to provide them for review by the Commission. The request remains open. Work on each of the Cold War incidents continues.

VIETNAM WAR WORKING GROUP

The Vietnam War Working Group (VWWG) of the Commission has examined issues regarding the loss of U.S. servicemen in Southeast Asia. The Russian side has provided the U.S. side 270 pages of material in 76 documents, including 64 pages of

previously classified information from Soviet military intelligence holdings on the air war in Vietnam. Interviews on events in Vietnam during the war years have been conducted with more than 100 witnesses. Many of these interviews have been with intelligence officers, senior military technicians, present and former high-ranking government officials. Efforts to discover additional documentation and to locate and interview additional witnesses continue.

As in other areas of the Commission's work, the Vietnam War Working Group believes it is essential to seek further information from Russian archives regarding the issue of American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. In its continuing examination of the issue, the VWWG believes that additional interviews with officers of the former Committee for State Security (KGB), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff are a high priority.

The issues before the VWWG have included the transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union; Soviet involvement with U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia, either through direct or indirect contact; information from Soviet archives concerning Vietnamese policy toward U.S. POWs, and information known to Soviet veterans and other personnel concerning loss incidents involving U.S. personnel during the Vietnam War. In this context, one of the primary lines of inquiry guiding the work of the VWWG has been the question of whether American POWs were transported from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union. At this stage in its investigation, the working group has found no first-hand, substantiated evidence that American prisoners of war were taken from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union. However, the working group continues to investigate other information which suggests that such transfers may have taken place. The issue continues to be one of highest priority in the Commission's research and investigation.

The VWWG has reviewed two important documents from the Russian GRU (military intelligence). While not vouching for the accuracy of the documents' contents,

the Russian Co-chairman of the Commission has stated that they are valid transcripts of wartime reports by North Vietnamese officials on the number of American POWs captured and held in North Vietnam during the war. In the first document, dated 1971, a North Vietnamese official stated that 735 American POWs were being held. In the second document, dated 1972, another North Vietnamese official state that 1205 American POWs were being held by the North Vietnamese. Both documents have been dismissed as fabrications by the Government of Vietnam.

The numbers 1205 and 735 are higher than the 591 U.S. servicemen who were returned in early 1973 during Operation Homecoming. There is debate within the U.S. side of the Commission as to whether the numbers cited in these reports are plausible.¹ The U.S. Government has concluded that there is probably more information in Vietnamese party and military archives that could shed light on these documents, and both the U.S. and Russian sides agree that ultimate clarification of these documents should come from the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, in the interim, the VWWG is continuing to seek additional information from Russian sources to assist with its investigation into these documents, to include access to the Soviet-Vietnamese translators who initially acquired and evaluated these reports, as well as access to relevant archival reports.

The Vietnam War Working Group has also received important leads which may clarify the degree of Soviet involvement with interrogations of American POWs. The VWWG is continuing to seek archival access to determine whether interrogation records might exist in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the KGB and the GRU. The Commission is also continuing to seek interviews with Russian Vietnam War veterans and Russian personnel who may have relevant recollections. The U.S. side of the Commission has underscored to the Russian side the importance of

¹ *A coordinated, interagency intelligence analysis released by the Department of Defense on 24 January 1994 casts doubt on the accuracy of the numbers in the Russian documents. Another analysis, by U.S. Senator Bob Smith released on 21 July 1993, lends credibility to the documents.*

determining whether any Vietnamese or Russian interrogation records might contain information on unaccounted for U.S. personnel. The efforts of the VWWG continue.

RECOMMENDATIONS


In its work to date the Commission has made steady progress towards its objectives. In May 1995, an interim report on the work of the Commission was presented to the Presidents of the United States and Russia. This comprehensive report is designed to present to the President of the United States the Commission's findings to date and to inform the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State of the need for follow-up action by each of the Armed Services and other appropriate agencies of the federal government. We have managed to resolve certain of the issues which have been before us. However, we believe that a considerable amount of work remains to be done. We recommend that the United States Government reaffirm its commitment to building and sustaining a vigorous interview and archival search program in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to pursue additional information on the fates of American POW/MIAs. This, coupled with a well-targeted use of the media for publicizing the Commission's program and objectives, has proven to be the only effective means for achieving progress. For by keeping the issue of American POW/MIAs in the public eye, both in the U.S. and in Russia, we assure that those with information that might help resolve our unanswered questions are aware of the U.S. Government's efforts on behalf of our unaccounted-for servicemen.

**United States-Russia Joint Commission on
Prisoners of War/Missing in Action**


U.S. Side



Malcolm Toon, Chairman




A. Denis Clift



John E. Herbst




Sam Johnson



John F. Kerry




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
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
Robert C. Smith



Kent M. Wiedemann



James W. Wold



Norman Kass, Executive Secretary

1992-1996 FINDINGS
OF THE
COLD WAR WORKING GROUP

INTRODUCTION

Accounting for American crews missing from Cold War aircraft losses has been one of the principal goals of the Commission. Accounting for Soviet crews missing from Cold War losses and for Soviet POW/MIAs from the conflict in Afghanistan has been of equal importance in the Commission's work. The Cold War Working Group of the Commission was established in 1993 with A. Denis Clift, President of the Joint Military Intelligence College, designated as the American Co-chairman and General-Lieutenant Anatolii Krayushkin, Directorate Chief of the Federal Security Service, designated as the Russian Co-chairman. In 1996 Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov replaced General Krayushkin on the Russian side. By mutual agreement of the two sides of the Commission, the Cold War Working Group has focused on ten specific incidents involving U.S. aircraft with eighty nine crew members unaccounted for:

- 8 April 1950, PB4Y2 Privateer shot down over the Baltic Sea, 10 unaccounted for.
- 6 November 1951, P2V Neptune shot down over the Sea of Japan, 10 unaccounted for.
- 13 June 1952, RB-29 shot down over the Sea of Japan, 12 unaccounted for.
- 7 October 1952, RB-29 shot down over the Pacific Ocean, 7 unaccounted for.
- 29 July 1953, RB-50 shot down over the Sea of Japan, 13 unaccounted for.
- 17 April 1955, RB-47 shot down over the Bering Sea, 3 unaccounted for.
- 10 September 1956, RB-50 lost over the Sea of Japan, 16 unaccounted for.
- 2 September 1958, C-130 shot down over Armenia, 13 unaccounted for.
- 1 July 1960, RB-47 shot down over the Barents Sea, 3 unaccounted for.
- 14 December 1965, RB-57 lost over the Black Sea, 2 unaccounted for.

Cooperation which could not have been imagined during the Cold War era has enabled us to obtain information regarding the ten incidents that simply was not available in earlier times. However, there are still very important questions which remain unanswered. This report is on the work we have conducted from 1992 to mid-1996, the results that we have achieved thus far, and areas where further work is still required. Through archival research, interviews and field

investigations important information has been developed, as is reported in the status reports on each of these incidents in Sections 1-10 of this portion of the Commission's report.

To summarize these findings, as a result of access to Russian archival material and of the research conducted thus far more than 80 primary Soviet source documents have been obtained which contain some 200 pages of information of the highest authority relating to the incidents as well as charts and, in one case, gun-camera photography. As work to locate additional documentation continues, the U.S. side will continue to press for fuller access to all relevant Russian archives.

Scores of interviews with Soviet pilots who participated in the shootdowns as well as with other participants, witnesses and knowledgeable individuals have provided first-hand accounts of these Cold War incidents. The Commission has undertaken field trips across Russia as well as in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Witnesses to the loss of the RB-29 on 7 October 1952, for example, provided testimony which led to the field investigation, recovery and repatriation of the remains of Captain John Robertson Dunham, USAF.

The Commission also conducted a field investigation of the 2 September 1958 loss of a C-130 near Yerevan in Soviet Armenia, visiting the crash site in August 1993, interviewing witnesses and coordinating a detailed investigation by forensic anthropologists from the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii (CILHI). This investigation is documented in Section 8. Field investigations of the Cold War incidents will continue.

In the course of its work the U.S. side has pressed the Russian side repeatedly for access to Border Guards archives in the belief that Soviet Border Guards units would have played a role or, at least, been fully aware of the circumstances surrounding each of these incidents. The testimony of Border Guards sailor Vasiliy Saiko, which led to the recovery of Captain John Dunham's remains, supports the view held by the U.S. side. At the request of the U.S. co-Chairman of the Cold War Working Group, Ambassador Toon wrote to the Chief of the Russian Border Guards specifically requesting the Border Guards play a more active role in the work of the Commission. No response to this request was received. The Border Guards declined to participate stating that all relevant information had already been provided to the Commission.

Standing U.S. questions relating to the Border Guards were again passed to the Russian side at the February 1996 Technical Talks.

The Cold War Working Group has addressed the Russian side's request for information on its servicemen missing from the conflict in Afghanistan, as reported in Section 11 of this report. The United States has provided important, detailed information on Soviet losses in Afghanistan which has assisted the Russian Federation in reducing the number of official MIAs resulting from the Afghan conflict from 315 to 287. The U.S. side has also created an annotated computerized database for the Russian side with detailed information on each of the remaining 287 MIAs.

The Cold War Working Group has also addressed the Russian side's request for information on incidents involving Soviet servicemen missing from the Cold War era. The Department of Defense, Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marine Corps, the Joint Staff, the Department of State, the National Archives and intelligence organizations of the United States have engaged in a search of records and archives in order to be as responsive as possible to each Russian request. The U.S. has provided important information on certain of these incidents, including the return of ship's artifacts relating to the loss of the Soviet Golf-class submarine in 1968, reports, messages, deck logs and other documentation relating to Soviet aircraft lost on 4 September 1950, 18 November 1952 and 25 May 1968, as well as film footage documenting the 1968 crash. The U.S. side has provided a significant number of documents from the National Archives pertaining to the loss of a Soviet IL-12 on 27 July 1953. Information on seven Soviet advisors captured in the Ogaden in July 1978 has also been provided. Work relating to the fates of missing Russian servicemen continues on the U.S. side.

The Cold War Working Group has developed information of central importance to the work of the Commission and continues to pursue new avenues of inquiry. The working group is totally dedicated to the fullest possible accounting of all servicemen still unaccounted for from Cold War losses.

The current status of each aspect of the working group's investigations is reported as indicated below. The entire report of the Cold War Working Group with attachments has been provided to the National Archives and Records Administration and to the appropriate armed service casualty offices.

<u>Cold War Incident</u>	<u>Page Number</u>
8 April 1950 PB4Y2 Privateer incident	6
6 November 1951 P2V Neptune incident	13
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U.S. NAVY PB4Y2 PRIVATEER -- 8 APRIL 1950 -- BALTIC SEA

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 8 April 1950, a PB4Y2 Privateer aircraft stationed at Port Lyautey, Morocco, serving on temporary duty in Wiesbaden, Germany, carrying a crew of ten, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during the conduct of an operational mission over the Baltic Sea. American search and rescue efforts continued until 16 April but were unsuccessful. The only known eyewitnesses to the incident were the Soviet fighter pilots who shot down the plane. The entire crew is unaccounted for. A presumptive finding of death was issued by the U.S. Navy on 11 April 1951 (Tab A).

Personnel Involved. PB4Y2 crew

FETTE, John H., LT	Unaccounted For
SEESCHAF, Howard W., LT	Unaccounted For
REYNOLDS, Robert D., LTJG	Unaccounted For
BURGESS, Tommy L., ENS	Unaccounted For
BECKMAN, Frank L., AT1	Unaccounted For
DANENS, Joe H., AD1	Unaccounted For
THOMAS, Jack W., AD1	Unaccounted For
BOURASSA, Joseph Jay, AL3	Unaccounted For
PURCELL, Edward J., CT3	Unaccounted For
RINNIER, Joseph Norris Jr., AT3	Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that this plane had been on a routine flight when it was attacked by Soviet fighters and shot down over international waters. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the Commission in 1992, the U.S. side acknowledged that the plane had been on an intelligence gathering mission.

Russian position. At the time of the incident, the USSR insisted that the plane had violated the state border of the USSR, flying 21 kilometers inland over Soviet territory in the vicinity of Liepaya and then opening fire on Soviet fighters. The USSR maintained that the Soviet fighters had returned fire only after being shot at by the American plane, which had then turned towards the sea and disappeared. The USSR claimed that the American aircraft had been a B-29. There were no USAF B-29 aircraft in the vicinity of Liepaya on that day. During the work of the Commission, the Russian side has acknowledged from the beginning that the PB4Y2 was shot down by Soviet aircraft.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of the unaccounted-for crew from the 8 April 1950 shootdown at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow, March 1992. As reviewed in the second through fifth sections, the Commission has researched archival records and interviewed participants and witnesses as part of the ongoing investigation into the fates of those unaccounted for. The current status of the Commission's work on this incident is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The Russian side has passed to the U.S. side diplomatic and military documents during the meetings of the Joint Commission. Soviet archival sources establish that Soviet fighters shot down the plane because the PB4Y2 violated Soviet airspace. Soviet fighters were scrambled from an airfield near Liepaya and intercepted the PB4Y2 south of Liepaya at the coastline. The Soviet documents state that the U.S. plane fired on the Soviet fighters first and that they were forced to return fire. Four Soviet fighters, flown by Senior Lieutenants Tezyaev, Gerasimov, Sataev, and Dokin from a Guards Aviation unit, engaged the PB4Y2. The Soviet documents report that the American plane sharply descended and entered the clouds on a course of 270° crashing into the sea 5-10 kilometers from the coastline. These actions occurred at 1739 hours local time.

During plenary sessions of the Joint Commission the Russians have passed the U.S. side documents which shed light on the air engagement and the Soviet search effort. These documents state that 45 Soviet vessels and 160 divers participated in the search but found no part of the plane and no survivors.

The holdings from Russian archives that have been provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission are as follows (included with translations at Tab B):

Handwritten reports of pilots Tezyaev, Gerasimov, Sataev and Dokin	dated 8 April 1950
Handwritten report to Colonel Kovalenko	dated 13 April 1950
Letter to Stalin and Bulganin from Yumashev	dated 14 June 1950
Corrections made by Stalin to an article on the shootdown	for publication in Pravda

U.S. This incident is heavily documented in U.S. files. The Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean ordered a special board convened at Port Lyautey to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the PB4Y2's loss. The Board of Investigation interviewed at least 17 individuals and examined hundreds of pages of documents. The United States made several formal diplomatic protests to the Soviet Union, although the case was never taken to the International Court of Justice. U.S. records indicate that the plane was shot down within a 50 mile radius centered at 56-19N 18-45E. This location was estimated by the Chief of Naval Operations based on current and wind information and the locations of debris picked up by search crews.

The PB4Y2 took off at 1031 Greenwich time from Wiesbaden, Germany. A radio transmission was received approximately two and one half hours later which stated that the plane had crossed the coastline of the British Zone of Germany. The plane was tracked between 1412Z hours and 1457Z hours by American radar. A projection of the flight plan indicates that at the time of the incident the plane should have been at approximately 53 30N 20 17E.

The American search and rescue effort started almost immediately after the plane was reported missing. American, British, and Swedish vessels searched until 16 April. Two life rafts were found that were tentatively identified as belonging to the lost aircraft. The nose wheel of

the PB4Y2 was found on 25 April 1950 by Swedish fishermen. Seat cushions, radio logs, and other debris washed up on the coastline and were brought to U.S. authorities conducting the search. No survivors or remains were found.

An unconfirmed press report by an American news commentator on 30 April 1950 stated that the Soviets had succeeded in finding the sunken PB4Y2 and were attempting to salvage its electronic equipment.

Summary of U.S. holdings. Documents relating to this case found in U.S. holdings are as follows (included at Tab C):

Crew List

Letter to Secretary of the Navy from Chief of Naval Operations	dated 14 April 1950
Telegram no. 1143 to Secretary of State from Moscow	dated 15 April 1950
Press Releases of Diplomatic Notes	dated 18 April 1950
Foreign Service Dispatch to State Department from Helsinki	dated 21 April 1950
Telegram no. 1193 to Secretary of State from Moscow	dated 21 April 1950
Message to CNO from CINCNELM	undated
Naval Message from CINCNELM	dated 22 April 1950
Naval Message from American Embassy STOCKHOLM	dated 23 April 1950 1800 hrs
Telegram no. 526 to Secretary of State from Stockholm	dated 24 April 1950
Naval Message from CINCNELM	dated 25 April 1950
Telegram no. 537 to Secretary of State from Stockholm	dated 26 April 1950
Naval Message from VP 26	dated 26 April 1950
Telegram no. 542 to Secretary of State from Stockholm	dated 26 April 1950
Telegram no. 299 to Secretary of State from Copenhagen	dated 27 April 1950
Naval Message from CINCNELM	dated 29 April 1950

Naval Message from ALUSNA STOCKHOLM	dated 1 May 1950
Naval Message from CNO	dated 1 May 1950
Naval Message from CNO	dated 2 May 1950
Memorandum for Under Secretary of State	dated 2 May 1950
Intelligence Report 396-50	dated 2 May 1950
Naval Message from CINCNELM	dated 3 May 1950
Naval Message from ALUSNA COPENHAGEN	dated 3 May 1950
Naval Message from CINCNELM	dated 3 May 1950
Naval Message from CINCNELM	dated 4 May 1950
Naval Message from COMNAVFORGER, BERLIN	dated 5 May 1950
Confidential Memorandum for Op-03	dated 15 May 1950
Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy from Naval Intelligence	dated 24 May 1950
Memorandum for Record	dated 7 December 1951
Security Information	dated 25 January 1952
Security Information - Department of State	dated 28 January 1952
Note no. 79 from the Soviet Government	dated 13 August 1956
Memorandum of Conversation	dated 5 July 1955
Letter to the Honorable Alvin M. Bentley from Walter Stoessel	dated 29 December 1955
Excerpts from Foreign Relations	
Excerpt from Soviet Weekly	

Eyewitness accounts

The only known eyewitnesses to this incident are the four Soviet fighter pilots. The Russian side of the Commission has passed to the U.S. side the debriefings of the four Soviet fighter pilots, all of which confirm the facts of the case as maintained in the Soviet archival record. At the 9th Plenary of the Joint Commission Mr. Anatoliy Gerasimov, one of the Soviet pilots, was interviewed. Mr. Gerasimov stated that the plane was approximately 70 kilometers from the Russian coast when it was intercepted by Soviet fighters. On the approach of the Soviet planes Mr. Gerasimov indicated to the American plane that it was to fly towards land. The PB4Y2 attempted to fly out to sea. Mr. Gerasimov was ordered to fire warning shots at the American plane, which he did. The Soviet pilots were then given the command to fire on the plane. Mr. Gerasimov stated that his comrades opened fire and the plane "caught fire, exploded in the air, and fell in pieces into the sea". After circling the area a few times the Soviet fighters returned to base. Mr. Gerasimov's testimony accords with the facts as established by U.S. archival evidence. Mr. Gerasimov's full account is at Tab D.

On 2 September 1992, retired Soviet General Fyodor Shinkarenko was interviewed. General (ret.) Shinkarenko stated that he had heard from another Soviet citizen that the PB4Y2 had been salvaged and sent to Moscow. General Shinkarenko's full account is at Tab E.

An article printed in the Russian newspaper Izvestiya in the morning edition of 29 August 1992 stated that a letter had been received from a former Soviet sailor, Victor Shevchuk, who claimed to have participated in the search for the PB4Y2. Mr. Shevchuk remembered items from the plane being raised to the deck of the ship he served on, and heard from divers that the remains of the crew of the PB4Y2 was found in the cockpit of the plane. Efforts to locate and interview Mr. Shevchuk are currently underway.

Field investigations

None

Current status

As a result of the work thus far of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the PB4Y2 in some detail. Archival data, eyewitness accounts, and the testimony of one of the Soviet pilots who shot down the plane have contributed to the information available to the Commission.

The Commission's efforts to develop information on the fates of those missing from this incident continue. Specific archival documentation related to this incident was identified in 1995 and requested from the Russian side. It has not yet been received. Additional witnesses to include participants in Soviet search and recovery operations are also being sought.

At the request of a family member, information on the crew was sent to five Russian psychiatric hospitals asking if members of the crew had ever been in these hospitals. Responses received to date have indicated no record of such individuals.

Paramount to the efforts of the Commission is the question of determining whether or not there were survivors. There are no references to survivors in any of the documentation presented thus far by either side, nor do any witnesses or participants interviewed thus far mention survivors. Work continues as identified above.

U.S. NAVY P2V - - 6 NOVEMBER 1951 - - SEA OF JAPAN

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 6 November 1951 a P2V Neptune stationed at Atsugi Airfield, Japan, assigned to Fleet Air Wing Six, carrying a crew of ten, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. American search and rescue efforts were conducted through 9 November; they were unsuccessful. The only known eyewitnesses to this incident are the two Soviet pilots. The entire crew of the P2V is unaccounted for. A presumptive finding of death for the crew members was issued by the U.S. Navy on 7 November 1952 (Tab A).

Personnel Involved. P2V Crew

HODGSON, Judd C., LTJG	Unaccounted For
ROSENFELD, Sam, LTJG	Unaccounted For
SMITH, Donald E., ENS	Unaccounted For
BAGGETT, Reuben S., AO1	Unaccounted For
FOSTER, Paul R., AD1	Unaccounted For
RAGLIN, Erwin D., AT1	Unaccounted For
JURIC, Paul G., AL2	Unaccounted For
MEYER, William S., AT2	Unaccounted For
WIGERT, Ralph A. Jr., AL2	Unaccounted For
LIVELY, Jack, AD3	Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that this plane had been on a weather reconnaissance flight when it was shot down by Soviet fighters over international waters. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the Commission in 1992, the U.S. side acknowledged that the plane had been on an intelligence gathering mission.

Russian position. At the time of the incident, the USSR insisted that the plane had violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Cape Ostrovnoy. The USSR Foreign Ministry protested the alleged border violation to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and asserted that Soviet fighter planes had been forced to return fire when the P2V fired on them. During the work of the Commission, the Russian side has acknowledged from the beginning that the P2V was shot down by Soviet aircraft.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of the unaccounted-for crew from the 6 November 1951 shutdown as an agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow in March 1992. To further the work of the Commission, the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in the second through fifth sections, the Commission has researched archival records relating to the incident and carried out field investigations in the Soviet Far East. The current status of the Commission's work on this incident is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The Russian side has passed to the U.S. side diplomatic and military documents related to this incident during the meetings of the Joint Commission. These documents begin to clarify what happened to the P2V.

Soviet archival sources establish that Soviet fighters shot down the plane because the P2V violated Soviet airspace in the area of Cape Ostrovnoy approximately 7-8 miles from the shore. Soviet fighters were scrambled and intercepted the P2V south-west of Cape Ostrovnoy. Two Soviet LA-11 fighters, flown by Senior Lieutenants Lukashev and Shchukin from 5th Fleet Naval Aviation, engaged the P2V. The Soviet documents report that the American plane "fell, burning, into the water and exploded 18 miles from the shore". These actions occurred between 1010 and 1018 hours local time.

During plenary sessions of the Joint Commission, the Russians passed to the U.S. side documents addressing the air engagement and their search efforts. The holdings from Soviet archives that have been provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission are as follows (included with translations at Tab C).

Letter to Stalin from Kuznetsov with enclosures	dated 6 November 1951
Journal of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on 7 November meeting with U.S. Charge d'Affaires	dated 7 November 1951
Letter to Stalin from Kuznetsov	dated 7 November 1951
Central Committee Report, Demarche to U.S. Government	dated 7 November 1951
Special Report from Deputy Chief, Border Guards' Headquarters	dated 9 November 1951
Decree awarding Red Banner to pilots Lukashev and Shchukin	dated 17 November 1951

U.S. This incident is also documented in U.S. files. The U.S. exchanged diplomatic notes with the USSR, made a protest to the United Nations, and considered requesting the Secretary General of the UN to make a claim against the USSR in the International Court of Justice. The American legal position was unclear because of the P2V's official status as part of UN forces. For this reason the claim was not pursued further.

The last communications check from the P2V was at 0646 hours. U.S. military authorities tracked the plane by radar from Hokkaido to latitude 42 39 North longitude 138 12 East at 0850 hours. A routine report which should have been transmitted at approximately 0945 was not received. No signals were heard from the plane indicating an attack or reporting the approach of Soviet fighters.

The American search and rescue effort started almost immediately. Aircraft from the Sixth Fleet Air Wing and search and rescue units from the Atsugi area participated. The search continued until 9 November 1951 but no debris or survivors were found.

Summary of U.S. holdings. Documents relating to this case found in U.S. holdings are as follows (included at Tab D).

Crew List

Report on Circumstances Attending the Disappearance of P2V-3W dated 11 November 1951

Message traffic to CINCUNC JAPAN from SECDEF dated 8 November 1951

Memorandum to JCS from Chief of Naval Operations dated 9 November 1951

Security Information for OSD from CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN dated 10 November 1951

State Department telegram to American Embassy Moscow dated 13 November 1951
6:08 p.m.

War Diary of Commander, Fleet Air Wing Six

Request for Information to CG FEAF Japan and COMNAVFE dated 14 November 1951

Department of State Bulletin dated 3 December 1951

Letter to MG Samford from James Walsh dated 3 December 1951

Memorandum for Record- USAF Directorate of Intelligence dated 12 December 1951

Letter to James Walsh from Colonel Kieling dated 17 December 1951

Semi-Annual Historical Report of Patrol Squadron Six dated 12 March 52

Eyewitness accounts

The Soviet fighter pilots involved have not been located. Efforts to locate and interview them continue.

Field investigations

Several trips have been made to the Russian Far East to search for information regarding this incident. Two former Soviet prison camps, Magadan and Susuman, have been visited and their card files searched for mention of names of American personnel.

In March 1995, representatives of the Joint Commission visited Vladivostok in an attempt to locate eyewitnesses and confirm archival data pertaining to the loss of the P2V. In

response to an appeal for information published in a local newspaper, Mr. Vladimir Trotsenko contacted Commission representatives and stated that in late October or early November 1951, while in a military hospital in the town of Novosysoyevka in the Soviet Far East, he saw four American servicemen who were being treated for injuries. He also said he had been shown a grave in the hospital cemetery in which a fifth American was buried. A field investigation with the participation of CILHI specialists was conducted in October 1995. No American remains were discovered.

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the P2V in some detail. Archival data and field investigation have contributed to the information available to the Commission.

Efforts to locate witnesses to this incident who might clarify the fate of those unaccounted for from the crew of the P2V continue. To date, as stated above, neither of the two Soviet pilots involved in this incident has been located. Finding and interviewing these pilots remains a priority in the investigation of this incident. Additional documentation on this incident is also being sought, to include reports on the debriefing of the pilots and reports from the Border Guards detachment nearest the location of the incident.

Paramount in the efforts of the Commission is the question of survivors. There are no references to survivors in archival evidence from either side. The possibility that the testimony of Mr. Trotsenko, repeated in detail at the 12th Plenary Session of the Joint Commission in August 1995, relates to this incident is being thoroughly researched. During the Plenary Session, the Russian side of the Commission stated that archival records indicated that Mr. Trotsenko was a patient in the hospital from March through May 1951. Following the 12th Plenary Session the Russian side provided three documents identifying the period March-May 1951 as the time of Trotsenko's hospitalization. The U.S. side continues to follow up on his testimony. Additional archival research and efforts to locate additional witnesses are currently underway.

U.S. AIR FORCE RB-29 - - 13 JUNE 1952 - - SEA OF JAPAN

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 13 June 1952, an RB-29 aircraft stationed at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, assigned to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, carrying a crew of twelve, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during the conduct of a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan.

American search and rescue efforts were conducted from 14 June until 17 June. On 14 June one of the search planes sighted and photographed an empty life raft. Search planes remained in the area until darkness but were unable to salvage the raft due to prevailing conditions. An unconfirmed report indicated that a second life raft was seen four miles south of the first raft. This report could not be verified. The search resumed on 15 June but neither life raft was seen. The search continued until 17 June 1952. Contemporary American documents report that neither survivors nor wreckage were seen during the search operations. One contemporary Soviet document also notes that no wreckage of the aircraft, pieces of equipment or members of the crew were found. The documentary record of this case is provided in the Archival records section.

In March 1995, during interviews conducted as part of the Commission's investigation of this incident, two American participants in the search and rescue operations reported having seen the RB-29 intact and floating on the water. Their statements are further detailed in the Eyewitness accounts section.

The entire crew of the RB-29 remains unaccounted for. A presumptive finding of death was issued by the Air Force on 14 November 1955 (Tab A).

Personnel Involved. RB-29 crew

BUSCH, Samuel N., MAJ	Unaccounted For
SCULLEY, James A., CAPT	Unaccounted For
SERVICE, Samuel D., CAPT	Unaccounted For

[REDACTED]	Unaccounted For
HOMER, William R., MSGT	Unaccounted For
MOORE, David L., MSGT	Unaccounted For
BLIZZARD, William A., SSGT	Unaccounted For
MONSERRAT, Miguel W., SSGT	Unaccounted For
BONURA, Leon F., SSGT	Unaccounted For
BECKER, Roscoe G., SSGT	Unaccounted For
BERG, Eddie R., SSGT	Unaccounted For
PILLSBURY, Danny H., A1C	Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that the plane had disappeared during a routine flight over the Sea of Japan. During the work of the Commission, the U.S. side acknowledged that the plane had been on a reconnaissance mission.

Russian position. At the time of the incident the USSR denied any knowledge of the reason for the plane's disappearance or of the fate of the crew. Following presentation of the case to the Russian side of the Commission, the Russian side provided documents which confirmed that the plane had been shot down by Soviet fighters.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of the unaccounted-for crew from the 13 June 1952 incident at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow in March 1992. To further the work of the Commission, the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in the second through fifth sections, the Commission has researched archival records relating to the incident, interviewed U.S. search crew members, and conducted field investigations in Magadan and Vladivostok. The Commission's work is presented in the Current status section.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records:

Russian. The Russian side has passed to the U.S. side diplomatic and military documents related to this incident during the meetings of the Joint Commission. These documents begin to clarify events surrounding the downing of the RB-29.

Soviet archival documents report that Soviet fighters shot down the plane because the RB-29 violated Soviet airspace in the area of Valentin Bay, nine miles from the Soviet coastline. The Soviet documents state that the U.S. plane fired on the Soviet fighters first and that they were forced to return fire. Two MIG-15 fighters, flown by Captains Fedotov and Proskurin, engaged the RB-29. The Soviet documents report that the U.S. plane then “descended to an altitude of 10-15 meters at 1739 hrs, burst into flames and crashed into the water at a distance of about 18 miles from our coastline”.

The three contemporary documents relating to this incident which have been provided by the Russian side to date also shed light on the air engagement and on Soviet knowledge of U.S. search efforts. The 13 June 1952 report from Kuznetsov to Stalin states that the shootdown was recorded on film. The U.S. side has formally requested any photography from the incident. The Russian side has formally stated that the photography cannot be found and that it no longer exists.

In a report to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Zorin, the Soviet Deputy Minister of State Security reported that no wreckage of the aircraft, pieces of equipment or crew members were found by the coast guard or the shore patrol.

Additional documents being sought by the U.S. side which might pertain to the incident include possible debriefing reports from the two Soviet pilots who are now both deceased (see Current status section), a report made by the Commander of the 5th Fleet, reports on search and rescue efforts by Soviet forces, and information pertaining to a radio broadcast picked up at Yokota Air Force Base which claimed that a U.S. airman had been picked up from a downed aircraft (see Tab A, paragraph 4.b.).

The holdings from Russian archives that have been provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission are as follows (included with translations at Tab C):

1. Letter to Stalin from Kuznetsov, w/map dated 13 June 1952
2. Letter to Stalin from Kuznetsov dated 14 June 1952
3. Letter to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from Stakhanov dated 25 June 1952
4. Excerpt from Deciphered telegram No.503826/sh to 8th Directorate, Soviet General Staff dated 26 November 1952
5. Russian newspaper articles in translation "May I Not See the Statue of Liberty for as Long as I Live" 11 June 1992, Komsomolskaya Pravda, by K. Belyaninov. "Where did 20,000 Americans Disappear to?" 1 August 1991, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, by Vadim Birshteyn.

U.S. The U.S. side has established documentation of this incident in U.S. files as follows. The U.S. did not present a formal diplomatic claim against the USSR to the International Court of Justice because of a lack of hard evidence at the time that the plane had been shot down. The U.S. issued one note, no.689 of June 18, 1952, requesting that the USSR investigate the disappearance of a B-29 aircraft during a routine flight over the Sea of Japan. On 16 June 1956 the U.S. claimed that the Soviet Union was aware of U.S. servicemen being held on Soviet territory, specifically mentioning the crew of the RB-29. This note was based on various source reports that American servicemen had been seen in prison camps on Soviet territory. These reports remain unsubstantiated, and no definitive evidence has been located to date on the fates of the twelve unaccounted-for crew members.

The U.S. documents indicate that on 13 June 1952, U.S. military authorities tracked the RB-29 by radar until 1320 hours, at which time it left the radar zone over the Sea of Japan, approximately 100 miles northwest of Hokkaido at a point 120 miles from the Russian coast. The last radio contact with the plane was a routine "coast-out" transmission at 1027 hours.

The American search and rescue effort started on the morning of 14 June and continued until 17 June. A total of 10 aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, the 345th Bomber Squadron, and Air Sea Rescue units participated in an intensive search of the proposed route and adjacent areas.

On 14 June one of the search planes sighted and photographed an empty life raft, which was right side up, at a location approximately 100 miles off the Russian coast. Aircraft remained in the area until nightfall when they returned to base. On 15 June aircraft dispatched to recover the raft were unable to relocate it.

A report indicating that on 14 June another search plane sighted an overturned life raft about four miles south of the first raft could not be verified. No photographs were taken of this second raft, nor was it recovered.

In an Air Force report titled, "Continuance of Missing Status Beyond Twelve Months" and dated 4 Jun 1953, the results of the search and rescue operations conducted from 14-17 June were summarized; "... no wreckage was found, nor was there any sign of survivors."

Summary of U.S. holdings. Documents related to this case found in U.S. holdings are as follows (Tab D):

USAF Continuance of Missing status for case # 418	dated 4 June 1953
Telegram to Moscow from State Department	dated 17 June 1952
Telegram to Secretary of State from Moscow	dated 18 June 1952
Telegram to Secretary of State from Moscow	dated 24 June 1952
Telegram to Secretary of State from Moscow	dated 15 July 1952
Message to American Embassy MOSCOW	
New York Times Article	dated 17 July 1956
Excerpts from State Department Bulletin	dated 30 July 1956
Excerpts from the History of 91 st Strategic Reconnaissance	dated 26 January 1956

Squadron 10. Letter from William E. Koski to Air Force Casualty Office

Casualty Questionnaire of Francis A. Strieby

date unknown

Eyewitness accounts

Captains Fedotov and Proskurin, the Soviet pilots who shot down the RB-29, are deceased. No Russian eyewitnesses to the incident or participants in the subsequent search and rescue operations have been identified by the Joint Commission.

During the work of the Commission, former crew members of American planes which participated in the search for the RB-29 and its crew have been interviewed. Two members of a search crew from the 345th Bomber Squadron at Yokota Air Force Base stated, during interviews conducted in March 1995, that they sighted the RB-29 aircraft floating in the water about twenty-five miles off the Russian coast. (Reports on these interviews are contained at Tab E). According to the two crew members' reports, the aircraft was floating on the water, undamaged and intact. One crew member recalled that both life raft compartments were open and at least one life raft was missing. As a result of communication problems the aircraft commander did not realize the plane had been spotted until about 15 minutes later. Efforts at that time to relocate the plane were not successful. Because the RB-29 had not been relocated and because none of the search plane's officers had seen the plane, the two crew members made no mention of the sighting in the debriefing which followed completion of the search mission.

No information on possible survivors to the incident was received from interviews with American search crew members. Information gained from a related incident indicates that captured members of the crew of an B-29 shot down on 4 July 1952 over North Korea were interrogated, in North Korea and China, and were specifically asked about Major Busch, the aircraft commander of the RB-29 shot down on 13 June 1952.

Following their return to the United States after being held prisoner, two of the crew members from the 4 July 1952 shootdown reported that they had been asked about Major Busch during interrogation. (Documents included at Tab D.) One crew member stated in a 1956

statement that the questioning on Major Busch was very intense and that questions on Major Busch's personality, past history and previous service were asked. This crew member's statements were confirmed in a follow-up interview conducted recently by the Commission's support staff.

A document provided by the Russian side of the Commission in the Korean War Working Group also indicates that information on Major Busch was elicited during the interrogations of the crew of the B-29 downed on 4 July 1952 (Tab C). The Russian side believes there were no survivors in the shootdown of the RB-29, and suggests the interrogators may have learned of the crew names through signals or communications intercepts. Neither side of the Commission has been able to clarify the circumstances surrounding the interrogation about Major Busch. This issue remains unanswered and open to further research.

Field investigations

Representatives of the Joint Commission have made several trips to the Russian Far East in an effort to ascertain the fate of the crew of the RB-29. Two former Soviet prison camps, Magadan and Susuman, have been visited and a trip was made to Vladivostok in March 1995 to attempt to locate eyewitnesses and confirm archival evidence.

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission the U.S. side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the RB-29 in detail. Archival data and interviews of search and rescue personnel have contributed to the information available to the Commission.

Efforts are currently underway to locate additional records of the incident in both U.S. and Russian archives, to clarify the significance of the radio message heard on 14 June 1952, and to complete the record by interviewing any additional personnel who have knowledge pertaining to this incident. While both Soviet pilots who participated in the shootdown are now deceased, the U.S. side has asked the Russian side to help locate squadron mates of the pilots who might have authoritative knowledge of the incident. Two newspaper articles citing a variety of witnesses and documentary sources have appeared in the Russian press. (English translations are

included at Tab C.) These articles raise a number of questions related to the incident. The Commission continues efforts to locate and interview the journalists who wrote the articles in an effort to identify additional concrete sources of information.

Paramount in the efforts of the Commission is the question of survivors. Thus far, the work of the Commission has produced the 25 June 1952 letter from Stakhanov to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stating that no wreckage of the aircraft, pieces of equipment or crew members were found by the coast guard or the shore patrol. The U.S. side continues to press for more detailed, unit-level information from the Border Guards. Additionally, the Commission continues efforts to follow up on the documents at Tab C addressing the interrogation of the crew of the RB-29 shot down on 4 July 1952, to include specific questions about Major Busch. The Commission is still trying to establish why these questions would have been asked.

U.S. AIR FORCE RB-29 -- 7 OCTOBER 1952 -- NORTHERN PACIFIC

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 7 October 1952, an RB-29 aircraft stationed at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, assigned to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, carrying a crew of eight, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during the conduct of a reconnaissance mission north of the island of Hokkaido. American search and rescue efforts continued through 12 October, but were unsuccessful due primarily to bad weather. However, there were many eyewitnesses to the incident, mostly Japanese fishermen. Soviet search and rescue units recovered the body of one U.S. crewman, John R. Dunham. His remains were transported to Yuri Island in the Kurile chain, where he was buried. As a direct result of the work of the Commission, his remains have been recovered. The remainder of the crew is still unaccounted for. A presumptive finding of death for the crew was issued by the Air Force on 15 November 1955. The 30 November 1955 casualty report for Captain John Robertson Dunham with its 15 November 1955 presumptive finding of death is included at Tab A.

Personnel Involved. RB-29 crew

DUNHAM, John R., CAPT	Remains Recovered
ENGLISH, Eugene M., CAPT	Unaccounted For
BROCK, Paul E., 1LT	Unaccounted For
COLGAN, Sam A., E-6	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
KENDRICK, Fred G., E-2	Unaccounted For
NEAIL, Frank E. III, E-2	Unaccounted For
SHIPP, Thomas G., E-1	Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that this plane had been on a routine operational flight when it was attacked by Soviet fighters and shot down over international waters. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the

Commission in 1992, the U.S. side acknowledged that the plane had been on an intelligence gathering mission.

Russian position. At the time of the incident, the USSR insisted that the plane had violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Yuri Island. The USSR Foreign Ministry protested the alleged border violation to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and asserted that Soviet forces had been justified in shooting down the RB-29. During the work of the Commission, the Russian side has acknowledged from the beginning that the RB-29 was shot down by Soviet aircraft.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of the unaccounted-for crew from the 7 October 1952 shootdown as an agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow, March 1992. To further the work of the Commission, the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in the second through fifth sections, the Commission has researched archival records relating to the incident, interviewed participants and witnesses and carried out two field investigations on Yuri Island. The current status of the Commission's work on this incident is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The Russian side has passed to the U.S. side diplomatic and military documents during the meetings of the Joint Commission. These documents provide a detailed account of what happened to the RB-29.

Soviet archival sources establish that Soviet fighters shot down the plane because the RB-29 violated Soviet airspace three times over the southern Kuriles. The first and second alleged violations were for a total of eight or nine minutes over Tanfilev Island, the third over water at latitude 43°, 18' North, longitude 145° 59' East. Soviet fighters were scrambled from South Sakhalin airfield, and intercepted the RB-29 south of Demin Island. The Soviet documents state that the U.S. plane fired on the Soviet fighters first and that they were forced to return fire. Two

Soviet LA-11 fighters, flown by Senior Lieutenants Zhiryakov and Lesnov from the 368th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, engaged the RB-29. The Soviet documents report that the American plane then lost altitude and “went off into the direction of the sea.” These actions occurred between 1400 and 1535 Khabarovsk time (which is one hour later than the Japanese local time).

During plenary sessions of the Joint Commission the Russians passed the U.S. side documents which shed light on the air engagement and their search efforts. One of the first documents received by the U.S. side of the Commission on this incident was a report to Stalin detailing the crash at sea and the recovery of a body. A handwritten log of the 114th Border Guard detachment indicates that the RB-29 crashed 1.5 KM southwest of Demin Island, and goes on, “the aircraft was in flames as it fell, upon striking the water there were two strong explosions... During examination of the crash site by border troops, the 114th Border Detachment picked up a pilot’s headless body... The body was in a black flight suit with the name of Dunkkhen Dzhon Robertson, service # 2073A.” Documents which detail the Soviet Board of Inquiry, carried out later in October 1952, were passed to the U.S. side in September 1993, along with a map indicating the flight path of the RB-29. The Russian side of the Commission passed the U.S. side a document in March 1994 that detailed the location of Dunham’s burial site on Yuri Island. It was signed by three Soviet officers who attested to the burial.

The holdings from Russian archives that have been provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission are as follows (included with translations at Tab C):

1. Logs (Handwritten) of 114th Border Guard Detachment dated 7 October 1952
2. Message to Stalin from Sokolovskiy and Vasilevskiy dated 8 October 1952
3. Certificate of Burial w/chart dated 10 October 1952
4. Excerpts of Report by Makhun on the incident w/map dated 26 October 1952
5. Report to Bulganin from Mikhajlov on Violations of Soviet Air dated 19 December 1952
Space

6. Letter to Comrade Malik from Comrade Bazikin dated 22 January 1953
7. Letter to Molotov from Secretary TsK KPSS dated 4 August 1953
8. Letter to TsK KPSS from Molotov dated 29 December 1954
9. Letter to Molotov from Secretary TsK KPSS w/draft dated 31 December 1954

U.S. This incident is heavily documented in U.S. files. The U.S. presented a formal diplomatic claim against the USSR in September 1954 for \$1.6 million for loss of the plane and crew, and took the case to the International Court of Justice in May 1955. The American legal position centered on questions of sovereignty over the Kuriles and nearby islands. U.S. records indicate that Soviet fighters shot down the RB-29 in the vicinity of Demin Island at around 1430 local on 7 October 1952 at approximately 43° 24' North, 146°, 6' East.

U.S. military authorities were tracking the RB-29 at the Air Defense Center in Nagoya, Japan. They saw the radar trace of the American plane merge with the track of an unidentified plane. The RB-29 had time to broadcast, "Mayday, let's get the hell out of here," before it went down. All military authorities interviewed by U.S. investigators shortly after the incident insisted that the RB-29 was on the U.S. side of the so-called MacArthur line, the dividing line between Soviet and American zones of occupation in post-war Japan.

The American SAR effort started immediately. Fighters from Chitose AB, and planes from the 3rd Air Rescue Group engaged in a search of the general crash area until 12 October 52. This effort was hampered greatly by bad weather. The Navy vessel referenced in U.S. documents as "Falcon Victor" also searched the crash area. No debris or survivors were found.

Summary of U.S. holdings. Documents related to this case found in U.S. holdings are as follows (at Tab D):

Chronology of incident

Combat Operations Division Daily Diary dated 7 October 1952

Japan Air Defense Force History with list of supporting documents

Security Information dated 8 October 1952
w/correction of 10 October
1952

Soviet note dated 12 October 1952

Department of State Bulletin: Soviet note of 12 October 1952

Department of State Bulletin: U.S. reply of 17 October 1952

Telegram to Department of State from the Charge D'Affaires dated 17 October 1952

Press Release No. 816

Department of State Bulletin: Soviet note of 24 November 1953

Department of State Bulletin: U.S. note of 16 December 1953

Eyewitness accounts

There is much eyewitness evidence in U.S. archival material. The U.S. side interviewed numerous (at least 51) Japanese fishermen who were in the area on 7 October 1952, some in Soviet custody on Yuri Island. None of the interviewees saw the attack, but all saw the plane at some point during its flight. The eyewitnesses all tell much the same story: the RB-29 was flying in the vicinity of the Kurile/Habomai Islands on the afternoon of 7 October 1952 when fighters appeared and shot the plane down. It went down trailing thick black smoke.

At the 7th Plenary session of the Commission in December, 1993, former Soviet KGB Maritime Border Guards sailor Vasili Saiko came forward. Saiko had served in the Maritime Border Guards on a cutter in the Yuri Island region. On 7 October 1952, he and his mates watched the shootdown of the RB-29 from their ship, and were then tasked to sail to the crash site to recover survivors/plane parts. Saiko himself pulled Captain Dunham's body out of the water. On the evening of 7 October, while the cutter was en route to Yuri Island, Saiko took from one of Dunham's fingers his Naval Academy class ring. Saiko first showed the ring to the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Cold War Working Group and then presented the ring to Ambassador Toon at a press conference, and asked that the ring be presented to Dunham's widow. This was

done in a Pentagon ceremony on 16 December 1993. Saiko said that there were no survivors and no other remains at the crash site. Saiko's full account is at Tab E.

On 22 June 1994, U.S. interviewers met with retired Colonel Boris Alekseyevich Zhiryakov in Yevpatoriya, Ukraine. In 1952, he served as the Deputy Commander of the 368th Fighter Air Regiment. He stated that he was the pilot who shot down the RB-29 on 7 October 1952. He described how he warned the plane and tried to get it to land. When his warnings were ignored, he fired at it. The plane blew up in the air at 5000 meters, with the wings separating from the fuselage before it crashed into the sea near the shore. He stated emphatically and unequivocally that no air crewman could have survived the shootdown. A report on the interview with Zhiryakov and a transcript from a follow-on interview are at Tab F.

Field investigations

In May 1994, a joint U.S.-Russian team went to Yuri Island to attempt to find Captain Dunham's remains. This first try was unsuccessful. In August/September 1994 a second expedition found and repatriated the remains of Captain Dunham. Full accounts of both trips are at Tab G.

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the RB-29 in detail. Archival data, eyewitness accounts, and the testimony of two former Soviet military personnel - one who shot down the plane, the other who recovered Captain Dunham's body from the Pacific Ocean - have contributed to the information available to the Commission.

Paramount in the efforts of the Commission is the question of survivors. Besides Captain Dunham, there were seven other crewmen on board the aircraft. At the 11th Plenary session in December 1994, new information from an interview with former Soviet Captain Panov was presented. Captain Panov stated that he was serving at a command post on Kunashir Island at the time of the incident and had heard that an American aviator was picked up by a Soviet cutter.

There are no other references to survivors in any of the documentation on either side, nor do any witnesses or participants mention the possibility of survivors.

Captain Panov also stated that he had been told by Lieutenant Zhiryakov that two parachutes were seen during this shutdown incident. During a follow-up interview, Colonel (Ret.) Zhiryakov disavowed any such statements. A report in the combat log of the USAF 39th Air Division asserts that the Japanese National Police had received reports of two parachutes sighted shortly after the attack. However, it was later reported by USAF tracking station #26 at Nemuro Point that the sighting had been erroneous. At this point in the work of the Commission, new leads for further inquiry have not yet been developed.

U.S. AIR FORCE RB-50- - 29 JULY 1953 - - SEA OF JAPAN

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 29 July 1953 an RB-50 aircraft stationed at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, carrying a crew of seventeen, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during the conduct of a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. From 29 July until 31 July search and rescue efforts along the planned flight path of the missing aircraft were conducted by U.S. Navy surface vessels and planes from the U.S. Air Force. On 30 July, the RB-50's co-pilot, Captain John E. Roche, the lone occupant of a life raft which had been dropped on 29 July, was rescued by the USS Picking.

Crew members from U.S. search and rescue planes reported dropping a life boat to four survivors in the vicinity of the area where Captain Roche was rescued. They also thought they had seen three additional survivors about one mile away. Deteriorating weather conditions precluded positive confirmation of these sightings.

The scope of Soviet search and rescue operations remains unclear. Participants in the U.S. search and rescue operations reported seeing between nine and twelve Soviet "PT" type boats during their search and that at least six of these boats were heading in the direction of the crash. U.S. communications intercept reports also place Soviet ships in the area at the time of the incident. On the Russian side, a contemporary Soviet document states that with the exception of one trawler, no other Soviet ships were in the area. However, the Russian co-Chairman of the Commission has said there were Soviet patrol boats in the area, although their logs have not been found.

The remains of two crew members, Captain Stanley O'Kelley and Master Sergeant Francis Brown, were later recovered along the coast of Japan. First Lieutenant James Keith is presumed dead based on information provided by Captain Roche. The remainder of the crew is unaccounted for. A presumptive finding of death was issued by the Air Force on 14 November 1955. (At Tab A)

Personnel Involved. RB-50 crew

ROCHE, John E., CAPT	Rescued
O'KELLEY, Stanley K., CAPT	Remains Recovered
BROWN, Francis L., MSGT	Remains Recovered
KEITH, James G., CAPT	Presumed Dead
TEJEDA, Francisco J., MAJ	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
SANDERSON, Warren J., CAPT	Unaccounted For
STALNAKER, Robert E., CAPT	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
WIGGINS, Lloyd C., CAPT	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
GOULET, Roland E., A1C	Unaccounted For
RADLEIN, Earl W. Jr., A2C	Unaccounted For
RUSSELL, Charles J. Jr., A2C	Unaccounted For
WOODS, James E., A2C	Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that this plane had been on a routine navigational training flight when it was attacked by Soviet fighters approximately 40 miles off the Russian coast. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the Commission in 1992 the U.S. side acknowledged that the plane had been on a reconnaissance mission.

In diplomatic correspondence and high-level meetings following the incident, the U.S. Government repeatedly raised the question of additional survivors with the Soviet Government.

Within the U.S. Government at the time of the incident there was a strong belief that the Soviets had picked up survivors of the crash.

Russian position. At the time of the incident the USSR insisted that the plane had violated Soviet territorial waters off Cape Povorotny. The USSR Foreign Ministry protested this alleged border violation to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, stating that the RB-50 had fired first and the Soviet fighters had been forced to return fire. During the work of the Commission the Russian side has acknowledged from the beginning that the RB-50 was shot down by Soviet aircraft.

Throughout the diplomatic activity which followed the incident, the Soviet Government repeatedly stated that it had no information whatsoever concerning the plane or any member of its crew and that, according to verified information, the plane was last seen headed out to sea.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of the unaccounted-for crewmen from the 29 July 1953 shootdown as an agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow in March 1992. To further the work of the Commission the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in the second through fifth sections, the Commission has continued to pursue this case with great dedication, researching archival records relating to the incident, interviewing participants and witnesses and visiting sites in the former Soviet Union.

At the 10th Plenary Session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission held in Moscow in September 1994, General Volkogonov, the Russian co-Chairman of the Commission, described the 29 July 1953 incident as a "very puzzling case." He further suggested that pieces of the puzzle have yet to be found and that work remains to be done on this case and must continue. General Volkogonov concluded his remarks on the RB-50 shootdown by stating, "The case remains an historic mystery." Interviewed about the case in a 1994 BBC TV documentary, *Spies in the Sky*, General Volkogonov said, "There were boats in the area. We can't find the logs. This, too, makes me suspicious." The current status of the Commission's work on this incident is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. During meetings of the Joint Commission, the Russian side has passed to the U.S. side diplomatic and military documents related to this incident. These documents detail the Soviet version of what happened to the RB-50.

Soviet archival sources establish that Soviet fighters shot down the plane because the RB-50 violated Soviet airspace in the vicinity of Cape Gamov and Vladivostok. Soviet fighters were scrambled from Nikolaevka airfield and intercepted the RB-50 fifteen kilometers to the south of Askol'd Island. These documents state that the U.S. plane fired on the Soviet fighters first and that they were forced to return fire. Two Soviet MIG-17 fighters, flown by Captain Rybakov and Senior Lieutenant Yablonovsky from Pacific Fleet Naval Aviation, engaged the RB-50. The Soviet documents report that the American plane "while breaking into pieces, fell in flames into the water 15 km (8 miles) to the south of Askol'd Island". These actions occurred between 0700 and 0730 hours Vladivostok time.

Documents indicate that the Soviets were fully aware, through radio-intercept reports, of the nature and scope of American search and rescue efforts and of the successful rescue of Captain John Roche. Photographs of charts located at the Russian Naval Archives in Gatchina taken by the Commission depict in detail the flight pattern of the RB-50 and the Soviet interceptors and the names, types and locations of U.S. naval vessels involved in the subsequent search. One Soviet vessel, labeled SRT-423 (SRT - medium fishing trawler) is depicted on the chart. In a letter to Defense Minister Bulganin, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov detailed the American search operations and stated that Trawler #423 was approached by two American destroyers in an attempt to get information regarding the B-50. No interpreter was available to either side and no information was exchanged. Another contemporary Soviet document maintains that the Soviets had no ships in the area of the crash besides trawler #423, which left the area and docked at the port of Nakhodka.

A list of the documents from Russian archives that have been provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission is included at Tab C. The documents are appended to this report with English translations at Appendix 1.

U.S. This incident is heavily documented in U.S. files. Archival holdings include demarches to the USSR, military reporting on the incident and the subsequent search and rescue operations, diplomatic records of high-level meetings and correspondence with Soviet officials, and affidavits and statements collected by U.S. legal representatives. U.S. records indicate that Soviet fighters shot down the RB-50 forty miles from the Siberian coast at approximately 4215N 13245E at 0615 on 29 July 1953.

U.S. military authorities tracked the RB-50 during the course of its flight. They saw the radar trace of the American plane merge with the track of an unidentified plane. Five additional plots were reported in the ten minutes after the two radar traces merged. It is unclear whether this tracking reflected the RB-50 taking evasive action or whether the plots reflected the interceptor aircraft after the interception occurred.

The American search and rescue effort started almost immediately. Two B-29's were dispatched to the area where radar had last tracked the RB-50. A document summarizing the debriefings of two search and rescue aircraft crews states that a life boat was dropped to four survivors at approximately 4214N 13259E. Scanners reported sighting what they thought were three additional survivors approximately one mile away in an oil slick. Fog and haze precluded positive observation. The mission report on the search and rescue operations conducted by the 37th Air rescue Squadron is included among the U.S. documentation on the case.

One U.S. heavy cruiser, four U.S. destroyers and one Australian destroyer were dispatched to the area at 1518 hours on 29 July, arriving at the rescue area at 2326 hours on 29 July. At 0419 hours on 30 July the destroyer USS Picking recovered Captain Roche in the vicinity of 4221N 13244E. No other survivors were found.

U.S. search and rescue reports and communications intercept reports indicate that between nine and twelve Soviet ships to include destroyers, submarines, minelayers, three unidentified minesweepers, three subchasers, and smaller surface craft were tracked in the area of

the crash on 30 July. U.S. reports do not indicate whether any Soviet vessels or aircraft made visual contact with U.S. search planes or ships.

Efforts by the U.S. Government to determine the extent of Soviet knowledge regarding the incident and, in particular, the question of survivors are chronicled in a series of diplomatic notes and protests. No information regarding the fates of the missing crew members was received.

Summary of U.S. holdings. The files of former Special Assistant to the State Department Legal Advisor, Mr. Samuel Klaus contain extensive documentation of this case. The files are located in the National Archives at Record Group 59, Lot File 64D551. A list of selected documents relating to the RB-50 shutdown is included at Tab D. Copies of the selected documents are appended to this report at Appendix 2.

Eyewitness accounts

There is much eyewitness evidence in U.S. archival material. The U.S. side interviewed crew members of search planes, personnel from naval vessels, experts on navigation and currents, and the one survivor from the crew to clarify the events of 29 and 30 July. These interviews and affidavits give a detailed picture of what happened to the RB-50. According to the statements of Captain Roche who survived the incident, the plane was hit on the right side and one of the engines was damaged. The alarm was sounded to bail out. Captain Roche was able to exit the aircraft and land safely in the water. He and the pilot, Captain O'Kelly, floated in the water waiting for rescue from 0620 until 1740 on 29 July, when a search plane commanded by Major Gourley dropped an A-3 life boat into the water not far from their position. Captain Roche managed to reach the life boat but Captain O'Kelly disappeared beneath the surface of the sea and is presumed dead. The search plane commanded by Major Gourley requested assistance by radio. At 1928 another search plane commanded by Captain Schneider reached the crash site. Both planes continued to search until 2055 before returning to base. At 0322 on 30 July the USS Picking spotted a rescue flare fired by Captain Roche and successfully rescued him at 0419. No other survivors were found. The remains of Captain O'Kelley and Master Sergeant Brown were found on the coast of Japan after the search had been discontinued.

On 27 October 1993 Russian interviewers met with A.V. Rybakov, the pilot of the MIG-17 which first engaged the RB-50. Mr. Rybakov declined interview requests with the U.S. side of the Commission. Mr. Rybakov's interview confirmed the facts already established by Soviet documents from 1953, passed to the U.S. side of the Commission by the Russians. He stated that the RB-50 had fired first, that the plane descended into a cloud bank and out of sight without any parachutes being seen, and that he and his wing man, Senior Lieutenant Yablonovsky, returned to Nikolaevka airfield immediately after the incident. Mr. Rybakov stated that he had no knowledge of any part of the plane being recovered, nor did he have any knowledge of survivors.

In November 1994 and again in April 1995, Yuri Mikhailovich Yablonovsky, a retired Soviet Air Force Colonel who was the second pilot involved in the shootdown incident, was interviewed by U.S. interviewers. The information provided by Mr. Yablonovsky confirmed the facts established in the interview with Mr. Rybakov. and in Soviet documents contemporary with the incident.

On 10 June 1993 U.S. interviewers met with retired Soviet Sergeant Georgiy Yakovlevich Kravchenko in Moscow. Mr. Kravchenko served as an anti-aircraft gunner on Russkiy Island near Vladivostok in 1953. Mr. Kravchenko stated that he witnessed the shootdown of the RB-50 from his vantage point on Russkiy Island and that within two minutes of the engagement he saw seven parachutes descending from the burning aircraft.

Information bearing on this case has been presented to the Commission by retired Soviet Colonel (now Professor) Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov a former Soviet military intelligence officer who was stationed in Khabarovsk during the period of the Korean War. Professor Korotkov stated in a taped interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation that he personally interrogated an American prisoner during the Korean War. When the armistice ending the Korean War was signed (27 July 1953) he was in the town of Posyet, located not far from Vladivostok. Professor Korotkov heard that a large U.S. plane had been shot down in the Vladivostok area and had crashed into the sea. He heard that crew members had parachuted from the plane. Colonel Korotkov and other military intelligence specialists heard that survivors had been picked up by Soviet forces. Consequently, he expected that he and his colleagues would be

afforded the opportunity to interrogate the Americans. Colonel Korotkov and his colleagues were told that the war was over and they were forbidden to meet Americans. He stated that survivors were considered spies, not prisoners of war, and as such would be handled by the security services. At the 10th Plenary Session of the Commission Professor Korotkov repeated his conviction that several American fliers survived the shutdown and were rescued. Transcripts and reports of selected eyewitness accounts related to this incident are included at Appendix 3.

Field investigations

Representatives of the Joint Commission have made several trips to the Far East area in an effort to ascertain the fate of the crew of the RB-50. Two former Soviet prison camps, Magadan and Susuman, have been visited and a trip was made to Vladivostok and Nakhodka in March 1995 to attempt to locate eyewitnesses and confirm archival evidence. Appeals for information on this and other shutdown incidents which occurred in the Vladivostok area were made in local newspapers. To date, the response to the appeals has been positive, however, no new definitive information had been developed. Follow-on visits to the area have been conducted and will be planned on a periodic basis.

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the RB-50 in some detail. Archival data, eyewitness reports, and the testimony of former Soviet military personnel have contributed to the information available to the Commission.

Efforts are currently underway to locate additional witnesses who can clarify details of the shutdown, particularly the discrepancies regarding parachutes and survivors. Colleagues of Professor Korotkov who may be able to corroborate his statements are being sought. Crew members from Soviet Trawler #423, known to have been in the search area, are also being sought.

The Russian archival record on this incident consists predominantly of documents of a political rather than military/operational nature. Efforts to gain access to additional military/operational documentation are being undertaken. In particular, unit-level Border Guards records and the deck logs of Soviet ships known to have been in the area of the search are being sought. During a visit to Vladivostok in March 1995, Commission representatives received specific archival citations for some of the deck logs being sought. The logs were sent from the Pacific Fleet Archives in Vladivostok to the Central Naval Archives at Gatchina in the 1960's. During a visit to Gatchina by Commission representatives after the 12th Plenary Session, naval archivists agreed to search for the requested deck logs. The Commission still awaits the results of this search

Paramount in the efforts of the Commission is the question of survivors. Thirteen crew members remain unaccounted for. Based on the work conducted to date, no information has been gained to clarify the fates of those unaccounted-for. Circumstantial evidence exists that other crew members in addition to Captain Roche may have survived. The Commission continues its efforts to determine the fates of those still unaccounted for.

U.S. AIR FORCE RB-47 - - 18 APRIL 1955 - - NORTHERN PACIFIC

Introduction

Summary of Incident. At approximately 1130 Khabarovsk time on 18 April 1955, an RB-47E assigned to the 4th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 26th Reconnaissance Wing, based at Eielson AB, Alaska, was shot down with a crew of three over the northern Pacific Ocean off the Kamchatka Peninsula by Soviet MIG fighters. The three crewmen are unaccounted for. A presumptive finding of death was issued by the Air Force on 17 April 1956 (Tab A).

Personnel Involved. RB-47 crew

NEIGHBORS, Lacie C., MAJ	Unaccounted For
BROOKS, Robert N., CAPT	Unaccounted For
WATKINS, Richard E., Jr., CAPT	Unaccounted For

US position. The US position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that this plane had been on a routine weather reconnaissance flight when it was attacked by Soviet fighters and shot down over international waters. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the Commission in 1992, the US side acknowledged that the plane had been on an intelligence gathering mission.

Russian position. During the work of the Commission, the Russian side has acknowledged from the beginning that the RB-47 was shot down by Soviet aircraft. However, we have no diplomatic documents from either side to indicate whether the USSR believed that this plane violated their state borders, or whether a protest was lodged by the USSR.

Work of the Commission. The US side included the issue of the unaccounted-for crew from the 18 April 1955 shootdown as a formal agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow, March 1992. To further the work of the Commission, the US side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in Archival records section, the Commission has researched archival records relating to this loss. As indicated in the fourth and fifth sections, no eyewitnesses have been interviewed by the Commission, and there was no field

investigation given the loss over the Northern Pacific Ocean. The current status of the Commission's work on this incident is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The Russian side has passed to the American side military documents that indicate that the RB-47 was tracked by Soviet signals intelligence units from 0943 Khabarovsk time. The US aircraft was located at that time in the vicinity of Cape Lopatka, at the southern end of the Kamchatka Peninsula. By 1057 the plane was reported 43 miles southeast of Cape Vasiliev. Russian military authorities stated in the documents that the plane did not violate their borders. Nevertheless, two MIG-15 aircraft were scrambled to intercept it, and did so 32 miles east of Cape Kronotski (approximately 55° North, 164° East) at an altitude of 12,200 meters. From 11:25-27, the MIGs attacked the RB-47, and it left Soviet radar screens at 1140 hours.

The crash site was reported by Soviet fishermen aboard the boat "Komandor." They noted an explosion 13 kilometers west of the settlement of Nikol'skoye on Bering Island, approximately 55°, 50 minutes North, 165° 50 minutes East. Soviet intelligence also reported extensively on the American search and rescue (SAR) efforts. The SAR started on 19 April (the dates used by the Soviets in this analysis are one day ahead of ours, owing to the proximity of the International Date Line) and lasted four days using over 20 planes in an extensive SAR effort. However, the Soviet conclusion was "from the nature of the search one can suppose that the Americans do not know the place, cause, and time of the plane's destruction." That is, the plane did not go down where the Americans thought it went down, and so they searched in the wrong place.

The Soviets also mounted a search effort which yielded parts of the aircraft, a life vest, topographic maps of Chukhotka and Alaska, diagrams and a written description of the plane. However, there is no mention of survivors in any Russian document.

The holdings from Russian archives that have been provided to the US side in the work of the Commission are as follows (included with translation at Tab C):

Letter to TsK KPSS from Zhukov	dated 20 April 1955
Letter to TsK KPSS from Zhukov and Molotov	dated 22 April 1955
Note to Molotov and Zhukov from Secretary CC	dated 22 April 1955
Letter to Kuznetsov from Perevertkin	dated April 1955
Message to Colonel Ionev from Zarovskiy	dated 23 April 1955
Memorandum to CC CPSU from Zhukov	dated 28 April 1955
Telegram to Shashenkov from Razumniy	dated 25 April 1955
Recommendation for the Order of the Red Banner	dated 9 September 1955
Memorandum from Border Guards' Troops of the Pacific Fleet	dated 27 April 1955

U.S. Until 1992, when Russian documents were received, the U.S. government suspected, but could not prove, that the aircraft had been shot down. There is relatively little information in the U.S. archives on this incident. Contemporary accounts of the incident indicate that in 1955 the Air Force knew only that the RB-47 had failed to return from its mission. The Air Force, in its presumptive finding of death of the crew, said that there was no indication that the plane had been shot down by the Soviets, and no mention is made of survivors. The Air Force describes the U.S. SAR effort as 20 sorties comprising 207 search hours, to no avail. Apparently the search for the plane was conducted well away from the actual crash site. Since the US Government had little definitive information that the RB-47 was shot down by Soviet MIGs, no demarches were made to Moscow concerning the fate of the crew.

Documents from the National Security Agency made available for public release indicate that the US aircraft was shot down by Soviet fighters.

Summary of US holdings. Documents related to this case from US holdings (included at Tab D) are:

Incident Chronology

“Soviet Reaction to the flight of a US RB-47”

Telegram to Mrs. Casteel dated 19 April 1955

Letter to Mrs. Casteel dated 1955

Excerpts from Unit History of 3d and 10th Air Rescue Groups,
and Air Rescue Service dated January to June 1955

Declassified intercept records

Eyewitness accounts

None

Field investigations

None

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the US side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the RB-47 and the fate of the unaccounted-for crew in as much detail as the evidence thus far will allow. Archival data makes it clear that the RB-47 was shot down by Soviet fighters over international waters on 18 April 1955. The US side has asked the GRU to follow-up on the report of the recovery of aircraft parts, life vests and maps referenced at the time of the incident. The US side continues to follow up on reports of the search carried out by Soviet Maritime Border Guard units. Efforts to locate and interview participants in the search operations mounted by the Soviet Border Guards, crew members of the “Komandor,” in particular, continue.

Paramount in the efforts of the Commission is the question of survivors. The archival record has yielded no evidence of survivors from this shootdown. There are no reports that parachutes were sighted. There are no references in the documentation from either side to survivors.

U.S. AIR FORCE RB-50 -- 10 SEPTEMBER 1956 -- SEA OF JAPAN

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 10 September 1956, a USAF RB-50 stationed at Yokota AB, Japan, assigned to the 41st Air Division, 5th Air Force, was lost over the Sea of Japan. There was a very powerful storm, Typhoon Emma, in the area. No distress signal was received from the RB-50. All sixteen crew members remain unaccounted for. A presumptive finding of death for the crew was issued by the Air Force on 31 December 1956 (Tab A).

Personnel Involved. RB-50 crew

████████████████████	Unaccounted For
DAVIS, Bobby R., E-6	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
SWINEHART, Paul W., E-5	Unaccounted For
TR AIS, Theodorus J., E-5	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The US position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that the plane was on a weather reconnaissance flight, sent out to check Typhoon Emma. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the Commission in 1992, the US side confirmed that this had been an intelligence gathering flight. The U.S. had no evidence to indicate that the plane's loss resulted from an attack by Soviet fighters. The U.S. did not know if, in fact, the USSR had been involved, whether there had been a Soviet search and rescue effort at the time of the loss or whether either the crew or their remains had been taken by the Soviets.

Russian position. On 13 November 1956, in response to a 12 October 1956 U.S. request, the Soviet Government informed the American Embassy in Moscow that the USSR had no information about the aircraft or its crew.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of those unaccounted for from the 10 September 1956 loss as an agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow, in March 1992. To further the work of the Commission, the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). The Commission's research on this case is presented in the second through fifth sections. The current status of the Commission's work on this case is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The Russian side of the Commission has provided no documents to the US side on this case. The Russian side does not carry this case as a Cold War incident. In Cold War Working Group sessions, the Russian side has indicated that it has no information on this incident. As noted above, in a 13 November 1956 Soviet response to an American request for information, the USSR then stated that it had no information on the loss of the aircraft. During the work of the Commission in response to US requests, the Russian side specifically said it had no search and rescue records relating to the incident. In spite of the lack of information to date, the Russian

side of the Commission pledged during the 11th Plenary Session to undertake a renewed effort at locating information related to this incident. The absence of Russian archival materials related to this case is documented at Tab C.

U.S. There are few holdings in the U.S. archival records. Air Force files included the accident report (included at Tab D) and the presumptive finding of death (Tab A). Both documents discuss in detail the climatic conditions along the proposed flight path. The presumptive finding of death (Tab A), unit histories, and recently declassified National Security Agency documents (included at Tab D) detail the U.S. search and rescue effort.

The Commission notes that the files of Sam Klaus, former Special Assistant to the State Department Legal Advisor, which have provided us much information on other incidents, do not contain information on this incident.

Summary of U.S. holdings. Documents related to this case from U.S. holdings (included at Tab D) are:

Aide-Memoire delivered to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs	dated 12 October 1956
Declassified NSA documents	dated 12-14 September 1956
Letter from Assistant Secretary of State Robert Hill to Senator Knowland	dated 20 March 1957
History of the 41 st Air Division	dated 31 December 1956
Report of Aircraft Accident	
History of the 3rd Air Rescue Group	dated June-December 1956

Eyewitness accounts

None

Field investigation

None

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side has worked to assemble such information as exists on this case. We find no evidence to indicate that this aircraft loss was caused by hostile Soviet action. The Commission notes that the planned flight path called for the aircraft to go no closer than 120 miles from Soviet territory. This planning reflected technological advances which allowed U.S. aircraft to carry out their classified missions at greater distances from Soviet territory, lessening the chances of attack by the Soviet military.

Turning from the cause of the aircraft's loss, the Commission addressed the question of survivors. Typhoon Emma severely hindered American search and rescue efforts, and it would have had similar effects on any Soviet search. US search efforts were unsuccessful. The Russian side has stated that there were no Soviet SAR operations. During the 11th Plenary Session the Russian co-Chairman of the Cold War Working Group told a family member of the missing crew that the Russian side would continue to search for information on the RB-50. At the Cold War Working Group session of the Commission held in Moscow in April 1995 the Russian side reported that it had again researched the loss of the RB-50 and that further information was not found on this case. At this point in the work of the Commission, new leads for further inquiry have not yet been developed.

KAMPS, Harold T., E-3	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
████████████████████	Unaccounted For
MADEIROS, Gerald H., E-3	Unaccounted For
MOORE, Robert H., E-3	Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that this plane had been on a routine operational flight when it inadvertently strayed into Soviet airspace and was shot down. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the Commission in 1992, the U.S. side acknowledged that it was an intelligence gathering flight.

Russian position. At the time of the incident, the USSR insisted that the plane had crashed on the territory of the USSR with no Soviet fighter involvement. This position was maintained well into 1959, when CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev wrote in response to a query by Vice President Nixon that no Soviet fighters had been involved. At the onset of the Commission's work, the Russian side admitted that the C-130 was shot down by Soviet fighters.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of those unaccounted for from the 2 September 1958 shootdown as a formal agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow, in March 1992. To further the work of the Commission, the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in the second through fifth sections, the Commission has researched archival records relating to the incident, interviewed participants and witnesses and carried out a field investigation at the C-130 crash site. The current status of the Commission's work on this incident is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The Russian side of the Commission has provided archival data primarily from two sources. A fairly extensive diplomatic record from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this incident,

to include Soviet denials of the shutdown has been provided the US side. In January 1993, researchers from the U.S. side of the Commission went to the Central Army Archives in Podol'sk and were allowed to read, but not copy, the Air Defense Forces (PVO) casefile on this incident. Their report is included after the case study at Tab B.

Soviet archival sources indicate that the C-130 was attacked by four MIG-17s, which used cannon and rocket fire to shoot down the plane. The attackers first damaged the right wing. The tail section separated from the fuselage. The aircraft then crashed and burned. The Russian side has passed to the US side gun camera photographs of the shutdown and photographs taken on the ground after the incident which confirm the catastrophic nature of the crash (copies included at Appendix A).

One piece of historical data differs from the rest. In January 1961, an article printed in the Soviet magazine *Ogonyok* reported that eleven parachutes were seen coming out of the C-130, and that the crewmembers were captured on the outskirts of Yerevan, Armenia. However, this article was a reprint from an East German magazine. Commission researchers obtained a copy of the original German article, in which there is absolutely no mention of parachutes. The Executive Secretary of the Russian side of the Commission informed the U.S. side that the editor of *Ogonyok* lost his job over this mistake.

The holdings from Russian archives that have been either reviewed or provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission are listed at Tab C. The documents with English translations are attached at Appendix I.

U.S. The archival record on the U.S. side comes primarily from State Department files, in particular the files of Samuel Klaus. Mr. Klaus was the Special Assistant to the State Department Legal Advisor charged with investigating shutdown incidents with the goal of bringing suit against the USSR in the International Court of Justice for aircraft and human losses suffered as a result of these incidents.

The record indicates clearly that Klaus conducted an energetic investigation. Klaus went to the Turkish-Armenian border area, where he interviewed seven eyewitnesses. He also interviewed

many people in the Armenian-American community in California who had recently visited Armenia.

The most detailed, informative document in the US record is the Air Force presumptive finding of death, dated 9 November 1961. This document sums up the incident, considers similar incidents, and makes the following judgement on the possibility of survivors: "Consideration of the information available to the Air Force and factors involved appear to lead to no other logical conclusion than that the subject personnel crashed with the C-130." It is attached at Tab A.

Summary of U.S. holdings. Documents related to this case from U.S. holdings are listed at Tab D. Copies of the documents are attached at Appendix II.

Eyewitness accounts

Interviews of seven Turkish eyewitnesses in 1959, and of over a dozen eyewitnesses carried out in Armenia in 1993 indicate that none of them saw parachutes emerge from the plane either as it was under attack, or from the time of the attack to the aircraft's crash. According to the Armenian eyewitnesses, representatives of the security services were on site shortly after the crash to supervise cleanup operations.

At the Sixth Plenary session in September 1993, both sides in the Cold War Working Group heard the testimony of retired Soviet General Valentin Sozinov, a colonel at the time, who had given the order to shoot down the plane, and who was at the crash site moments after impact. Sozinov said that the plane was an inferno, and that it burned for about eight hours. He said that no one could have survived the crash. General Sozinov's statement to the Commission is at Tab E.

At the Ninth Plenary session in June 1994, former Soviet pilot First Lieutenant Viktor Lopatkov, who was assigned at the time to the 25th Fighter Air Regiment, testified before the Cold War Working Group. He was one of the pilots who shot down the C-130. He described how he and his mates attacked the plane. He himself did not see the plane's actual crash, as he was caught in the C-130's slipstream and was fighting to save his aircraft. Neither did he hear any rumors about survivors. Lopatkov's statement is at Tab F.

Field investigation

In August 1993, the U.S. side of the Joint Commission went to Armenia to conduct an investigation of the crash site. The Commission, led by U.S. Co-chairman Ambassador Malcolm Toon, inspected the crash site, conducted interviews of witnesses to the incident, and oversaw the beginning of the site excavation work of the team from the Army's Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI).

The CILHI team looked for evidence of human remains, as well as pieces of the plane and its contents, which might provide clues as to how many crewmen were aboard when the aircraft crashed and burned. The CILHI team was on-site for over two weeks, and in October 1993 issued its interim report. The team recovered hundreds of skeletal fragments. However, all were too small on which to perform DNA matching. Artifacts possible related to crew survival gear were brought to Hawaii to be analyzed by aircrash analysts. The report of the CILHI team is at Tab G.

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the C-130 and the fate of the crew still unaccounted for in considerable detail. Archival data, eyewitness accounts, the accounts of officers of the former Soviet Union who actually participated in the downing of the aircraft and the on-site investigation of the crash site have contributed to the information available to the Commission. The U.S. side continues to seek the after-action reports prepared by the security services and the forensic services of the former USSR to make an even fuller account available as a result of the Commission's work.

At the Cold War Working Group session of the Commission held in Moscow in April 1995, a Russian forensic specialist from the Ministry of Defense agreed to research questions related to the forensic work conducted by the Soviets at the time of the incident. The Russian side also agreed to search for additional forensic records related to this incident. This work is still on-going.

A key question addressed by the Commission is whether any member or members of the crew of the C-130 were able to parachute from the aircraft or survive the attack. The statements of participants in the attack and of eyewitnesses to the attack are strikingly similar. Their statements agree that no parachutes were sighted coming from the C-130, there was neither evidence nor rumors of crash survivors, and that no one could have survived the violent impact and hours-long

inferno that engulfed the destroyed aircraft. The CILHI excavation of the crash site lends support to the statements of both the participants and eyewitnesses.

U.S. AIR FORCE RB-47 - - 1 JULY 1960 - - BARENTS SEA

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 1 July 1960, an RB-47 aircraft stationed at Brize-Norton AB, England, assigned to the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, carrying a crew of six, was shot down by a Soviet fighter during conduct of a reconnaissance mission. American search and rescue efforts recovered no survivors or remains. A Soviet trawler picked up two survivors, Captains John R. McKone and Freeman B. Olmstead. They were imprisoned in the Soviet Union until January 1961 when they were repatriated. A Soviet search and rescue crew also recovered the body of the pilot, Captain Willard G. Palm. Captain Palm's body was returned to U.S. authorities on 25 July 1960. In October 1960 the Soviets recovered but did not repatriate the body of Major Eugene E. Posa. Major Posa and the remaining two crew members are unaccounted for. An official report of death was issued on the unaccounted-for crew members on 30 June 1961 (Tab A).

Personnel Involved. RB-47 crew

PALM, Willard G., MAJ	Remains repatriated
MCKONE, John R., CAPT	Survived/Repatriated
OLMSTEAD, Freeman B. CAPT	Survived/Repatriated
POSA, Eugene E., MAJ	Unaccounted for
GOFORTH, Oscar L., CAPT	Unaccounted for
PHILLIPS, Dean B., CAPT	Unaccounted for

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that the plane was on an electromagnetic research flight over international waters when it was shot down. When the case was presented to the Russian side of the Commission in 1992, the U.S. position was that the plane was on a reconnaissance flight and was shot down over international waters.

Russian position. The Russian side included this case on their original list of ten Cold War incidents which they presented at the second Plenary session in September 1992. They acknowledged shooting down this plane after it allegedly violated Soviet airspace.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of those unaccounted-for from the 1 July 1960 shootdown as an agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow, in March 1992. To further the work of the Commission, the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in the second through fifth sections, the Commission has researched archival records related to this incident and has interviewed participants in the shootdown and the search and rescue operations which followed. The current status of the Commission's work on this incident is presented in Current status.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The documents on this case provided by the Russian side deal primarily with the repatriation of the survivors, the repatriation of Major Palm's remains and the transfer of the body of Major Posa.

The Soviets shot down the plane north of Cape Svyatoy Nos (Holy Nose). The Soviets stated that the plane had violated Soviet airspace within the 12 mile limit. The American survivors contended that they were a full 50 miles off the Soviet coast when the attack took place.

Soviet maritime vessels picked up the two survivors and Major Palm's body from the Barents Sea. Captains McKone and Olmstead were taken to Moscow and put in Lubyanka Prison, where they were interrogated at great length by Soviet security services. Captains McKone and Olmstead were subsequently tried and found guilty of espionage. They were released from prison in January 1961.

Major Palm's body was found on 4 July 1960 and was returned to U.S. authorities on 25 July 1960.

A document provided by the Russian side indicates that the body of Major Eugene Posa was recovered from the Berents Sea by a fishing trawler in October 1960. According to this document the body was to have been transferred on 17 October 1960 to Severomorsk. At technical talks held in Moscow in February 1996, the Russian co-Chairman of the Cold War Working Group read from a document which stated that Major Posa's remains had, in fact, been transferred to Severomorsk (see Current status section).

Another document, a written statement from Captain Poliashov of the fishing trawler "Yalta", dated 25 October 1961, indicates that, on 13 October 1961 a Soviet trawler raised "part of a human leg, one boot and a sock." This was badly decomposed and was thrown back into the sea by the trawler's captain.

The documents provided by the Russian side to date make no mention of survivors other than Captain McKone and Captain Olmstead.

The documents from the Russian archives which have been provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission are as follows (with translations - at Tab C):

Incident map

Statement: transfer of body of Captain Palm	dated 25 July 1960
Statement: confirmation of transfer	dated 25 July 1960
Report to Commander in Chief of Air Defense Forces	dated 22 September 1960
Letter to Khrushchev from Shelepin	dated 17 October 1960
Resolution of Presidium CPSU	dated 25 January 1961
Resolution on closing the case	dated 28 January 1961
Explanation of Captain Poliashev from Fishing Trawler "Yalta"	dated 25 October 1961

U.S. The documentary record on the U.S. side is fairly complete. A detailed summary of the case is contained in the USAF Report of Death (Tab A). The Soviet government first announced they had picked up and were holding two survivors of the crash in an account of the incident given on 11 July 1960. This Soviet announcement opened an extensive exchange of diplomatic

The Commission has interviewed more than twenty Russian citizens who had some knowledge of this incident. Those interviewed include participants in the shootdown incident and participants in the subsequent search and rescue operations.

The pilot of the plane which shot down the RB-47, Vasiliy Polyakov, was interviewed on 31 May 1995. He stated that on 1 July 1960 he was on strip alert when he was scrambled to intercept an intruding plane. He approached the plane and identified it visually as an American bomber. He waved the wings of his plane in an attempt to signal the American plane to land. When the American plane gave no response, the ground navigator gave the command to destroy the aircraft. Polyakov fired, the RB-47 burst into flames and began to sharply roll upside down. Polyakov observed the RB-47 until it descended into the clouds. He did not see any parachutes, nor did he see the plane crash into the sea.

Information on the possible location of the remains of Major Posa was gained in an interview with Retired Admiral Lev Garkusha, a former commander of the naval headquarters at Gremikha, a base at which Major Posa's remains were said to have been. In the fall of 1960, Admiral Garkusha was informed by a duty officer that a trawler had recovered parts of a plane and bodies. He personally saw the bodies and remembered there were more than two, perhaps three or four. He received an order to send the bodies and airplane parts to Northern Fleet Headquarters in Severomorsk. They were sent there on Patrol Boat #72 after being at Gremikha for about two hours. Several days later, Admiral Garkusha was informed by telephone that the bodies had been received at Severomorsk and sent from there to Moscow. He did not know exactly where in Moscow the bodies were sent.

The Commission has also received information from a former crew member on a Soviet fishing trawler, Mr. Georgiy Gurinovich who reported that in late July 1960 he personally recovered a leg from the water near the RB-47 crash site. The leg was tangled in the fishing net of his trawler, had a boot on it and was wrapped in parachute lines. The trawler's captain had the leg buried at sea.

Field investigations

None

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the US side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the RB-47 in some detail. Archival data and interviews with Russian citizens have contributed to the information available to the Commission.

Efforts to locate witnesses to this incident who might clarify the fate of those unaccounted for from the crew of the RB-47 continue. Additional documentation is also being sought on this incident. At technical talks held in February 1996, the Russian co-Chairman read from a document which stated that the remains of Major Posa were, in fact, transferred to Severomorsk. The Russian side agreed to review the document for declassification and release. The Russian side has also volunteered to undertake a review of the criminal proceedings against the two American survivors in an attempt to locate additional information relevant to the fates of those still unaccounted for. The U.S. side continues to pursue leads on the possible location of the remains of Major Posa and other crew members.

Paramount in the efforts of the Commission is the question of survivors. Other than Captain McKone and Captain Olmstead who survived and were later repatriated, there have been no references to survivors in archival evidence from either side, nor do the results of more than twenty interviews indicate that there were survivors of the shootdown incident.

U.S. AIR FORCE RB-57 - - 14 DECEMBER 1965 - - BLACK SEA

Introduction

Summary of Incident. On 14 December 1965, a USAF RB-57 was lost over the southern Black Sea. The aircraft was assigned to the 7407th Support Squadron at Wiesbaden, Germany, and was on temporary duty at Incirlik AB, Turkey. A joint Turkish-American search effort began on 15 December 1965, and found parts of the plane but neither of the two-man crew. Presumptive findings of death for the crew were issued by the Air Force in June 1966 (Tab A).

Personnel Involved. RB-57 crew

LACKEY, Lester L., MAJ

Unaccounted For

████████████████████

Unaccounted For

U.S. position. The U.S. position prior to the establishment of the Joint Commission was that the plane had been on a routine flight and crashed in the Black Sea. We had no evidence to indicate that the plane's loss resulted from an attack by Soviet fighters. The U.S. did not know whether there had been a Soviet search and rescue effort or whether the crew or their remains had been taken by the Soviets.

Russian position. At the time of the incident, on 24 December 1965, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov called in U.S. Ambassador Kohler and, in a carefully worded, prepared statement, lectured him about U.S. reconnaissance flights near Soviet borders, to include the 14 December flight. Kohler asked specifically for information about the incident and raised questions about Soviet interference with the plane. Kuznetsov would not elaborate on his prepared remarks.

Work of the Commission. The U.S. side included the issue of those unaccounted for from the 14 December 1965 incident as a formal agenda item at the Joint Commission's first formal session in Moscow, in March 1992. This incident was not included in the cases on which the Russian side presented data at the September 1992 Plenum. The Russian side indicated it did not consider this as a shootdown case. To further the work of the Commission, the U.S. side presented a case study to the Russian side in 1993 (Tab B). As reviewed in the Archival records section, the Commission has researched archival records relating to the loss. The Commission has also addressed this loss

incident in meetings with leaders of other former Soviet republics. As indicated in the fourth and fifth sections, no eyewitnesses have been discovered by the Commission, and there was no field investigation given the loss over the Black Sea. The Commission's work is presented in the Current status section.

Live sighting reports

None

Archival records

Russian. The Russian side has provided two documents bearing on this incident. Both documents address the Soviet search operations. These operations succeeded in recovering parts of the RB-57. There is no mention in these documents of survivors.

These holdings from the Russian archives as provided to the U.S. side in the work of the Commission are as follows (in translation - at Tab C):

Message 18 December 1965 Admiral of the Navy Gorshkov to Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky

Message 20 December 1965 Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky to Central Committee Communist Party of the Soviet Union

U.S. As a result of the Commission's work, certain American records have been recovered on this incident. The loss of the plane resulted in a joint U.S.-Turkish search effort, which succeeded in recovering parts of the aircraft. The accident report described the aircraft as a total loss.

Documents related to the incident from U.S. holdings (Tab D) are:

Aircraft Incident Report	dated 13 January 1966
Telegram to Amembassy Paris	dated 15 December 1965 12:11 pm
Telegram to Amembassy Moscow	dated 15 December 1965 4:23 pm
Telegram to State from Amembassy Ankara	dated 16 December 1965 8:05 am
Telegram to State from Amembassy Ankara	dated 16 December 1965 8:56 am

Telegram to Amembassy Ankara	dated 16 December 1965 12:08 pm
Telegram to SecState from Amembassy Ankara	dated 16 December 1965 12:52 pm
Telegram to Secstate from Amembassy Ankara	16 December 1965 3:27 pm
Telegram to Amembassy Ankara	dated 16 December 1965 5:58 pm
Telegram to Amembassy Ankara	dated 17 December 1965 12:59 pm
Telegram to SecState from Amembassy Ankara	dated 17 December 1965 7:06 am
Telegram to SecState from Amembassy Ankara	dated 18 December 1965 5:16 am
Telegram to SecState from Amembassy Ankara	dated 22 December 1965 8:47 am
Telegram to SecState from Amembassy Moscow	dated 24 December 1965 2:02pm
Telegram to Amembassy Moscow and Amembassy Ankara	dated 24 December 1965 4:37 pm
Telegram to Secstate from Amembassy Ankara	dated 27 December 1965 7:28 am
Missing Persons Supplementary Report	dated 28 December 1965
Telegram to Amembassy Ankara and Amembassy Moscow	dated 28 December 1965 6:43 pm
Telegram to Amembassy Moscow and Amembassy Ankara	dated 6 January 1966 6:10 pm
Message Traffic to General Greene	dated 25 January 1966
Message Traffic to General Greene	dated 31 January 1966
Message Traffic to CSAF	dated 4 June 1966

Diplomatic communications at the time indicated that while there was initial speculation regarding Soviet involvement, it was ruled out. Most cables centered on the Turkish involvement in the search effort, and on the need for discretion regarding American bases in Turkey.

The archival record indicates that while both sides were successful in searching for the plane, the crew was not found. None of the US documents mentions survivors of the lost aircraft.

Eyewitness statements

None

Field investigations

None

Current status

As a result of the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side has had the opportunity to examine the loss of the RB-57 and its crew in detail.

The Commission has reviewed the archival data presented by both sides. There is no evidence indicating that the aircraft was lost to hostile action. It is clear that the US and Soviet militaries tracked the plane on their radars and knew with relative certainty when and where the aircraft crashed. Both sides conducted Black Sea search and rescue operations in which parts of the RB-57 were recovered. There is no reference in any document to survivors of the crash. At this point in the work of the Commission, new leads for further inquiry have not yet been developed.

SOVIET LOSSES IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction

Summary of Incident. The Soviet conflict against the Afghan rebels, the Mujahadeen, lasted from 24 December 1979 until 16 February 1989. During this conflict, the Soviet Union lost 13,833 military personnel. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the Soviet military listed 315 servicemen as Missing In Action or Prisoners of War.

U.S. Position Prior to Commission. The United States assisted the former Soviet Union in obtaining information and facilitating exchanges of POWs following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. On 13 September 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union issued the U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement on Afghanistan. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze agreed that the U.S. would assist, to the highest degree possible, in the effort to return Soviet POWs from Afghanistan. This agreement led to an intensification of U.S. efforts.

In accordance with this agreement, Mr. Peter Tomsen, Special Envoy to Afghanistan and the Mujahadeen from 1989 until 1993, travelled throughout Afghanistan to collect information and press for the release of POWs. He met with resistance commanders, tribal leaders and politicians, turned over information and lists of POWs from the Soviet Veterans Association, and met with Western travellers, including correspondents, in Afghanistan. The information gained through these efforts was turned over to the Russian government.

The U.S. intelligence community also provided information on Soviet missing in Afghanistan. In November 1991, a list of 16 servicemen believed to be held by the Mujahadeen was turned over to the Russian government. This list is attached at Tab A.

Work of the Commission

Initial Efforts. At the first Plenary Session in Moscow in March 1992, the Commission included the subject of former Soviet servicemen missing in action in Afghanistan as part of the official work of the Commission. At this initial meeting, the U.S. side presented a U.S. government list of 57 Soviet POW/MIAs in Afghanistan, three photographs of Soviet POWs and a videotape of a

Soviet POW. The U.S. side also turned over a list of 19 former POWs from Afghanistan then living in the West, the names of seven former Soviet soldiers who had returned to the former Soviet Union and a list 16 former Soviet soldiers believed to still be held by the Mujahedeen.

During the early stages of the Commission's work, additional documentation was passed by the U.S. side. One document, compiled with the assistance of governments in the Afghan region and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), provided details on 7-8 former Soviet soldiers and their captors. Another document provided information on Soviet soldiers who were living in the mountains of the "Black Valley" region of Afghanistan.

In August 1994, the U.S. co-Chairman of the Cold War Working Group presented information to the Russian side on the location of two Russian servicemen who disappeared in Afghanistan and the names of the Mujahedeen commanders holding them. Subsequently, the U.S. and Russian sides agreed to include the discussions on Soviet losses in Afghanistan as part of the work of the Cold War Working Group.

Copies of all the documents mentioned above are included at Tab B.

The Cold War Working Group. The Russian side of the Commission turned over a list of 290 former Soviet servicemen considered missing in action or prisoners of war in Afghanistan. This list continues to serve as the foundation for the work of the Commission on this issue. The Russian side has stressed that although information may indicate that some of these men are dead, Russian military protocol dictates that two witnesses are required to declare a soldier dead. Therefore, all of these servicemen are considered MIA/POW. A copy of this list is located at Tab C.

The U.S. side conducted a detailed analysis of this list and created a computerized, annotated, database which was presented to the Russian side. Commission efforts have assisted the Russian government in reducing the number of missing servicemen to 287 (see the third section).

Meetings with Foreign Officials. In addition to the documentary information exchanged by both sides of the Commission, U.S. government officials have met with Afghan and Pakistani leaders

in order to push for the release of former Soviet POWs. Since the inception of the Commission, the U.S. co-Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Malcolm Toon, and other Commission members have met with Afghan leaders, including the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and Charge d'affaires to urge them to work for the release of any former Soviet servicemen still held as POWs.

On 3 May 1995, Ambassador Toon and staff members met with the Afghan Charge d'affaires and a representative from the Afghan Ministry of Defense. The Afghan charge stated that no more than 20-30 former Soviet servicemen were being held against their will in Afghanistan at that time. Ambassador Toon turned over the 290 list and requested the Afghan government investigate these cases and provide the U.S. any new information on these servicemen as it becomes available.

The U.S. side sent copies of the 290 list to U.S. Embassies in the Afghan region and the Middle East and requested that the host governments provide any information concerning the missing soldiers to the Commission for passage to the Russian side.

Additionally, in meetings with representatives of the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union the U.S. side has presented information on former Soviet servicemen missing from the war in Afghanistan who came from these countries.

Archival records

U.S. In January 1995, under the auspices of the Cold War Working Group, the U.S. side of the Commission initiated an exhaustive search of U.S. government archives for information on missing Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan. At technical talks held in Moscow in February 1995, the U.S. delegation turned over information and extracts from 42 Department of State documents and nine documents from the U.S. intelligence community. At working group meetings in April 1995 in Moscow, the U.S. side of the Commission turned over the text of the aforementioned 42 Department of State documents, the text of 40 additional State department documents, the text of 30 documents from the personal files of Special Envoy Peter Tomsen, and information extracted from some 150 intelligence community documents. At the Twelfth Plenary Session held in

August 1995, the U.S. side turned over 19 Department of State documents. This information represents a complete and exhaustive search of all available U.S. government files.

The listing of documents from U.S. archives that have been provided to the Russian side in the work of the Commission is attached in Tab D.

Russian. Since March 1992, the Russian side of the Commission has provided several lists of servicemen missing in Afghanistan as the number of missing has been reduced. In 1992, the Russian side of the Commission provided a list of 22 priority cases of missing servicemen in Afghanistan and the commanders holding them.

Current status

During the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Commission held in August 1995, the Russian side indicated that two servicemen, Nikolai Bystrov and Byashimgel'dy Yazhkanov, had recently returned. (Note: Nikolai Bystrov does not appear on the U.S. side's copy of the 290 list). The Russian side also indicated that two additional servicemen, Mumin Altyev and Dovletnazar Gulgeldiev, had been located and contacted by both family members and government officials, but decided not to return to the former Soviet Union. Even though these servicemen did not return, the Russian side informed the U.S. side that these men were no longer considered POW/MIA. Based on this information, the list of 290 has been reduced to 287 missing soldiers.

At the Twelfth Plenary Session, the Russian side emphasized that the Russian government knew the names and current locations of all POWs held in Afghanistan. The Russian side requested that the U.S. focus its efforts on assisting in the release of these men. The U.S. side will request that the Afghan Embassy in Washington and governments in the region of Afghanistan turn over any additional information on former Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan and continue to press for the release of any POWs still held against their will. In response to a suggestion by the Russian side of the Commission, the U.S. side stated it would be pleased to receive names requiring priority attention from the 287 list. The U.S. side has not received such a list at this time. The U.S. side continues to be responsive to Russian requests.

SOVIET COLD WAR LOSSES

Introduction

Throughout the course of the Commission's work, the Russian side of the Commission has inquired about 28 specific Cold War era incidents of Soviet losses of aircraft, submarines and personnel, and requested the U.S. side investigate these incidents. A list of these incidents is located at Tab A.

Work of the Commission

Since the First Plenary Session of the Commission, efforts by the U.S. side to uncover information on Russian requests have taken place under the guidance of the Cold War Working Group. The U.S. side of the Commission has conducted a broad search of U.S. government archives to investigate the incidents raised by the Russian side. The U.S. side searched for information from the Joint Staff, the Navy Historical Center, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, the Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the U.S. intelligence community, the Department of State and the National Archives. In addition, members of the U.S. side of the Commission met with officials at the highest level of the intelligence community in the investigation of these incidents.

In October 1992, the United States government turned over a video tape of the burial at sea of the remains of six crew members of the Soviet Golf-class submarine which sank in 1968. These bodies were recovered during a salvage operation conducted by the United States in 1974. On 30 August 1993, the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Malcolm Toon, turned over the bell of the Golf-class sub to the Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. In May 1994, members of the U.S. side of the Commission presented a picture of a Soviet sailor to the Russian government. This picture was retrieved from film recovered during the 1974 salvage operation. During working group sessions held in April 1995, the U.S. side turned over extracts from the deck logs of the U.S.S. Swordfish from March 1968.

The information on this incident which has been passed by the U.S. side of the Commission represents all available information on this Soviet loss.

The U.S. side of the Commission also presented information on the 25 May 1968 crash of a Soviet Tu-16 "Badger" in the Norwegian Sea. During working group sessions held in April 1995, the U.S. side turned over the Deck Log and Command History of the U.S.S. Essex for May 1968. At the Twelfth Plenary Session in August 1995, the U.S. side passed to the Russian side film footage of the crash of the Tu-16 taken from the U.S.S. Essex as well as a written eyewitness testimony of this incident.

In April 1995, during working group sessions, the U.S. side passed over the deck logs of the U.S.S. Bennington from 1 July 64 to 31 July 1964, the deck log of the U.S.S. Cunningham from 14 July 1964 to 16 July 1964 and the deck log of the U.S.S. Eversole from 14 July 1964 to 16 July 1964. These deck logs all pertain to the crash of a Soviet Tu-16r "Badger" on 15 July 1964 in the Sea of Japan.

In addition to the information described above, the U.S. side of the Commission has passed extensive information on several other cases. The Navy Historical Center turned over seven pages of information on a Soviet twin engine bomber shot down off the coast of Korea on 4 September 1950. This information included medical reports and a photograph of the pilot's body which was recovered by the U.S.S. Philippine Sea. The Joint Staff gathered 17 additional pages of information on this incident, including incident reports, statements from the pilots and combat charts.

The U.S. side of the Commission has also turned over information on 12 additional Soviet loss incidents, including information on eight Soviet advisors captured in the Ogaden in 1978. This information begins to clarify the circumstances surrounding these incidents. In some cases, when no information was found, reports documenting U.S. efforts have been passed to the Russian side. Copies of all the documents described above are located at Tab B.

Current status

The U.S. side of the Commission continues its efforts to uncover further information on each of the Russian requests addressing Soviet Cold War losses.

1992-1996 FINDINGS
OF THE
VIETNAM WAR WORKING GROUP

INTRODUCTION

This report is a review of the work completed by the Vietnam War Working Group (VWWG) of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. It is submitted by the VWWG Chairman from the American side, Congressman Pete Peterson (D-FL), along with the primary U.S. VWWG Commissioners: U.S. Senator Bob Smith (R-NH), U.S. Senator John Kerry (D-MA), Congressman Sam Johnson (R-TX), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA Affairs) James Wold, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kent Wiedemann.

The Commission began its work in March 1992 by Presidential Order. It was established to investigate information from Russian witnesses and Soviet-era documents on the fate of missing American servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. During the first months, the Commission defined its goals and developed the structures and strategies to conduct an organized investigation covering a broad range of unresolved POW/MIA issues.

The VWWG was established during the Commission's first plenary session in Moscow on 26 March 1992. At the first meeting, the VWWG identified several specific areas of interest, which included general Soviet knowledge about American POWs during the Vietnam War; reports that Soviet forces downed American aircraft; Soviet access to American POWs in Indochina, and reports that American POWs may have been transferred to the territory of the former Soviet Union. By the Eighth Plenum, held in Washington, D.C., in March 1994, the VWWG had focused on achieving satisfactory answers to four fundamental questions:

1. Did any individual of the Soviet Government or any organization transfer American POWs from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union?
2. Did any individual of the Soviet government or any organization have direct or indirect contact with, or information about, American POWs in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War years?

3. What information is available in Russian archives regarding names, numbers, status, fate, and policies in reference to American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia?
4. What information is known to citizens of the former Soviet Union that may improve American understanding and analysis of specific incidents of loss in Southeast Asia?

In the course of its investigation, the Commission has gathered a great deal of information regarding the Soviet role in North Vietnam vis-à-vis American prisoners. This search has primarily included documents from Russian archives as well as interviews with Russian witnesses. Although the four questions of investigation cannot be considered as "closed" or "resolved," enough information has been gathered to suggest a number of preliminary analytical findings.

In presenting these findings, however, three points must be made about "closure" of the issues before the Vietnam War Working Group:

1. The VWWG was not organized to resolve the broad question of American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia -- this challenge remains within the scope of current efforts between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the Kingdom of Cambodia, and the Laotian People's Democratic Republic. The VWWG has addressed only those aspects of the POW/MIA question in which the Russians (or former Soviets) were, or might have been, directly or indirectly involved, or to which Russian documents or witnesses could contribute new information.
2. Some issues being examined by the VWWG will always remain open. For example, we continue to identify and interview many Russian witnesses to events in Vietnam, and as long as legitimate questions remain concerning the fate of unaccounted for U.S. servicemembers in Southeast Asia, such interviews must be continued. The working group also cannot preclude the possibility of finding new and important Soviet documents, either in archival holdings not yet searched or materials not yet declassified.
3. To begin answering the questions under investigation, the working group has undertaken the process of writing a preliminary history of narrow issues associated with the Vietnam War.

The focus has remained on the substance of the questions under investigation, with an emphasis on acquiring fact and testimony and subjecting them to close examination and analysis. As the working group develops findings and results, the information will first be provided to the families of U.S. personnel still unaccounted for from the Vietnam War and then to the public at large. The information will also be made available to historians and academicians. It is hoped that these historians and academicians will accept the challenge of analyzing and understanding the true Soviet-Vietnamese-American dynamics during the Vietnam War.

This introduction includes remarks on the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam during the war based on materials and interviews reviewed by the VWWG. It is followed by the executive summary, which is designed to be a concise overview of the analytical findings regarding each of the four lines of inquiry.

The executive summary is followed by four analytical essays, each of which examines one issue in detail with supporting arguments and evidence. Lastly, the report includes four appendices for reference:

Appendix A: Summaries of the work done by the VWWG at plenary sessions.

Appendix B: Descriptions of documents on Vietnam provided by the Russians.

Appendix C: Interview summaries conducted with Russian witnesses related to Southeast Asia.

Although this paper ventures into the study and analysis of historical events, it is not intended to be strictly a historical work. The findings of the VWWG are intended first and foremost to serve the interests of the families of missing American servicemembers in Southeast Asia who deserve the best possible answers to questions regarding missing servicemembers in Southeast Asia. Secondly, this work seeks to serve the American and Russian publics, who not only long for factually accurate information, but can benefit from the trust and partnership developed between our countries as a result of humanitarian efforts such as this.

The members of the VWWG wish to acknowledge and thank the many witnesses from Russia and the former Soviet Union who stepped forward to provide their best recollections and

experiences, photographs, and diaries. Some had to fight through painful memories and veils of secrecy to share their recollections of the past. Their contributions are heroic and invaluable. The results of their effort are the bonds of trust and understanding that have developed between Russian and American participants in the Commission.

THE SOVIET-NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP

The Vietnam War Working Group cannot conduct a complete analysis of the four questions under investigation without briefly examining the historical context in which certain incidents occurred and certain circumstances existed. More specifically, the first two lines of investigation—the possibility that Soviet officials had either direct or indirect contact with, or transported, American prisoners to the former Soviet Union—must be examined with the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam taken into consideration. This line of inquiry is especially important because the Department of Defense has stated that none of the captured American servicemembers who were released by North Vietnam in 1973 reported any contact with Soviet personnel. Therefore, if there was Soviet contact with captured American servicemembers, it is most likely to have involved individuals who are still listed as unaccounted for by the U.S. Government.

If Soviet officials had direct or indirect contact with American POWs and were able to transport some of the POWs to the Soviet Union, the following conditions most likely existed:

- A political decision to do so on the part of the leadership of the Soviet Union.
- A political decision to allow this to occur on the part of the leadership of North Vietnam.
- A political agreement between the two countries on when and how this activity was to occur.
- Good working relations between military or security services of both sides.
- The conditions to perform such work in absolute secrecy.

Among many sectors of the U.S. Government and the American public, the Soviet-North Vietnamese relationship was viewed as one of “superior” (Soviet Union) and “surrogate” (North Vietnam). This relationship has been characterized by perceptions that the Soviet Union “pulled

the strings” during the Vietnam War, freely pursuing its own self-interests at every turn. After all, the Soviets provided most of the equipment and supplies with which North Vietnam waged the war, and it seems logical that Moscow extracted a price in return.

However, a review of Russian documents, interviews with former Soviet servicemen, and an analysis of academic literature from both Russian and American sources, suggest that the working level Soviet-Vietnamese war-time relationship was not as amicable and thriving as perceived.

We do not propose to review the entire relationship between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. This task is better accomplished by prominent experts on the subject. However, we draw on the following conclusions in order to analyze properly all evidence regarding possible Soviet actions vis-à-vis American POWs in Southeast Asia.

1. The Soviet Union was a reluctant partner of North Vietnam: Evidence suggests that the Soviet Union pursued a significant role with North Vietnam because of a direct need to compete with China, which maintained an adversarial position with the Soviet Union over major ideological differences. There is little evidence that the Soviet Union had specific security interests to protect by allying itself with North Vietnam other than the need to support “international communism” and a desire to maintain a prominent position in Southeast Asia in the face of emerging Chinese influence in the region.
2. North Vietnam perceived no obligation to the Soviet Union: North Vietnam considered the war to liberate South Vietnam as a singular objective that all fellow socialist nations were obligated to support. North Vietnam took assistance from both China and the Soviet Union to pursue its aims despite the apparent ideological rifts in the socialist camp. North Vietnam did not feel obligated to reciprocate, and there is little evidence to support the idea that the Soviet Union “got what it wanted” because it provided aid. In fact, many declassified Soviet documents and testimonials from Russian witnesses attest to the “unappreciative” and “arrogant” attitude taken by the North Vietnamese. In return, the North Vietnamese viewed

the Soviet military as “arrogant” and “acting superior” and were suspicious of Soviet efforts to improve relations with the United States.

3. The Soviet Union exercised little influence and no control over North Vietnam: The North Vietnamese acted independently in making most strategic and tactical decisions during the war. The North Vietnamese appealed to the Soviet Union for various types of assistance and for international propaganda and political support. However, little evidence has surfaced to indicate that the North Vietnamese coordinated decisions and strategies with the Soviet Union. The history of the Soviet-North Vietnamese relationship is replete with examples of unsuccessful Soviet efforts to influence the North Vietnamese in decisions such as peace negotiations.
4. The Soviets and North Vietnamese were suspicious of each other: The “1205” and “735” documents demonstrate the degree to which the Soviets found it necessary to “acquire insight” into the plans and intentions of the North Vietnamese [both documents (see Appendix A, 136-1 to 136-4, and 179-3 to 179-5) were intelligence acquisitions by Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU) during the period 1971-1972]. There is also evidence of a North Vietnamese “housecleaning” in 1968, whereby all Vietnamese citizens who were schooled in the Soviet Union were scrutinized for possible allegiance to Moscow as either spies or agents of political influence. Such suspicions and xenophobia seem to have dominated many senior-level relationships. There is also substantial evidence below the surface of their formal relationship on the operational level, that mutual distrust existed between the Soviets and North Vietnamese based on conflicting values and cultures.
5. Working relationships were functional and productive: Despite the political, cultural, and attitudinal problems that dominated the Soviet-North Vietnamese dialogue at senior levels, the working relationships between soldiers and security service members of both countries were reportedly productive. Some witnesses describe cordial, working relationships that included the exchange of information and freedom of movement beyond what was technically “allowed.” The Soviet Union clearly had many opportunities to gather intelligence on American forces to test their emerging military technologies against

American targets, and to acquire captured American equipment and documents for exploitation. Some of these activities were conducted under agreements between the two sides, while other activities were undertaken clearly at the Soviet initiative.

In summary, the evidence reviewed by the VWWG suggests that the relationship between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union was unfavorable for the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union, at least on a large scale. However, although the evidence also suggests that the North Vietnamese believed the POWs to be "their" prisoners captured during "their" war, there is evidence that conditions existed for Soviet involvement, perhaps indirectly, with the interrogation of American POWs in Southeast Asia. The historical record suggests that the North Vietnamese also considered the political, propaganda, and hostage value of the prisoners to far outweigh the benefits of exploitation of technical knowledge. With these facts in mind, the search conducted by the VWWG has been for evidence of Soviet activities (vis-à-vis American POWs) conducted in limited times and circumstances, perhaps even isolated incidents, under extreme secrecy, and possibly even without the knowledge of the North Vietnamese.

The VWWG has concentrated its efforts to date on pursuing those sources of information judged most likely to offer insights about American POWs in Southeast Asia. Consistent with this approach, considerable attention has been directed at such topics as the role of Soviet journalists and their writings as well as the participation of Soviet officials in international monitoring organizations. In the same vein, the working group has designed its interview program and research initiatives in a manner that encourages continuous and widespread contact with Soviet-era military personnel as well as officials from the security and intelligence services and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose functional responsibilities were likely to have generated interest in and knowledge of American POW/MIAs.

To this initial listing of sources, the VWWG has added still others, which are expected to expand the scope of information available for future research activity. One such source involves Soviet-era professional publications depicting, among other things, contacts that may have occurred between Soviet journalists and observers and American POWs in places and at times not previously known to the U.S. Government. Indeed, the VWWG is currently pursuing

specific leads pertaining to an account of a meeting between Soviet media representatives in Laos and an American POW who remains unaccounted for from the Vietnam War.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Regarding the four major questions before the Vietnam War Working Group of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, the following observations have been made based on information gathered to date (May 1996).

Question 1: Did any individual of the Soviet government or organization transport American POWs from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union?

Preliminary Finding. A four-year investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War has found no first-hand, substantiated evidence that American prisoners of war were taken from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union. However, the VWWG continues to investigate other information that suggests that such transfers may have taken place.

In the continuing examination of this issue, the U.S. side believes that the need for additional interviews with former State Security (KGB) Officers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Officers, and Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) Officers, is of the highest priority. Though there is no substantial evidence that the Russians are concealing the transfer of American prisoners, such interviews provide important insight on what did and did not occur in North Vietnam concerning the American POW issue. Given that the KGB is the subject of most accusations regarding American POWs in Southeast Asia, it would be beneficial if additional testimony could be gathered from both KGB and GRU officers who served in Southeast Asia during the war.

The question of the transfer of U.S. POWs to the former Soviet Union will remain at the top of the list of every interview and line of investigation. Every interview improves our understanding of the Soviet position vis-à-vis American prisoners. With the investigation of every lead or allegation, we learn even more, not only about what did occur, but also about what did not occur.

Though this issue has not been investigated to a definitive conclusion, a great deal of positive work has been done to clarify the Soviet role in Southeast Asia. In a historical context,

however, the lack of first-hand, substantiated evidence of transfer immediately suggests other questions, such as, "If not, why not?" Soviet policies during the Cold War suggest at least a predisposition by Soviet authorities to want to transfer American POWs to Soviet soil for further exploitation or recruitment purposes. For example, the U.S. side of the Commission has concluded that many American POWs, including some whose fate is still unknown, were directly interrogated by Soviet personnel during the Korean War. Moreover, there is a high probability that some of these Americans may have been sent to the USSR during the early 1950s. With respect to the Vietnam War, the VWWG has confirmed the existence of a broad and aggressive Soviet-run program to transfer to the USSR American military equipment from land, naval, and air forces. This effort exceeded 700 pieces of U.S. equipment by March 1967 and included an intact capsule from an F-111A shot down over North Vietnam in 1972. Past experience with Soviet intelligence services suggests that the KGB and GRU would not have knowingly passed up opportunities to transfer American prisoners to the USSR for further exploitation regarding captured equipment and other military information, as well as for recruitment purposes. However, to date, there is no first-hand, substantiated evidence proving this allegation.

Question 2: What involvement, to include direct or indirect contact, did the Soviets have with U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia?

Preliminary Finding. A four-year investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in North Vietnam during the years of the Vietnam War has shown that the Soviets conducted in-depth, intensive, and focused intelligence gathering against the American target in Vietnam.

The VWWG has also confirmed one face-to-face meeting in January 1973, between a KGB officer and an American CIA agent who was captured in North Vietnam in 1968 and released with other American POWs during Operation Homecoming in March 1973. In 1992, the CIA, the Vietnamese Government, and the Russian Government all publicly acknowledged that this contact took place. In addition to the above-referenced encounter, there is limited evidence before the VWWG that other American personnel captured during the Vietnam War may have been directly interrogated by Soviet personnel. The VWWG continues to investigate this and other reports. Finally, there is a growing amount of evidence that Soviet personnel were

indirectly involved with the interrogations of some American POWs by their North Vietnamese counterparts through the preparation of technical questions and the subsequent evaluation of interrogation results. The VWWG is continuing to pursue this question to determine if there is any information from Russian sources that could shed light on the fate of unaccounted for U.S. personnel.

In the continuing examination of this issue, the U.S. side has been guided by the views of the late Chairman of the Russian side of the Commission, General-Colonel Dmitri Volkogonov. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in November 1992, General-Colonel Volkogonov stated, in reference to Soviet participation in interrogations in Vietnam, that "it is possible, because in Korea, our special services did interrogate American pilots, so by logic it is possible that the same was done in Vietnam." The U.S. side believes that additional testimony from former KGB, MFA, and GRU officers is necessary as well as additional archival research.

The VWWG has also received important leads from the Russian side that may clarify the degree of Soviet involvement in interrogations of American POWs. The VWWG is continuing to pursue this line of inquiry to determine whether interrogation records might exist in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the GRU, or the KGB. The Commission is also continuing to seek interviews with former Soviet Vietnam War veterans and other former Soviet personnel who may have relevant recollections. Though this issue has not been investigated to a definitive conclusion, a great deal of positive work has been done to clarify past assumptions about the Soviet role in North Vietnam (see appendices).

Question 3: What information is available in Russian archives regarding names, numbers, status, fate, and policies regarding repatriation of American POWs in Southeast Asia?

Preliminary Finding. The VWWG has received important GRU information concerning alleged wartime reports by Vietnamese officials on numbers, names, and policies regarding American POWs in Southeast Asia. The working group has also received from the archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense limited information concerning specific loss incidents involving American personnel during the Vietnam War. On balance, however, access to Russian archival

holdings has been sporadic and unpredictable, stopping far short of the thorough, systematic review that the U.S. side anticipated would be the bedrock of its research program. Efforts to improve this situation are among the highest priorities of the Commission and the VWWG.

The VWWG has reviewed two important documents from the Russian GRU which purport to be transcripts of wartime reports by North Vietnamese officials in which the number of American POWs captured and held in North Vietnam during the war was referenced. In the first document, dated 1971, a North Vietnamese official states that 735 American POWs are being held. In the second document, dated 1972, another North Vietnamese official states that 1,205 American POWs are being held. Both numbers are significantly higher than the 591 American POWs who were actually released by Vietnam in 1973. While both documents have been dismissed as fabrications by the Government of Vietnam, Russian officials maintain that both documents are authentic.

There is debate within the U.S. side of the Commission as to whether the numbers cited in these reports are plausible¹. The U.S. Government has concluded that there probably is more information in Vietnamese party and military archives that could shed light on these documents, but to date, such information has not been provided by the Vietnamese Government. The VWWG continues to seek additional information from Russian sources to assist with its investigation into these documents, to include access to the Soviet-Vietnamese translators who initially acquired and evaluated these reports, as well as access to relevant archival reports. Moreover, the VWWG notes that GRU officials have informed Ambassador Toon that additional information concerning the method by which these two documents were acquired does exist, but this information cannot be disclosed because it involves intelligence collection capabilities. Nonetheless, the relevant information contained in both the 1205 and 735 documents (see Appendix A, TFR 136-1 and TFR 179-3) has been passed to appropriate U.S. officials already engaged in discussions with Vietnamese officials on POW/MIA issues. In Shcherbakov's

¹ A coordinated, interagency intelligence analysis released by the Department of Defense on 24 January 1994 casts doubt on the accuracy of the numbers in the Russian documents. Another analysis, by U.S. Senator Bob Smith, released on 21 July 1993, lends credibility to the documents.

(Soviet Ambassador to North Vietnam during the war) messages, the former Ambassador complained of a lack of assistance by the North Vietnamese in providing access to equipment and crash sites, but the Ambassador stated nothing about prisoners of war. The material from the GRU 7-volume study included detailed information on tactics, approaches, and air battles, but only anecdotal information on the fates of the pilots of downed American aircraft. The GRU subsequently provided a written statement dated June 1994, asserting that the "primary" reporting material on which the 7-volume study was based was destroyed during an internal file review conducted in 1975. In most major documents provided by the Russian side of the Commission, data on American prisoners was tangential. Russian witnesses reported acquiring the information to help Soviet research and development better counter American aircraft, to develop better Soviet systems, and to assist the North Vietnamese in defending against American air attacks. Information about the fate of pilots was tangential and anecdotal in the reports sent to Moscow. More importantly, the documents provided by the Russian side to date have not given information about any specific American POWs who were not previously listed by the U.S. Government as having been captured.

The search for Soviet documents that contain definitive information on American prisoners is not over. We shall continue to utilize available archives, both Russian and American. However, due to the complexity of archival document filing, the task is enormous. It is impossible to search every folder of every archive. It is also very difficult to declassify every secret holding that may have information germane to our work. The works of scholars, historians, archivists, or others may yet yield new and illuminating documents, and the effects of time on classified information may also yield interesting results. It remains clear that there is more information in Soviet archives that bears on the questions being examined, especially the archives of the KGB, GRU, MFA, and International Department of the Communist Party. Although Russian members of the Commission have asserted that these classified archives are not known to contain additional information about American POWs or MIAs from the Vietnam War, the U.S. side has reason to believe otherwise. Therefore, the U.S. side of the Commission

is continuing its effort to ensure that Russian archives are thoroughly checked for relevant information.

Question 4: What information is known to citizens of the former Soviet Union that may improve American understanding and analysis of specific incidents of loss in Southeast Asia?

Preliminary Finding. Information from citizens of the former Soviet Union has substantially added to American understanding of certain events surrounding specific incidents of loss in Southeast Asia.

Both sides of the Commission fully expect that work in this area will continue until the U.S. Government has established that the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing in Southeast Asia has been completed. Though it is impossible to expect that the Commission can interview every former Soviet veteran of the war in Southeast Asia, there remain potentially hundreds of witnesses who must be identified and interviewed. Efforts continue by working with veterans organizations, using print media to elicit information, and acquiring leads from relevant documents. Success is measured by the resolution of cases for the families of missing servicemembers. Therefore, this line of investigation continues to hold critical potential for achieving results that reflect the highest aims of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

ANALYTICAL ESSAY I

Question 1: Did any individual of the Soviet government or any organization transfer American POWs from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union?

Discussion. No aspect of the work of the Commission has been more pressing and emotional than the possibility that American POWs were taken from Southeast Asia and sent to the Soviet Union for exploitation. This possibility has been the subject of hearsay for years.

Within weeks after the efforts of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission began in 1992, there were rumors that American POWs were moved to the Soviet Union. This process has left some family members, POW/MIA activists, journalists, and members of the general public with the overall perception that the Soviets “might have” taken our prisoners from Southeast Asia. In reflecting these concerns, the U.S. side of the Commission has made this the most urgent question for investigation by the VWWG. The results of our joint investigations to date are presented below.

Analysis and Preliminary Finding. A four-year investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War has yielded no first-hand, substantiated evidence to date that American POWs were taken from Southeast Asia to the former USSR. However, the working group continues to investigate other information which suggests that such transfers may have taken place.

The investigation of this issue to date has been based on the assumption that transfers did occur or might have occurred, and the search for documents and witnesses was intended to find evidence of such transfers. The investigation began with the development of a thesis that represents a list of the conditions which should have existed if transfers of POWs had occurred:

1. The Soviets had a strong interest in recruiting Americans as intelligence agents, learning about sophisticated American technology (ARM/HARM, Ravens, electronic countermeasures, etc.) and acquiring information for propaganda purposes.

2. The Soviet leadership, having weighed the potential gains against the potential risks, chose to take American prisoners from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union.
3. The Soviets used their access to the North Vietnamese military and intelligence circles to gather information to assess the intelligence/propaganda potential of each American POW.
4. The Soviets used their influence as an "elder ally" and chose the prisoners they wanted, took them, and moved them to the former Soviet Union.
5. The sensitive nature of such an undertaking required absolute secrecy, and could only be executed by the KGB or GRU as directed by their superiors in Moscow. The operations to conduct transfers would have had one of following characteristics: a) The transfer of one, or a small number, of POWs at unique times because of circumstances or opportunities, or, b) The transfer of a small number of POWs in a "steady stream" as part of an ongoing program.

This thesis suggested lines of investigation based on the many critical points at which evidence of the above activities should have been detected:

1. The degree of interest in American POWs by the institutions of Soviet authority would have been reflected in communication sent from Moscow to Hanoi and would be well-known to Soviet officials who served in Vietnam.
2. The decision to transport prisoners to the Soviet Union would have been reflected in classified holdings of the Politburo and other sensitive documents reflecting the "inner workings" of the Soviet leadership. By the 1960s and 1970s, the KGB, GRU, and other organizations of Soviet authority did not undertake such highly sensitive activities without the appropriate high-level political decision that directed or sanctioned such activity.
3. Evidence of Soviet questioning and efforts to assess information would have been discernible in the debriefings of returned American POWs. Given that Soviet interest was likely to have been strategic (knowledge of high technology, nuclear, and space programs), the POWs who possessed such information would have been the first priority for Soviet exploitation. Soviet personnel stationed in Southeast Asia would have participated in the process of assessing Americans, and their records would have reflected this work.

4. Had prisoners actually been taken and moved to the Soviet Union, the trail of witnesses and documents would have been extensive. Vietnamese records would have reflected the loss of prisoners to their allies. Secret discussions between Soviet and North Vietnamese foreign affairs and communist party officials would have recorded the agreement upon which such actions were undertaken. Beyond the potential document records, the following categories of witnesses should have known of such incidents:

- a) The North Vietnamese who allowed prisoners to be assessed.
- b) The North Vietnamese who transferred the prisoners to Soviet custody.
- c) The Soviets who assessed the prisoners.
- d) The Soviets who took custody of the prisoners.
- e) The Soviets who transported the prisoners to the Soviet Union.
- f) The Soviets who took custody of the prisoners in the Soviet Union.
- g) The Soviet security service personnel who exploited the prisoners.
- h) The Soviet analysts who benefited from the intelligence gathered.
- i) The Soviet personnel who incarcerated or otherwise managed the short or long term "disposition" of the prisoners after exploitation.

The above thesis, as well as the assumptions that underlie it, have been investigated by the Commission for more than four years. The investigation is not complete, although in many areas sufficient information has been gathered to formulate preliminary conclusions.

To date, however, every line of investigation has been explored thoroughly, and the search has not been limited to Russian archives and witnesses. The American side of the Commission sought information from a variety of sources to confirm or deny this thesis. The scope of the investigation included the following:

Russian witnesses. We have pursued and interviewed members of the MFA, KGB, GRU, Soviet military, and Communist Party officials who served in, or visited Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War.

Russian documents. We have sought records attesting to MFA, KGB, GRU, Soviet military, and Communist Party communication, records, reports, and policy decisions regarding Soviet involvement as allies, advisors, and participants in the Vietnam War.

American intelligence. We have sought information from the broad array of American intelligence efforts against the Soviet Union during the years of the Cold War in search of evidence of Soviet transfer of American prisoners.

Former POWs. We have reviewed information from the debriefs of American POWs held in Southeast Asia for evidence of Soviet involvement with American prisoners.

The results of the investigation to date are summarized below:

Regarding the official Russian version of events. The American side of the Commission has been told in definitive terms that the Soviet Government did not at any time transport American POWs from Southeast Asia to the territory of the Soviet Union. These statements have been made by the Directors, past and present, of the External Intelligence Service (former-KGB), the Directors of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU), and other high ranking Cabinet-level members of the Russian Government. As the Russian co-Chairman of the Commission, General-Colonel Volkogonov, stated early in the investigation that he could not discount the possibility that transfers from Vietnam occurred. After extensive reviews of Russian archival holdings, however, he stated that he had seen no evidence that transfers occurred.

Regarding Russian witnesses. The American side of the commission has interviewed more than 200 Soviets who served in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War. They varied in rank from Senior Lieutenant (none below) to Colonel (vast majority) and Senior General Officers and an Ambassador. They represented varied interests: MFA Officers including an ambassador and a member of the CPSU International Department, a physician, a

Tass correspondent, two attaches who have been separately identified as being GRU officers, and various Soviet service members. Some were interviewed in the company of Russian counterparts in Russia; others were interviewed in third countries without Russian participation. Every witness, without exception, stated that he had not known or heard of any operation to transport American prisoners to the Soviet Union. Many of the witnesses questioned the possible motives of such a transfer and opined that American perceptions about Russian potential gains versus the tremendous political risk of such operations, were simply wrong. They could not imagine any information known to a prisoner that would be worth the risk of endangering Soviet-American relations. Several of the witnesses served in very senior positions in North Vietnam, such as commanders of Soviet technicians in Vietnam, one ambassador, and attaches. Each of the senior personnel claim that their duty positions were so well-placed that if transfers of POWs had occurred, they would have known about it.

Another analytical conclusion drawn from the interviews conducted to date is that the Soviet-North Vietnamese relationship was considerably less amicable than previously believed by U.S. analysts. At one time, the premise that POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union was based on a perception of Soviet impunity in North Vietnam. It was assumed that the Soviets could take prisoners if they desired, given their ostensible status as a "senior ally." The scenario characterized by the Soviet witnesses, however, is that of a tense, formal, and sometimes cold relationship with their North Vietnamese counterparts. Most military officers described the environment as "restricted" and "controlled," and even the most senior officers could travel around North Vietnam only with permission and a North Vietnamese escort. Many senior Soviet military officers privately criticized the fact that the North Vietnamese seemed very "unappreciative" of the military assistance provided by the Soviet Union. These Soviet officers resented the fact that the North Vietnamese restricted Soviet access to crash sites, military equipment, and other sources of valuable technical intelligence. Most described the Chinese as having had a more advantageous relationship with the North Vietnamese. The ideological conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s between the Soviet Union and China were reflected in the dynamics of the Soviet-North Vietnamese relationship.

The American side has interviewed several former KGB officers who served in Vietnam. One of the officers claimed that the KGB had nothing to do with American prisoners, and he did not believe that the Soviet Union had any information to suggest that the North Vietnamese held prisoners back after Operation Homecoming. On 11 August 1992, the commission met with an SVR representative from the Public Affairs and Press Bureau and asked to meet with KGB veterans of the war. Mr. Kobaladze stated that, of the names provided to Russian officials as having been former KGB officers who served in Vietnam during the war, four were dead, four could not be located, one could not be identified, and six were identified as KGB officers who in fact, served in Vietnam. All of the latter six apparently denied having any knowledge of American POWs. The U.S. side of the Commission continues to seek such witness testimonials because they would be very insightful regarding the Soviet "mindset" regarding prisoners. Was the KGB denied access? Did the KGB attempt to get access? The U.S. side of the Commission has been privately told that some of the former KGB officers are reluctant to appear before the Commission because they presently conduct legitimate business with Vietnam and do not wish to be affiliated with their former employer. This information remains difficult to verify. Though the U.S. side believes that further interviews with former KGB officers from Southeast Asia are important, there has been no substantiated evidence to suggest that the KGB is concealing knowledge of the transfer of American prisoners.

Regarding Russian documents. Among the documents formally passed to the U.S. side of the Commission by the Russian side (see Appendix A), there is no information, direct or indirect, on the transfer of American prisoners from Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union.

However, the documents are replete with references to information that supports the statements of the witnesses that relations with the North Vietnamese were difficult and restricted. Documents have been received from MFA journals, MFA communications with Moscow, military assessments, and Soviet intelligence analysis. All of the documents reflect the frequent problems of lack of North Vietnamese cooperation, restricted access, lack of reciprocity in executing formal relationships and agreements, and obstruction. Several documents include complaints about the Chinese having had better and faster access to crash sites and information.

The documents available to date support the assertion that the Soviets did not have the authority and position of superiority in North Vietnam that many had assumed.

From American intelligence holdings. A preliminary search was conducted in the holdings of the U.S. Intelligence Community for evidence, information, even credible rumors or suggestions of Soviet complicity in transferring American prisoners to the former USSR. It is inappropriate in this forum to discuss the specifics of the search.

The conclusion of this preliminary review is: American intelligence records contain limited information suggesting that the Soviets transferred American POWs to the Soviet Union. The completeness and accuracy of American intelligence insight into the Soviet Union during the Cold War has often been questioned. For this issue, however, the analysis takes into account that although American intelligence certainly did not know everything about the inner workings of the Soviet military, political and security apparatus, the U.S. Intelligence Community has, over the years, been able to establish at least the basic traces of Soviet involvement in covert operations, terrorism, communist front organizations, espionage, disinformation, and other forms of clandestine foreign policy. The VWWG is continuing to pursue additional information from American intelligence records with the above perspective in mind.

From former American POWs in Vietnam. A review of analytical work done on information from returning POWs has failed to support the assertion that the Soviets transferred prisoners to the former Soviet Union. During the debriefings of the nearly 600 returned POWs, none reported information suggesting that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union.

Conclusions. In attempting to establish the validity of the thesis that the Soviets transferred American POWs to the former Soviet Union, the evidence gathered to date suggests that:

1. There is evidence that the Soviets were interested in the information of American POWs.
2. There is no evidence that the political decision to undertake transfer operations existed.

3. There is evidence that the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship was complicated, restricted, and cumbersome.
4. There is no first-hand, substantiated evidence that transfers of American POWs to the Soviet Union occurred, either in unique singular occurrences, or as part of a steady program.

Prospects. For the future, the U.S. side of the Commission continues to believe that interviews with former KGB officers, MFA officers, and GRU officers are important (by contrast, the American side of the Commission has interviewed an ample number of military veterans of service in Southeast Asia on this issue). Though there is no substantiated evidence that the Russians are concealing the transfer of American prisoners, such interviews provide the best insight on what did, and did not, occur in Southeast Asia concerning American POWs. The MFA and GRU efforts in Southeast Asia are at least partially accounted for in documents and several witness testimonials. Examination of this issue would be greatly aided by a review of KGB policies, interests, and activities in Southeast Asia during the war, but such a review would probably have to wait until the records can be declassified for historical examination. In the meantime, it is hoped that the Commission may yet interview other KGB officers who served in Southeast Asia during the war years to answer the key questions being examined by the Commission.

ANALYTICAL ESSAY 2

Question 2: Did any individual of the Soviet Government or any organization have direct or indirect contact with, or information about, American POWs in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War?

Discussion. The question of direct Soviet contact with American POWs is closely related to the issue of transfer. The two questions share the following common characteristics of the underlying motives and circumstances: the presumed superior relationship of the Soviets with the North Vietnamese, and the expectation that the Soviets had a high degree of interest in the information known by American POWs.

The Soviet military and security services have cited three potential areas of interest for exploitation of foreign prisoners in the conflicts in which the Soviet Union has been involved since 1945: recruitment of spies among prisoners to be repatriated, acquisition of potential technical and military information from knowledgeable prisoners, and gathering information for propaganda. Ample evidence of all three types of activity by the Soviets has been documented from the post-World War II period and the Korean War.

The truth about direct contact with POWs is just as clouded as the issue of transfer. Many people assume that the Soviets "probably" participated in the interrogation of American prisoners. Many have pointed to the fact that some American prisoners in Hanoi had knowledge of the American nuclear program, high technology aviation, even the U.S. space program, and to many, it remains inconceivable that the "senior" ally did not take full advantage of the opportunity to exploit this information.

Analysis and Preliminary Finding. A four-year investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War has shown that the Soviets conducted in-depth, intensive, and focused intelligence gathering against the American target in Vietnam.

As with the issue of transfers, investigation of this issue to date has been based on the assumption that direct contacts did occur or might have occurred, and the search for documents

and witnesses was intended to find evidence of such contact. As with the subject of transfers, the investigation began with the development of a thesis that represented the likely conditions under which the Soviets had contact with American prisoners. The thesis stated:

1. The Soviets had a strong interest in recruiting Americans as intelligence agents, learning about sophisticated American technology, and acquiring information for propaganda purposes.
2. The Soviet leadership, having weighed the importance of access to American prisoners, and having felt entitled to compliance by the North Vietnamese to whom they provided military and technical assistance, made the political decision to access American prisoners for intelligence information.
3. The Soviets used their access to North Vietnamese military and intelligence circles to gather information on the technical knowledge of each American prisoner of war.
4. The Soviets used their influence as an "elder" ally and selected the prisoners who were suitable for questioning consistent with Soviet intelligence objectives and interrogated and debriefed them.
5. Such operations could only have been undertaken by the KGB or GRU as directed by their superiors in Moscow. Had such contacts been productive, it would have been reflected in Soviet research and development efforts, where information gathered from American prisoners would have been incorporated for the improvement of Soviet systems and equipment.

This thesis suggested lines of investigation based on the many critical points at which evidence of the above activities should have been detected:

1. The degree of interest in American prisoners of war by the institutions of Soviet authority would have been reflected in communication sent from Moscow to Hanoi and would be well known to Soviet military and intelligence officials who served in Vietnam.
2. The decision to have contact with American prisoners may well have been made without Central Committee or Politburo approval because the sensitivity of such activity was

substantially lower. After all, the Soviets served in North Vietnam openly and at the invitation of the North Vietnamese. Such decisions, however, would still be reflected in KGB and GRU policy and communication records, because it was unlikely that the KGB or GRU personnel in North Vietnam would have conducted such activities without the prior approval of Moscow central authority.

3. Evidence of Soviet questioning and efforts to assess technical knowledge would have been brought out in the debriefings of returned American prisoners. Given the generally unsophisticated methods of interrogation practiced by the North Vietnamese, technically accurate and focused questioning on subjects of strategic importance would have been noted by American prisoners of war who underwent interrogation.
4. Had prisoners actually been contacted directly by Soviet officials, the following witnesses and documents would have remained to attest to this activity:
 - a) The Soviets who acquired, forwarded, and evaluated the assessments of the prisoners.
 - b) The Soviets who interrogated or debriefed the prisoners.
 - c) The Soviets who wrote, communicated, evaluated, or disseminated the intelligence information gathered from the prisoners.
 - d) The Soviets who read the intelligence products, and the scientists, engineers, tacticians, and others who were charged with evaluating and incorporating the data.
 - e) Documentary evidence should exist to substantiate every step of the above process.

The above thesis, as well as the assumptions that underlie it, have been investigated by the Commission for more than four years. The investigation is not complete, although in many areas, sufficient information has been gathered to formulate preliminary conclusions. The scope of the investigation included the following:

Russian witnesses. The Commission has sought and interviewed members of the MFA, KGB, GRU, Soviet military, and Communist Party officials who served in or visited North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

Russian documents. The Commission has sought records attesting to MFA, KGB, GRU, Soviet military, and Communist Party communication, records, reports, and policy decisions regarding Soviet involvement as allies, advisors, and participants in the Vietnam War.

American intelligence. The Commission has sought information from the broad array of American intelligence efforts against the Soviet Union during the years of the Cold War indicating Soviet participation in the interrogation or other exploitation of American prisoners.

Former POWs. The Commission has reviewed the experiences of American POWs held in North Vietnam for evidence of Soviet involvement in the interrogation, exploitation, or attempts to recruit American prisoners of war.

The results of the investigation to date are summarized below:

Regarding the official Russian version of events. The American side of the Commission has been told in definitive terms that the Soviet Government did not at any time have direct contact with American prisoners of war held in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Government allowed, however, for the possibility that overzealous Soviet officers may have tried to approach American prisoners unofficially, in contravention of their orders, when they saw prisoners in locations other than prison camps (two known occurrences include in a hospital and in a village immediately after the prisoner's capture; during these incidents, only casual contact occurred and no interrogation or formal exploitation was reported). The Russians have readily provided information to substantiate an occurrence in 1973 when a Soviet KGB officer interrogated an ostensible CIA asset in North Vietnam. The Russians have formally told the U.S. side of the Commission of the three possible objectives for the Soviets vis-à-vis American POWs: recruitment, exploitation of technical knowledge, and propaganda. The Deputy Archivist of the Russian Federation, Dr. Vladimir Kozlov, who reviewed many Soviet archives of the Vietnam War era, stated that in Soviet policy circles, the propaganda objective prevailed to the exclusion of the other two. This position has been supported by formal statements from Directors (past and present) of the External Intelligence Service (former-KGB), the Directors (past and present) of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU), and other high ranking Cabinet-level members of the Russian Government. As the Russian co-Chairman of the

Commission, General-Colonel Volkogonov stated during the early stages of the investigation that he could not discount the possibility that KGB or GRU officers were involved with American prisoners in North Vietnam. After an extensive review of Russian archival holdings, though, he stated that he had seen no evidence of such contacts.

Regarding Russian witnesses. The American side of the Commission has interviewed more than 100 Soviets who served in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War. They varied in rank from Senior Lieutenant (none below) to Colonel (vast majority) to General Officers and an Ambassador. They represented varied interests: 4 MFA officers, including an ambassador, a member of the CPSU International Department, a physician, a Tass correspondent, two attaches who have been separately identified as being GRU officers, and 42 former Soviet service members. Some were interviewed in the company of Russian counterparts in Russia; others were interviewed in third countries without Russian participation. Every witness, without exception, stated that he had no knowledge of Soviet officials directly interrogating American POWs for intelligence or non-intelligence purposes. Many of the witnesses clearly stated that the North Vietnamese Government and military proscribed the Soviets from being at all involved with U.S. POWs. Some stated that the Soviets clearly wanted to, but absolutely could not, get information directly from U.S. POWs. At least several of the witnesses served in very senior positions in North Vietnam: two commanders of all Soviet technicians in Vietnam, one ambassador, and two attaches. Each of the senior personnel stated and supported the argument that their duty positions were so well-placed that, if POWs had be contacted or exploited by Soviet officials, they would have known about it.

Again, pursuit of information on this issue has led to the conclusion that the Soviet-North Vietnamese relationship during the Vietnam War was considerably worse that previously believed by U.S. analysts. At one time, the premise that POWs were interrogated by the Soviets was based on a perception of Soviet "superiority" in North Vietnam. It was assumed that the Soviets could simply ask for, or demand, access to one or more prisoners as a "senior ally." The scenario characterized by the Soviet witnesses, however, is that of a tense, formal, and sometimes cold relationship with their North Vietnamese counterparts. Most military officers

described the environment as “restricted” and “controlled,” and even the most senior officers could travel around North Vietnam only with permission and a North Vietnamese escort. Many senior Soviet military officers privately criticized the fact that the North Vietnamese seemed very “unappreciative” of the military assistance provided by the Soviet Union. These officers resented the fact that the North Vietnamese restricted Soviet access to crash sites, military equipment, and other sources of valuable technical intelligence. This is supported by information known to the U.S. Government suggesting that the North Vietnamese had a period of extreme anti-Soviet reaction in the late 1960s. The North Vietnamese were concerned with the amount of influence shown by the Soviets, and Hanoi conducted a “purge” by arresting and imprisoning North Vietnamese citizens who were suspected of leaning too closely toward Moscow. Most of those arrested were North Vietnamese citizens who underwent some sort of education in the Soviet Union. These circumstances portray a substantially different relationship than the one first estimated by American analysts.

This does not change the fact that Soviet technicians and intelligence officers had intelligence gathering objectives to fulfill. Both the senior-level personnel in Hanoi, as well as officers with working level contacts in ADA, aviation, and radio-technical units, had requirements to gather information on American equipment, tactics, and the performance of Soviet equipment against American equipment. Many former Soviet officers described going to crash sites, looking at American aircraft in a North Vietnamese “aircraft graveyard,” photographing and examining American equipment removed from crash sites, and gathering information from North Vietnamese pilots, ADA technicians, and field search teams. Many officers passed questions to be asked of American prisoners to their North Vietnamese counterparts. Sometimes this occurred at the working level (where a Soviet military major at an air base might pass specific questions to counterparts for the crew of a specific aircraft shot down on a specific date). At other times, these questions, some general and others specific, were passed via higher level exchanges in Hanoi. Some officers described the answers as coming back in days, others in weeks, and yet others complained that many questions went unanswered. In analyzing how Soviet officers gathered information in North Vietnam, one clear pattern emerges: every officer interviewed clearly stated that Soviet officers were forbidden from

approaching, talking to, questioning, or having any contact whatsoever with American prisoners. Several Soviet-era officers described seeing American POWs at crash sites, in hospitals, and in the streets of Hanoi, but the Soviet officers claimed they never spoke to the American POWs and knew nothing of their fate.

Regarding Russian documents. Among the documents formally passed to the U.S. side of the Commission by the Russian side, there is no first-hand, substantiated evidence suggesting Soviet contact, direct or indirect, with American POWs in Southeast Asia.

However, the documents are full of references to the difficult and restricted relations between and the Soviets. Documents have been received from MFA journals, MFA communication with Moscow, military assessments, and Soviet intelligence analysis. All of these sources describe the frequent problems of lack of North Vietnamese cooperation, restricted access, lack of reciprocity in executing formal relationships and agreements, and obstruction. Several documents include complaints about the Chinese having better and faster access to crash sites and information. One document included complaints that the North Vietnamese would not allow Soviet access to a crash site where new Soviet technology was successfully used for the first time against an air target. The documents available to date support the assertion that the Soviets did not have the authority or position to directly contact or exploit American prisoners.

Extracted portions of the GRU 7-volume study titled "U.S. Aggression in Southeast Asia" proved to be of much value to the Commission work because they represent a genuine, formerly classified reflection of Soviet intelligence holdings on U.S. forces in Vietnam. This meant that if the Soviets had direct access to American prisoners, or a constant flow of strategic information from them, such knowledge would be reflected in GRU intelligence analysis. Careful examination of the contents of the 7-volume study shows that the Soviets gathered a great deal of information from many intelligence sources: debriefs of North Vietnamese pilots, debriefs of ADA crews, information from North Vietnamese crash site search teams, radar and radio-electronic technical information, liaison information, and signals intelligence. There were fragmentary bits of information included in descriptions of certain incidents that suggested that the information was gathered from interrogations of American pilots. Such information was only

fragmentary, however, and it probably was available only in singular, unique circumstances. The study clearly lacked the detailed, strategically focused information that would have been available from the debriefs and interrogations of American air crew personnel if the Soviets had direct contact with American POWs.

From American intelligence holdings. In conjunction with the search for information on the transfer of prisoners to the former Soviet Union, a preliminary search was conducted in the holdings of the U.S. Intelligence Community for evidence, information, perhaps even credible rumors, of Soviet contact with American prisoners. It is inappropriate in this forum to discuss the specifics of the search.

The conclusion of this preliminary review is that American intelligence records contain limited information to suggest that the Soviets had direct or indirect contact with American POWs. The most critical part of the review was the examination of observations made by former Soviets, many of whom served as scientists, researchers, and engineers in the Soviet R&D system. Many former Soviets have provided accounts of having seen American equipment, manuals, and photographs while participating in highly classified programs at Soviet design bureaus and research institutes. None reported seeing or hearing, however, the kind of information associated with the interrogations or debriefings of American prisoners.

From former American prisoners of war in Vietnam. A review of the analytical work from the debriefings of returning American POWs has failed to support the assertion that the Soviets directly interrogated American prisoners. Among the nearly 600 returned POWs, none has ever reported being interrogated by a known or suspected Soviet official. There have been prisoner reports of questions posed by North Vietnamese interrogators which were clearly beyond the scope of Vietnamese capability and sophistication. The incidents described correlate with descriptions of the Soviets and Chinese passing questions for interrogation to the North Vietnamese. None of the POWs reported in their debriefings seeing any "third parties" thought to be Soviet or Chinese participants in interrogations. There are, however, examples of prisoners who were held in North Vietnam who had extensive and detailed knowledge of highly sensitive and classified electronic, aviation, nuclear, and other programs, who were never identified for

exploitation. Their information was of sufficient sensitivity to assume that, if the Soviets had a program of identifying and directly interrogating knowledgeable prisoners, they would have been among the first candidates.

Conclusions. In attempting to establish the validity of the thesis that the Soviets directly contacted American POWs, the first-hand, substantiated evidence gathered to date suggests that:

1. There is evidence that the Soviets were very interested in what American POWs knew as part of their overall interest in American equipment, tactics, and capabilities.
2. There is no substantiated evidence that a political decision to directly contact American POWs existed.
3. There is evidence that the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship was complicated, restricted, and cumbersome.
4. There is no first-hand, substantiated evidence that American POWs were directly interrogated or debriefed by Soviet officials.

Prospects. The U.S. side of the Commission continues to believe that interviews with former KGB officers, MFA officers, GRU officers, and other military officers are important. Though there is no first-hand, substantiated evidence that the Russians are concealing direct contact with American POWs, such interviews provide the best insight on what did and did not occur in Southeast Asia with American POWs. Interviews with KGB and GRU officers are the most desirable, since efforts to exploit Americans would have been done by specialists from these organizations. For example, it has been established that Soviet intelligence, specifically the KGB, received assessment information on senior-ranking American prisoners who were captive in Southeast Asia for use in potential recruitment operations after the war. There is no evidence that the Soviets acquired this information themselves. Such information precedes the question as to what the threshold of Soviet activities vis-à-vis American prisoners was: How much did Vietnamese intelligence share with the Soviets? How much did the Soviets ask for? How much did they receive? Such questions will probably only be answered when information is declassified for the historical record. Though this issue has not been investigated to a definitive

conclusion, a great deal of positive work has been done to dispel assumptions about the Soviet role in Southeast Asia.

ANALYTICAL ESSAY 3

Question 3: What information is available in Russian archives regarding names, numbers, status, fate, and policies in reference to the repatriation of American POWs in Southeast Asia?

Discussion. Question three resulted after the Russian side of the Commission presented the American side with two controversial documents. In the first document, dated 1971, a North Vietnamese official stated that "735" American POWs were being held. In the second document, dated 1972, another North Vietnamese official stated that 1,205 POWs were being held by the North Vietnamese. The numbers 1205 and 735 are higher than the 591 U.S. servicemen who were returned in early 1973 during Operation Homecoming.

There is debate within the U.S. side of the Commission as to whether the numbers cited in these reports are plausible. A coordinated interagency intelligence analysis released by the Department of Defense on 24 January 1994, casts doubt on the accuracy of the numbers in the Russian documents. Another analysis by U.S. Senator Bob Smith, released on 21 July 1993, lends credibility to the documents.

The controversy regarding the documents comes from the apparent contradictions over their validity. For example, the Russians have persistently claimed that the 1205 and 735 documents were genuine intelligence finds, and though they could not comment on the accuracy of the facts contained in these documents, they have attested to the validity of the source that provided the information. The Vietnamese have dismissed both documents as fabrication. In light of the fact that there is no evidence whatsoever that either of these documents was fabricated by the Russians, either in 1993 (when found) or 1971/2 (when acquired), this contradiction remains difficult to resolve.

Analysis and Preliminary Finding. The VWWG has received important GRU information concerning alleged wartime reports by Vietnamese officials on numbers, names, and policies regarding American POWs in Southeast Asia. We have also received from the archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense limited information concerning specific loss incidents involving American personnel during the Vietnam War. On balance, however, access to Russian

archival holdings has been sporadic and unpredictable, stopping far short of the thorough, systematic review that the U.S. side anticipated would be the bedrock of its research program. Efforts to improve this situation are among the highest priorities of the Commission and the VWWG.

The investigation of this issue to date has been based on the assumption that the Soviets had a definite interest in information about American POWs in Southeast Asia. An investigation was conducted (in Russian archives by the Russians) based on numerous presumptions about the likely nature of Soviet interest and inferences about where information gathered by the Soviets was reported. The memoirs of Andrey Gromyko and Henry Kissinger suggest that there were numerous high-level dialogues between the Soviet Union and the United States on issues concerning American POWs. These discussions ranged from requests that the Soviets intervene to requests that the Soviets provide for the transport of Red Cross packages to American POWs in Hanoi. The argument has been made that information known to the Soviets about American POWs was in many records. Therefore:

1. Information known to Soviet diplomatic personnel would be reflected in Vietnam-era MFA records in Moscow and in records of communications between the MFA in Moscow and Hanoi.
2. Information known to Soviet intelligence organizations would have been reflected in the Moscow intelligence holdings of both the American and Southeast Asian departments, First Chief Directorate, KGB, and the records of the GRU. Such information would also be reflected in the records of communications between Hanoi and the appropriate headquarters in Moscow.
3. Information known to military specialists and technicians would be reflected in the records of the 10th Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, as well as in records of communications between Hanoi and the General Staff in Moscow.

4. Information known to members of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party would be in the CPSU records and may well be in records of information provided to the Politburo.
5. Information may also have been stored in the records of other Soviet institutions which may have had some involvement in the policy and military aspects of the war in Vietnam. If American POWs had been transported to the Soviet Union, records of maritime, rail, or air transportation may have contained critical information. If POWs had been interrogated by Soviet officials, information may exist with air defense, aviation, research and development, and other Soviet institutions that may have benefited from the information acquired. The Soviet Red Cross, United Nations Observer Group Members, and other Soviet participants in international or relief organizations may have had information stored in their records.

Based on the above presumptions, archival searches have been requested from a broad array of Russian archives and institutions. Requests for archival searches, however, have been complicated by a number of reasons:

Since almost all archival searches have been conducted by the Russians, there remains a disparity between perceptions on both sides as to the degree and depth to which searches should be conducted. The American side, for obvious reasons, desires that the search be conducted in as much depth and detail as possible with the aim of capturing any small piece of information from any source, no matter how obscure. The Russians, who are critically short of resources to conduct searches on so broad a scale, require narrow lines of inquiry in order to use their limited resources effectively. In the long run, it will be difficult to define when the search for information is "complete."

The question of archival searches is further complicated by the issue of direct versus tangential knowledge. The 1205 document and the 735 document are illustrations of this problem. The information on POWs contained in the 1205 and 735 documents was not the direct information sought by the Soviets when the documents were acquired. Rather, it was tangential information received during the acquisition of information about the inner workings of the North Vietnamese Government. It is probable that information on American POWs in Soviet archives

is not in file folders marked "information on American POWs." Rather, the information of importance to the Commission is likely buried in documents in other categories, such as, communication between Moscow and Hanoi, working notes, information gathering efforts against the North Vietnamese, Soviet policy papers on Vietnam, and so on. This has made the search for information much more difficult, especially given the lack of resources available to our Russian colleagues.

One additional aspect to the process of searching for documents is the reluctance that some archivists may feel toward making public documents that are potentially damaging. In 1993 the disclosure of these documents drew a great deal of attention from the American press and was loud enough to cause friction between Russia and Vietnam. Such a dynamic can only have the effect of causing some to be reluctant to reveal information that may be sensational at face value.

A final source of confusion is the long series of denials from the Russian side. The Russians persistently claim that their archives contain no additional information about American POWs in Vietnam. An example of this is confusion resulting from statements by the KGB and GRU in 1992 that their archives contained no information about American prisoners. However, since 1992, the GRU has provided many references in documents about American shootdowns which included information on the fate of the American aircrews. However, the evidence indicates that the information available to the GRU was tangential to the information they held on the American air war over Southeast Asia. This again leaves the ambiguous question: where should the search for other tangential information be focused?

The search for documents on American POWs in Southeast Asia has been conducted by the Commission for more than four years. The investigation is not complete, though the principal lines of inquiry have been exhausted. The documents provided to date have contained information which allow for the following observations:

Many documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and documents reflecting reports sent to the Soviet leadership, characterize the strained relationship between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. In some cases, the Soviets accuse the North Vietnamese of not living up to

agreements between the two countries, of obstructing and frustrating Soviet efforts to examine crash sites, and of allowing the Chinese to strip crash sites before the Soviets even arrived. Some documents include statements that that the Soviets had waited “months” for technical equipment to be packaged and released for shipment to the Soviet Union. The documents also reflect the perception that lower, working-level relationships between Soviet and North Vietnamese personnel were basically functional and cordial, but higher-level exchanges and contacts were strained, insincere, and at times adversarial. In one report to Leonid Brezhnev from the Minister of Defense, the Soviets praised the shutdown of an American aircraft in North Vietnam by a new Soviet missile system, yet detailed information on the shutdown was promised only “if” the Soviets were “allowed” to visit the crash site by their North Vietnamese colleagues.

The documents provided to date do not support the characterization of the Soviets as the “elder” ally of the North Vietnamese. Documents from diplomatic and Politburo leaders demonstrate that the Soviets informed and advised the North Vietnamese on many issues, but there is no evidence that the Soviets instructed or dictated policy to the North Vietnamese. The Soviets consulted the North Vietnamese before replying to American requests to intervene in issues concerning the war. Many documents show that the North Vietnamese “requested” support from the Soviets and “thanked” them for it, but there are also many references to the North Vietnamese pursuing their own policies and decisions in complete disregard of Soviet positions.

The documents provided to date have substantiated the concerted effort by the Soviets to gather American technical equipment and information. One document stated that the Soviets had worked to acquire more than 700 pieces of American equipment.

Several documents provided to date have stated that information about, and acquired from, U.S. POWs was passed to Soviet officials. Yet many leads pursued in Ministry of Defense archives have failed to produce these documents. Both the former-KGB and the GRU claim not to have any such documents in their holdings.

The documents demonstrate that Soviet members of international observer groups and journalists had contact with American POWs. The Commission has established, through the

interview of a former Soviet MFA officer who served in Vietnam, that the Soviet Government encouraged "independent" observers from international observer groups, as well as Czech, East German, French, and Soviet journalists, to meet with prisoners at opportunities staged by the North Vietnamese. Such activities supported the Soviet effort to gain maximum propaganda from the American involvement in Indochina.

Conclusions. The question regarding information available in Russian archives remains a difficult one. Evidence gathered to date suggests that:

1. The Soviets gathered and received information on American POWs in Southeast Asia.
2. The Soviets conducted a focused and centralized gathering effort for information known to American POWs.
3. The Soviet-Vietnamese relationship almost certainly was complicated, restricted and, cumbersome.
4. The search for documents is not near completion, given the likelihood that the information most critical to the work of the Commission is hidden in other files regarding Soviet involvement, policies, and political views on the war in Vietnam.

Prospects. No different than the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War is nearing the point where scholars, historians, and participants will be ready to write a more in-depth history of the Vietnam War from the communist perspective. Much of this effort will be based on new access to both Russian and American archives. Access to some documents has been granted by a new sense of openness, while access to others results from their eventual declassification. Current efforts include the Cold War International History Project and works such as "The Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations" by Ilya Gaiduk of the Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences.

The final word on this issue is the need for balance. Both sides have consistently pledged to support the mutual work done by the VWWG. For the American side, this means continuing to focus the search as narrowly and precisely as possible so as not to overextend the sparse resources available to the Russians. As for the Russian side, it is hoped that the searches are

conducted as thoroughly as possible with thought given to the likelihood that the documents sought will not be identified by the name on the file folder.

The true historical record on this issue requires more evidence from former Soviet archives. There are many documents that must, at least hypothetically, be available in holdings from the period of the Vietnam War.

1. Documents which directed the Soviet propaganda effort during the war.
2. Documents which dictated policy regarding contact with American POWs.
3. Documents which concerned contact with American POWs.
4. Documents which itemized Soviet information gathering priorities in Southeast Asia.

From the Russian perspective, since the above documents do not contain information that directly answer the questions pursued by the VWVG, there is no reason to declassify and publicize them. While researcher access to these documents would not further the resolution of cases of missing Americans in Southeast Asia, such access would assist in writing the historical record of the Vietnam War.

ANALYTICAL ESSAY 4

Question 4: What information is known to citizens of the former Soviet Union that may improve American understanding and analysis of specific incidents of loss in Southeast Asia?

Discussion. The information gathered on specific incidents of loss in Vietnam is an important accomplishment of the Commission's past work, and it represents the area of significant potential for the future.

The U.S. maintains a commitment to the families of all missing servicemembers that the cases regarding the loss of American servicemembers will be investigated until the "fullest possible accounting" has been completed. The establishment of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs added a new dimension to the investigation: the eyewitness accounts of the Soviet personnel who served in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War. We have also gained some access to information from the formerly classified holdings of Soviet military and intelligence services that served in Southeast Asia during the war.

Analysis. Preliminary Finding: Information from citizens of the former Soviet Union has substantially added to American understanding of certain events surrounding specific incidents of loss in Southeast Asia.

The legacy of the Soviet presence throughout Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War is a trail of documents and witnesses that provide detailed information about specific incidents of loss. During more than four years of investigation, the VWWG has received information on specific incidents from the following types of sources:

1. The 7-volume GRU study contained literally dozens of references on the fate of aircrew shot down over Southeast Asia. The GRU has also provided a second, two-page summary of American loss incidents over Southeast Asia which also included anecdotal information on the fate of the aircrews.
2. A Russian journalist provided a list of shootdown incidents from his personal notes. The information was gathered during his tour as a journalist in Southeast Asia and included

descriptions of the fliers, who were mentioned by name, being presented to foreign journalists by the North Vietnamese.

3. A senior retired Russian military officer provided a copy of a map on which he had conducted a statistical analysis of American loss incidents during the period of his service in Southeast Asia.
4. Several retired Soviet military officers provided specific information on losses from their personal notebooks, diaries, photograph collections, and other resources. Items provided to investigators for the Commission include photographs of identification cards of downed fliers; photographs of prisoners of war; photographs of equipment removed from American crash sites; and diary pages reflecting questions asked, and the information received, in the interrogation of American POWs by North Vietnamese officers.
5. Many witnesses have provided personal accounts of seeing POWs in Southeast Asia and of specific shootdown incidents over Southeast Asia.

A thorough review and analysis of information gleaned from documents and witnesses allows for several preliminary conclusions:

Anecdotal information on the fate of American pilots are in many Russian documents.

The documents reviewed to date suggest that anecdotal information about the fate of American aircrews was scattered through many Soviet records including pilot debriefings, radio-technical reports, reports on the acquisition of American equipment, possible signal intelligence products, and reports gathered from the Soviet technicians who were assigned down to the regimental level in North Vietnamese aviation and air defense units. Documents allegedly destroyed by the GRU in 1975 probably contained a great deal of information that would have been valuable to the work of the Commission (the GRU ordered a housecleaning in 1975 during which it is alleged that all primary intelligence source documents on which the GRU 7-volume study was based, were destroyed).

In practically every instance Russian witnesses reported only on air loss incidents that occurred over North Vietnam. Virtually all Russian witnesses who have provided information to date have described air incidents over North Vietnam. There has been little information on losses in South Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos, and no information has been collected from Russian sources on ground losses or on aircraft that went down over water. Some witnesses described seeing aircraft go down over Laos from vantage points in North Vietnam, but there is no evidence of Soviet involvement with captures that occurred in Laos. There is no first-hand, substantiated evidence to suggest that the Soviets in North Vietnam had the access or opportunity to gather information on losses outside of North Vietnam.

A review of all documents and testimonials received to date allow for the following observations:

1. Russian documents and witnesses have provided information on the capture of 90 American personnel during shootdowns of U.S. aircraft. Some were captured in single incidents, others in groups from one aircrew. Thirty-five of these reports match the exact circumstances of capture of American personnel, 46 reports roughly match the circumstances of capture of American personnel, and 9 reported cases of capture could not be correlated to an American loss incident. This is roughly a 90 percent correlation. There were no cases where Russian sources reported a capture and American records showed a killed or missing service member.
2. Russian documents and witnesses reported information on 23.6% of the cases (259 reports on incidents of loss out of 1,097), the total number of air loss incidents over North Vietnam. This statistic does not exclude possible redundancy in some reports, which is impossible to verify without more precise information. The highest amount of reporting occurred in 1972, in which Russian sources reported on 115 out of 128 air loss incidents. This may be explained by the fact that Russian reports from 1972 contained large numbers of broad statistics (with claims of as many as 57 aircraft shootdowns in one seven-day period in December 1972; again, redundancies are impossible to detect).
3. The review conducted to date does not suggest a higher or lower level of Soviet information gathering activity during any particular period of the war. The type and amount of

information gathered by Soviet technicians seems to be more a result of the duty position, specialization, level of initiative, and curiosity of the individual technician/military officer performing duties in a battery or airwing.

4. From the reports of two Russian witnesses, the U.S. Government has learned additional information verifying the deaths of two American servicemembers shot down during the war in Vietnam. The cases involved two shootdowns: one of an EB-66, the other of an F-4. In both cases, though there was evidence that the two missing American crewmen perished, no remains had been recovered. The Russian witnesses provided additional important information that clarified certain circumstances regarding the case. Though the testimonials of the witnesses are not in themselves conclusive, they are important to the overall analytical assessment of the incidents of loss and are considered significant contributions to the work of the Commission.

Conclusions. The investigative work of the Commission has sought to gather every available scrap of information on incidents of loss in Vietnam. Evidence gathered to date suggests that:

1. There is evidence that the Soviets gathered and received voluminous information that included data on the fate of American servicemembers.
2. There is no evidence that the Soviets had a focused or centralized information collection effort on the fate of American POWs.
3. It remains difficult to conclude that the search for witnesses is nearing conclusion. In fact, the American side of the Commission has many names of Soviet veterans of service during the war in Vietnam who have yet to be interviewed. These witnesses may be capable of providing information that is important to the work of the Commission.

Prospects. Both sides of the Commission agree that many Soviet witnesses to events in Southeast Asia remain to be identified and interviewed. Former Soviet witnesses have provided very unique perspectives to the work of examining individual cases: personal photographs; personal diaries; recollections of exchanges with North Vietnamese counterparts; first-hand observations; even manuscripts for books. Though it is impossible to expect that the Commission can interview every former Soviet veteran of the war in Vietnam, there are methods by which knowledgeable witnesses can be identified and interviewed. These include working with veterans organizations and acquiring leads from the continued search for relevant documents. The success of the Commission is measured by the resolution or illumination of cases for the families of missing servicemembers. Therefore, it is this line of investigation that holds the critical potential for achieving results that reflect the highest aims of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

APPENDIX A

Summary of documents received by the Joint Commission Support Directorate

of the Defense POW/MIA Office concerning the Vietnam War

- TFR 1-15 Document dated 20 November 1972, requesting approval to send LTC Nechiporenko TDY to Vietnam for 14 days. Signed by LTG Mortin, Chief First Main Directorate, KGB.
- TFR 1-16 Document dated 7 February 1974 requesting approval to send LTC Nechiporenko TDY to Vietnam for 14 days. Signed by LTG Mortin, Chief First Main Directorate, KGB.
- TFR 2-152-153 A document dated 14 May 1992 and signed by Lezhikov which contains a list of 41 names yielded after checking against a list of 3,752 US servicemen and other foreigners who are listed as missing in South East Asia between 1922-1968.
- TFR 3-2-3 Document dated 10 November 1967 addressed to the CPSU CC and signed by Andropov regarding a Japanese pacifist organization's desire to spirit four US Navy defectors from the Aircraft carrier Intrepid out of Japan to Europe, via the Soviet Union. Andropov recommends support for the plan. Duplicate of TFR 32-17 to 32-18.
- TFR 3-5-10 Series of documents tracking the status of the four deserters/ defectors referenced in TFR 3-1 to 3-4. These documents are duplicated in TFR 32.
- TFR 3-11-21 A series of documents dated April-May 1968 and circulated between the CPSU CC and Andropov regarding the Japanese pacifist organization's continued work in transporting US deserters/defectors to the Soviet Union. Duplicated in TFR 32.
- TFR 24-1-2 Undated report to General Volkogonov from the Foreign Intelligence Service reporting on the work done in their archives. States that the 510 list was passed to Senators Kerry and Smith in February 1992, that there is no information available on Cold War era shootdowns, that they searched for information on individuals on the list of 3,752 individuals that was passed to them from the Americans, and that the Foreign Intelligence Service afforded Smith and Kerry the opportunity to meet with Nechiporenko and Sorokin.

- TFR 32-2-5 Brezhnev's copy of a 31 July 1965 Ministry of Foreign Affairs classified and coded telegram from Hanoi outlining the successes of the first combat operations by Soviet SAM units in North Vietnam, 24-25 July 1965. Report indicates that the Vietnamese were pleased and that one US pilot was captured during this period. Signed by Shcherbakov.
- TFR 32-6 Brezhnev's copy of a 26 July 1965 GRU classified and coded telegram from Hanoi which reports on Soviet SAM operations on 24 and 26 July 1965. Report submitted by Major Ivanov. The first entry indicates that on 26 July 1965 in the area of Sontay, two US aircraft (one U-2, other unk) were shot down. The second entry reports on the engagement of three F-4Cs on 24 July 1965, during which at least one US pilot was captured and another one of the aircraft went down in Laos.
- TFR 32-7-8 Brezhnev's copy of a 25 August 1965 Ministry of Foreign Affairs classified and coded telegram from Hanoi that reports on the combat operations of Soviet SAM units deployed to North Vietnam. The report indicates that on 4 August 1965, four US aircraft were shot down south of Hanoi in the vicinity of Ninh Binh, with two US pilots being captured. In a summary of the activity, the report shows that since 24 July 1965, the first regiment had conducted five combat operations, expended 18 missiles, and shot down 14 enemy aircraft. Signed by Shcherbakov.
- TFR 32-9-13 A November 1966 unclassified report from General Major of Aviation Lebedev, Soviet Defense Attaché in Hanoi, on the strained relations between the Soviets and the Vietnamese in 1965-1966. Lebedev discusses the pro-Chinese orientation of the Vietnamese leadership and the difficulty the Soviet military had in obtaining access to the results of technical exploitation of US technology. He states that the Vietnamese are asking for detailed strategic information on the US that is of no value to the Vietnamese, so the requests must actually be coming from the Chinese.
- TFR 32-14 A ministry of Foreign Affairs memo signed by Gromyko, dated 21 April 1967 to the Central Committee, informing its members that the US Embassy had requested the Soviet Government approach the Vietnamese Government on the issue of allowing the International Red Cross access to US POWs in Vietnam. The MFA recommended denying the US request and informing the Vietnamese of their answer to the US.
- TFR 32-15-16 Undated response to the US informing that the Soviets are denying the request related in TFR 32-14.

- TFR 32-51-52 Document dated 25 November 1967 from KGB Chairman Andropov to the Central Committee recommending measures to be taken in response to continued US aggression in Vietnam.
- TFR 32-53-54 Note dated 27 November 1967 recording the Central Committee's vote on Andropov's proposal made in TFR 32-51 to 32-52.
- TFR 32-55-57 Documents dated July 1968 to the Central Committee informing them that another group of US deserters arrived in Moscow. Three Army soldiers deserted from Japan, one of which turned himself into the US Embassy, Moscow.
- TFR 32-58-59 Directive from the Central Committee dated 5 June 1969, outlining how to respond to the US Embassy's latest request for Soviet assistance in opening the door for International Red Cross access to US POWs held in North Vietnam.
- TFR 32-6-61 Document dated 3 July 1970 on the Soviet intelligence effort in Hanoi during the second quarter of 1970. Signed by Katro.
- TFR 32-62-63 A 28 March 1972 MFA memo discussing the issue of the delivery of US mail and parcels through the Soviet Union to American POWs in North Vietnam.
- TFR 32-64-65 Document dated 26 September 1972 from the MFA informing the Central Committee that three freed US POWs are transiting Moscow to the US.
- TFR 32-66-67 Document dated 16 January 1986 detailing US-Vietnamese discussions in January 1986. The detail of the report suggests that the Soviets had good access to North Vietnamese government information.
- TFR 130-1 List entitled "List of Documents Regarding American Citizens Imprisoned in the DRV". Lists documents contained in this TFR.
- TFR 130-2 Document dated 21 April 1967 addressed to the Central Committee of the CPSU and signed by Gromyko forwarding a US request to implore the DRV to allow International Red Cross access to US POWs in Vietnam. Gromyko proposes to decline the US request and respond to the US verbally. Draft verbal response is in TFR 130-3.
- TFR 130-3 Undated draft verbal response to the US request of 11 April 1967 imploring the Soviet Union to use its influence with North Vietnam to allow International Red Cross access to US POWs. States that North Vietnam is a sovereign country and if the USA wants something from

them, they need to deal directly with the North Vietnamese. Soviets feel that to appeal on a humanitarian issue like this is extremely impertinent when daily bombings of innocent civilians is conducted by the US.

- TFR 130-4 Letter dated 5 June 1969 addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party with recommendations on handling the US request, delivered by Jacob Beam, to act as an intermediary with North Vietnam in the POW issue. Recommends that the request be coordinated with the North Vietnamese before any action is taken.
- TFR 130-5 Central Committee of the CPSU decree dated 6 June 1969 approving the draft directive to the Soviet Ambassador in Vietnam on the US inquiry on the POW issue contained in TFR 130-4.
- TFR 130-6 Russian translation of a letter from US Ambassador Jacob Beam to Gromyko dated 1 June 1970 forwarding a copy of House Concurrent Resolution 582 which concerns the treatment of US POWs in SE Asia.
- TFR 130-7-8 Russian translation of House Concurrent Resolution 582 that was forwarded with TFR 130-6.
- TFR 130-9 English version of TFR 130-6 dated 1 June 1970, but with handwritten Russian notations.
- TFR 130-10 English version of House Concurrent Resolution 582 dated 19 January 1970.
- TFR 130-11 Note dated 26 September 1972 to the Central Committee of the CPSU informing that three US pilots freed by the Vietnamese are going to be transiting through Moscow enroute to Stockholm. Accompanying them are family members and anti-war activists. The US asks for permission to contact them to aid in their return to the US. The note states that the returning pilots be told of the US request and to allow this to happen only if the repatriates are willing to do so.
- TFR 130-12 Draft Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU dated 26 September 1972 agreeing with the recommendations set forth in TFR 130-11.
- TFR 130-13-14 Two page MFA document dated 16 January 1986 reporting on the visit of a high ranking US delegation to Vietnam. States that the MIA issue and the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea were the subjects of conversation. The Vietnamese wanted the US not to tie the MIA issue together with the normalization of relations with Vietnam. Upon the US delegation return to the USA, a statement was issued that relations would

not be normalized until the MIA issue is resolved. The Vietnamese believe that this ran counter to the agreements reached in Hanoi during the visit.

TFR 136-1-3

Three page summary of the 15 September 1972 report to the Vietnamese Politburo by the Deputy Chief of the Vietnamese People's Army General Staff, Tran Van Quang, on American POWs. Unsigned and undated, but stamped with a CPSU Central Committee stamp dated 1 December 72.

TFR 136-4-10

Partial text of the report by General Tran Van Quang referenced in TFR 136-1. Many pages of this report appear to be missing. The report starts on page 17 and abruptly ends on page 22. These are the documents published by Izvestia and the NY Times on 10 and 12 April 1993 respectively, and have become the focus of high interest.

TFR 136-11-14

Four page document dated 14 March 1967 which states that there is a group of Soviet specialists in Vietnam collecting and analyzing captured US equipment and technical documents. States that the Soviets have received over 700 pieces of US military equipment to include: parts of aircraft, missiles, radio electronics, photo reconnaissance, and other types of equipment. The Vietnamese say that the Soviets have received only 417 pieces. In spite of the great benefit to both the Soviet Union and North Vietnam of this group, the Vietnamese are making work very difficult. States that when the Soviets go to a crash site, the trip is prolonged and round about. Says that the Chinese also get involved and are a hindrance to their work. Cites one example when the Soviets visited a site where an (improved model) reconnaissance aircraft crashed in January 1967. When they got there, the Chinese had already stripped it of anything valuable and had prepared the aircraft remains for demolition. In order to smooth the Russians' anger, the Vietnamese gave them a Shrike missile which they had been trying to get for a long time. States that the Vietnamese bureaucracy bogs down the specialists' work. Takes from 2-3 months from when the equipment is collected before they can finally ship it to the Soviet Union. States that there are friendly relations with the Vietnamese. Says they get more done unofficially than through official channels by dealing with the individual as opposed to the bureaucracy. Apparently, there was an agreement between the Soviets and the Vietnamese that the Vietnamese were not adhering to closely. The Soviet specialists were to be informed monthly of the combat situation, aerial combats and be given the interrogation reports of captured American pilots and information on ECM effects against American missiles and aerial tactics. Sums up that something must be done to improve the ability of the Soviet specialists to do their work.

TFR 136-15-17

Excerpt from the diary of I.S. Shcherbakov, Soviet Ambassador to North Vietnam. This excerpt is a three page transcript of a meeting with Nguyen Duy Chinh, dated 23 July 1970. Chinh is the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam. The Soviets originally requested to meet with Le Duan, but were told that Duan is ill. The Vietnamese were given a letter from Brezhnev offering assistance in constructing a mausoleum for Ho Chi Minh. There is discussion about the design and construction of the mausoleum, and whether or not Ho Chi Minh's body will be displayed during the 25th anniversary of the DRV celebration. States that the CC CPSU has agreed to accept Chan Khyu Zyk and Bin' Fyong [phonetic] into Moscow in August for medical treatment. Xuan Thui has returned from Paris and briefed the DRV government about the activities of the delegation he headed in Paris. The analysis of the latest steps of the Nixon Administration leads the Vietnamese to believe that Nixon may pull out 50 thousand American troops by October of this year, in connection with the US elections. The possibility of the withdrawal of 150 thousand American troops by Spring of next year remains for the Vietnamese simply words. The alleged letter by 89 American senators addressed to Pham Van Dong has still not been received, but the report about the letter has attracted Vietnamese interest. Nguyen thi Binh, Foreign Minister for the Provisional Revolutionary Council of the Republic of South Vietnam made a successful trip to India, in the opinion of both the North Vietnamese and the Soviets. Nguyen thi Binh will be leaving for a trip to Ceylon on the invitation of Sirimavo Bandarananke. Discussion about two South Vietnamese traitors and American attempts to use them in a "sensational disclosure." The USSR and Eastern European Dept. advisor Nguyen Tan, Dang Dich Khoi and USSR Embassy attaché Kuz'minov.

TFR 136-18-22

A five page memorandum, dated 1 September 1971, on the history and current status of US-Vietnamese contacts, from 31 March 1968 when Johnson discontinued bombing north of the 20th parallel to the date of issue of the memorandum. On 26 July 1971, Kissinger lays out a three phase plan to the North Vietnamese for stabilizing the situation in Vietnam. The first phase of the plan calls for a mutual declaration of principles. One of the points of this declaration is the release and return of all POWs.

TFR 136-22A-50

Selective 29 page excerpt from a political summary for the year 1970 by the USSR Embassy in North Vietnam. Discussion of how North Vietnam is integrating into the international socialist camp; of the evolution of Vietnamese political thought in relation to Soviet and Chinese thinking; about the economic climate, including a detailed account of Soviet financial and technical aid; and about Soviet military assistance. States

that in a number of cases, the Vietnamese have begun to better inform the Soviets about actions taken and, as an example, the transfer of lists of American POWs. Contains a table of foreign aid in rubles given by Socialist Countries to Vietnam, for the years 1970 and 1971 (expected). Discusses the lack of trust on the part of the Vietnamese and the obstacles that the Vietnamese set up which prevent better Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The document ends with conclusions and suggestions for improving the political and economic relations with Vietnam.

Note: TFR 136-22A is a result of this page being skipped over during the initial numbering of the document.

TFR 136-51-58 Excerpt from the diary of I. S. Shcherbakov, Soviet Ambassador to North Vietnam. This excerpt is an eight page transcript of a meeting with Khoang Van Tien, dated 17 January 1973. Tien is the Deputy Foreign Minister of the DRV. Begins with overview of current political situation surrounding American involvement in Vietnam. Next is a description of the Kissinger - Le Duc Tho talks of 8-13 January 1973 concerning the wording, and signing and concerning various points of a treaty to be signed 27 January. This is followed by a discussion concerning whom the Vietnamese will inform about the contents of these talks. There is also a discussion about the situation in the other Indonesian countries and about Vietnamese-Cambodian relations. States that the Soviets are willing to assist in clearing North Vietnamese ports of mines. The Vietnamese believe that Washington should be responsible for this. The discussion ends with the Soviets asking how the Vietnamese will celebrate their victory. The Vietnamese answer that they are more pre-occupied with ensuring that the US live up to the agreement, with attracting international assistance in rebuilding North and South Vietnam, and with making sure that the South Vietnamese revolution withstands to the end.

TFR 179-1-2 Two pages of undated, but recent documents summarizing the shutdown and capture of aviators in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Gives dates and reports that 94-97 aircraft were shot down and 58 aviators were captured from 24 July 65 through 27 June 1972. This appears to be a recent Russian analysis from other documents and was probably prepared specifically for the August Joint Commission meeting.

TFR 179-3-5 Three page undated report of Hoang Anh, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, to its 20th Plenum which was held at the end of December 70 to the beginning of January 1971. Reports that the total number of captured American pilots in the DRV is 735.

- TFR 186-1-12 Twelve page undated report covering the activities of the International Investigatory Commission's 16 July - 1 August 1970 trip to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Commission consisted of G. Frank of Sweden and A.I. Poltorak (report author). They met with several North Vietnamese Commissions to include the Commission investigating US war crimes. They were taken to various sights where these alleged crimes took place, met with locals, and were given the opportunity to talk to three US aviators and one deserter. No names given.
- TFR 186-13-16 Four page Russian translation of a North Vietnamese document dated 10 February 1971 accusing the US of violating numerous Geneva Accords, escalating the war, being military adventurers, and spreading imperialist aggression in Laos and Cambodia.
- TFR 186-17-19 Three page document dated 16 January 1969 from the journal of S. Divil'kovskij, a Soviet Embassy Advisor to North Vietnam detailing meetings that he had with Ngyuen Fu Soaem, the representative of the People's Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (PFLSV) during the 30 December 1968 to 3 January 1969 period. Nothing related to POW/MIAs.
- TFR 186-20-22 Three page document from the journal of G.V. Cheshev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in North Vietnam, dated 31 January 1969 detailing a meeting that he had on 23 January 1969 with Vladislav Baduryj. It lists the four-point American-Saigon program that is to be discussed at the conference in Paris, touches on the role the Chinese are playing in supplying the PFLSV with weapons and looks at the Buddhist/Catholic religious dilemma.
- TFR 186-23-26 Four page document dated 29 September 1969 that reviews the military operations being conducted by the US backed Vietnamese and Suvanno Fyma forces and the Patriotic Front of Laos who are supported by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It looks at the objectives of the operations, how they were backed, who supported them, and their success or failure.
- TFR 186-27-31 Five page document dated 29 September 1969 that reviews the situation in Laos in the areas controlled by the leftist group Neo Lao Khak Sat (NLKHS), who are supported by China and the DRV, looks at their operational objectives, and successes. It reviews the role of the International Control Commission and the problems it faces in Southeast Asia.

- TFR 186-32-33 Two page document dated 2 February 1971 from the journal of I. S. Shcherbakov, Soviet Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), detailing his meeting with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRV Khoang Van Tien. US military operations and objectives in Southern Laos were discussed.
- TFR 186-34-35 Two page document dated 12 November 1970 from the journal of I. M. Merkulov, Advisor to the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, detailing his meeting with Ta Khyu Kan, the Deputy Director of Soviet and Eastern European Department. Kan presented an upgrade in postal privileges for arrested American fliers, the attempts by American millionaires to manipulate world opinion against the DRV and asked for Soviet aid to counter it.
- TFR 186-36 One page document dated 13 November 1970 from the journal of M. P. Isaev, Secretary of the Southeast Asia Department of the USSR MID, detailing a meeting with the First Secretary of the DRV Embassy in the USSR Ngyuen Van Kuang concerning the new humanitarian measures taken for captured US Fliers.
- TFR 186-37-40 Four page document dated 25 February 1971 detailing the meeting between the Deputy Director of the South-East Asia Department of the MID USSR V. P. Vdovin and the advisor sent to Moscow by the DRV Embassy Vu Tuan. Tuan reported on the situations in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam concerning South Vietnamese and American forces and their activities as well as the activities of the patriots (North Vietnam). He requested that the Soviets speak out on his behalf at the Red Cross Conference and support their position on the American POW issue.
- TFR 186-41 Message dated 12 January 1971 from the Soviet Ambassador to the DRV for routing a letter.
- TFR 186-42-43 Letter dated 31 December 1970 to the General Secretary of the TsK KPSS USSR Brezhnev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin from the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Worker's Party Le Zuan and the Prime Minister of the DRV Fam Van Dong. It thanks the Soviets for their support at the recent Warsaw Pact meeting and the recent statement made by the Soviet Government stating its support of the Worker's Party and the government of the DRV.
- TFR 186-44-45 Two page document dated 18 May 1971 detailing the meeting between the Deputy Director of the South-East Asia Department MID USSR Yu. I. Kuznetsov and DRV Embassy advisor Vu Toan. Toan requests permission for the VIP aircraft, carrying the DRV Deputy Prime Minister and other

state officials to the XIV session of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in Prague, to make a stop in Irkutsk to take on a Soviet navigator and food and for a stop over in Moscow on the return flight. He also asks the Soviets to support the DRV position on American POWs at the upcoming Red Cross Conference in Geneva.

- TFR 186-46-49 Document dated 1 July 1971 from the journal of I. S. Shcherbakov detailing his meeting with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the DRV Ngyuen Ko Tkhat. Reports on Le Dak Tho and Suan Tkhyui's meeting with Kissinger in Paris on 26 June 1971 and reiterates the North Vietnamese position for ending the war. Emphatically states that the release of US POWs will start and end on the same days that the withdraw of US and allied forces starts/ends.
- TFR 186-50 Note dated 23 July 1971 requesting that K.V. Rusakov prepare a proposal in reference to TFR 186-52.
- TFR 186-51 Note dated 6-7 July 1971 to V Chebrikov in reference to TFR 186-53.
- TFR 186-52 Letter from the Deputy Chairman of the KGB V. Chebrikov dated 2 July 1971 approving the proposal from M. V. Zakharov to create Aeroflot flights in association with the FRG firm "Ostturist" for flying passengers from Hanoi to Paris via Moscow. He requests that, since this will include the transport of about 5,000 people, the topic of organizing a transfer of American POWs could arise and would like the point of view of the DRV to be clarified.
- TFR 186-53 The proposal made by M. Zakharov (mentioned in TFR 186-52) for Aeroflot to develop charter routes from Peking to any destination in Europe. Knoblokh, director of the German tourist firm "Ostturist", arrived in Paris to conclude the contract on 26 June 1971. The Aeroflot representatives in Paris have come to the conclusion that the topic of discussion is the organization of the transfer of American POWs. They believe that the DRV and USA are in the process of, or have already, agreed to free them.
- TFR 186-54 Letter dated 20 July 1971 from B. Bugaev from the office of the Civil Aviation Ministry USSR to the TsK KPSS stating that the proposed chartered flights are not desirable because the Chinese would in turn make the same request for routes to Europe. He states that the civil aviation is ready to fly the chartered route of Hanoi-Vientiene-Calcutta-Karachi-Tashkent-Moscow-Paris (or another unspecified European city). Permission from third party countries (Burma, Pakistan) would be required along with a contract, no less than 16 days prior to the flight.

TFR 186-55-56

Letter dated 3 August 1971 and signed by the Head of the Department for Administrative agencies TsK KPSS North Savinkin, Deputy Head of the Department of the TsK KPSS for ties with Communist and Worker's Parties in Socialist States O. Rakhmanin, and the Deputy Head of the International Department of the TsK KPSS R. Ul'yanovskij to the TsK KPSS (with reference to TFR 186-52, -53, -54) voices concern on project due to ambiguities in the origin and terminal locations, number of passengers and their nationalities etc., and suggest that the proposal not be adopted.

TFR 186-57

List dated 18 August 1993 of the documents found in TFR 186-52 to 186-55 with archival designators showing document number, document content, search information and number of pages.

TFR 210-2

Volume 1

TFR 210-3

States that the first aerial combat of the war was on 4 April 1965 when the flight of North Vietnamese Captain Khan' discovered a group of four F-105s at 3,000 meters and shot down one of them. The second pair of Captain Khan's group also shot down one F-105 which crashed into the sea. No locations given for this combat.

The second aerial combat of the war was on 4 June 1965 in the area of Bu-Ban between a flight of MiG-17s and three F-4Hs. The Vietnamese gave credit for the shootdown of the lead F-4H which crashed in Laos.

The third battle of the war was on 17 June 1965 in the area of Nin'-Bin' was between a flight of MiG-17s and a flight of F-4Hs. As a result of this battle, two F-4Hs were shot down. Of the four Vietnamese fighters, only one returned to base. Two of the MiG-17s were abandoned when they ran out of fuel and one made a forced landing at the Haiphong airfield. States that in previous combat, there was mass confusion in the air.

TFR 210-4

Another air battle occurred on 20 September 1965 in the area of the train station at Kep, 60 kilometers northeast of Hanoi. The alert flight of MiG-17s was scrambled from Noi-Bai to intercept a flight of F-4Bs that was going to attack the rail station. As a result of this combat, an F-4B that was making a bomb run on the station was shot down. The two-man crew of this F-4B was killed when their aircraft impacted.

This page then goes on to generally summarize the results of combat in 1965. It states that the MiG-17 was successful against F-105s and F-4Hs and also that US pilots were primarily interested in defensive tactics and attempted to extract themselves from combat as quickly as possible. States that the Vietnamese pilots were not adequately trained for combat,

that the ground controlled intercept functioned well, but control was lost once the aircraft were engaged. After a study of the aerial combats, the US deployed an additional 36 F-104 fighter-interceptors and 10 F-4 fighters to Thailand. On 19 June 1966, F-104s were used as escort for fighter-bombers raiding North Vietnam.

TFR 210-5

The first MiG-21 aerial combat occurred on 23 April 1966 when a pair of MiG-21s attacked a flight of 4 F-4Cs, that was escorting radar jamming RB-66s. Two F-4s managed to launch two Sidewinders apiece which were unsuccessful. Another battle occurred on this date when six MiG-17s attacked four F-4Cs, that were escorting 16 F-105s. In this combat, two US aircraft and two North Vietnamese aircraft were shot down.

As a result of the battles on 23 April 1966, US pilots stated that the Vietnamese fought with great skill and that the MiG-17 was more maneuverable than the F-4C but was inferior in diving and in climbing.

TFR 210-6

Volume 2

TFR 210-7

19 June 1966, two MiG-17s flying over Noi-Bai detected two F-105s approaching for an attack and shot one of them down. The surviving F-105 evaded attack. The pair of MiGs then detected another F-105 which they managed to shoot down as well.

7 June 1966, a pair of MiG-21s detected two F-105s over Noi-Bai and managed to shoot one down by cannon fire. The leader of the MiGs was armed with missiles but was unable to launch because of the frantic maneuvering of the F-105.

13 June 1966 a flight of MiG-17s was scrambled to attack a group of 12 Naval A-4s that was going to attack a bridge over the Red River near Khung-En and managed to shoot down two A-4s. The MiGs then were attacked by the 8 F-4Bs that were providing cover. The leader of a pair of MiGs was shot down, but the F-4B was then shot down by the MiG wingman.

TFR 210-8

12 August 1966, a pair of MiG-17s, covered by a pair of MiG-21s shot down one of a group of four F-105s.

18 August 1966, a flight of MiG-17s was scrambled from Noi-Bai to battle 8 F-105s that were conducting ground attack near Noi Bai. Immediately after take-off, they encountered the F-105s at 500 meters and shot down one of them. There were no Vietnamese combat losses, but one of them

was accidentally shot down by friendly AAA fire while making a landing approach.

A similar incident to the one immediately above occurred on 22 August 1966. Two pairs of MiG-17s conducting a defensive fighter patrol over Noi-Bai conducted a series of three engagements at 400-500 meters with three groups (12 aircraft [not sure if this is 12 aircraft total or 12 aircraft in each group]). During these engagements, two F-105s were shot down. A Vietnamese aircraft was shot down by friendly AAA fire while returning to base.

TFR 210-9

5 September 1966, US air assets were especially active in the area of Fu-Li (55 KM south of Hanoi) trying to destroy the rebuilt bridge over the Song-Dai River. At 1630 hrs, the P-30 radar station detected a group of aircraft heading for the bridge at Fu-li. A pair of MiG-17s were in the air at the time and were directed to intercept them. As a result of the aerial combat, two US A-8s were shot down.

16 September 1966, Four Vietnamese MiG-17s were successful in combat with a group of eight US F-4Cs in the area of Hai-Duong. The F-4Cs launched a total of 12 air-to-air missiles with no success. Two F-4Cs were shot down and one was damaged. 21 September 1966, a flight of MiG-17 engaged a group of eight F-105s and 4 F-4Cs in the area of the Kep airfield. One F-4C was shot down and an F-105 shot down a MiG-17. The Vietnamese pilot ejected.

TFR 210-10

There were eight aerial engagements in October 1966 with the engagements on the 5, 8, and 9 October 1966 being the most successful.

A flight of MiG-21s of the 921st Fighter Aviation Regiment were scrambled from the Noi-Bai airfield on 0900 hrs on 5 October 1966 to engage two RB-66 aircraft that were jamming. An RB-66 was shot down by a R-3s missile.

9 October 1966 at 0750, two MiG-21s were scrambled in reaction to a raid of 28 F-4s and F-8s in the area of Khao-Bin' (50 km southwest of Hanoi). Two F-4s were shot down and the aircrews captured and one MiG was also shot down.

9 October 1966 at 0900, in the same area, a pair of MiG-17s of the 923rd Fighter Aviation Regiment detected two A-1Hs and four F-4Hs. One A-1H and one MiG were shot down. The pilot ejected [Does not specify if it was the American or Vietnamese pilot. Most likely it was the Vietnamese by the placement of this sentence in the paragraph].

- TFR 210-11 2 December 1966, 10 MiG-21s of the 921st Fighter Aviation Regiment were scramble to engage a group of 38 F-105s and 10 F-4Cs approaching from Thailand. At the same time, 18 MiG-17s of the 923rd Fighter Aviation Regiment were scrambled from Gi-Lam airfield to defend Noi-Bai airfield. The Vietnamese [MiG-21 pilots?] engaged the enemy aircraft and shot down two of them with eight missiles. The Americans launched two missiles with negative results. At the same time, there was intensive AAA and SAM activity. In all, 12 USAF aircraft were shot down on this day.
- TFR 210-12 5 December 1966, three pairs of MiG-21s intercepted a group of about 16 F-105s. Two F-105s were shot down by missiles and the rest ejected their stores and ran for home.
- 8 December 1966, two pairs of MiG-21s were scrambled to intercept a group of 16 F-105 heading towards Noi-Bai. The enemy was intercepted 70 km northwest of Hanoi. The Vietnamese launched four missiles and shot down two F-105s. Immediately upon being attacked, the Americans jettisoned their stores and retreated toward Laos.
- 13 December 1966, from 1505-1530, 8 MiG-21s and 8 MiG-17s of the 921st Fighter Aviation Regiment were scrambled to intercept a group consisting of 50 F-105s and F-4Cs and 40 A-4s, F-8s, and F-4Bs. 4 MiG-17s of the 923rd Fighter Aviation Regiment were scrambled to provide cover for the airfield. The first three groups of enemy fighters were engaged, one F-105 was shot down, and the rest reversed course. The next group of 12 enemy fighters continued on to Hanoi, dropped bombs on the rail depot at Gia-Lam and on anti-aircraft positions on the outskirts of Hanoi.
- 14 December 1966, DRV fighter defended against a mass raid on Hanoi. There were about 140 Air Force and Naval aircraft in this raid. 14 MiG-21PFLs and 16 MiG-17Fx were scrambled to intercept 60 aircraft approaching from Thailand.
- TFR 210-13 Upon encountering these MiGs, 24 F-105s dropped their bombs and fled. Two F-105s and one pilotless 147J recce drone were shot down by 5 air-to-air missiles and 28 free-flight rockets.
- TFR 210-14 Flight of 54 American aircraft, to include 24 F-4C aircraft, flew toward the Noj-Baj airfield. The airfield serves as the base for the 921st fighter regiment. The 24 F-4C aircraft flew directly to the airfield and the 30 remaining aircraft continued on in the direction of the POL warehouse at Tyun-Ze, imitating an air strike on it. During approach to the airfield, the

enemy fighter cover broke off into several groups and began to conduct a defensive fighter patrol (DFP) around the airfield in four zones.

TFR 210-15

The fighters flew a DFP in order to improve their ability to detect DRV fighters. There were groups of four fighter aircraft at an altitude of 2,500 - 3,000 meters 15 - 20 km from the airfield and groups of two at an altitude of 4,000 - 5,000 meters 40 - 80 km from the airfield. Every fighter providing cover was equipped with four "Sidewinder" and four "Sparrow" missiles. Their mission was to destroy any DRV aircraft which attempted to takeoff. There was total cloud cover and the American aircraft waited for the MiG-21s above it.

This information was reported by an American flier POW who was shot down in an aerial battle on 6 January 1967.

TFR 210-16

Despite the complicated and extremely unfavorable situation, the central command post issued the order for the 2nd flight of MiG-21s to takeoff.

TFR 210-17

The first salvo of missiles shot down the MiG-21 and the pilot bailed out successfully. The remaining DRV fliers increased speed and engaged the enemy aircraft. The MiGs used two R-3s missiles and several salvos of cannon fire to knock down two American F-4C aircraft. The Americans continued to attack. Each MiG had six to eight missiles shot at it but not one missile hit its target. The aerial battle was characterized by a large number of American fighters, tasked to destroy the North Vietnamese aircraft in the air. They were supported by ECM aircraft and search and rescue helicopters of the USAF

The aerial battle on 6 January 1967 was conducted in a similar fashion. During the approach of the American aircraft toward the Noj-Baj airfield, the deputy commander of the 921st fighter regiment gave the order for the to remain on the ground and ordered that the approaching enemy be destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery. 100mm anti-aircraft artillery cannons opened fire and the order came from the central command post for the MiG-21 flight to takeoff. After the MiGs had taken off, they were immediately attacked by six F-4C aircraft, who were positioned above and behind them, after breaking through the cloud cover (Drawing 40).

TFR 210-18

They shot 20 missiles at the MiGs and downed two North Vietnamese fighters. The pilots from the MiG-21s ejected, but one of them died due to a parachute failure. The remaining DRV fighters made a banked turn and engaged in the aerial battle. The Hero of the Vietnamese People's Army, Major Chanh-Khanh shot a F-4C with a R-3s missile and the aircraft began to smoke and flew away into the cloud cover. The American

aircraft disengaged. This aerial battle took place at an altitude of 2,500 - 3,000 meters, 60 km from the airfield.

February 1967, DRV fighter aircraft conducted 58 sorties to provide cover for important military targets and to repulse air attacks by American aircraft. 32 of these sorties were conducted at night. Chinese fighters conducted eight sorties during this time frame. There was an aerial battle which involved a flight of MiG-17s from the 923rd fighter aviation regiment against four F-4C aircraft. This engagement occurred 50 km southwest of Hanoi. The enemy (American) aircraft were visually detected at an altitude of 1,200-1,500 meters and the North Vietnamese fighters attacked with cannon fire. The wingman of the second pair shot down one US fighter.

Only one flight of MiG aircraft directly participated in the aerial battle which occurred on 26 March 1967. They attacked six American aircraft. The result of the attack was that one F-105 was shot down and one F-4C was damaged.

TFR 210-19

Twenty-four MiG-17 and six MiG-21 aircraft engaged 20 F-105 and F-4C American aircraft on 19 April 1967. The group of MiGs contained eight MiG-17 aircraft, piloted by Koreans. The enemy air attack was repulsed. The battle resulted in the loss of two American F-105 and two A-1H were damaged. All Vietnamese and Korean aircraft returned to their respective bases. Two MiG-17s suffered damage from cannon fire.

Two aerial battles occurred on 24 April 1967. Participants included 16 MiG-17 aircraft. They shot down four American aircraft without suffering any losses. One of the aircraft was shot down by Korean pilots. The aerial battle took place at an altitude of 600 - 2,200 meters and at a speed of 950 - 1,100 kph.

The aerial battle by the DRV fighter flight, commanded by Hero of the Vietnamese People's Army Baj (Drawing 41), was successful. The aircraft staged from the Kyn-An airfield (near Haiphong). The pilots detected several enemy fighters on an intercept course. The flight leader closed on an F-4H and downed it with cannon fire. The second pair of American fighters noted the attacking MiG and shot four air-to-air missiles at it. The wingman of the pair of MiGs noticed the missile launches and informed his leader by radio. Due to Baj's expert maneuvers, the missiles missed their targets and, continuing their flight, hit the leader of the F-4H pair and knocked it down. The remaining American fighters broke off the attack and the MiGs landed at the Gia-Lam airfield.

Ten groups, including 72 MiG-17 and MiG-21 aircraft, took part in the next seven aerial battles, which occurred on 25, 26 and 28 April 1967. Two MiG-21 aircraft scrambled to intercept a RB-66 aircraft conducting ECM operations at 1542 on 28 April 1967. The central command post vectored them to the target. During the flight toward the RB-66, two F-105 aircraft were sighted. The MiGs reported the sighting in and attacked the fighters from the rear hemisphere. The MiGs fired R-3s missiles on the wingman of the F-105 pair. The missile attack was unsuccessful and the MiG wingman began an attack run. He launched a R-3s missile and the wingman of the F-105 formation. There was no ECM during the attack.

30 April at 1620, a pair of MiG-21 aircraft scrambled from the Noj-Baj airfield to destroy American aircraft which were operating in the area of Fu-Tkho. The flight leader was Senior Lieutenant Khueh, the wingman was Senior Lieutenant Dinh. There was 50% - 70% cloud cover with the edge at 3,200 meters. The visibility was 10 km. The target indicators were provided by the command post of the 921st fighter regiment. The MiGs encountered a pair of F-105 aircraft at an altitude of 3,000 meters 90 km out from the North Vietnamese fighters airfield. The F-105 aircraft also noticed the MiGs and began to turn.

TFR 210-20

The MiGs attacked the American aircraft. Senior Lieutenant Khuehn shot a missile at the leader of the F-105 formation, but missed. Senior Lieutenant Dinh shot a missile at the wingman of the F-105 pair and the F-105 exploded in the air. The second attack by Senior Lieutenant Khuehn was successful and the missile hit the exhaust of the F-105 and the plane was destroyed. The pilot of the F-105 ejected and was captured.

During the course of the aerial battles in April, the North Vietnamese and Korean pilots shot down 22 American aircraft. The most successful aerial battle occurred on 28 April when a flight of eight MiG-17 aircraft scrambled to repulse an air attack against the Haiphong airfield and downed four American F-4H and A-4 aircraft.

TFR 210-21

Freight was shipped by rail to Dong-Fong-Tuong from Hanoi and by ship and barge from the Haiphong region.

The mission to destroy warehouses and communications nodes was given to the 77th aircraft carrier strike force. The mission was developed by the command staff of Rear Admiral D. Richardson. The strike wing from the aircraft carriers "Kitty Hawk", "Coral Sea" and "Ticonderoga" (aircraft types "Phantom", "Crusader", "Sky Hawk" and "Intruder" were to be used). The primary targets were the bridges, a steam ferry and warehouses. The strike was to be conducted over the course of two days.

The strike on the first day was conducted by the 9th aviation wing from the aircraft carrier "Ticonderoga". The 192nd ground attack squadron conducted the strike on the railroad bridge. The strike was carried out by two groups of aircraft. The first group employed guided missiles "Bullpup" and the second used 1,000 lb bombs. Two pair of ground attack aircraft were given the mission to knock out specific points of anti-aircraft artillery and air defense missile units which were protecting the bridge. The 194th fighter squadron carried out a strike on the rail branch line. One fighter from the squadron was assigned to cover the reconnaissance aircraft which was to take photographs to be used for battle damage assessment.

On the following day, after the battle damage assessment had been studied and prior to the reconnaissance of the Dong-Fong-Tuong area, the 85th ground attack squadron from the aircraft carrier "Kitty Hawk", equipped with "Intruder" aircraft, carried out a strike on the bypass railroad bridge using 1,000 lb bombs. The ground attack fighters approached the bridge at a very low altitude in order to avoid the loose PVO systems however, one "Intruder" was shot down. As a result of the attack, one bridge span was destroyed.

TFR 210-22

Volume 3

TFR 210-23

20 August 1967 at 1213 hrs, a pair of MiG-21 aircraft were launched from the Noi-Bai airfield to intercept a group of American aircraft that were approaching Fu-To (75 km northwest of Hanoi). After climbing to an altitude of 5000 m, the aircraft headed for the area of Viet-Chu. From there, following commands from the TsKP PVO and VVS VHA, they started to enter into the rear hemisphere of the trailing group of American aircraft. The TsKP could carry out accurate guidance due to radio interference, and led its fighters out at a distance of 20 km from the enemy. The fliers radioed that they had not discovered the enemy. After that, guidance was transferred to the regimental KP [command post]. On its command, the fighters descended to an altitude of 2500 m and started to disengage for an attack on another group of aircraft. At 1225 hours the wingman of a pair of North Vietnamese fighters saw two F-4 aircraft ahead and to the right. He reported this to his leader and requested permission to attack. Having received permission, he closed with the group of enemy aircraft and fired an R-3s rocket from a distance of 1500-2000 meters, which exploded before it reached the target. Seeing the explosion of the rocket, the American fliers increased speed and with a heading maneuver started to gain altitude. Following them, the wingman of the pair of North Vietnamese aircraft fired a second rocket from a distance of 1500-1800 meters, which exploded under the trailing F-4

aircraft. The American aircraft burst into flames and fell into the jungle on the south slope of the Tam-Dao mountain range, 40 km from Noi-Bai. The rocket was fired at a speed of 1200 kph and at an altitude of 3500 meters.

23 August 1967, a group of eight F-105 aircraft flying from the direction of Laos towards Tuen-Kuang was intercepted by a pair of MiG-21 fighters. The intercept occurred 10 minutes after takeoff at an altitude of 4000 meters. The leader of the pair of MiGs decided to attack the trailing flight of enemy aircraft, but at this time the wingman radioed that a group of 12 F-4 aircraft were following behind and 1000 meters below him. The North Vietnamese fighters turned to the right allowing the enemy aircraft to fly past them, then turning to the left flew into their rear hemisphere. The combat formation of the American aircraft consisted of columns of flights with a distance of 3 km between them. Each flight was formed into a "wedge" formation. The distance between the trailing F-105 aircraft and the lead F-4 consisted of about 10 km. The American fliers evidently did not notice the MiGs and continued on course at a speed of 800 kph.

TFR 210-24

Occupying an attack attitude, the North Vietnamese Fliers in a "front" formation started to close using afterburners. Turning to the right and descending, they attacked the trailing flight of F-4 aircraft. Rockets were fired at an altitude of 5200 meters, at a speed of mach 1.2-1.3, from a distance of 1800-1500 meters (first rocket) and 800 meters (second rocket). Both rockets hit their targets and two F-4s were shot down. After the first rocket was fired, the North Vietnamese fighter turned 15-20 degrees more to the right and flying above the trailing flight attacked, firing another rocket, and shot down the second aircraft - the wingman of the second pair of the lead flight. The second rocket was fired from a distance of 1500-1200 meters, at a speed of mach 1,2 and at an altitude of 500 meters. In both instances a PKI sight was used. The leader of the pair of Vietnamese aircraft broke off the attack by turning right with a 60% dive. The wingman made a combat turn climbing to an altitude of 10,000 meters. Breaking off the attack after a short delay, the wingman flew into an area filled with rocket fragments from the F-4 aircraft. As a result of this the aircraft was slightly damaged. Both DRV fliers landed safely at their airfield.

31 August 1967 at 0935, a pair of MiG-21s took off from Noi-Bai airfield to intercept an American reconnaissance aircraft which was flying from the direction of Laos towards Viet-Chi. Executing a command from the TsKP, the North Vietnamese fliers climbed to an altitude of 6,000 meters and soon detected two RF-4 aircraft ahead and 100-1500 meters beneath them, which were flying on a course of 260-280 degrees in an echelon formation. The leader of the pair of North Vietnamese aircraft ordered his

wingman to attack the RF-4 wingman, he himself went after the leader. The American wingman, apparently having noticed the MiG aircraft turned and descended. Flying low over the jungle, he disappeared against the jungle background. The leader continued his flight with energetic heading and altitude maneuvers. After approaching the enemy aircraft to a distance of 2.5 km, the DRV flier aimed using an RP-21 and fired the first rocket. At that time the altitude was 4500 meters and the air speed was mach 1.2. The rocket exploded near the aircraft, which continued its flight in a westerly direction with a straight in descent. Continuing the pursuit, the North Vietnamese flier fired a second rocket from a distance of 1500-1800 meters, at an altitude of 3000 meters and air speed of 1100 kph. As a result of the explosion of the second rocket, the RF-4 aircraft rolled over upside down, burst into flames and augured into the ground at a 60-70 degree angle.

10 September 1967, two MiG-21s were scramble to intercept an American aircraft flying from En-Bai to Fu-To. The American aircraft flew over Viet-Chi and continued on towards Noi-Bai airfield.

TFR 210-25

The lead MiG-21, separated from his wingman, engaged an American aircraft, identified visually as an F-4, alone and after locking on the target with a R-3s heat-seeking missile, shot down the F-4 at a distance of 1500 meters and an altitude of 7500 meters.

16 September 1967, a group of enemy aircraft were detected over Hoi-Suan (105 km southwest of Hanoi) heading towards Van-En (120 km west of Hanoi). A pair of MiG-21s were scrambled to intercept. After flying over Van-En, the American aircraft started following the Hanoi-Lao Kai railroad line and headed south after reaching the Bao-Ma station. The MiG-21s intercepted the American aircraft apparently without being detected. The wing MiG-21 fired an R-3s missile at the leader of a pair of RF-101s. The missile hit the tail section of the RF-101 and exploded. The RF-101 fell 25 km northwest of Muong-Hung. The pilot ejected and was taken prisoner. The lead MiG-21 then tried to attack the second RF-101, but could not lock on target. His wingman fired an R-3s missile, which exploded under the right wing of the second RF-101 setting the aircraft ablaze.

TFR 210-26

On the second day after this air battle, the pilot of an RF-4 from the US 432nd Reconnaissance Wing based in Thailand, shot down by DRV AAA, was captured. The captured pilot testified that on 16 September 1967 two RF-101s from his squadron failed to return from its mission. One of the RF-101 pilots who ejected and landed near the Vietnamese Laotian border was rescued by helicopter. The other RF-101 pilot was considered to be KIA.

26 September 1967, a pair of MiG-21s were scrambled to intercept a group of American F-4 aircraft which were flying from the direction of Laos towards Tuen-Kuang. The DRV MiG pilots intercepted a group of 8 F-4 aircraft in the area of En-Bai. The lead MiG-21 fired a R-3s missile at the trailing F-4. The missile exploded under the F-4, which burst into flames and fell into the jungle 20 km southeast of Tuen-Kuang.

29 September 1967, an air battle took place between two MiG-21s (scrambled to intercept) and F-4B carrier-based fighters from the direction of the Gulf of Tonkin towards Kam-Fa. The MiG-21s intercepted the F-4 aircraft without being noticed. The lead MiG-21, after achieving target lock with an RP-21, fired a rocket at the left wingman of a flight of F-4 aircraft. The rocket exploded under the F-4, which burst into flames and fell.

TFR 210-27

30 September 1967 at 1510, a pair MiG-21 aircraft were scrambled from Noi-Bai airfield to intercept a group of American aircraft flying from the direction of Tonkin Bay across Kam-Fa in the direction of Kep station. The DRV MiG-21 engaged F-105 aircraft which were bombing the Kep airfield and railway station. One F-105 was shot down and crashed 15 km southeast of Kep.

3 October 1967 at 1100 hrs, MiG-17s were scrambled from Gia-Lam airfield to intercept a group of enemy aircraft bombing railway bridges in the area of Hai Duong. The MiG-17s exited the cloud cover in the area of the Great Hanoi Bridge over the Red River where they two RF-101 aircraft 1500 meters above them. The enemy reconnaissance aircraft, apparently not expecting an attack, flew over the Noi-Bai airfield and continued flying towards Tuen-Kuang increasing altitude. 40-50 km from Noi-Bai airfield the RF-101 aircraft noticed the MiGs and broke formation. The MiG flight commander and his wingman overtook and shot down the leader of the pair of RF-101 aircraft 20 km northwest of Fu-To, expending 57-37mm and 190-23mm shells. The leader of the second pair of MiGs overtook and shot down the RF-101 wingman 25-30 km south of Tuen-Kuang, expending 44-37mm and 180-23mm shells.

TFR 210-28

3 October 1967 at 1348 hrs, a pair of MiG-21 aircraft were scrambled from Noi-Bai airfield to intercept two US reconnaissance aircraft which were flying from the direction of Tonkin Bay across Hong Gai and Hai Duong at an altitude of 7000 meters towards Hanoi. When the aircraft were 25-30 km from Hanoi active ECM prevented ground-based guidance of the MiGs to the target. The North Vietnamese MiGs were ordered to 7500 meters to

visually search for the targets. At 1354 hours, after following these instructions, four enemy aircraft were visually sighted following southwesterly course. One American F-4 aircraft was shot down 30-40 km from the Laotian border.

7 October 1967, a pair of MiG-21s were scramble from Noi-Bai airfield to intercept a group of US F-4 aircraft.

TFR 210-29

An F-4 was hit by an air-to-air missile, burst into flames and fell 30 km west of Hoa-Lak airfield. A second F-4 was hit by an R-3s missile and fell 20 km west of Hoa-Lak airfield.

9 October 1967, a pair of MiG-21s were scrambled from Noi-Bai airfield to intercept a group of 16 F-105 aircraft flying from the direction of Laos across En-Chau towards En-Bai. The DRV aircraft were warned of another group of 8 F-4 aircraft flying 10 km behind the F-105s.

TFR 210-30

Both pilots broke off the attack and climbed to an altitude of 8,000 meters. They witnessed how the enemy aircraft conducted the bombing in a disorderly fashion and flew to the southwest.

16 January 1968, eight American F-4C aircraft appeared coming from Laos. The group was cruising at 3,500 meters and were deployed in an echelon right combat formation. Medium intensity radio interference was observed.

A pair of MiG-21 aircraft were scrambled to intercept the enemy aircraft. The command was received from the command post: "The target is to the left and ahead at a range of 15 km, turn on your afterburners". The pilots then sighted the flight of American F-4C aircraft on an intercept course. The flight leader conducted a maneuver and approached the enemy formation from the rear hemisphere of the lead pair of F-4C aircraft. He fired a R-3s missile from a range of 1,800 meters and hit the target. The aircraft exploded. During the attack, the second pair of American aircraft approached the rear of the lead pair of MiGs in order to conduct an attack. After receiving a warning from his wingman, the North Vietnamese pilot conducted several evasive maneuvers and headed out on a course back to the airfield. The wingman attempted to attack the enemy. However, due to the high rate of closure, he broke off the attack, gained altitude, and left. The aerial battle was characterized by a good deal of interaction between the pair and the provision of accurate combat situation information which allowed the North Vietnamese pilot to evade enemy fire.

23 February 1968 at 0642, a single DRV MiG-21 took off from Noj-Baj. He was ordered to attack a group of 12 American F-4C aircraft, approaching from the Gulf of Tonkin at an altitude of 4,000 - 5,000 meters with the intent of conducting an air strike on the Kep airfield. There was total cloud cover that day. (The altitude of the lower edge of the cloud cover: 700 meters, upper edge: 2,200 meters), visibility was 12 - 15 km.

The pilot detected the formation of F-4C aircraft at a range of 12 km. The F-4C aircraft were in a "column of twos" formation. He turned on his afterburner and closed on the American aircraft. When the pair was 4 km from his position, they conducted a "scissors" maneuver. The North Vietnamese pilot launched a missile when the F-4 was at a range of 1,500 meters and it hit the lead aircraft of the second pair. The American aircraft caught fire and crashed into the ground. The North Vietnamese pilot broke off the attack and at 0714 hours returned to his airfield with 700 liters of fuel remaining. During this battle, the central command post carried out the command and control functions in an environment of weak radio interference. Due to the fact that the alert aircraft received the scramble order late, the fighter did not engage the enemy aircraft until after they had conducted the air strike on Kep airfield.

7 May 1968 at 1420 hours, the alert pair of MiG-21 aircraft was scrambled to intercept an A-3D aircraft, cruising at an altitude of 500 meters and approaching from Tan'kho.

TFR 210-31

After taking off from the Noj-Baj airfield, the pilots broke through the cloud cover and climbed to 10,000 meters. The North Vietnamese pilots detected the enemy aircraft visually at a distance of 12 km and approached it from the rear and above. The leader fired a R-3s missile at a range of 1,200 meters and shot down the enemy aircraft. Following a 54 minute flight, the pilots landed back at their airfield with a reserve of 400 liters in their fuel tanks.

TFR 210-32

23 August 1967 at 1455 hours, a flight of MiG-17 aircraft took off from the airfield at Noj-Baj to fly a combat air patrol (CAP) mission over it. The pilots were Korean. The aircraft shot down one F-105, which had flown into their sector at an altitude of 700 meters. At 1522 hours, the flight commander and his wingman attacked a pair of F-4 aircraft, which were pursuing a MiG-17. The flight commander closed on the wingman of the American formation and fired approximately 70% of his combat load on the enemy aircraft. The enemy aircraft caught fire and attempted to maneuver out of the area and fly toward the Tam-Dao mountain ridge. The aircraft crashed into a mountain near that ridge. The other American aircraft broke off and flew back towards Laos.

14 January 1968 at 1530 hours, a MiG-21, piloted by a Korean flier, took off from the airfield at Noj-Baj to intercept a flight of American F-4C fighters. The Korean pilot observed the American fighters flying in a wedge formation. He attacked the lead aircraft of the second pair with a R-3s missile. The American pilot attempted to evade the missile but was unsuccessful. The missile downed the aircraft. The Korean pilot broke off the attack and returned to the airfield at Noj-Baj at 1605 hours.

12 February 1968 at 1526 hours, a pair of MiG-21 aircraft, piloted by Korean fliers, scrambled from the Noj-Baj airfield to intercept a flight of 12 F-4H aircraft. The flight of F-4H aircraft were cruising at an altitude of 4,500 - 7,000 meters and traveling from the Gulf of Tonkin toward Tien-En and Dinh-Lap. The wingman reported that he saw four F-4 aircraft below and to the left of his position and three F-4 aircraft below him. The wingman shot down one enemy aircraft. As he attempted to break off after the attack, he was attacked by a group of three F-4 aircraft. The Korean pilot ejected from his damaged aircraft and the Americans shot and killed him as he descended by parachute.

TFR 210-33

Volume 4

TFR 210-34

No information.

TFR 210-35

Volume 5

TFR 210-36

21 January, a pair of MiG-21 aircraft took off on command from the central command post to destroy three American helicopters. The command post guided the aircraft to the targets and reported that the helicopters also had aircraft providing top cover for them. The MiGs sighted a pair of F-4 aircraft. In order to evade the enemy attack, the leader engaged his afterburner. The wingman remained behind. He sighted a single F-4 and, with permission from his leader, attacked and downed the enemy aircraft. However, he was then attacked and downed by the second F-4.

The remaining MiG spotted the helicopters and attacked the closest one with a R-3s missile. The missile hit the target and the helicopter went down. The MiG received the command to break off the attack and return to base from the command post.

TFR 210-37

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TFR 210-38

Repelling enemy air raids, on this day the country's air defense units shot down seven aircraft (according to data of the VNA Command), including three B-52 bombers and one F-111A fighter. 69 anti-aircraft rockets were fired.

TFR 210-39

30 carrier-based aircraft attacked various targets in the Haiphong area from 1900-2200 hrs. Tactical aviation assets attacked other targets in the Quang Bin Province. 19 December 1972, PVO troops shot down 6 enemy aircraft (two B-52 bombers near Hanoi and four naval aircraft above Haiphong).

20 December 1972, American aircraft flew 336 sorties above the DRV (266 of them being night sorties). 93 B-52s and 8 helicopters participated in the raids. There were three massed raids on Hanoi:

- from 0500-0545, 12 B-52s, 16 F-4 and F-105 fighters attacked Dong-An' and Ien-Vien railroad stations.

- from 1250-1310 hrs, more than 40 tactical aviation aircraft carried out repeat raids of the above plus Zak-La and Khoa-Lak.

- from 1925-2100 hrs, 33 B-52 bombers and 32 tactical aircraft attacked targets near Za-Lam, Hanoi, V'et-Chi and Ien-Vien. F-111A aircraft attacked the Bat'-Mai airport, PVO positions from Kim-Lien to Bon-Don (on the left bank of the Red River, south of Za-Lam) and warehouses southwest of Hanoi. 45 B-52 "Flying Fortresses" and 90 tactical aircraft operated near the capital on this day. 80 sorties were flown near Haiphong by mainly naval aircraft on this day.

- from 0030-0100 hrs 30 A-6 and A-7 aircraft attacked targets in and around Haiphong.

- from 0430-0543 hrs 10 A-6s attacked Haiphong port.

- from 1755-1840 hrs 10 A-6s attacked the Kien-An crossing targets south of Haiphong.

- from 2220-0040 hrs on 21 December 1972, nearly 30 aircraft attacked targets around Kat-Bi.

- from 2345-0030 on 21 December 1972, there was a mass raid on Bak-Zang (Ha-Bak Province) by 18 B-52 bombers. There were two massed raids on targets near Kao-Hgai:

- from 0430-0600 hrs, 12 B-52s and 12 F-4 and F-105 fighters.

TFR 210-40

- from 2345-0115 hrs, 18 B-52 bombers and 30 F-4 and F-111A. Single aircraft and small groups attacked targets in the En-Baj region and in Nge-An, Ha-Bak and Nam-Ha provinces. Single F-111A aircraft attacked Hanoi in 25-30 minute intervals between the massed raids.

Naval helicopters made four raids on Khon-La Island. PVO troops shot down 13 enemy aircraft, including four B-52 bombers. VNA fighter aircraft were unable to participate in combat aircraft operations.

21 December 1972, American aircraft flew 190 sorties above DRV territory (80 at night), including 21 B-52 sorties. For the 24-hour period, there were two massed raids on Hanoi lasting one hour and 45 minutes:

- from 0445-0530 hrs, 21 B-52 bombers and up to 40 tactical aircraft (including F-111As) attacked targets in Noi-Bai, Dong-An, Za-Lam and Hanoi.
- from 1230-1330 hrs nearly 60 F-4 and F-105 aircraft attacked targets in Hanoi, Noi-Bai, Bat-Mai and Za-Lam. One of the targets hit was a jail holding captive American fliers (some of whom were injured). Nine naval aircraft attacked targets near Haiphong at 0340 and 1820 hrs.

For the 24-hour period F-111As attacked targets in or near Za-Lam, Hanoi, Tu-Din, Quan-Nhan, Fa-Den, Dong-An, Noi-Bai and Dyk-Zang. Other types of tactical aircraft attacked Hanoi, Haiphong, Fu-Li, Viet-Chi and other targets in the 4th military zone. During combat operations, VNA anti-aircraft rocket troops shot down nine American aircraft (three B-52s, three F-111As, one A-7, one A-6, one F-4 and one RA-5C). VNA fighter aircraft were unable to participate.

TFR 210-41

Two MiG-21 aircraft scrambled from Noi-Bai and Za-Lam, but had radar problems and did not engage in combat.

22 December 1972, American aircraft flew 154 sorties above North Vietnam (75 of them at night), including 21 B-52 sorties.

In the 24-hour period there were two massed raids:

- from 0300-0420, 21 B-52 bombers and 19 tactical aircraft attacked Hanoi.
- from 1330-1430 hrs, 48 F-4 and F-105 fighters attacked Viet-Chi.

Tactical aircraft, including F-111As, attacked Hanoi, Haiphong, Ha-Tin, En-Bai, and targets in Ha-Bak, Hai-Hyng, Than-Hoa, Quang Bin and Bin-Lin. During combat, anti-aircraft troops shot down four American aircraft (three B-52s and one F-111A). Two MiG-21s scrambled (one was shot down, the pilot ejected). On 23 December 72, US aircraft flew 150 sorties above the DRV (70 of them at night), including 18 B-52 sorties. For the 24-hour period, there were two massed attacks:

- from 0526-0630 hrs, 18 B-52 bombers attacked targets in Haiphong.
- from 1345-1430 hrs, 44 F-4 and F-105 attacked the road to Shon-Tai. Tactical aircraft, in singles and small groups attacked targets in Dong-Hoi, Ti-Long, Dong-Mo and various targets in Ha-Tei, Nam-Ha, Quang-Nin, Thai-Bin, Hai-Hing and Quang-Bin. In repelling the attacks, anti-aircraft rocket troops shot down two B-52 bombers. VNA fighter aviation scrambled four MiG-21s from Noi-Bai. A pair of MiG-21s engaged in

TFR 210-42

aerial combat with four F-4s and shot down one enemy aircraft without friendly losses. 24 December 1972, American aircraft flew 173 sorties (of these, 151 were at night), including 36 B-52 sorties. There were two massed attacks:

- from 1130-1230 hrs, 28 tactical aircraft attacked targets near Thai-Ngyuen.

- from 1918-2037 hrs 36 B-52 bombers attacked Kep and Thai-Ngyuen. Single aircraft and small groups conducted bombing and strafing attacks throughout this period. In particular, a single F-111A bombed Port Fa-Den. Two A-6s attacked -Son Island and Hon-Me. Two F-4 fighters bombed Li-Hoa pass and Quan-Khau pass on Highway 1.

Anti-aircraft troops destroyed three American aircraft in the course of combat operations, including a B-52 strategic bomber. VNA fighter aircraft did not participate due to poor weather conditions.

25 December 1972, the Americans did not bomb North Vietnam due to the Christmas holiday. There were 18 aerial reconnaissance flights (including two SR-71s and four reconnaissance drones). Anti-aircraft troops and VNA fighter aviation did not engage in combat on this day.

26 December 1972, after a 36-hour lull, the bombing of the DRV resumed. 227 aircraft participated in the sorties (173 of them at night), including 63 B-52 bombers.

There were two massed raids on Hanoi:

- from 1315-1450 hrs, 50 tactical aircraft attacked targets in the city and Dong-An RR Station.

- from 2200-2315 hrs, wings of B-52 bombers made 12 attacks on targets throughout the city.

- from 2210-2300 hrs, 15 B-52 bombers and 20 tactical aircraft attacked targets near Haiphong.

- from 2200-2250 hrs, 12 B-52 bombers bombed various targets near Thai-Ngyuen. For the 24-hour period, VNA anti-aircraft troops shot down nine aircraft, including eight B-52 bombers (five over Hanoi, two over Haiphong and one near Thai-Ngyuen). 27 December 1972, 372 sorties were flown by American aircraft (105 of them at night), including 51 B-52 sorties. There were three massed raids on the central and northern provinces:

- from 1330-1430 hrs, tactical aircraft attacked Hanoi (eight F-4s attacked the radio station and the suburbs) and Haiphong (24 A-6s and A-7s bombed and strafed the port, where one ship was sunk and two were

TFR 210-43

damaged, the Kien-An airfield, machine and concrete factories, living quarters in the area of the railroad station) and Kha Dong, where the theater, military camp and inhabited suburbs were subjected to attack.

- from 1555-1635 hrs, tactical aviation (36 F-4 and F-105 fighters) raided the city of Tu-Liem (10 km west of Hanoi).
- from 2230-2335 hrs, 51 B-52 bombers and 100 tactical aviation fighters struck Hanoi and its environs. The bombers hit the rail stations at Dong-An' and Ien-Bien, the Za-Lam airfield, the crossing at the Red River and inhabited suburbs. More than 10 industrial and apartment buildings were destroyed and the Za-Lam airfield was put out of commission.

In the 4th Military district, tactical aviation worked in single ship formations or in small groups hitting the rail station at Kuan-Khan', the [island?] of Khon-Me, bridges, river crossings, fords on Highways 1 and 15, troop concentrations, supply lines, and inhabited areas of the provinces of Tkhan'-Khoa, Nge-An, Kha-Tin', and Kuang-Bien. Anti-aircraft forces used 33 missiles during the 24 hour period and shot down 4 B-52s in the Hanoi area. AAA shot down one F-4. There were 5 MiG-21 sorties from Noi-Bai and Kep airfields that shot down one B-52 and two F-4s. 28 December 1972, the USAF conducted 369 flights over North Vietnam of which 244 were at night. 78 of these flights were by B-52s.

There were three mass raids on the central provinces:

- from 0700-0745 hrs, 40 F-4s and F-105s attacked anti-aircraft assets in the Kha-Tej, Khoa-Bin', Nin'-Bin' and the Khoa-Bin' electricity works.
- from 1230-1340 hrs, 60 F-4s and F-105 attacked Hanoi and anti-aircraft assets in the Hanoi area, bridges, river ports, rail stations, factories, warehouses, irrigation facilities, and dwellings.
- from 2140-2235 hrs, 78 B-52s supported by 144 tactical aviation aircraft struck Hanoi, Dong-Mo, and roads in the province of Kuang-Bin'. In the Hanoi area they attacked rail stations, river crossings, living quarters, and inhabited suburbs. In Dong-Mo they attacked living quarters and the rail station. In the province of Kuang-Bin' they attacked highways 12, 15, 20.

Single F-111s, at night and at low altitude attacked the Kep airfield, the city of Bak-Zang, the electricity works in Tkhaj-Nguen, and a number of inhabited areas in the central part of the country. In the 4th military district,

TFR 210-44

tactical aviation for the 24 hour period in single ship and small formations attacked troop concentrations, supply lines at river crossings, bridges, mountain passes, and inhabited areas.

In the 24 hour period, SAMs shot down 4 aircraft to include one B-52. They used a total of 15 missiles. Fighter Aviation sortied three MiG-21 flights from Noi-Bai that shot down one B-52, one F-4, and one RA-5C.

29 December 1972, American aircraft conducted 206 flights over North Vietnam, of which 145 were at night. There were 48 B-52 sorties. In the center and northern area of the country there were two mass raids:

- from 0930-1015 hrs, 40 F-4s and F-105s attacked troop concentrations, supplies at the junction of Highways 3 and 13a and inhabited areas northwest of Tkhaj-Nguen.

- from 2200-2315 hrs, 33 B-52 supported by 80 tactical aircraft bombed inhabited areas northeast of Tkhaj-Nguen, in the area of the Dong-Mo rail station, and the suburbs of Hanoi. 30-40 minutes after this ended, up to 18 F-111As in single ship formations bombed the same areas.

For the rest of the 24 hour period, single ship and small formations of tactical aircraft hit targets in the Khoa-Bin', Kha-Tin', Nam-Kha, Hanoi, and Kuang-Bin' provinces. Separate cells of B-52 bombers bombed targets in the Kuang-Bin' province. Helicopters performed search and rescue and one of them was shot down by ground troops. Missile forces expended 6 missiles and shot down 4 aircraft to include one B-52. Fighter aviation launched four sorties from Noi-Bai without results.

TFR 210-45 According to incomplete data, American air crew losses reached 100, of which more than 15 were KIA and the rest are MIA/POW.

TFR 210-46 18 December 1971, three pairs of MiG-21PFL aircraft were scrambled from Noi-Bai airfield to intercept six F-4 Phantom-2 aircraft detected crossing the DVR-Laotian border. An F-4 was hit by an R-3s missile and fell 120 km southwest of Noi-Bai airfield. Two American fliers (a major and a lieutenant) ejected and were taken prisoner. The rest of the American aircraft retreated across the Laotian border.

TFR 210-47 19 January 1972, a pair of North Vietnamese MiG-21PFL aircraft were scrambled to intercept an RF-101. The RF-101 was hit by a missile fired by one of the MiGs, which destroyed the tail section of the RF-101.

TFR 210-48 6 March 1972, a pair of MiG-17PS aircraft were scrambled from Kep airfield to destroy two American aircraft.

TFR 210-49 The formation leader conducted evasive maneuvers and gained altitude. The wingman trailed his leader. He spotted an F-4 and shot it down. The leader came out of his evasive maneuver and was shot down by the second

F-4. At the command of the central command post, a second pair of MiG-21 aircraft were sent the area of the aerial engagement. The American flier, sighting the additional MiG-21s, broke off the attack and flew off in the direction of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Later, a flight of four American A-7 bomber/ground attack aircraft, with top cover from a flight of F-4 aircraft, were sent to bomb a North Vietnamese airfield. At this time, a RA-5C, with top cover provided by a pair of F-4 aircraft, was conducting ESM operations while flying along the border of the DRV and Laos. A pair of MiG-21 aircraft was scrambled to repulse the air strike. The wingman of the MiG formation was the first to spot the enemy aircraft and fired two missiles. One pair of A-7 aircraft noticed the missiles and turned toward the shoreline. The other pair, covered by a pair of F-4 aircraft, continued on and completed their mission. Four 250 kg bombs knocked out the metal VPP.

The leader of the pair of MiG-21s left the battle because he did not detect any enemy aircraft and his wingman soon followed. A neighboring airfield scrambled a pair of MiG-21s and a pair of MiG-17 aircraft. The MiG-21s took up a DFP over their airfield at an altitude of 4,000 - 4,500 meters. The pair of MiG-17 aircraft proceeded to the area where the American ground attack aircraft were operating. The MiG-17s spotted the F-4 aircraft conducting top cover and used their advantageous position (to the rear and below the enemy aircraft) to start an attack run. The MiG-17s fired their cannons at a range of 300 - 500 meters. Two F-4 aircraft were shot down as a result of the attack.

TFR 210-50

27 April 1972 at 1613, a pair of MiG-21 and MiG-17 aircraft took off to intercept several groups of American aircraft which were detected 100 kms east of Than'-Khoa. The MiG-17 was sent to conduct a CAP over Hanoi and the MiG-21s conducted CAP over the airfield.

The regimental CP radar station detected four enemy aircraft 10 km south of the airfield.

TFR 210-51

The MiG-21s visually acquired two F-4s, one was hit by and air-to-air missile and the pilot ejected.

TFR 210-52

10 May 1972, while fighting off attacks in the cities of Haiphong and Khe Song, the VNA conducted 64 operational flights (18 MiG-21s, 8 MiG-19s, 38 MiG-17s) and carried out 15 air battles in which 7 F-4s were shot down (3 by MiG-21s, 3 by MiG-19s and one by a MiG-17). We lost 5 aircraft in these battles - 2 MiG-21s (one flier died and the other ejected) and 1 MiG-19 (the flier ejected).

Another characteristic battle of the day was while fighting off attacks at Khe Song. A MiG-17 was sent up to intercept the enemy, which at an altitude of 300-400m shot down an F-4.

TFR 210-53

2 MiG-17s were shot down (one flier dead, the other ejected).

To augment the MiG-17 a pair of MiG-21s were scrambled from a neighboring airfield. They flew up to the F-4s and at a range of 2 km and fired a rocket which shot down both aircraft.

11 May 1972, while fighting off an attack in Hanoi a pair of MiG-21s took off from an area 40-50 km north-west of Hanoi climbing to an altitude of 8000m to distract the enemy fighters. At the same time, another pair, flying at a low altitude towards the south were following a enemy aircraft.

A formation of F-4s flew near a pair of MiG-21s at a high altitude. They were 2-3 km away from the F-4s and therefore only saw the lead pair. They turned on the afterburners and attacked the F-4s from below. The lead man fired one rocket and the wingman fired another rocket which shot down one of the F-4s. While looking for his lead man, the MiG-21 did not notice the 2nd pair of F-4s and who fired 4 rockets at him and shot him down. The flier ejected.

18 May 1972 American aircraft conducted more than 270 operational flights in various areas of DRV. The VNA made 26 flights to fight them off (8 MiG-21s, 6 MiG-19, 12 MiG-17s) and carried out 8 air battles in which 3 "Phantoms" were shot down and no losses to VNA aircraft.

In particular, from 1130-1215 hours, 40 F-4s conducted massive strikes of various areas in Hanoi. A formation of North Vietnamese MiG-21s scrambled from Hoj-Baj airfield, under the command of TSKP to fight off the attackers. Within several minutes the MiGs fulfilled their mission and attacked 8 F-4s in the zone of the air patrol.

TFR 210-54

The North Vietnamese pair launched a guided missile and made a direct hit into a F-4. The wingman shot down another F-4 and the remaining American fighters retreated.

On the same day a pair of MiG-21s battled a formation of F-4s. The F-4s tried out a new tactical vertical maneuver but the Vietnamese caught on and were unaffected by it. No aircraft from either side were shot down.

12 June 1972 a pair of MiG-21s were scrambled to interdict 24 enemy aircraft at Laos and 16 F-4 Naval aircraft at the Gulf of Tonkin. An F-4 was shot down by a rocket.

TFR 210-55

13 June 1972 at 0845 hrs, 3 groups of American aircraft were discovered southwest of Hanoi where it borders with Laos in the Tkhan'-Khoa providence.

2 pairs of MiG-21s were scrambled at 0902 hours from an airfield in Khoj-Baj. The 1st pair flew 50 km north-west of Hanoi and the 2nd pair went to the north of that.

0913 hours the 1st pair of MiG-21s flew to F-Tho and discovered 4 F-4s. They fired a rocket at one F-4 that exploded and crashed in the area of Khoa-Lak airfield.

The 2nd pair of fighters was told to return home because of a lack of fuel. On the way back they discovered a group of F-4s in front of them. The MiG-21s fired rockets and one F-4 exploded. The pilot of the F-4 ejected and was taken prisoner. The remaining 3 F-4 fighters took off towards the Gulf of Tonkin. In this battle 2 F-4s were shot down by 3 R-3s.

5 July 1972, 60-70 kms southwest of Hanoi, a group of enemy aircraft in a column of pairs and flying at an altitude of 3000-5000 meters was detected. Two MiG-21s from Noi-Bai were launched, one of the MiGs returned to base due to radio malfunction. A second pair was launched. The North Vietnamese pilots visually detected the flight of F-4 fighters, released their drop tanks and on afterburner (1100 km/hr) closed in on the trail pair of F-4s. At a distance of 1000-1500 meters the pilots fired R-3s rockets (2 each). Both targets were shot down. After the attack, the pilots returned to base.

TFR 210-56

Two F-4s were shot down, four R-3s rockets were expended, evaluation of [Vietnamese] pilots' performance. On 8 July 1972, 50-60 kilometers southwest of Hanoi, a group of enemy aircraft was detected. A pair of MiG-21s was launched from Za-Lam airfield. The lead pair detected a group of 8 F-4s from a distance of 15 kms and at an altitude of 2000-2500 meters. The F-4s were in combat formation 'column of flights' 2-3 kms from one another and escheloned at an altitude (illustration 72). At a distance of 10-12 kms from the target, the wingman detected another group of eight F-4s following the first group at a distance of 3-5 kms. The pair leader commanded the wingman to attack the second group of eight and launched an R-3s rocket (the target was not destroyed). At that time, the wingman of the North Vietnamese pair approached the second group

of F-4s and at a distance of 1.5 kms from the target launched an R-3s rocket at the Tail End Charlie and shot him down. After which, the [wingman] disengaged.

TFR 210-57

24 July 1972, 75 kms southwest of Hanoi a group of enemy aircraft was detected. A pair of MiG-21s was launched from Noi-Bai. Two minutes after the first pair took off, another pair of MiG-21s was launched from Za-Lam airfield (illustration 73). The first pair engaged in battle in the rear half of the tail flight of the enemy group which consisted of 12 F-4 aircraft. The pair released their drop tanks and on afterburner (1100 km/hr) attacked the wingman of the pair of the tail flight of F-4s. The pair fired three R-3s rockets. As a result, two aircraft of the wing pair were shot down. In this battle, North Vietnamese fighters shot down 3 F-4 aircraft (expending six R-3s rockets) with no friendly losses. Evaluation of combat action given. The aerial combat success was enabled by:

- absence of jamming
- concealed approach of the fighters
- timely target engagement

26 August 1972, VNA fighter aircraft flew 16 combat sorties (twelve MiG-21 sorties and four MiG-17 sorties) from Noi-Bai and En-Bai Airfields. In one engagement, the lead pair of MiG-21s shot down an American F-4 over Vin-Fu Province. At the same time, a pair of MiG-21s shot down another F-4 over Ha-Tai Province. Later that day, North Vietnamese pilots in MiG-17s shot down a reconnaissance drone near Hanoi.

TFR 210-58

7 October 1972, a pair of MiG-21PFL aircraft were scrambled to intercept a formation of F-4s heading towards the Noi-Bai airfield. Two flights of F-4s were visually detected and engaged. As a result of this combat, the number 1 and 4 aircraft of the second flight were shot down. The number 2 MiG then recovered at Za-Lam airfield. The lead MiG then proceeded to attack and shoot down the number 3 F-4 of the second flight.

12 October 1972, two MiG-21PFLs were scrambled from Noi-Bai to intercept a group of F-4s. Having visually acquired three flights of F-4s, they attack the trail flight. The last F-4 of the third flight was shot down. The lead MiG recovered at Noi-Bai. The second MiG pilot ejected from his aircraft after he entered into the cloud cover and lost his orientation.

TFR 210-59
TFR 210-60

23 December 1972, two MiG-21s were scrambled from Noi-Bai. The MiG pair detected a flight of F-4s and shot down the number 4 aircraft. They then recovered at Noi-Bai airfield.

27 December 1972, two MiG-21s were scrambled from Noi-Bai to intercept a group of tactical aircraft in heavy jamming conditions. The wingman of the MiGs detected a pair of F-4s, launched two missiles and shot down the lead F-4. A minimum of one of the air crew of the F-4 ejected. The MiGs recovered at Noi-Bai.

At night on 27 December 1972, a lone MiG-21 was scrambled from En-Bai to intercept a group of B-52s. Using ground controlled intercept and acquiring a B-52 visually (pilot stated that the B-52 had 4 white navigation lights on), the pilot launched a pair of missiles which struck the B-52. The fate of the B-52 is unknown. The MiG-21 recovered at En-Bai.

TFR 210-61 28 December 1972, a pair of MiG-21 aircraft was scrambled from Noi-Bai airfield to intercept a group of enemy tactical fighters and to prevent them from attacking Hanoi. An F-4 and an RA-5C were shot down and the pilots of these aircraft were captured.

TFR 210-62 9 June 1972, a helicopter was shot in the area of the central plateau. The leader of the American advisors in the II Corps operations area, Dzhon Vehn, was on board this downed helicopter.

9 July 1972, American General R. Tomlehn died under similar conditions. A week later, the commander of the South Vietnamese 4th Air Division, Brigadier General Nguen Hyui Anh, and others. [rest of page not provided]

TFR 210-63

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TFR 210-64 No information

TFR 234-1-2 Two page document dated 17 April 1968 addressed to Leonid Brezhnev from the Minister of Defense Andrej Grechko reporting on a shoot down of a US F-111 over Hanoi by a "Divina" SA-75M SAM on 30 March 68. Reports that the F-111 crashed outside of North Vietnam and that a search is underway to locate the downed aircraft. After the crash is located, the effectiveness of the "Divina" can be better assessed if the North Vietnamese allow the Soviets access to the crash.

TFR 235-1-3 Extract from the diary of I.S. Shcherbakov for 3 January 1970. Reports on a meeting with Nguyen Ko Tkhat' at which the Chief of the Vietnamese People's Army, Fung Tkhe Taj, was present. Issues discussed were Soviet support for the upcoming trip to Cambodia by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong. The Vietnamese thanked the Soviets for this support as well as for supporting the North Vietnamese position at the

International Red Cross conference in Istanbul, where the issue of US conduct of the war and POWs was apparently discussed. The North Vietnamese referred to the 1949 Geneva Convention and maintain that captured American pilots are not prisoners [of war], but are military criminals and not subject to protection under the Geneva Convention. The humane and lenient policy of North Vietnam however, provides for treatment of these captured Americans. They are provided with medical attention, are fed the same as North Vietnamese, and are allowed to conduct correspondence. States that there are no published lists of American prisoners. States that the delegation of American women who recently visited North Vietnam, were given over 100 postcards and were told the names of five Americans who died in captivity. The North Vietnamese are in favor of resolving the American POW issue in accordance with paragraph 9 of the "Global Resolution of the South Vietnamese Problem", which was proposed by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Reports that American Millionaire Perot has offered to rebuild schools, hospitals, and temples that were destroyed by US bombing in exchange for the release of American POWs. The Vietnamese did not reject outright Perot's offer, but maintained the issue must be resolved in accordance with Paragraph 9 of the Global resolution.

TFR 236-1

Cover letter for the rest of this TFR dated 29 March 1968 to the Central Committee of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union from Yu. Chepyzhev, Secretary of the Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace that forwards notes from an unofficial conversation with Konaka [Kanaka] who was a member of the Japanese committee "Peace to Vietnam."

TFR 236-2-3

Undated document entitled "Short Notes of the Unofficial Conversation with the member of the Japanese Committee Peace to Vietnam, Konaka. Konaka arrived in Moscow on 26 March 1968 after participating in a convention in Stockholm with representatives of international and national organizations that are speaking out for an end to aggression in Vietnam. The Chairman of the Peace to Vietnam Committee, Oda Makoto, was unable to attend the convention, or come to Moscow because of the recent death of his Mother. Oda, is however, planning to go to Moscow in April 1968. Konaka came to Moscow to iron out "technical problems" involving the moving of US deserters from Japan. In official discussions, Konaka is going to ask for guidance as to what to do with the 11 US deserters already in Japan. Wants a suggestion as to what country to send them to, keeping in mind that any country that is served by water navigation can be used. Prior to coming to Moscow, Konaka also discussed this issue in Sweden and France but the issue is still unresolved. Konaka also said that the Japanese peace movement wants to establish closer ties with the Soviet peace movement.

- TFR 240-1 Undated cover letter for the rest of this TFR 240 Material. Addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and unsigned. This page is heavily sanitized. States that in accordance with the assignment given on 17 September 1970, material is being forwarded for use in the talks with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam party-government delegation.
- TFR 240-2 Page 5 of the material forwarded by TFR 240-1 that, again is heavily sanitized. States that since February 1965, 3,357 American aircraft were shot down by the PVO and Air Force of the Vietnamese People's Army. Of these, 898 were shot down by SAMs, 259 by fighter aviation, and 2,200 by AAA.
- TFR 258-1-7 A 7 page document containing the names, birth years, periods of service, and home address of 76 people living in the territory of the Republic of Belarus', who served in Vietnam from 1961-1974.

APPENDIX B

Interviews

4 November 1992. **Pavel Ponomaryov**, former Soviet Air Force Navigator with the 708th Military Aviation Regiment, stationed at Vinh, North Vietnam from January to December 1962.

Ponomaryev's unit had two missions: to drop ammunition and supplies into the Van Viyeng Valley (Plain of Jars) in Laos, and to ferry North Vietnamese personnel supplies from Vinh to an airstrip called Tchepone, inside Laos on the border of South Vietnam. Ponomaryov recalled frequently seeing American pilots while flying over the Plain of Jars. Sometimes they would communicate over the radio, and sometimes they would buzz him and laugh.

Ponomaryov felt that the relationship was friendly. He mentioned that after the three warring Princes signed a peace agreement on 9 November 1962, he often saw Americans on the same airfield in Vientiane with the Russians.

Ponomaryov said that in 1962, after the monsoon season (possibly August or September), he and a pilot named Aleksandr Leonidovich Matkin picked up a Caucasian male, from Tchepone and flew the man to Vinh, where he reportedly was put on a North Vietnamese aircraft bound for Hanoi, Ponomaryov related that he and Matkin returned to the same location a few days later to pick-up a second Caucasian male and delivered him to Vinh also. Ponomaryov had minimal contact with his passengers since both were escorted by Vietnamese who did not permit any communication between the passengers and the Soviets. Ponomaryov described the first individual as six feet tall, with blond or light-colored hair, about 28 years old, and very good looking. He described the second individual as somewhat shorter than the first prisoner and about the same age. Neither man showed any evidence of wounds or identifying marks. They wore "regular" shoes, shirts draped outside their trousers, and no military insignia. Ponomaryov was told by local Vietnamese soldiers that the Caucasians were American pilots.

18 November 1992. **Mikhail Georgyevich Lesin**, former Soviet Air Force Captain, served as an aircraft Commander on Il-2s, based at Vinh, Vietnam from February to November 1962.

Lesin did not remember the flights described by Ponomaryov. The only POW-related information he recalled is that in 1962, he delivered one group of U.S. POWs from the Plain of Jars to U.S. control at Vientiane. He said there were either three or six U.S. POWs. He remembered that the POWs were escorted by Vietnamese guards, and that the aircraft had Laotian markings. Lesin claimed not to have heard of any other POWs being flown on Soviet aircraft.

25 November 1992. **Petr Konstantinovich Chivkunov**, former Colonel, and Deputy Commander of the 708th Military Transport Aviation Regiment, stationed in North Vietnam from January to December 1962.

Chivkunov stated that his unit often flew uniformed North Vietnamese soldiers as well as European-looking men who spoke French, and some who even spoke English. All the "Europeans" wore civilian clothes. Chivkunov saw many European-looking men in Hanoi and noted that French planes often flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Hanoi. Chivkunov denied any personal contact with, or knowledge of, any American POWs. He was adamant that no American pilots were transported north during his tour.

24 January 1995. **Ivan Makarovich Romanenko**, former Soviet ADA, served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969 and had no substantive information about American POW/MIAs.

25 January 1995. **Yevgeniy Timofeyevich Sidorov**, former Soviet instructor of air defense techniques, served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969 and was stationed in Son Tay, but had no information on American POW/MIAs.

25 January 1995. **Aleksandr Semyenovich Mushenko**, former Soviet Army Colonel, served in Vietnam from 1954 to 1966 as an ADA.

The U.S. previously interviewed Mushenko in May 1994, at that time he stated that he once saw an American POW but from a great distance. [However, General Cherginets provided the U.S. with a document that stated that Mushenko had repeated meetings with U.S. POWs.] During the interview he stated that his service in Vietnam was many years ago and that he could no longer remember any meetings with U.S. POWs.

26 January 1995. **Nazyat Salikhovich Mingazov**, former Soviet ADA Group Commander, served in Vietnam from September 1969 through August 1970. Mingazov was based in Quang Binh Province, and had no information on American POW/MIAs.

27 January 1995. **Viktor Vasilyevich Pronin**, former Soviet Army Lieutenant Colonel, served in Vietnam from August 1972 through January 1973 as an ADA.

Pronin was assigned to the Hanoi area, and had no information on American POW/MIAs. However, Pronin allowed the U.S. to make copies of a Vietnamese newspaper that had articles concerning shoot downs of U.S. aircraft and which contained the pictures of nine U.S. POWs. He additionally allowed the U.S. to make copies of several pictures he took of a B-52 crash site, and part of a flight suit.

28 January 1995. **Anatoliy Panteleyevich Odinets**, former Soviet Army Colonel, served in Vietnam as a Senior ADA from April 1966 to April 1967.

During the second interview by the U.S., Odinets explained that during his time in Vietnam he was the only ADA who had permission from both the Soviets and the Vietnamese to take official pictures of downed aircraft and other items of military significance. Odinets provided the U.S. with hundreds of negatives showing U.S. crash sites, tail numbers, equipment data plates. Odinets stated that many of these pictures were included in secret books under the title "The Experience of War in Vietnam" ("Opyt Voiny Vo Vietname"), "Combating Maneuverable Flying Targets" ("Borba Protiv Maneviruyushchikh Letayushchikh Obyektov"), and "Combating the Shrike Missile" ("Borba Protiv Rakety Shrike").

30 January 1995. **Nikolay Arsenyevich Blinkov**, former Soviet Army Colonel, commanded a group of Soviet ADA in Vietnam from September 1967 through September 1968.

In Haiphong in late January or early February 1968, Blinkov stated that he saw the coffin of a dead U.S. flyer who had been piloting an A-7 or A-4. Blinkov stated that the Vietnamese told him that this American was a lieutenant born in 1941, who had sustained stomach wounds during the shootdown of his aircraft and had ejected at about 300 meters. Additionally, Blinkov related that he had heard that the commander and his deputy of the U.S. aviation group "Karat",

based in Thailand, were shot down and captured, and that their pictures were in Vietnamese newspapers at the end of 1967 or early 1968. Blinkov further stated that he had met military specialists from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba who were providing assistance to the North Vietnamese. Blinkov added that the Vietnamese always wrote down and recorded all pertinent information on every plane they shot down.

10 March 1995. **Yevgeney Petrovich Sulyga**, author of the 28 February 1995 article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* concerning the Commission's work in Minsk.

Sulyga clarified certain details of the article. Sulyga said that the name "Alexander Sergeev" was fictitious, created to protect the privacy of the individual who found the ID card of the downed U.S. flyer mentioned in the article. Additionally, Sulyga clarified that the words "Viet Cong" in his article were understood by him to mean all soldiers serving under Ho Chi Minh. Sulyga stressed that he had no information regarding Soviet advisors serving in South Vietnam.

10 March 1995. **Anatoliy Panteleyevich Odinets**, former Soviet Army Colonel, served in Vietnam as a Senior ADA from April 1966 to April 1967.

During the third interview with Odinets, he clarified some previous points of discussion with the U.S. and gave explanations pertaining to some of the photos which he had previously provided. Additionally, Odinets provided the U.S. with dozens of new negatives from his service in Vietnam, which he had located in his personal notes since he last met with the U.S. in January 1995. Odinets stated that he was given permission by the North Vietnamese to take photos of ADA sites, and any pictures of downed aircraft were taken at his own risk.

Odinets provided the following additional information about his service in Vietnam: The Military attaché to Vietnam was General-Major Alexander Lebedev. There were KGB representatives present in military units, but they were assigned to a unit only for its first six months in country. The GRU had no independent resident agents in Vietnam, since they were a part of the military structure. Representatives of the GRU conducted their intelligence gathering work as a routine part of military operations in Vietnam. Odinets was a bit surprised when the

U.S. mentioned Col Razuvayev, who was in charge of a specialized team or "Spetsgruppa" in Vietnam, which was tasked with the collection of captured enemy equipment and its subsequent transport to the USSR. Razuvayev, through documents acquired earlier by the U.S., consistently attempted to acquire from the North Vietnamese, interrogation protocols of downed U.S. fliers. Odinets said that Razuvayev worked for the "Byuro Vneshnikh Snoshenii" and was indeed in the business of sending captured equipment to the USSR. Odinets said that Razuvayev's group would at times, pack up entire aircraft for transport by train to the Soviet Union - Odinets did not know the destination of the equipment. As an ADA officer, Odinets did not have a high opinion of Razuvayev's work, calling it "thievery", as opposed to good, clean intelligence work. He opined that Razuvayev reported to ADA (PVO) HQ in Moscow and that he was himself an ADA officer. Odinets does not know what happened to Razuvayev or the Spetsgruppa, nor does he know Razuvayev's current whereabouts. Odinets recalled that there were two such Spetsgruppa at work in Hanoi, the second of which was involved in SIGINT operations in North Vietnam, and he mentioned the name "Tachan". Odinets could give no further information about either Spetsgruppa.

Odinets also disclosed that there were five POW camps in North Vietnam that were exclusively for fliers. He does not know the camps locations and claimed, "No one knew". He said however, that all five of the POW camps were located north of Hanoi, approximately 50 km behind the Red River, on the territory that extends towards the border with China. When asked if Soviet advisors ever had the opportunity to have contact with American POWs, he answered in the negative. Odinets revealed the actual regimental numerical designations of the North Vietnamese ADA regiments as the: 236th(1), 238th(2), 285th(3), 274th(4), 257th(5), 275th(6), 278th(7), 263rd(8), 267th(9), and 261st(10) - Odinets stated that the numbers in parentheses are code numbers for the corresponding regiments.

12 March 1995. **Yevgeniy Timofeyevich Sidorov**, former Soviet instructor of air defense techniques, served at Son Tay in Vietnam from November 1968 to October 1969. Sidorov had nothing new to add to his previous interview conducted in January 1995.

12 March 1995. **Viktor Vasiliyevich Pronin**, former Soviet Army Lieutenant Colonel, served as an ADA in Vietnam from August 1972 to January 1973.

During the second interview Pronin provided a last name (Timoshenko) of a lead (Mikhail Kuzmich), which he had provided during his first interview in January 1995.

12 March 1995. **Grigory Mikhailovich Deykun**, former Soviet ADA, served in Vietnam from February - May 1972.

Follow-up from 7 July 1994 interview, Deykun provided the full name of a lead for which he had previously had only partial information. Mikhail Adamovich Simonov served in Vietnam with Deykun, the U.S. has made numerous unsuccessful attempts to locate Simonov during previous trips to Minsk. Deykun showed the U.S. souvenirs which he took from a downed U.S. F-105 in the Quang Tri province of North Vietnam. These souvenirs are 2 "Sharikovye Fugasy" or bomb pieces. Deykun had no information about the pilot of this downed F-105. Additionally, Deykun showed the U.S. an official document signed by General Maksimenko, thanking Deykun for his service in Vietnam. Deykun also stated that he had heard that the Soviets shipped a U.S. F-4 Phantom, in good condition, from North Vietnam to a Moscow aviation factory.

13 March 1995. **Nazyat Salikhonovich Mingazov**, former Soviet Army Colonel commanded a group of ADA in Vietnam from September 1969 - August 1970. Follow-up interview, Mingazov had no new information of substance for the U.S.

14 March 1995. **Viktor Mikhailovich Odintsov**, former Soviet Army Colonel, served in Vietnam as an ADA from October 1972 to October 1973.

Odintsov was based in Hanoi and traveled all over North Vietnam and even visited Laos. Odintsov showed the U.S. the original pictures he had taken in Hanoi sometime between December 1972 and January 1973 of several U.S. POWs at a news conference. He said that he had heard the names of these U.S. POWs but was unable to remember them. Upon closer inspection, in one of the pictures of a captured U.S. flyer, the flyer's name-tag is visible and can be partially read. The U.S. convinced him to turn over this picture, which he did. Odintsov

claimed that he did not have any meetings with U.S. POWs, and that he only saw them from a distance at the press conference. In addition, there were several other cases, apparently not related to the above-mentioned POWs, where Odintsov had visited crash sites of downed American aircraft. He stated that he had visited two separate places on the outskirts of Hanoi where B-52 bombers had crashed. In addition, he visited the crash site of an F-106 in the same area. Odintsov further related that a Soviet television correspondent, last name of Kamenev-Almazov, possibly of Moscow (NFI), had said that he had seen the body of a dead U.S. flyer from a downed B-52 in Hanoi in December 1972. According to Odintsov, the Vietnamese claimed to have shot down 32 B-52 bombers during attacks on Vietnam.

14 March 1995. **Valentin Mikhailovich Kozubovskiy**, former Soviet Colonel, served in Vietnam from August 1973 to August 1974 as an instructor at the Military Institute in Son Tay.

Kozubovskiy related that the Vietnamese published a military newspaper which he thinks was called "Star". Kozubovskiy will attempt to locate this newspaper, in which he claims are published the photographs of "around 50" U.S. POWs in Vietnam, in his personal belongings.

15 March 1995. **Nikolay Arsenyevich Blinkov**, former Soviet ADA, served in North Vietnam from September 1967 - September 1968.

Follow-up interview. Blinkov had previously provided the U.S. information on an A-4 or A-7 aircraft downed in late January or early February 1968, and said that he had personally seen the coffin containing the body of the flier.

16 March 1995. **Carole Crenshaw**, the American Ambassadors secretary in Minsk, and George Fitzgerald, the spouse of the Political Officer in Minsk.

Crenshaw and Fitzgerald both related that they had visited the KGB museum in Vilnius, Lithuania on 15 March 1995. During the visit, their tour guide revealed that he had served over ten years as a prisoner in the Gulags and that "four American Officers had been with me in one of the camps". The tour guide revealed neither the location of the camps nor the names of the Americans.

16 March 1995. Mikhail Kuzmich Timoshenko, former Soviet ADA for equipment repair, served around Hanoi, North Vietnam from March 1971 to February 1972.

Timoshenko related that on three occasions he saw U.S. F-4 Phantoms get shot down around Hanoi near "Phu Lo" in June or July 1971. Timoshenko said that on two of these occasions he saw, from a distance, the fliers eject. Timoshenko never heard the names or any other information about these downed flyers. Timoshenko further related that he has pictures of downed U.S. aircraft in Vietnam, but was unable to locate these pictures prior to the interview. Timoshenko said he would continue searching for the pictures.

17 March 1995. Stanislav Ivanovich Sorokin, former Chief Soviet KGB representative to Hanoi, North Vietnam from 1974 to 1979.

Sorokin had a good understanding of the purpose of the meeting, and said that he had once meet with U.S. Congressmen to discuss the issue of American POW/MIAs. While in Vietnam he provided the liaison between the leadership of the Soviet and North Vietnamese KGB's, and at times also represented the Soviet MVD since they had no representative there. He was housed and worked in downtown Hanoi near a number of foreign embassies. He was not a witness to any specific incidents of U.S. losses. He had of course heard of incidents of losses, and had witnesses first hand the destruction resulting from American bombings. He also denied ever getting information on specific losses, but said it could have been possible; and of course he had read about specific incidents in newspapers. Sorokin stated that he had no requests to the Vietnamese for information on specific losses, nor any procedures for getting that information. He was not interested in it. His primary interests were in the equipment on U.S. aircraft and weaponry. He would get letters from Moscow on specific items of interest to the Soviets, and he would pass on these interests to the Deputy Minister for Technology. However, there was no cooperation from the Vietnamese side. Sorokin was astonished by the uncooperative attitude of the Vietnamese. Vietnamese officials would on the surface treat him very well smiles and politeness, but would not follow through on the Soviet requests. Sorokin replied in the affirmative when asked if there was a Soviet interest in meeting American POWs. As an intelligence officer, there would be a real interest, since Americans were the number on enemy of

the Soviet Union. Sorokin said he tried to raise this issue with the Vietnamese, but all he got were smiles, affirmative head nodding, and positive verbal responses. However, he stated that after he got on station, he read a report written by his predecessor that in 1973 or 1974, the Vietnamese had shown his predecessor an American POW in building where he and his Vietnamese counterparts would have meetings. However, it was only a one time event. Sorokin did not know the name of the POW. When asked if Sorokin had any specific instructions from headquarters not to meet with American POWs, he replied in the negative, and stated that it would have been useful, but the Vietnamese did not permit it. According to Sorokin, no other Soviet personnel met with American POWs, because he would have known about it, since the requests and meetings would have had to go through him. Sorokin said he realized that it was useless to keep asking for access to American POWs, due to Vietnamese rejections. In regard to Soviets in other countries like Laos having access to American POWs, Sorokin stated that he was not possession of any information on that topic, but thought that it was probably no different in Laos, because the Lao, and the rules/restrictions would have probably been the same. Sorokin was asked if he had a mission to collect information on American POWs, such as name, DOB, or any other statistical data. He replied that he would have if it had been possible to get it. But since there was no opportunity to get it - the Vietnamese attitude - he did not have that as a mission. If he had obtained information, he would have sent it off to headquarters, who would have advised him if it was useful or required. Regarding the receipt of assessment of the Vietnamese interrogation reports of American POWs, Sorokin said he received no such assessments, because of the relationship with the Vietnamese. He again reiterated the unsuccessful attempts by the Soviets to get equipment, and the way in which the Vietnamese kept putting the Soviets off. They would not reject the Soviet requests in words, but would just take no action. Sorokin believes that American POWs would not have been transferred to China because the Chinese would not have deemed this advantageous in the long run to their future relationship with the U.S. They knew that sooner or later, the relationship would get better. Nor does he believe any American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union, since he would have known about it. He qualified that response by saying it is difficult for anyone to say 100% to something, but he does not think that Americans were transferred. Sorokin was asked if he

obtained any information on American POWs from Soviet Advisors who were serving in Vietnam, and replied that he could have had conversations with advisors related to that topic, but he had no information from them. Sorokin would not provide any names of personnel the U.S. could follow-up with, citing a law that prohibits him from disclosing names.

27 March 1995. **Zdislovas Juchnevicius**, Russian language teacher in Saigon from 1985 to 1989.

Follow-up to the 1993 interview conducted by a Consular Officer at the American Embassy, Vilnius, Lithuania. Juchnevicius related that during his time in Vietnam, the local Vietnamese had told him about an American officer who had refused to leave Vietnam at the end of the war. He was able to recall that the Officer's name was "Bernard" and that the Vietnamese called him "Ben". Juchnevicius never saw this man, he and his wife only heard about him. He related that this American lived in the Mekong Delta, that he was known locally for being mentally unbalanced and was probably a deserter, that his family (wife) was in America, that he was a Caucasian, had become a Buddhist, and that he wore glasses. Juchnevicius further related that this American died in 1985 and was buried in a coffin wearing a white robe, in a village called "Kyi Long" or "Cuu Long." Juchnevicius cautioned that "Ben" was buried in accordance with Buddhist custom and that he may have been buried under a Vietnamese name. Juchnevicius never heard this person's last name. Additionally, he related that after the end of the war, Soviet specialists lived in the San-San Hotel in Saigon and that there were approximately 200 Soviet military specialists and 3000 civilian specialists in Vietnam at any one time in the late eighties.

28 March 1995. **Vladas Burbulis**, TASS correspondent in Vietnam from 1971 to 1975 and from 1985 to 1989.

Burbulis visited Laos periodically, and in 1978 published a book about Vietnam called: "Between the Red River and the Mekong". Burbulis gave the U.S. the holdings in his personal archive concerning his work in Vietnam. This archive consists of a large number of pictures of various Vietnamese personalities, places, and events to include some military events such as

parades; copies of articles Burbulis had written about Vietnam; and a large number of negatives.

Burbulis stated that there should be negatives from pictures he took at the crash site of a U.S.

B-52 on 30 December 1972. Burbulis related that under Soviet rule, when TASS assigned correspondents to a country, two were usually assigned and that one of them was a real journalist and that the other one was actually KGB or GRU. As a result of this, Burbulis was able to recall that several of his colleagues in Vietnam were actually KGB or GRU. Burbulis provided a picture of Oleg Oleynik, possibly in Moscow working for the Russian Information Agency, who was actually a GRU Major (now retired) while in Vietnam. Burbulis said that Oleynik worked for two years in Paris as a journalist after Vietnam. Burbulis related that Oleynik loved to drink and would boast while drinking. According to Burbulis, Oleynik once stated that there was an agreement between the USSR and Vietnam that whenever a plane was shot down and prisoners taken, that first the Vietnamese would interrogate the prisoners, then the Vietnamese and KGB/GRU would interrogate them together, then the KGB/GRU would interrogate them alone. Burbulis related that Oleynik claimed that he went to the places where downed or dead fliers were being held and that he interrogated them. Burbulis stated that the KGB/GRU took pictures of downed U.S. aircraft and bodies of U.S. fliers. He is 100% sure that this information is held in KGB/GRU archives in Moscow, although he clarified this by saying that this was his "personal opinion." Burbulis also believes that American POWs from Vietnam were taken to the USSR. He bases this statement on the fact that a TASS correspondent, Volodya Blazhenkov, who was actually a KGB LtCol, said that this had taken place. Burbulis further related that while in Laos he had been told that in May 1973, the Pathet Lao shot down a F-4 Phantom. One flier perished and one ejected. The one who ejected was a Caucasian named George, who "stayed voluntarily and helped the Pathet Lao." Burbulis never heard this flier's last name.

5 May 1995. **Aleksey Overchuk**, newspaper reporter, in April 1995, Overchuk authored and published an article in *Moskovsky Komsomolets* on the Soviet Air Defense Artillery effort and presence in Vietnam.

Overchuk was not willing to reveal his sources for the article but did pass onto the U.S. a copy of a picture of a remnant from a downed U.S. fighter which was shot down near Hanoi in

1967. Overchuk stated that the Moscow regional air defense regiments sent large numbers of individuals to serve tours in Vietnam. According to Overchuk, the information in the article was second hand information.

15 May 1995. **Valentin Mikhailovich Kozubovsky**, former Soviet Colonel, served in Vietnam from August 1973 to August 1974 as an instructor at the Military Institute in Son Tay.

Follow-up from March 1995 interview during which Kozubovsky claimed that he had a Vietnamese newspaper with pictures of approximately 50 U.S. POWs. Kozubovsky had been unable to find this newspaper and had no new information for the U.S. Kozubovsky said he would continue searching for the newspaper. The U.S. to follow-up.

15 May 1995. **Vladimir Pavolich Belozub**, served in Vietnam from August 1970 to August 1971 in Son Tay. Belozub had no substantive information concerning U.S. POW/MIA personnel.

15 May 1995. **Georgiy Semenovich Nominat**, former Soviet LtCol., served in Vietnam from April to November 1966 as an ADA. Follow-up from June 1994 interview. Nominat had no new information of substance for the U.S.

16 May 1995. **Diogen Nikolayevich Ivanov**, served in Vietnam in 1966. Ivanov was a very reluctant interviewee and would not answer most questions. Ivanov claimed that he had no knowledge concerning U.S. POW/MIA personnel.

16 May 1995. **Grigoriy Mikhaylovich Deykun**, former Soviet Army member, served in Vietnam from February to May 1972. Follow-up from July 1994 interview. Deykun had no new information for the U.S.

18 May 1995. **Georgiy Mikhailovich Govorko**, former Soviet Army LtCol., served as an ADA in North Vietnam from March - September 1966.

Govorko stated that on one occasion he had seen 3 U.S. POWs at a distance as Vietnamese villagers were abusing them. Govorko had no additional information about this incident and never heard the names of these POWs. Govorko heard rumors that occasionally Vietnamese villagers killed American flyers who fell into their hands. Govorko additionally

heard that an intact U.S. A-4D was shipped to Moscow after it had landed undamaged after the pilot had ejected. Govorko claimed to have a data plate from a U.S. airplane downed in Vietnam. He said he would search through his belongings to locate any possible items of interest to the U.S.

18 May 1995. **Lev Nikolayevich Markov**, former Soviet Army Colonel, served at Son Tay, North Vietnam as a ADA from September 1971 to August 1972.

Markov heard from a Vietnamese Captain that groups of U.S. POWs were moved to different locations every night to avoid U.S. rescue attempts. Markov says that the Russians were not allowed to speak to U.S. POWs, but thinks the Chinese were, since the Vietnamese had better relations with the Chinese. Markov related that he knew 2 Soviet officers who were killed by U.S. bombs. Markov never saw any U.S. POWs nor did he have any substantive information about them.

18 May 1995. **Mikhail Adamovich Simonov**, served as an ADA in North Vietnam from April 1967 - April 1968. Follow-up from 15 March 1995 interview. Simonov provided 2 pictures of a U.S. F-105 shot down on 1 August 1967.

18 May 1995. **Mikhail Kuzmich Timoshenko**, former Soviet ADA for equipment repair, served around Hanoi, North Vietnam from March 1971 to February 1972.

Follow-up from 16 March 1995 interview. Timoshenko had located some of his pictures from his service in Vietnam and showed the U.S. 4 pictures of unidentifiable wreckage from a U.S. B-52 aircraft downed in 1971 or 1972. These pictures showed nothing of significance.

19 May 1995. **Nikolay Arsenyevich Blinkov**, former Soviet Army Colonel, commanded a group of Soviet ADA in Vietnam from September 1967 to September 1968.

Follow-up from January and March 1995 interviews. During the 30 January 1995 interview, Blinkov stated that he had seen the coffin of a dead U.S. flyer whose A-7 or A-4 had been shot down near Hanoi in late January or early February 1968. Blinkov related that the Vietnamese told him that the flyer was a Lieutenant, born in 1941, who was shot in the stomach. Today, Blinkov stated that he never saw the body and that he never heard the flyer's name.

Additionally, Blinkov showed the U.S. his photo album from Vietnam with approximately 100 pictures of Vietnam. While interesting, these pictures were of no significance to the U.S., except the pictures of Blinkov's fellow Soviet advisors.

19 May 1995. **Anatoliy Panteleyevich Odinets**, former Soviet Army Colonel, served in Vietnam as a Senior ADA from April 1966 to April 1967. During the fourth interview with Odinets he had no substantive information concerning U.S. POW/MIAs.

20 May 1995. **Anatoliy Ivanovich Gutsalyuk**, former Soviet ADA - refused to answer almost all questions and claimed that he had no information at all that would be of interest to the U.S. concerning U.S. POW/MIAs.

22 May 1995. **Vladimir Aleksandrovich Krupnov**, former Soviet ADA, served in Vietnam from September 1966 to December 1967.

Krupnov never saw any U.S. POWs in Vietnam and claimed to have only heard about them in general. Krupnov gave the U.S. a Vietnamese Newspaper dated 7 May 1967 that contained pictures of 3 U.S. flyers supposedly shot down on 5 May 1971. This newspaper will be forwarded to JCSD analyst for translation and analysis.

23 May 1995. **Aleksey Gavrilovich Khokhlov**, is writing a book about the history of the Belorussian armed forces and will include a chapter about its participation in local wars such as Vietnam.

Khokhlov was already aware of the work that the U.S. has been doing in Belarus. He stated that all the Belorussian Vietnam veterans that he has talked with "have already been contacted by you" and at the present time he has not collected any material that would be of interest to the U.S. The U.S. replied that it would be in our mutual interest to stay in touch and Khokhlov agreed to being contacted in the future.

23 May 1995. Leonid Ivanovich Fedyukovich, a Belorussian Afghanistan veteran and a friend of Georgiy Mikhailovich Govorko (see 18 May 1995 interview).

Govorko had gone out of town on vacation but had asked Fedyukovich to show TFR several souvenirs which Govorko had brought back from his time in North Vietnam. The only item of interest to TFR was a data plate from a downed U.S. aircraft.

23 May 1995. **Yury Khangereyevich Totrov**, member of the board and head of the foreign section of The Association of Retired Intelligence Officers of Russia, and a senior consultant with Noukas and Associates, international Investigative and Consulting Services, Moscow.

Totrov provided TFR with a copy of a listing of American aircraft shot down in Vietnam between 1 January 1967 and 17 February 1968, in Russian original and English translation, which had previously been forwarded to DPMO by John Wood a professional colleague in Michigan. The source of the list was retired Colonel Anatoli Ivanovich Melnik of Moscow, who served as a Soviet advisor and a supervisor of Vietnamese air defenses. Totrov also provided a copy of a Kansas City Star newspaper article of 4 November 1993, telling of a speaking tour he made in America with three other retired KGB foreign intelligence officers. Totrov is very interested in expanding professional contacts with retired western intelligence officers. Totrov related that he worked for General Oleg Kalugin in the seventies and highly respects him. One of Totrov's professional responsibilities at the time was knowledge and tracking of CIA operations and agents. He claimed that Kalugin originally wanted him to go to Vietnam in 1973 to question CIA agent Weaver. But upon returning from vacation, he was surprised to learn that Kalugin had sent Colonel Nechiporenko in his place. Totrov said he did not know the names of the alleged American pilots Nechiporenko interrogated in Hanoi in 1973, but would contact Nechiporenko to see if he might remember their names. Totrov was adamant in his belief that no U.S. servicemembers were transferred to the USSR from Vietnam. Totrov promised to inform other retired Russian foreign intelligence officers of the POW/MIA issue and possibly provide a forum for TFR members to speak before the association some time in early September when the organization reconvenes after summer vacation. Totrov mentioned that he is a friend of General Sergeyeovich Leonov, the author of a book entitled "Likholet'ye." General Leonov was formerly head of the KGB analytical directorate circa 1980-1990. TFR will follow up with the General.

23 May 1995. **Vladimir Fedorovich Gres**, former Soviet Army Captain, served in Vietnam as an ADA from March 1967 to February 1968.

Gres said that in his capacity as an antiaircraft rocket engineer, he had absolutely no personal contact with American POWs. He professes no knowledge of locations of POWs. He professes no knowledge of locations of POW camps or of POWs were processed and interrogated. Gres said that the Vietnamese did not allow Soviets to visit "fresh" crash sites, and did not provide the Soviets with information on shootdown survivors or deaths. Gres stated that at any one time there were approximately twenty-five Soviet pilots in country to train their Vietnamese counterparts, but were forbidden to fly combat missions. Gres and others in the group were encouraged to submit queries on American equipment and technical matters. Such questions, on purely technical matters, were submitted in an ongoing fashion. Every once in a while, they received answers to some of the questions. Gres does not know how or by whom these questions were processed, or how the answers were obtained. Gres said that he had heard a rumor that in 1966 or 1967 a "Phantom" had been recovered in good condition and had been shipped somewhere in the USSR. Gres recalled that in December 1967, an American Lieutenant Colonel shot down and died in the crash. Gres said that the pilot was the assistant commander of an American air wing and that he had a airline ticket for a return trip to the U.S.

24 May 1995. **Aleksandr Sergeyeovich Bukhalovskiy**, former ADA instructor who served in North Vietnam from September 1966 - September 1967.

Bukhalovskiy claims that he never saw any U.S. POWs but that he did see pilots ejecting from U.S. aircraft on 10 or 12 occasions, and that he would check his personal archives to try to find his pictures as well as his notes and diary from Vietnam.

24 May 1995. **Maksim Ivanovich Tsaryuk**, served as an ADA in North Vietnam from July 1965 to September 1965. Tsaryuk had no substantive information concerning U.S. POW/MIA personnel.

24 May 1995. **Lev Nikolayevich Markov**, former Soviet ADA instructor at Son Tay, North Vietnam, from September 1971 to August 1972. Follow up from 18 May 1995 interview. Markov had no substantive information concerning U.S. POW/MIA personnel.

25 May 1995. **Nikolay Vasilyevich Vasilenko**, served as an ADA, then as the Assistant Commander for Political Matters with the 430th or 460th Bryansk Antiaircraft Rocket Brigade at Nabai Aerodrome from May 1966 to February 1967.

Vasilenko said that the Bryansk regiment was the first such Soviet anti-aircraft training regiment to serve in Vietnam in 1965. Vasilenko professes no knowledge of American POWs whatsoever. He did recall a shootdown of an American aircraft in October 1966 on the China-Laos-Vietnamese border, where his unit was TDY for a few weeks. Two American aircraft, F-104s or F-105s, were shot down by his unit. Four parachutes were seen exiting the two aircraft. Vasilenko saw three captured fliers in passing at the regimental command post. Vasilenko does not recall any details about these POWs, and does not know what happened to them afterwards or where they were taken. Vasilenko said, that there was talk that the fourth parachutist, a second lieutenant, was rumored to have been killed. Vasilenko kept a diary that he donated to Valentin Vasilyevich Nezhelskiy (Dec) who wrote a dissertation on Political Officers' experiences during the war in Vietnam. Vasilenko opined that the dissertation was completed, and that it is probably still on file at the Lenin Military Political Academy in Moscow.

1 June 1995. **Aleksey Dmitriyevich Yaroslavtsev**, former Soviet Colonel, served in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968.

He served as the Commanding Officer of the 263rd Anti-aircraft Rocket Forces Brigade until June 1967, then as the Commanding Officer of the 368th, stationed approximately fifteen km northwest of Hanoi. Yaroslavtsev said that he had no contact with POWs whatsoever. he said that even at the highest levels of the antiaircraft command, there was never any discussion of American POWs, nor was there any direction given pertaining to POWs. He said few if any Soviets ever came into contact with American POWs during the war in Vietnam. Yaroslavtsev recalled that on 24 October 1967, there was a massive raid on Hanoi. The 1st battalion of the

368th regiment shot down one aircraft, which crashed near the airport outside of Hanoi. The pilot ejected prior to the crash.

1 June 1995. **Valeriy Ivanovich Zubko**, former Soviet Captain, served as an SAM technician and engineer from September 1966 to July 1967.

Zubko had no information regarding POWs. He said that it was not part of his work in Vietnam. Zubko was surprised that several U.S. aircraft which had crashed relatively intact had not been taken back to the Soviet Union for exploitation. He said the political situation was such that the Soviets had little leeway for independent action. He said the Vietnamese would become upset if even a Soviet advisor left the vicinity of a firing position unannounced.

14 June 1995. **Vladas Burbulis**, served as a TASS correspondent in Vietnam from 1971 to 1975, and from 1985 to 1989. Follow-up from 28 March 1995 interview.

Burbulis again restated his earlier remarks that U.S. flyers had been transported to the Soviet Union from Vietnam. Burbulis repeated that he had been told this by Vladimir Blazhenkov, but added that Oleg Oleynik, a GRU Captain who worked as a TASS correspondent while in Vietnam, had also told him that U.S. flyers had been taken to the Soviet Union. Burbulis further related that both Blazhenkov and Oleynik had told him and other Soviet Journalists that "American flyers had been taken to Moscow to be interrogated about U.S. technology." When asked how often this had occurred, Burbulis stated that he was not sure, "they did not say", but Burbulis felt that "it happened more than once." Burbulis related that U.S. POWs were sent to Moscow to be debriefed on their knowledge of the electronic countermeasure (ECM) capabilities of the U.S. B-52, as well as on their knowledge concerning equipment recovered from downed U.S. aircraft. Additionally, Burbulis stated that it was common knowledge that Soviet officers were actually firing the ADA weapons systems that brought down many U.S. aircraft. Burbulis stated that the U.S. B-52s downed after December 1972 were a direct result of the Soviets having studied U.S. technology in greater detail. Burbulis also related that he had seen and actually spoken to a group of 15 U.S. POWs in Haiphong just prior to their release from captivity in 1973. Burbulis related that "some of the flyers that were at the Haiphong 'Hilton' were taken to Moscow." Burbulis added that "George" was shot down

near Sam Neua in Laos and that "George" stayed in Laos "voluntarily" and had married a Laotian woman.

14 June 1995. **Zdislovas Juchnevicius**, Russian language teacher in Saigon from 1985 to 1989. Follow-up from 27 March 1995 interview. Juchnevicius had no new substantive information concerning U.S. POW/MIA personnel.

20 June 1995. **Leonid Klichevskiy**, served as a TASS correspondent in North Vietnam from 1966 to 1968.

Klichevskiy claimed to have no knowledge of U.S. POWs except those that he saw at official press conferences in Hanoi. Klichevskiy related that he was able to question U.S. POWs only through an interpreter since he does not speak English. Klichevskiy related that he no longer has any pictures, notes, souvenirs, or film remaining from his time in Vietnam.

28 June 1995. **Valery Mikhailovich Amirov**, Soviet LtCol and Chief of the Combat Department of the Ural Military District weekly newspaper "Ural Military News." Amirov was the source for a 1991 Yury Rankov article on the alleged transfer of an American POW from Vietnam to the Soviet Union in 1967. Amirov had no new information.

30 June 1995. **Aleksey Mikhaylovich Vasilyev**, served as a Pravda correspondent in Vietnam from February 1967 to January 1969.

Vasilyev is now the director of The Institute of African and Arab Studies for the Russian Academy of Sciences; President of the Center for Arab, African, and Islamic Studies; and a member of the Council for Foreign Policy, Ministry of foreign Affairs, Russian Federation. Vasilyev was able to travel around Vietnam and took pictures at several crash sites of U.S. aircraft. He also saw U.S. POWs, and that he conducted an interview of one U.S. POW. Vasilyev said this interview is included in a book he wrote about his time in Vietnam, "Rockets Over the Lotus Flower" which he provided to JCSD. "The Vietnamese were very good at filtering the POWs into the groups which would help them and those which would not help."

30 June 1995. **Vladimir Vasilyevich Fedorov**, former Soviet Colonel, served in Vietnam as an ADA and commanded an ADA regiment in the late sixties. Fedorov is quite elderly, has no information concerning U.S. POW/MIA personnel.

3 July 1995. **Olga Konstantinova Belan**, a journalist for a Moscow weekly, "Sobesednik."

Belan has written several articles concerning POW/MIA issues including the "Golden Parachutes" article in 1993. Belan said she has not worked on the issue for some time but is willing to help in any way she can. She feels that the Russians did everything they could in the past to hide evidence of U.S. POWs. She believes U.S. names were changed to Russian names in the prison system; prison records were destroyed as the U.S. expressed an interest in specific personnel at the time of the disintegration of the USSR; and that those who were aware that POWs were American were killed. Belan also felt that the Russian side of the joint commission is not making a sincere effort. Belan felt there was a reluctance on the part of Russian veterans of Vietnam to discuss the issue. This reluctance made her think that these veterans were "hiding something." Belan had interviewed General Abramov before he passed away. Abramov had been a senior Soviet officer in Vietnam. Belan felt that Abramov was not telling the truth when he said there had been no contact between the Soviets and U.S. POWs.

5 July 1995. **Nikolai Nikolayevich Kolesnik**, former Soviet Sergeant, served as an ADA in Vietnam from July 1965 to March 1966.

Kolesnik is now the chairman of the Union of Veterans of Vietnam, and was the source for an April 1995 newspaper article by Aleksey Overchuk which discusses events from the Vietnam War. Kolesnik did not personally see any U.S. POWs, and his quotes concerning U.S. POWs mentioned in the newspaper article were all related to him by Vietnamese translators. Kolesnik said that in the initial engagements with U.S. aircraft, the rocket warheads were so powerful that aircraft were destroyed by the blast and that the pilots bodies disintegrated. Later they switched to a less powerful warhead so there would be a chance to get POWs. Kolesnik said that on 11 August 1965, the Vietnamese shot down four U.S. A-4D aircraft. According to the Vietnamese, they found some remains of three dead flyers. Three of these planes came down

close to Kolesnik's position, the fourth plane crashed some 15-20 kilometers away and the Vietnamese did not find the pilot.

27 July 1995. **Aleksandr Mineyev**, former Soviet war correspondent, stationed in Hanoi, North Vietnam from November 1972 to the mid-seventies.

Mineyev said that from the time he arrived in Hanoi until the end of the war, he attended numerous press conferences at which American POWs were present. He affirmed that he and French APF correspondent, John Jacques Du Sablon, visited two American POWs in their prison cell in December 1972. Mineyev only recalls the last name of one of these Americans as being "Padgett." He also remembers seeing about 30 American POWs in the central Hanoi prison center in early 1973. Mineyev stated that this prison facility was about a ten minute walk from the Russian embassy in Hanoi. Mineyev claims that the Russian Ambassador to North Vietnam, I.S. Shcherbakov, talked with several American POWs during the course of the war. When asked about rumors of possible Americans being left behind in Vietnam, Mineyev replied that he heard such rumors but only from his western colleagues and not from any Russian or Vietnamese sources. Mineyev further claimed he never heard rumors of American POWs being sent to China. He asserted that Vietnamese relations with China deteriorated towards the end of the war. At this time the Vietnamese were playing both the Chinese and Russians against each other. They were, however, more sympathetic toward the Russians who were providing them with missiles. Mineyev revealed that even though the Russian "special services" had close relations with the North Vietnamese, the latter did not share much information toward the end of the war. When queried on the possibility of American POWs being transported to the Soviet Union, Mineyev replied that "he cannot exclude the possibility of this happening."

2 August 1995. **Aleksey Mikhaylovich Vasilyev**, served as a Pravda correspondent in Vietnam from February 1967 to January 1969 and wrote a book about his Vietnam experiences called "Rockets Over The Lotus Flower."

On page 38 Vasilyev writes: "In February 1965 one of the first U.S. jets was brought down in the area. The pilot of the Skyhawk bailed out but his parachute failed. Both the body and the wreckage fell into the sea at a distance of around two kilometers from shore. An order

came from Hanoi to recover the wreckage of the aircraft and the body at any cost. The wreckage of the aircraft and the body of the pilot, as well as maps and documents, were intact and unspoiled, and found their way to the surface." Vasilyev said that the paragraphs about the recovery of the pilot's body were related to him by Ho Tien Quoc, a fisherman who spent ten days working on the recovery of the plane and the body in the Quang Binh Province. Vasilyev said that Ho Tien Quoc related all this in the presence of Vietnamese government officials so Vasilyev feels that this must have been a government approved version of events since Vasilyev was a foreign journalist. On page 80 Vasilyev writes that on 25 April 1967 he witnessed the shoot down of a U.S. aircraft over Hanoi - he could not remember the type of aircraft and did not see a parachute. On pages 82-83, Vasilyev reports seeing a U.S. aircraft hit by a missile and disintegrating on 19 May 1967. On page 104 Vasilyev writes that at the end of April 1967, he attended a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which the Vietnamese planned to show off a recently shot down U.S. aircraft and its captured pilot. When Vasilyev arrived the pilot had died from his injuries but he did manage to see the body of "Larry Weskamp." On page 150-151, Vasilyev writes about a U.S. pilot who was shot down on 26 April 1967. The pilot bailed out and was in a "dinghy" on the water when the Vietnamese sunk the dinghy with the pilot in it. Vasilyev was unable to recall further details about this incident.

3 August 1995. **Vasily Anatoliyevich Taregradskiy**, served as a French and English translator based in Hanoi from December 1960 to January 1962. Taregradskiy had no information concerning U.S. POW/MIA personnel and was unable to provide any new leads.

6 September 1995. **Viktor Vasilyevich Tregubov**, former Sergeant in the Soviet Army, served in Vietnam from 1964 to 1965 in a Soviet ADA Detachment.

Tregubov said that in September 1964 he saw an American POW pilot, with parachute, being escorted by Vietnamese soldiers. He does not remember the exact date or time, save that it was not at night. The American was brought by vehicle to the Russian unit, fed, and given something to drink. He stayed with the unit for 20-30 minutes, was treated correctly, and then taken away. As a Sergeant, Tregubov was not told anything about the prisoner, and did not speak to him, although he said that others in his unit probably did briefly. The American wore a

specialized aviator's uniform, but Tregubov did not note his rank. The man seemed tired, but otherwise in good physical health with no wounds. The American appeared to be around 28 years of age, of average build, and was Caucasian. Tregubov said that this was the only American POW he saw. He did hear various rumors about U.S. POWs, but could not confirm any of them, and none pertained to their transfer to Russia. He personally could not see any benefit in the Soviets transferring prisoners out of Vietnam, feeling that their value would have been extremely limited. He said that perhaps specialists from larger plane crews might have had such value, but he doubted it.

10 January 1996. **Timofey Alekseyevich Svityuk**, served as a medic in North Vietnam from 27 May - 4 November 1966.

On one occasion in late October 1966, Svityuk claims he was summoned to the crash site of a U.S. aircraft in Xabac Province, North Vietnam, to administer first aid to two U.S. flyers. Svityuk claims to have arrived at the scene of the crash around 40 minutes after the U.S. plane was shot down. Svityuk was unable to identify the type of aircraft but he was certain that it was "some kind of reconnaissance aircraft since it was shot down at an altitude of around 500-600 meters." Svityuk claims that upon his arrival he checked the pulses of two partially buried U.S. flyers. Their hands and feet were still protruding from the ground while the remaining parts of their bodies were lightly covered with dirt. Svityuk claims that one flyer was already dead but the other flyer had a weak pulse and was still alive. Svityuk claims that he alerted the Vietnamese to the fact that this flyer was still alive and that "they needed to save him." However, Svityuk claims that the measures claiming that the "flyer had fired at us after his plane crashed;" and that although he was alive when he made it to the ground "we killed him." Svityuk claims that these flyers landed in the downed aircraft and did not eject. Svityuk says the U.S. flyers were buried at a distance of about 5 or 6 meters from the downed aircraft. Svityuk says that he never heard the names or ranks of these flyers and was even unable to say if they were white or black since "their faces were covered by dirt and their hands were extremely dirty." Svityuk says the crash site was near a metal factory called "Than Gu Yen" in the province of Xabac. Svityuk advised that he took the helmet of one of the flyers as a souvenir but

the Vietnamese found out, went to his commander, and he was forced to turn the helmet over to the North Vietnamese. Svityuk says the helmet had the name of the flyer written on it. If necessary, Svityuk is willing to return to Vietnam since he believes he could still locate the burial sites of these two flyers.

In August 1966, Svityuk claims that he witnessed the shootdown of a U.S. F-105 in the North Vietnamese province of Xabac. Svityuk claims the pilot ejected and was captured by the Vietnamese. Svityuk further claims the pilot was a white officer, his parachute was red and white, he had blonde hair, and was around 6 feet tall, and looked to be about 25 years old. Svityuk never found out the name, rank or fate of this pilot.

25 January 1996. **Nikolay Prokofyevich Surnov**, LtCol (Ret), served in Hanoi from 25 December 1960 - 3 June 1961, flight navigator and flew missions into Laos to supply equipment to the Pathet Lao.

Surnov related that on 31 December 1960, the Pathet Lao seized a U.S. aircraft, possibly a C-47, that had been abandoned by its crew on the runway somewhere in Laos. Surnov had no information as to the fate of the crew of the plane. After seizure, the plane was flown to Hanoi on 2 January 1961, with Surnov as the navigator and with Sergey Alekseyevich Somov of Moscow as the pilot. Surnov provided a photograph of this aircraft, showing a partial tail number 0-35. The photograph will be forwarded to JCSD. Surnov also provided pictures of Soviet advisors in Laos shown with the founder of the Pathet Lao, Cong Gle. Surnov further provided new contacts who served in Vietnam: Arefi Grigoriyevich Popov of Vitebsk; Safin (deceased); Ippolit Vasilyevich Kononov, possibly of Moscow; Charkin, possibly of Moscow; Valentin Ivanovich Novikov, possibly of Kiev, Ukraine, who was a translator; Sergey Ivanov of Lyubertsy, Moscow region; Scherbatykh of Lyubertsy Moscow region; Konstantin Dmitriyevich Biryukov of Moscow; Spiridonov of Moscow, a former attaché in Vietnam; Khasan Alikhamovich Yepkhiev (deceased); Andreyev of Moscow, a translator; Leonid Grigoriyevich Gavrilenko of Novokunznetsk; and Krasnyanskiy of Tula. Surnov had no information concerning U.S. POW/MIAs.

28 January 1996. **Boris Petrovich Yegin**, Colonel (Ret), served as an artillery advisor in North Vietnam from December 1971 - November 1972.

Yegin claims to have encountered a downed U.S. pilot in the far northern jungle of North Vietnam in December 1971. Yegin claims that the U.S. pilot's name was "Sidney" and that he was from Kentucky. Yegin claims that "Sidney" was rescued by U.S. forces and since he was alone Yegin did not hinder the rescue effort. Yegin also claims that in May 1972 he observed two U.S. POWs being guarded by a Vietnamese woman.

31 January 1996. **Mikhail Trofimovich Belyakov**, served as a fighter pilot instructor in North Vietnam from April 1966 - November 1966.

Belyakov stated that his mission was to teach the North Vietnamese pilots how to shoot down U.S. aircraft. Belyakov stated that there were Chinese representatives everywhere who hindered their efforts to assist the Vietnamese. Belyakov had no information concerning U.S. POWs.

31 January 1996. **Mikhail Ivanovich Smirnov**, Major (Ret), served as a Soviet Air Defense Instructor in North Vietnam from May - December 1967.

Smirnov saw "around seven" parachutists in the air from U.S. aircraft which had just been shot down. However, he did not know their fates or identities. Smirnov related that he had an acquaintance who was a Soviet geologist who saw a U.S. POW in captivity but he was unable to provide further details about this incident.

APPENDIX C

Summary of Plenary and Vietnam War Working Group Accomplishments

of the USRJC on POW/MIA Affairs:

1st Plenum: Moscow, March 1992. This initial meeting established the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov were assigned by their respective Presidents as co-Chairman.

2nd Plenum: Moscow, June 1992. Initial working meeting in Moscow. This meeting consisted of planning and coordination for the future work of the Commission. No specific information on the Vietnam War was passed. Senator Bob Smith provided the Russian side with a list of the U.S. personnel missing in Southeast Asia, and asked that Russian records be reviewed for information on missing American servicemembers.

3rd Plenum: Moscow, September 1992. The Russian side informed the American side that the Russian intelligence services could not find any information that supported the thesis that Americans were transported to the USSR from Vietnam. The SVR stated that Soviet intelligence officers were not permitted access to American prisoners. The GRU stated that they found no evidence of GRU access to American prisoners in Vietnam, and found no interrogation reports from their North Vietnamese counterparts. The GRU reported that they collected aircraft parts and intelligence reports from their North Vietnamese counterparts, but that their relations were poor. GRU contacts and travel in North Vietnam were limited. MFA Officer's Sviridov and Voronin were interviewed. Documents were passed by the Russian side which demonstrated the lack of Soviet autonomy in North Vietnam, and the apparent lack of involvement of Soviet personnel with American POWs.

4th Plenum: Moscow, December 1992. The Russian side made a definitive statement that live American POWs were not being held on the Moscow territory of the former Soviet Union. The Russian side reported on the reluctance by some former MFA officials who served in Vietnam to speak with the Commission.

5th Plenum: Moscow, April 1993. The Russian side made witnesses available from MFA service in North Vietnam and Laos, who described the lack of open communication with counterparts. The American side provided extended briefings to the Russian side regarding efforts to work with the North Vietnamese to resolve cases of loss of Americans in Indochina. The Russians provided documents to amplify the "1205" document, and information about American service members who voluntarily transited the Soviet Union enroute to third countries.

6th Plenum: Moscow, August 1993. The Russian side provided information and documents to clarify issues surrounding the legitimacy of the "1205" document. The American side asked for the 7-volume GRU study of American forces in Vietnam. Both sides discussed the results of an American forensic examination of an F-111 capsule held in a Russian museum display. The results of the interview with Ambassador Vdovin, former ambassador to Laos were shared. Both sides discussed the potential of learning about American combat equipment acquired by Soviet advisors in the hopes that information might be found on the fate of American personnel associated with the equipment.

7th Plenum: Moscow, December 1993. The Russian side reported that they had completed major archival searches in the Presidential Archives and the Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation, without new acquisitions on Vietnam POWs. The Russian side provided documents from the 7-volume GRU study of American air power over North Vietnam. The Russian side further described negative results of archival searches conducted by GRU

officials, MoD officials, and archivists working in the archives of former-Soviet states. The working groups system was adopted by the Commission, and Congressman Peterson and Deputy Archivist Kozlov were appointed as co-Chairmen.

8th Plenum: Washington, DC, March 1994. The Russian side made its first official visit to Washington, DC. During the meetings, both sides agreed to focus the working groups efforts around four principal questions:

1. Soviet transfer of American POWs to the USSR
2. Soviet contact with American POWs in Vietnam
3. Soviet knowledge of numbers and names of POWs
4. Soviet information on specific loss incidents

A preliminary analysis was presented of GRU holdings on American aircraft losses over North Vietnam, which showed the limits of what Soviet military personnel knew, and did not know about U.S. losses. Both sides agreed to place more emphasis on witnesses now that efforts in archival searches seem to have diminishing returns (in terms of positive statements on what happened vis-à-vis American prisoners). The Russian side joined American representatives in meeting with family members of missing American servicemembers.

9th Plenum: Moscow, June 1994. The American side reported to the Russian side on interviews conducted with former Soviet servicemembers who served in Vietnam, and who presently reside in Belarus. These interviews demonstrated the potential to gain information on specific cases of loss that occurred in North Vietnam. The GRU presented the U.S. side with additional information on specific cases of loss that occurred in North Vietnam. The American side presented the Russian side with a list a priority interview candidates, those members of the MFA, KGB, GRU, MoD, and CPSU who had the greatest potential ability to provide informed answers to important questions concerning American prisoners.

10th Plenum: Moscow, September 1994. Two senior officers, one of whom served as the September 1994 Chief of Military Technical Assistants in Hanoi, were interviewed by the working group. General Stol'nikov and Colonel Starov stated that prisoners were not transported or contacted by Soviet military personnel. The U.S. side reported the results of the interviews conducted in Belarus, and described information gathered on specific incidents of loss. The Russian side accepted several new proposed lines of investigation in search of more information on missing Americans in Vietnam.

11th Plenum: Washington, DC, December 1994. This was the Russians second official visit to Washington, DC. The American side afforded the Russians an opportunity to tour the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and joined them in meeting with family members of missing American servicemembers. The U.S. side presented an interim report on the working groups efforts; past, present, and future. The report summarizes the working hypothesis used to guide the investigations into the four major questions regarding possible Russian involvement with American POWs. The American side stressed the need to interview a KGB officer and also declared its readiness to assist the Russian side in finding Russian MIAs. The Russian side suggested that the groups work proceed in two directions, formally - as complimented by the interim report, and proposing that the group present its findings to the scientific and academic communities.

12th Plenum: Moscow, April 1995. The working group discussed and formulated its input for the Commission's report to Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. Both sides agreed on future lines of investigation designed to advance the preliminary analysis which the group hopes to present to the historical and academic communities. Both sides agreed to write a historical chapter that will be added to the group's comprehensive report.

13th Plenum: Moscow, August 1995. The Russian side presented its “historical input” which included an in-depth analysis of the “1205” report. The American side presented its “historical” input which focused on the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam during the war. The Russian side provided a list containing the names of Russian translators who served in Vietnam during the years of the war.

1992-1996 FINDINGS

OF THE KOREAN WAR WORKING GROUP

INTRODUCTION

The Korean War Working Group (KWWG) was established in 1993 with Congressman Sam Johnson (R-TX) as the U.S. co-Chairman. Currently, John Herbst, U.S. State Department, also serves as a U.S. commissioner on the KWWG. Colonel Aleksandr Semenovitch Orlov is the Russian co-chairman for the KWWG.¹ Also, participating as a Russian commissioner on the KWWG is Colonel Viktor Vasilyevich Mukhin.²

Since the establishment of the KWWG, the commissioners have participated in twelve plenums both in Russia and the United States. The commissioners, furthermore, have met with American family members of unaccounted for servicemen from the Korean War in order to explain the efforts of the Commission and the KWWG to come to a full accounting of their missing loved ones.

For three years the KWWG of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs has engaged in a concerted effort to obtain information on the fate of missing American servicemen from the Korean War. This effort has followed along two basic lines of inquiry -- clarification of circumstances of loss and, the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. The report is divided into two basic sections. The first will discuss "Clarification on Circumstances of Loss" and the second will address the question of "the Transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union."

"It should be noted that the KWWG has determined, based on interviews and research in Russian and American archives, that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was heavily involved with the disposition of American POWs in northern China and North Korea. Both sides agree that it would be useful to the Commission's work and the resolution of Korean War POW/MIA issues for China to be approached on outstanding POW/MIA issues by the American side,

¹ Colonel Orlov is a retired Russian officer. He is a senior researcher at the Institute of Military History of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the former editor of **Military History Review**.

² Colonel Mukhin is head of the Military-Archive and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

notwithstanding China's official claim in July 1994 that 'China settled the cases of American POWs in the Korean War long ago and there is no outstanding issue in this regard.'"

Clarification of Circumstances of Loss

This line of inquiry has generated positive results. This approach is based on the fact that the Soviets were directly and significantly involved in the air war in Korea. For example, over the three years of the Korean War more than 70,000 Soviet military personnel served in the Korean Theater of Operations. At its peak, some 26,000 Soviets were present in Korea and were directly engaged in combat operations against American aviation.³ Given this magnitude of engagement, there is no doubt that the Soviets shot down, killed, and possibly captured American airmen. As all good armies, the Soviet Army kept records of its successes to, among other things, reward its most successful aircrews and anti-aircraft gunners.

The KWWG found the archival documents provided by the Russians to be very useful. As a result, the KWWG placed emphasis on reviewing Russian archival records supplemented by interviews with Soviet veterans throughout all regions of the former Soviet Union. When the Russian records were compared with American records, and interviews of American veterans, we were able to significantly clarify the circumstances of loss surrounding some missing American servicemen.

As a result of the archival information provided by the Russians, the American side of the KWWG now believes that in at least twenty-three cases of Americans considered to be MIA, there is currently sufficient information to conclude that the servicemen died. Moreover, there are an additional fifty-four cases where Russian data, although inconclusive, provides a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of these American servicemen.⁴

³ Jon Halliday, "Secret War of the Top Guns", **The Observer**, no date.

⁴ It should be noted that these are dynamic statistics. As more and more information is acquired from the Russians and other sources, the number of cases where the U.S. side can say that more is known about the circumstances of loss will increase.

To date, the Russians have provided the U.S. side with three types of archival documents. The first is the anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) reports. The Soviets stationed four AAA divisions in or around North Korea to guard bridges over the Yalu River and power stations.⁵ While helpful, these reports reflect the confusion or “fog” of war. They were often handwritten as each battery commander would rush to claim a “kill”, i.e. the shootdown of an aircraft. Often the AAA batteries would send out search parties to locate the wreckage of destroyed aircraft. Often the search parties would submit written reports detailing what was found at the crash site to include aircrew remains. The “kill” numbers were often inflated because several batteries would claim to have shot down an aircraft, when in reality it was one aircraft shot down by several neighboring batteries.

The second type of document received from the Russians is lists of American aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters during the Korean War. One key document of this sort is titled “List of Information from the Ministry of Defense Central Archive Documents Concerning the Fate of USAF Crews from Aircraft which were Shot Down by Fighters over North Korean Territory from 1950-1953.” The list provides the date, time, type of aircraft, and the possible crash location.⁶ The notations on the fate of the pilot and/or crew are very brief and provide little background information. However, in several cases it does note that the pilot/crew perished, but does not indicate where the remains were buried, if at all. The aviation regiments, like the AAA batteries, also on occasion sent out search teams to study the wreckage of shot down aircraft. Several of these reports were furnished to the U.S. side.

POW interrogation reports are the third type of document furnished by the Russians. This is a broad category of documents. Of the fifty-nine, so-called, interrogation reports the U.S. side received, two are duplicates and one is of an Australian serviceman. Thus, there are only fifty-six interrogations. Of the fifty-six interrogations, only thirty are typical interrogation

⁵ Of the four anti-aircraft divisions stationed in and around North Korea, the U.S. side received extensive records for the 28th and 87th AAA Divisions although there were some gaps in the data. The records from the 35th and 92nd AAA Divisions were limited. The Russians explained these gaps by noting that at times these units had little hostile contact with UN aviation.

⁶ TFR-180

protocols, i.e. a record of questions asked and answers received. Of the remaining twenty-six interrogations, one is a POW register, and three are lists of personal effects of non-returned and probably dead American servicemen. These personal effects lists were counted as interrogations by the Russians since the personal items transited an interrogation center. The rest are short, one paragraph biographies of American servicemen. Finally, it should be noted that most servicemen listed returned to Allied military control after the war.

The U.S. side was able to supplement the Russian archival documents with information gleaned from interviews with Soviet veterans. It should be underscored that the Russians have allowed several teams of U.S. investigators to travel about Russia to interview ordinary Russian citizens who were associated with the Korean War. Although Russian officials have the right to be present for any interview with a Russian citizen, the Russian officials usually waived this right. Consequently, U.S. investigators have had, and continue to have, direct and unimpeded access to Russian veterans and citizens.

The U.S. side believes more archival information from the Russians will make it possible to account for an increasing number of Americans still considered missing in action. The U.S. side expects to review photo albums kept by the various fighter regiments. These photo albums reportedly detail shootdowns of American aircraft to include photos of aircraft wreckage. The Russians promised the U.S. an opportunity to review several hundred pages of shootdown material kept in various unit histories. This additional information should allow the U.S. to clarify a number of MIA cases.

U.S.-Russian cooperation has progressed since the two sides first met in 1992. Indicative of this is a meeting that took place in October 1995. Colonel Aleksandr Semenovich Orlov, a Russian commissioner serving in the KWWG, traveled to Washington, D.C. where he spent a week with U.S. analysts reviewing and analyzing Russian and U.S. information on a number of Korean War MIA cases.

The purpose of this meeting was two-fold. First, both sides wanted to review the "List of 31." This is a list of American F-86 pilots who are designated as MIA from the Korean War. U.S. analysts developed the list in 1993 as an analytical tool to determine whether F-86 pilots

may have been taken to the USSR. The analysts reviewed available U.S. records and came up with thirty-one F-86 pilots who possibly could have survived the crash of their aircraft. A shortcoming with the "List of 31" is that it was prepared before we had access to the Russian records.

The second goal of the meeting was to review new information surrounding the circumstances of loss of seventy-seven American MIAs. Over the last few years, the U.S. has gathered additional data on many of these cases of which the Russian side of the Commission was not apprised. We believed that if both sides could review the data together, a common understanding could be reached on several of the outstanding MIA cases.

Consequently, the Russian and American Korean War analysts met and reviewed together the information gathered to date pertaining to the fate of these missing American servicemen. Both the Russian and American sides reviewed each of the cases and were able to come to a common assessment.

From the review of the "List of 31", the Russian and American sides agreed on the likelihood that seven of the pilots perished. As for the remaining twenty-four cases on this list, no information has thus far turned up in Russian documents or through the interviews of former Soviet citizens.

As for the remaining cases, both sides agreed that it appears highly probable that ten had died while more research was needed in the rest of the cases. Hence, there are seventeen incidents where both the Russian and American analysts believe it is highly probable that the servicemen in question died.⁷

These meetings proved to be productive and demonstrated that when the Russian and American sides sit down together and review definitive information regarding the fate of MIAs, a mutual agreement can be reached.

⁷ Since this meeting with the Russian representative, the U.S. side has added additional names to the list of those for whom there is a high level of certainty that they perished.

The following is a list of eighty-one American servicemen that we know a modicum more about their fates because of documents and information received from the Russians. It should be noted, however, that in several cases there is still substantial ambiguity. The Russian data may not solve the cases and, indeed, may not relate directly to them. But the data does shed some light on the fate of these unaccounted for American servicemen.

**LIST OF UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICAN SERVICEMEN FOR WHOM THERE IS A
HIGH LIKELIHOOD OF DEATH**

- | | | | |
|-----|------------------------|-----|----------------------|
| 1. | Major Felix Asla | 22. | ████████████████████ |
| 2. | 1Lt Austin Beetle | 23. | ████████████████████ |
| 3. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 4. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 5. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 6. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 7. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 8. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 9. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 10. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 11. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 12. | Captain Robert Niemann | | |
| 13. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 14. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 15. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 16. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 17. | 1Lt Jack Turberville | | |
| 18. | Captain Halbert Unruh | | |
| 19. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 20. | ████████████████████ | | |
| 21. | ████████████████████ | | |

AMERICAN SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION

FOR WHOM THERE IS RUSSIAN DATA RELATIVE TO THEIR CASES

- | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------|-----|----------------------|
| 1. | ████████████████████ | 21. | ████████████████████ |
| 2. | Asla, Felix, Major | 22. | ████████████████████ |
| 3. | Attinger, Douglas, A1C* | 23. | ████████████████████ |
| 4. | ████████████████████ | 24. | ████████████████████ |
| 5. | ████████████████████ | 25. | ████████████████████ |
| 6. | Beetle, Austin, Lt | 26. | ████████████████████ |
| 7. | ████████████████████ | 27. | Fuehrer, Alois, CPT |
| 8. | Bergmann, Louis, SGT | 28. | ████████████████████ |
| 9. | ████████████████████ | 29. | ████████████████████ |
| 10. | ████████████████████ | 30. | ████████████████████ |
| 11. | Bloesch, Fred, Lt | 31. | Harker, Charles, Lt |
| 12. | Bonney, Buddy, SSG* | 32. | ████████████████████ |
| 13. | Botter, William, SSG | 33. | ████████████████████ |
| 14. | ████████████████████ | 34. | ████████████████████ |
| 15. | ████████████████████ | 35. | ████████████████████ |
| 16. | ████████████████████ | 36. | ████████████████████ |
| 17. | ████████████████████ | 37. | ████████████████████ |
| 18. | ████████████████████ | 38. | ████████████████████ |
| 19. | ████████████████████ | 39. | ████████████████████ |
| 20. | de Luna, Leonard, Lt | 40. | ████████████████████ |

41. ██████████

42. Lawson, Milton, PVT

43. ██████████

44. ██████████

45. ██████████

46. ██████████

47. Lowe, James, CPT

48. ██████████

49. ██████████

50. ██████████

51. ██████████

52. ██████████

53. Mooradian, Ara, CPT

54. Niemann, Robert, Lt

55. ██████████

56. ██████████

57. ██████████

58. ██████████

59. ██████████

60. ██████████

61. ██████████

62. Royer, Ted, Lt

63. ██████████

64. ██████████

65. ██████████

66. ██████████

67. ██████████

68. ██████████

69. ██████████

70. Thompson, Elwood, SSG*

71. ██████████

72. Turberville, Jack, Lt*

73. Unruh, Halbert, CPT

74. Van Fleet, James, Lt

75. ██████████

76. ██████████

77. ██████████

78. ██████████

79. ██████████

80. ██████████

81. ██████████

* See the ██████████ case summary /** See the Bergmann case summary

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

General

DPMO	Defense POW MIA Office
JCSD	Joint Commission Support Directorate
USRJC	U.S. - Russia Joint Commission
CILHI	Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
MIA	Missing in Action
POW	Prisoner of War
KIA	Killed in Action
BNR	Body not Recovered
RMC	Returned to Military Control
TFR	Task Force Russia
USAF	United States Air Force

Military Ranks

A1C	Airman First Class
SGT	Sergeant
SSG	Staff Sergeant
TSGT	Technical Sergeant
MSG	Master Sergeant
LT	Lieutenant
CPT	Captain
MAJ	Major

COL Colonel

Russian Abbreviations

IAK Fighter Aviation Corps(64th IAK)

IAP Fighter Aviation Regiment (64th IAP)

MAJOR FELIX ASLA, JR.

Summary of Incident. On 1 August 1952, a MiG aircraft was seen chasing and firing on the F-86 piloted by Major Asla. His aircraft lost the left wing and was last seen spinning downward 15 miles southeast of Sakchu, North Korea (XE 8365). A subsequent aerial search of the area failed to reveal any trace of the missing pilot or his aircraft. No further information as to the fate of the pilot exists. The serial number of Major Asla's F-86 was 51-2767.

Personnel Involved.

Asla, Felix Jr., MAJ

MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 291: Operational Summary Number 00214 of the Headquarters of the Soviet 64th IAK dated 1 August 1952 states in Part V, "One of the downed F-86s fell 7 km southeast of Sakchu. The side number is USAF 12267, the ... fuselage was marked with 9 stars... The aircraft was destroyed, the pilot perished and his identity cannot be established."

JCSD analysts concluded that the tail number of Major Asla's aircraft "12767" was probably mistakenly recorded as "12267" in the Russian document. (51-2767 would have been displayed on the tail as 12767. It was common practice to shorten the tail numbers by omitting the first number in the production year). All other information in the Russian and U.S. records agrees.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Additional Information. The U.S. received from a British source, a copy of a photograph alleged to be the remains of Major Asla. It is a gruesome photograph leaving no doubt that the individual pictured perished in the crash. The British source said he obtained the photograph from the Russian archives at Podol'sk. It is believed to be the remains of Major Asla because accompanying the photograph were other photographs of an aircraft wreck. The tail number of the aircraft shown in one of the accompanying photographs is that of the aircraft flown by Major

Asla (12767). There is also a photograph of the fuselage showing the nine red stars as mentioned in the operational summary.

A copy of this photograph was sent to CILHI with a request that a forensic specialist at CILHI attempt to verify that the remains are Major Asla's. On 18 January 1996, CILHI informed the U.S. that "it is not possible to exclude or confirm that the remains depicted in this photograph ...are those of Major Felix Asla, Jr., 16568 A, U.S. Air Force."

Current Status

Based on the Russian documents and photographs, both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that Major Asla perished in the crash.

LT AUSTIN BEETLE

Summary of Incident. USAF casualty records indicate that LT Austin Beetle, pilot of an F-86, was lost in air-to-air combat on 4 July 1952 at approximately 1257 hours. LT Beetle drowned almost immediately after ejecting over Chodo Island. He could not be recovered with grappling hooks used by United Nations (U.N.) forces although they were no more than 300 yards away when LT Beetle hit the water.

Personnel Involved.

Beetle, Austin, LT

KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 269: According to Operational Summary Number 00186 from the Soviet 64th IAK for 4 July 1952, an F-86 was shot down by Soviet MiGs. The summary reports, "At 1145, Captain Sevast'yonov's group engaged and fired upon four F-86s near Chisyu-Bikhen. Two pilots fired on the enemy aircraft. Sr. Lieutenant Mishin shot down one F-86."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

The Soviet account for the 1145 shoot down appears to be consistent with the loss of LT Beetle. LT Beetle's status in CILHI data base is KIA/BNR.

SGT LOUIS BERGMANN

Summary of Incident. On 12 April 1951, a flight of B-29s departed Kadena Air Base for a combat mission over North Korea. The flight was attacked by a number of enemy aircraft. Moments later SGT Bergmann's B-29 was observed leaving the formation with one engine and left wing in flames and shortly afterwards spiraling downward out of control. The aircraft exploded upon impact with the side of a mountain.

Personnel Involved.

██████████	MIA	SGT Bevans, Robert	MIA
██████████	MIA	SGT Bergmann, Louis	MIA
1LT Aaron, George	KIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	poss. KIA	SGT Gant, John	RMC
2LT Bullock, Elmer	KIA	SGT Millward, George	RMC
MSG Jones, Robert	KIA		

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 76-8 to 76-14: The Russian side of the Commission presented to the U.S. side a document entitled "Brief Biographical Data on Prisoners". Under the heading "Prisoners from B-29 No. 69682, 93rd Squadron 19th Air Group", biographical information obtained from SGT Gant, SGT Millward and SGT Bergmann is summarized. With the exception of SGT Bergmann, all POWs mentioned in this section of the Russian document were subsequently repatriated.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

A report received from the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, dated 15 October 1951, revealed that a Korean Military Observer allegedly received word that five persons were

seen parachuting from the disabled plane before it crashed. He further related that of the five, four had been captured by the enemy forces and that a search was in progress for the fifth.

Statements from former POWs and witnesses confirm that three of the eleven individuals from the B-29 survived the crash and were captured. SGT Gant, SGT Millward, and SGT Bergmann were held prisoner in the same camp. SGT Gant and SGT Millward were repatriated during Operation Big Switch. Both Gant and Millward saw SGT Bergmann alive in the camp. In fact, SGT Gant shared a cell with SGT Bergmann. Repatriated POWs from other crews as well recall meeting SGT Bergmann while in captivity. He was seen alive several times between September and November 1951. At one point during his imprisonment, SGT Bergmann apparently became ill with amebic dysentery and he was taken to a hospital to be treated by a Hungarian medical team. Whether or not he returned alive from the hospital is unknown. It can, however, be said with certainty that SGT Bergmann was seen alive in a POW camp after the crash of the aircraft.

Current Status

Both Russian and U.S. sources confirm that SGT Bergmann survived the crash, was in a POW camp and was interrogated. SGT Bergmann did not return to United States military control after the war. The U.S. side has requested that the Russians provide additional information on SGT Bergmann. To date, no additional information has been provided. The ultimate fate of SGT Bergmann remains unknown.

Repatriated crew members reported that there were only three survivors. JCSD believes that there is a high probability that the "unaccounted for" (MIA) crew members [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], perished in the crash.

Additional Information. According to documentation and statements of repatriated POWs, of the eleven B-29 crew members, two were captured and returned, one was captured and not returned and eight did not survive the crash. Additional information has since been found regarding four of the deceased crew members. On 8 December 1993, The United States Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) received a shipment of 31 skeletal remains

from the Korean War. These remains were recovered by the North Korean Government and turned over to the U.N. Command. Remains were then taken to CILHI for processing. In 1994 the remains of the following individuals from the B-29 crew were identified by CILHI:

1. 1LT Aaron, George
2. 2LT Bullock, Elmer
3. MSG Jones, Robert

The identification of the remains believed to be those of [REDACTED] is pending.

SGT ROBERT BEVANS

See the summary on "SGT Louis Bergmann"

B-29 SHOT DOWN 23 OCTOBER 1951

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.⁸ No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane [REDACTED] is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
[REDACTED]	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

⁸ The name of the rescued co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty records.

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC
STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MacCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as [REDACTED].

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described

him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

Summary of Incident. On 7 May 1951, this B-29 departed Yokota Air Base for a bombing mission in the Pyongyang area of North Korea. After arriving in the target area, the plane was severely damaged by enemy flak causing a fire in the right wing and two engines. The aircraft commander radioed that they would have to crash land and were heading for friendly territory. Shortly thereafter, another radio report was received indicating that the fire could not be controlled and that the crew would have to leave the disabled aircraft. The parachutes of four unidentified crew members were then seen leaving the plane before it crashed to the ground southwest of Pyongyang. An extensive aerial search was initiated by Air Rescue units and the wreckage of the burning aircraft was sighted, but all efforts to locate the crew members were to no avail.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	POW/BNR
████████████████████	MIA

Accounted for:

McTAGGART, William C., CPT	RMC
JONES, Richard M., S/SGT	RMC
SMITH, Ellsworth E, S/SGT	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. The alleged Pravda article. JCSD is trying to obtain a copy.

U.S. The Individual Deceased Personnel File (293 file) of [REDACTED] contains several documents entitled "Returnee Report on Death of an Individual in a Captured Status". According to repatriated POWs who witnessed his death, [REDACTED] died of dysentery and malnutrition while in a North Korean POW Camp and was interred in November 1951.

Personal Accounts

In August 1992, JCSD members interviewed Colonel Gavril Korotkov, a retired senior Soviet intelligence officer. Colonel Korotkov stated that he personally interrogated two American POWs. Korotkov could not recall the names of any of the American POWs who were processed through Khabarovsk, except for a [REDACTED] (first name unknown).⁹

Colonel Aleksandr Semenovich Orlov, a retired Soviet intelligence officer and current Commissioner on the Russian side of the Joint Commission, met with [REDACTED] in North Korea in June 1951 and set up an interview between [REDACTED] and a local Pravda correspondent. According to Colonel Orlov, the article appeared in the summer of 1951. JCSD has not seen a copy of this article.

Current Status

According to U.S. Air Force records, [REDACTED] died of dysentery and malnutrition in November 1951, six months after his capture. The Russian side of the Commission has been forthright with the fact that the Russians interviewed [REDACTED] while he was a POW.

LT FRED BLOESCH B-29 SHOT DOWN 13 SEPTEMBER 1952

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival". One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch". The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800m to 7500m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and 5 corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.¹⁰ To date, no additional information has been provided.

¹⁰ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

SSG WILLIAM BOTTER

Summary of Incident. SSG Botter's B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.¹¹ No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. SSG Botter is currently listed as POW/BNR. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
████████████████████	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

¹¹ The name of the rescued co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty records.

STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MACCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian, a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as SSG Botter.

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that

LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

Summary of Incident. On 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival." One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch". The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and 5 corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated in above summary.

Current status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.¹² To date, no additional information has been provided.

¹² Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.¹³ No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. [REDACTED] is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
[REDACTED]	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

¹³ The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty report.

STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MACCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as ████████████████████

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that

LT Mooradian closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on LT Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. He came from California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 18 June 1951, ██████████ F-86 formation was attacked by eight enemy MiG-15s. ██████████ F-86 was last seen making a right break trying to avoid the attackers. The flight leader stated that MiG-15s were seen firing but no results observed. A search of the area revealed no indication of the pilot or the aircraft.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

None

Personal Accounts

Several witnesses have given statements concerning this incident. Although no archival material has been produced to confirm these testimonies, all the statements appear to confirm one another.

Askold Germon: A retired Soviet Air Force Colonel reported that he was able “to determine, with a reasonable degree of reliability, the fate of ██████████.” Germon learned that on 18 June 1951 an American F-86 was involved in a collision during an air engagement. Both aircraft crashed as a result of the incident. The Soviet airman was able to parachute to safety, but the American was killed. This incident was reported in the 21 June 1951 edition of Izvestiya. Other Soviet veterans have previously reported seeing ██████████ identification card.¹⁴

Vladimir Vladimirovich Dorofeyev: Dorofeyev claimed that he developed information that ██████████ had a mid-air collision with a Soviet MiG during a dog fight. The MiG pilot by the

¹⁴Paul Cole, *POW/MIA Archive Research Project: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Berlin, Volume 1: Moscow Research* (DFI International, Washington D.C., 1995)

name of Subotin bailed out and survived. Allegedly, Subotin witnessed ██████ death when his plane crashed.¹⁵

Vladimir Mikhailovich Roshchin: Soviet Korean War veteran recalls seeing the papers of a pilot of a shot down plane. According to Roshchin, these papers belonged to Karl Crone.

Current Status

There are discrepancies in the testimonies regarding dates, correct spelling and first name of the American pilot. The majority of the circumstances however, are consistent. Based on the testimonies, it is reasonable to assume that the pilot referred to by the witnesses ██████. Moreover, he probably did not survive the crash. Both the U.S. and Russian sides continue to search for additional archival documentation that may confirm this assessment.

¹⁵ Per request from the U.S., the Russian side of the Commission has located the Soviet pilot Subotin. Unfortunately, he is currently very ill and not capable of an interview.

Summary of Incident. On 10 February 1952, the F-86 piloted by [REDACTED] was shot down by fire from a MiG-15.¹⁶ "His aircraft went into a steep dive...Seconds later, the F-86 went into a series of lazy dives, climbs and spirals, and then crashed into the side of a hill approximately twelve miles northeast of Sonch'on. Although it appeared that the canopy had been jettisoned, the accompanying pilot was unable to determine whether [REDACTED] had left his aircraft prior to the crash. Friendly aircraft searched the crash site but were unable to find any trace of the missing officer. Efforts to locate his parachute were also unsuccessful, the search being extremely difficult due to the background of snow covered terrain."

Personnel Involved.

[REDACTED] MIA

(Information was obtained from Russian and Chinese sources. It should be noted that both the Russians and the Chinese have claimed credit for the shoot down.)

Archival records

Russian. None.

U.S. According to F-86 Sabre, [REDACTED], who was expected to become the Korean War's "ace of aces...the leading ace of the war" was killed on 10 February 1952.

Other. A 1990 Beijing publication, Chinese Military Power Almanac, 1949-1989, reported that Chinese Korean War Volunteers' (CVF) Battle Records stated that American ace [REDACTED] was shot down by Zhang Jihui on 10 February 1952.

A 1989 Korean War Logistic Work Experience Summary-Pictorial, endorsed by former Chinese President, Yang Shangkun, showed pictures of [REDACTED] along side of a photo of his dog tags. The caption above the pictures stated, "Deceased American ace jet pilot [REDACTED] picture and dog tag. [REDACTED] was shot down by Zhang Jihui."

¹⁶ rank at the time of the incident was Major. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel while MIA.

A March 1953 book published by Chinese Youth Publication Press, *Fearless Warrior of Our Great Nation*, included an interview with Zhang Jihui, the Chinese pilot who claimed to have shot down ██████, on the detail and the sequence of the shoot down. Furthermore, the article also discussed that the deceased pilot's dog tags were found during a search of the F-86 crash site.

Personal Accounts

According to Colonel Germon,¹⁷ ██████ was shot down and killed shortly after he had shot down two Soviet MiGs. "At the sight of the crash," Germon added, "besides documents the search team found his pistol. It is quite possible that he was shot down by Mikhail A. Averin."

Lt Gen. Georgii Lobov, commander of the 64th Air Corps, noted in his memoirs, "Our pilots shot down... ██████, the top American ace of the war at the time (killed)."

Additional Information (April 1995) Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), United States Division Deputy Chief conveyed the results of a Chinese investigation on this case. He said that ██████ had been shot down by Zhang Jihui in air combat on 10 February 1952. His plane crashed into the side of a hill. ██████ had been found dead at the crash site. The Chinese MFA did not think that the Chinese had been involved in handling the body...The Chinese had looked at the plane and a Chinese person had found articles at the crash site. An American Air Force Ribbon found at the site is on display in an exhibit hall in Anyang City. The Chinese MFA was unable to locate the dog tag depicted in the photograph.

(August 1995) A member of the U.S. Consulate Shenyang reported that ██████ . dog tags are on display at the Dandong Korean War Museum. The tag is exhibited with photos of an American reported to be ██████, articles said to be taken from him or his aircraft and pieces of wreckage said to be from the F-86 he was flying.

¹⁷ Paul Cole, *POW/MIA Archive Research Project: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Berlin, Volume I: Moscow Research* (DFI International, Washington D.C., 1995) Askold Germon-Retired Soviet Air Force Colonel.

Current Status

Several independent sources confirm the shoot down of [REDACTED] on 10 February 1952. There is no direct evidence from Russian archives that confirms that [REDACTED] was killed in the crash of his F-86. Although Chinese and Korean sources testify that [REDACTED] was killed in the crash, it should be noted that both the Russians and the Chinese have claimed credit for this kill. Moreover, the discovery of [REDACTED] dog tags and personal effects in a Chinese museum leads one to believe that additional information on the fate of [REDACTED] may be available. The Commission continues to investigate this case.

LT LEONARD DE LUNA

Summary of Incident. On 12 April 1953, LT de Luna took off on a single aircraft night interdiction combat mission at 1951 hours. His F-84 was reported over target area YD 2488. His radar blip was lost from the scope at 2042 hours. Another aircraft in the target area observed two bomb blasts followed by a third larger explosion approximately 40 minutes later.

Personnel Involved.

DE LUNA, Leonard, LT MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 261: Operational Summary Number 102 from the 64th IAK in Andung for 12 April 1953 states, "at 1604, eight MiG 15s from the 913th IAP (led by Captain Semenov) flying in the Bikhen region at 500m altitude, engaged four F-84s. One pilot, Captain Semenov, fired and shot down one F-84 at a distance of 800 m on the target's rear aspect."

U.S. According to USAF records, two F-84s were lost on 12 April 1953. The one above piloted by LT de Luna and the other piloted by ██████████. Both these individuals are listed as MIA.¹⁸

Current Status

Russian Operational Summary Number 102 most likely refers to one of these two incidents. Unfortunately, the report does not contain enough details to narrow it down to one. Moreover, the Russian report does not state the fate of the pilot of the shot down F-84. In any case, the loss of at least one F-84 on 12 April 1953 is confirmed by this Russian document. The possibility exists that this may have been LT Leonard de Luna's aircraft.

¹⁸ According to Paul Cole, the Soviet records appear to be more consistent with the loss of ██████████. However, based on the documents available to the U.S., it is our assessment that the Russian data is inconclusive.

See the summary on "SGT Louis Bergmann"

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 22 August 1952, ██████████ departed from Suwon Air Base for the Chong Chong Gang River. At approximately 1047 hours, the F-86s patrolling at more than 37,000 feet were attacked by MiGs. ██████████ last known location was YD 5099.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. Operational Summary No. 00202 of the Soviet 64th IAK for 22 August 1952 states, "Flights completed their mission in the area of Kajsen, Anju and Dzyunsen. Captain Frolov's flight encountered and engaged six F-86s at 0950 hours at 37,350 feet...Two pilots shot at the enemy aircraft. Senior Lt (Ignatov?) shot down one F-86 from a distance of 500-600 meters...The enemy aircraft crashed in the area of Kajsen; the (aircraft) remains were found; the pilot perished."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

This case has been associated with an interview of a retired Soviet Colonel. According to Paul Cole, POW/MIA Archive Research Project...Volume I: Moscow Research (DFI International), ██████████ status should be changed from MIA to POW based on a personal account. During a 1992 interview, Soviet veterans Col. Georgi Plotnikov and Col. Valentin Sozinov recalled, "The name Major Delit came up in my conversation with Lobov. I don't know what his position is. But he (Delit) also ejected and was captured, then escorted somewhere..." It is clear from further reading of the interview transcript that the veterans were not certain of the name of the individual nor whether or not he was ever a POW. The only information they seemed to have was the fact that the person allegedly mentioned by Lobov was a Major. It should be emphasized that this information was based on second hand hearsay. The individuals

interviewed had no direct knowledge of this information. The USRJC has investigated this case and has found no evidence that suggests these incidents or names are related.

Current Status

Based on the positive association between the U.S. and Russian data on the day, time, geographic location, and circumstances, there is significant evidence that the Russian records describe the shoot down of [REDACTED]. Moreover, according to U.S. records, [REDACTED] was the only air loss suffered on 22 August 1952. Both sides of the Commission agree that there is a high probability that the pilot mentioned in the Russian document as having perished was indeed [REDACTED].

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.¹⁹ No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. [REDACTED] is currently listed as POW/BNR. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
[REDACTED]	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

¹⁹ The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty file.

STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MACCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as [REDACTED].

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

Task Force Russia (TFR) provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical

information. The following information on LT Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

SGT ALOIS FUEHRER B-29 SHOT DOWN 23 OCTOBER 1951

Summary of Incident. SGT Fuehrer's B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.²⁰ No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. SGT Fuehrer is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC
STRINE, John, SSG	RMC

²⁰ The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty file.

JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MacCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as SGT Fuehrer.

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that LT Ara Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on LT Ara Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.

2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 10 July 1953, while coming off a bombing run, ██████████ F-84 was hit by flak. The aircraft did about 6 rolls and crashed at YD 553759, exploded and burned. The pilot was under constant observation and at no time was an attempt to eject made. No sign of life or parachute was observed on the ground. Pilot had no chance of survival.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival records

Russian. TFR 138-255 to 259: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of shoot down reports from units of the Soviet 64th IAK. Pages 255 to 259 are a detailed account, including sketches and maps, of the shoot down of an F-84 on 10 July 1953. According to the report, "The search revealed that the aforementioned aircraft crashed on the slope of a hill 1,000 meters SW of the town of Kusonri approximately 10 km NW of Sunchon...The fuselage and other aircraft surfaces were scattered into small pieces as a result of the powerful explosion. Other than that, the pilot's charred body (the torso and part of the head) was found amongst the wreckage." The report goes on to list several witnesses to the incident as well as physical evidence found at the site.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Research and analysis of this case provides strong evidence that the incident mentioned in the Russian document is the shoot down of ██████████. A thorough review of all U.S. records pertaining to personnel losses and aircraft losses for July 1953 was conducted. Of all the losses suffered in the month of July, ██████████ incident is the only possible match. Furthermore, the details in both the Russian and U.S. documents are exact - the date, time, aircraft type, circumstances and coordinates. Both sides of the Commission agree that there is significant evidence that the pilot of this aircraft perished and that it was indeed ██████████.

██████████

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, a B-29 (44-62183) was reported destroyed in a mid-air explosion and observed falling to earth in three burning sections. According to statements of 16 witnesses from accompanying aircraft, no parachutes were observed and the possibility of anyone surviving was small. However, at least one member of the crew, Anton Brom, survived the explosion, was held as a POW and subsequently repatriated.

Personnel Involved.

██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
CPT BROM, Anton	RMC	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA		

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 272: Russian Operational Summary No. 00613 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64th IAK reports "the aircraft explosion and the retreat of two burning B-29s were observed by search light crews...according to Korean and Chinese comrades, one B-29 fell into the sea 20 km SE of Simni-do and exploded. Up to four cutters approached the area where the aircraft fell." A second paragraph confirms that "During the night of 11 June 1952, night fighters shot down three B-29 aircraft and damaged one other. The corpses of 8 American pilots were found, as well as debris from one aircraft."

The following documents pertain to ██████████, a crew member of B-29 No. 44-62183.

TFR 16: ██████████ name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft

Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. [REDACTED] is one of the five from this list who is still "unaccounted for." The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the "interrogation" document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry # 24 on this list states, "10 June 1953...[REDACTED] "

TFR 76-39: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, "Inventory of [REDACTED], a gunner from the 19th Bomber Group. Shot down in a B-29 by a MiG-15 the night of 10 June 1952." Unfortunately, the fate of [REDACTED] is not specified.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Other. A passage in a Chinese book published by The Academy of Military Science History Department also confirms the B-29 shoot downs on the night of 10 June.²¹

Current Status

The shoot downs mentioned in the Russian document correspond to the loss of two USAF B-29s. Servicemen from both crews are still unaccounted for. Unfortunately, it cannot be determined with certainty, which aircraft and crew were found by the Russian search team. The Russians maintain that [REDACTED] perished and only his personal documents transited an interrogation point. The Russian side of the USRJC has been asked to provide any documents that could clarify this case. To date, no additional information has been provided.

²¹ *The War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Support Korea*, Academy of Military Science History Department (People's Liberation Army) December 1990.

LT CHARLES HARKER

Summary of Incident. On 3 May 1953 LT Harker was flying in an F-84 "on a night intruder mission. At approximately 2105 hours, he made his last radio contact. Shortly after his last call, LT Harker faded from the radar scope. The area was searched but no wreckage could be established."

Personnel Involved.

HARKER, Charles, LT MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 16: LT Harker's name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. LT Harker is one of the five from this list who is still "unaccounted for". The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the "interrogation" document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry #48 on the list states, "4 May 1953...2LT Charles A. Harker."

TFR 76-33: This document is entitled "Inventory of Documents from 2LT Charles A. Harker from the 311th AS 58th Fighter-Bomber Group. Service No. AO 2224102 Shot Down at Night in Aerial Combat with a MiG 15 4 May 1953." This is a one page document listing the personal effects of LT Harker such as ID card, ration card, red cross card, driver's license, etc. Unfortunately, there is no mention as to the disposition of the pilot or his remains.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

The Russian side of the Commission maintains that LT Harker perished in the crash and that only his personal effects transited an interrogation point. There is insufficient evidence on which to base any conclusions. The Russian side has been asked to provide any information regarding this incident. To date, there has been no additional information.

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] was one of the 14 member crew of a B-29 shot down on 12 January 1953. The aircraft was engaged by an estimated 12 aircraft approximately 20 miles east of Uiju before it disappeared from the radar scope. According to U. S. records, "On 22 January 1953, Peking radio reported that all but three of the crew had been captured, those three having been killed. Only Colonel Arnold and Captain Vaadi...were mentioned as having been captured."

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA

Accounted for:

ARNOLD, John K. COL	RMC
BENJAMIN, Harry, A1C	RMC
BAUMER, William, MAJ	RMC
BROWN, Howard, TSG	RMC
BROWN, Wallace, LT	RMC
BUCK, John W., LT	RMC
KIBA, Steve E, A1C	RMC
LLEWELLYN, Elmer, CPT	RMC
SCHMIDT, Daniel, A2C	RMC
THOMPSON, John W.	RMC
VAADI, Eugene CPT	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 37-23: A high level correspondence states, "according to the report from MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An'dun on 12 January 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT (Arnold) and staff officer of operational reconnaissance service Major BAUL (Baumer) were also on the aircraft..." The eleven crew members (nine plus Arnold and Baumer) that were mentioned as having been captured were confirmed as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side 30 sets of documents containing information on POWs. Some of the documents are full interrogation reports while others are summaries or lists. Nevertheless, the entire batch of documents is referred to as the "interrogation reports". This document is entitled "Register of POWs". It lists brief biographical data on the eleven members of the crew who were captured. The end comment on the document confirms that the remaining three crew members, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], were reported as having been killed in the crash.

U.S. USAF records as mentioned above in summary.

Current Status

[REDACTED] is mentioned in three independent sources as having perished in the crash - U.S. reports, Peking reports and Soviet reports. Unless there are adequate grounds or subsequent information that challenges the veracity of these reports, the evidence implies that [REDACTED] perished in the crash.

See the summary on "SGT Louis Bergmann"

████████████████████
Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival". One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch." The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.²² To date, no additional information has been provided.

²² Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 9 May 1952, an F-84 piloted by ██████████ was “hit by ground fire during a bomb run at an altitude between 1000 - 1500 feet. The aircraft burst into flames. Immediately thereafter, the aircraft exploded and was last seen burning on the ground. No radio contact was made, no chute observed.”

Personnel Involved.

██████████ KIA/BNR

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-133 to 137: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of shoot down reports from units of the Soviet 64th IAK. Pages 133 to 137 contain “material concerning the F-84 shot down on 9 May 1952...” The five pages include a photo copy of a data plate from the aircraft, a statement, a sketch of the crash site and fragments from an American map. According to the Russian document, this statement was “compiled at the crash site of an F-84. The aircraft crashed in the hills near the town of Tok-inri in the Rikhen district. The fuselage was flattened, the engine was smashed, the tail section was broken off and located 70 meters from the fuselage...The pilot burned with the aircraft, and local inhabitants buried his remains.”

U.S. ██████████ was the only F-84 pilot shot down on 9 May 1952 who is currently carried as KIA/BNR. Moreover, the data plate found by the Russians at the crash site lists the aircraft as type F-84E15RE. According to our records, ██████████ was the only pilot flying an F-84E15RE. This fact alone excludes other pilots within that time frame.²³

Current Status

Both sides of the Commission agree that there is a high probability that ██████████ perished in the crash and his remains were buried by local inhabitants.

²³ This Russian document was originally associated with a shoot down that occurred on 8 May 1952.

████████████████████
Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch”. The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

U.S. USAF records as stated above in above summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.²⁴ To date, no additional information has been provided.

²⁴ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

[REDACTED]
Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival." One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch." The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.²⁵ To date, no additional information has been provided.

²⁵ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

PVT MILTON LAWSON

Summary of Incident. PVT Lawson, a Marine Corps Reservist , was called to active duty on 27 July 1950 to serve in the Ground Forces in North Korea. On or about 5 December 1950, after telling a fellow Marine he thought his feet were frostbitten, PVT Lawson began to walk to an aid station near the town of Hagaru-ri. He was never seen or heard from again. PVT Lawson was declared MIA.

Background. On 22 June 1991, 60 Minutes aired a program called The Last Gulag: Perm 35. This program was narrated by Mike Wallace of CBS News and the film footage of the Russian prison camp was shot by the French. While watching this program, thirteen of Milton Lawson's friends and relatives identified one of the inmates as Lawson.

Archival Records

None

Personal Accounts

In September 1992, a member of Task Force Russia met with a former Perm 35 inmate "who easily identified a reputed MIA photo of PVT Lawson as a friend and former inmate named Vladimir Shchebol."

On 5 June 1995, Task Force Russia interviewed Vladimir Iosifovich Shchebol. He confirmed that journalists had been to Perm 35 and had taken pictures and films of several inmates. He stated that he had been born in Belarus and did not even have any knowledge of Lawson. During the interview, Task Force Russia took photographs of Shchebol.

Current Status

Based on an analysis of the photographs of Shchebol and Lawson and the testimony of Shchebol himself, it is highly probable that the man identified as Lawson on the 60 Minutes program was in fact Vladimir Shchebol. Other than the alleged association of PVT Lawson with a Russian prison camp by friends and family, there is no Russian activity regarding this case.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 2 September 1951, ██████████ F-86 was shot down over North Korea. He radioed that he was going to try to reach the northwest coast of Korea and bail out over water. According to Air Force casualty reports, another member of the flight observed him parachuting from the damaged F-86 near the mouth of the Ch'ongchongang River. The observer circled above and watched as the chute hit the water. Air Rescue units were alerted and an aerial search was immediately initiated. No trace of the missing officer could be found, but during the search an unidentified launch was seen in the vicinity of where ██████████ parachute was last sighted. An additional witness states that he observed the aircraft as it hit the water and did not see ██████████ bail out nor his parachute. ██████████ is listed as POW/BNR on the CILHI Korean War Data Base.²⁶

Personnel Involved.

██████████ POW/BNR

Archival Records

Russian. Soviet Operational Summary Number 0277 of the Headquarters, 64th Fighter Corps for 2 September 1951, reports that six F-86 aircraft were shot down that day. The summary states, "The 17th Fighter Regiment encountered 10 F-86s at 10,000 meters in the region of Syukusen at 1035 hours. As a result of the attack conducted against the enemy fighters by the regiment, Major Pulov²⁷ shot one down...One F-86, according to crew observations, scattered in the air."²⁸

²⁶ In a recent study, *POW/MIA Archive Research Project: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Berlin, Volume 1: Moscow Research* (DFI International, Washington D.C., 1995) Paul Cole suggests that ██████████ casualty status be changed from MIA to POW/BNR. However, U.S. records indicate that ██████████ status is POW/BNR.

²⁷ Major Pulov is currently living in the Moscow area but is very ill. JCSD will attempt to interview him.

²⁸ Paul Cole also indicates that an illegible word in the Russian document might be "Bailed out". As stated above, the actual translation reads, "F-86... **SCATTERED** in the air."

U.S. An intelligence report received from the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, in November 1951, reveals that ██████████ was believed to have been rescued by persons aboard a large power boat observed at the time of the search. The report further stated that this craft was known to be operated by the enemy.²⁹

Current Status

There is obviously conflicting evidence in this case. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to provide all search reports and any additional information on this incident. In light of the circumstances, the possibility cannot be excluded that ██████████ survived the crash. To date, no further information has been found.

²⁹ The following was noted in AFM 200-25, "...inquiry regarding the validity of the above report [boat sighting] revealed that the information may have been in error since purported source of the information had no record of subject being picked up by a Communist power boat."

[REDACTED]
Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival." One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch." The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.³⁰ To date, no additional information has been provided.

³⁰ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 4 December 1950 around noon time, ██████████ (924A also AO-16783) took off in a RB-45 from Yokota Air Base, Japan. Since ██████████ was not a regular member of the aircraft crew, but was rather a senior Air Force intelligence officer assigned to the Pentagon and on TDY in the Far East, ██████████ served as an observer on this mission.³¹ At approximately 1250 hours, the RB-45 was intercepted by a flight of MiG-15 fighters and was shot down 70 km east of Andung. At least one person managed to parachute from the aircraft.³²

Personnel Involved.

██████████ AO 794-558, pilot
██████████ AO 800-628, co-pilot
██████████ AO 928-027, navigator

Archival Records

Russian. ██████████ name does not appear on any of the lists of names provided to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

TFR 242: This is a set of two documents. Originally the Russians provided the U.S. side of the Commission with one document that was in reality a sanitized, pasted together version of the two. A contractor working for the Defense POW/MIA Office, however, was able to provide the U.S. side of the Commission copies of the two original documents.

The first document is a message dated 17 December 1950. It is from General Belov, who was then the commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, to Generals Shtemenko and Batitskii.³³

³¹ ██████████ was a graduate of West Point, Class of 1927. He was assigned as an assistant air attaché to Berlin, Germany in 1939, and served there until the outbreak of war. He was interned at Bad Nauheim and held until May 1942 when he was exchanged. In 1946 ██████████ was assigned to Bucharest, Romania where he served as military attaché. In 1948 he was accused of espionage by the Soviet backed regime, arrested, placed on trial, and found guilty. ██████████ was subsequently declared **persona non grata** and expelled from Romania in 1949. Upon his return to the United States in 1949, he transferred into the United States Air Force and was assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence. On Thanksgiving Day, 1950, he went TDY to Headquarters Far East Air Forces in Japan.

³² Because of conflicting statements on the number of people who managed to bail out of the RB-45, the case of ██████████ is inextricably intertwined with that of ██████████, the aircraft's pilot.

³³ At the time General Sergie Shtemenko was the Soviet Minister of Defense and General Pavel Fedorovich Batitskii was the first deputy commander of the Air Force.

The purpose of the message was to inform the senior Soviet leadership that for the first time an RB-45 had been shot down. At the time, the RB-45 was seen as the “hottest”, light bomber in the American inventory and General Belov was clearly pleased to inform Moscow of his unit’s success. In the message, Belov reported, “An aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km east of Andun. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to earth burned up completely. **The crew bailed out in parachutes** [emphasis added]. The pilot [REDACTED] was taken prisoner...The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out in parachutes. The navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to he did not see. The captive himself was burned and is in critical condition.” It is clear from this message that the Soviets did not know there were four and not three people on the RB-45.

The next day, General Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii, then a senior Soviet advisor to the North Koreans, sent a cryptic message to Moscow, “I report that the pilot from the shot down RB-45 died on route and the interrogation was not completed.”³⁴

TFR 76-31: This is the transcript of [REDACTED] interrogation. According to a note at the bottom of the document, a Major Kuznetsov prepared the questions. It is not clear who conducted the interrogation, but a Chinese official translated the original English text into Russian.³⁵

During the interrogation, [REDACTED] stated that the RB-45 ‘has a crew of three - a pilot, navigator, and radio operator.’ Later [REDACTED] recounted, “The plane caught fire and all **three** (emphasis added) crew members bailed out. I saw one run off, I don’t know where the other went to, and I landed where the plane crashed.” It is important to note that [REDACTED] did not mention during the interrogation that his RB-45 was carrying a fourth crew member - [REDACTED]. Indeed, a close reading of the transcript strongly suggests that [REDACTED] was deliberately trying to conceal from his captors the fact there was a fourth man aboard the aircraft.

³⁴ Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii (1897-1983) was promoted to Marshal of Aviation in 1959. From 1956 until 1970 he was commander of the prestigious Military Air Force Academy named after Iu. A. Gagarin.

³⁵ Colonel Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr., USAF, Ret for a short time shared a prison cell with [REDACTED]. At the time, then Lieutenant Shawe was interrogated by a Soviet major accompanied by English and Russian speaking Chinese interrogators. Shawe stated in a letter to DPMO, “To the best of my [REDACTED] ...was also interrogated by Russians.”

U.S. A document titled "Air Force Personnel Reported to Have Died in POW-Camp, Been Very Ill in POW Camp or Killed in Crash..." simply states "██████████ told another POW he was only survivor. Believed ██████████ was dead."³⁶

21 September 1955: In a letter to a Mr. Joseph P. Nagoski, U.S. Department of State from LTC Richard A. Steele, USAF, Chief, Casualty Branch, Personnel Services Division, Directorate of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, LTC Steele provides the following details of the shoot down on the RB-45 carrying ██████████. ".....██████████ furnished the following details concerning his missing status to Captain Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr.³⁷

██████████ indicated that while flying a B-45 (sic) along the Yalu River, the aircraft was attacked by five MiGs and two engines were shot out. He stated that **he was the only one who escaped from the aircraft** (emphasis added), having managed to get the canopy off and bail out at an altitude of about 1,000 feet. ██████████ landed in the burning wreckage and was severely burned about the hands and face. After evading capture, for 3 or 4 days without shoes, he turned himself in to the North Koreans...he was placed in a cell with Captain Shawe in Sinuiji, North Korea. Two days later they were removed from the cell and Captain Shawe joined a group of prisoners starting a march to another prison camp. ██████████ could not walk and was carried to an ox cart by fellow prisoners. The North Koreans said he was being taken to a hospital for medical treatment, because he was suffering from frostbite and gangrene of both legs. He was not seen again by repatriates after 16 December 1950, and they reported his condition was so bad at that time that he was not expected to survive."

Propaganda Broadcast - On 21 May 1951 U.S. listening stations intercepted an enemy (no further information) propaganda broadcast "in which a Lieutenant Colonel Lorel, United States Air Force, was mentioned as being captured in northern Korea. The spelling of the name could not be verified, was believed to be phonetic, and resembled none of the names of Air Force personnel missing in Korea, with the exception of ██████████."³⁸

Personal Accounts

³⁶ The source of this information was Colonel Hamilton B. Shaw, Jr., USAF, Ret. who shared a cell with
³⁷ was promoted to major posthumously.

³⁸ AFPMP-12-E 704 Missing (4 Dec 50) SR&D Case #80

Colonel Aleksandr Fedorovich Andrianov - He was the pilot who shot down the RB-45 that carried [REDACTED].³⁹ He was first interviewed by a Department of Defense contractor and later by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs at the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow.

During the first interview, Colonel Andrianov described in detail the shutdown, "When I fired the first time, it was still too far. And then the distance was about 600 to 800 meters. I started firing. And here I saw that something fell from him...And during the second approach, he (the RB-45) burst into flames. And here he started to descend and **only the pilot** (emphasis added) jumped out of the aircraft. The crew was supposed to be three or four people, I don't remember exactly now. We probably got them when we were firing. The plane hit the hill before our eyes. An explosion. We kept circling above. The pilot landed with his parachute. He was picked up by a special team, the Korean team would pick up all the pilots who were shot down, including ours. And he went to prison."

In April 1995, Colonel Andrianov expanded up his earlier testimony, "At approximately 3,000 meters or lower, **I saw one parachute deploy from the aircraft. All of my colleagues saw only one parachute as well. None of us saw any other parachutes** [emphasis added]. Although I have heard that others jumped, we did not note any other parachutes....However, I clearly saw the aircraft crash and explode."

Although Colonel Andrianov was not present, he was able to describe during the first interview how the pilot of the RB-45 ultimately died based on what a friend Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov told him. Fironov was a lieutenant colonel at the time and the regimental political officer. It was Fironov who interrogated the American pilot. "He (the pilot) was kind of arrogant", according to Andrianov. "... (T)he Koreans executed him the same way. They got a piece of plywood. They wrote down all he said on that plywood -- 'I am an American pilot. This is my third surveillance flight. According to my data such and such towns and plants were destroyed, such and such number of older people and children were killed'. And with it they let him go to Singisyu. They gave him a one man escort. That patrolman was given specific instructions not to interfere too much. First, he walked as if through a formation. People were

³⁹ Colonel Andrianov was born in 1919 and is a veteran of both the Second World War and the Korean War.

on both sides. First, they only shouted at him, cursed him, threw sticks. The patrolman did not interfere too much. Then, they started to spit at him, hit him...he was finished.”

Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov - In early 1995, Colonel Fironov was interviewed in Moscow by an investigator from the Joint Commission. This was for Fironov at least his second interview. Not long before, he was interviewed by Igor Morozov, a Russian journalist working for the BBC. Apparently during this interview, Fironov was given background information on the shutdown of the RB-45 and in particular information on the crew members. As a result, Fironov’s testimony to the Joint Commission can be considered as potentially influenced or “tainted”.

BBC Interview - In March 1996, the BBC television network aired on Time Watch a special report titled “Stalin’s Secret War”. One segment of this program discussed the case of ██████████. Colonel Fironov was introduced as the man who interrogated ██████████. Then for several moments Fironov was interviewed in Russian with an English voice over. Portions of the interview were edited out and replaced with the narrator’s summary of what Fironov said.

Fironov describes his initial meeting with ██████████, the fact that he had a fact book on the Soviet Air Force (described by the narrator as a “highly classified document”), and the anger of the North Korean general, who was also present for the interrogation, over ██████████ perceived arrogance.

Then switching to a photograph of ██████████, the narrator says, “The North Korean general angered by ██████████ belligerence had him marched to the local town, a placard with the words “War Criminal” hung around his neck. ██████████ was beaten to death by the local people.”

The program does not indicate how Fironov knew that the person he interrogated was ██████████ and not ██████████ or another airman. However, when an investigator from the Joint Commission interviewed Fironov a few months after his interview by the BBC, it seemed that Fironov’s identification of ██████████ is less certain.

During the interview with the Joint Commission investigator, Fironov recounted that the man identified himself as "the commander of that crew, although he himself told me that he was a regimental commander." When asked if this man was [REDACTED], Fironov replied, "Yes, yes, yes." Then when asked, "And how is that you heard his name?", Fironov said, "Who? The regimental commander? Morozov's (the Russian journalist who first interviewed Fironov) daughter told me this."

Later, during the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow, Colonel Fironov was interviewed by members of the Joint Commission. When asked to describe the man he interrogated, Colonel Fironov said, "I would say (he was) about 32 - no more than 32 years of age". Asked if the man he met wore glasses, Fironov replied, "No". Finally when requested to describe his prisoner, Fironov said, "About like me. Regarding his physical characteristics, he was similar to me". Colonel Fironov is of slender build and about 5' 7" tall while [REDACTED] was 5' 6" inches tall and stout at 183 lbs. [REDACTED] was also forty-six years of age and wore glasses. [REDACTED], however, was 31 years of age, tall, and slender at 6' 2" and 195 lbs. He did not wear glasses.

It should also be noted that during Colonel Fironov's first interview with an investigator from the Joint Commission, Fironov was asked, "Tell me, did you hear what happened to him, this person with whom you talked?"

Fironov replied, "No, how would I know?"

Investigator, "You didn't hear that they killed him, or that he died?"

"No, no", Fironov responded.

A similar line of questioning was raised with Fironov at the April 1995 Working Group Talks by a Joint Commission staffer who asked, "When he (the RB-45 crewman) asked you to spare his life, was it within your power to do so?"

"We had no relationship whatsoever with the prisoner," Colonel Fironov answered. "Don't you understand that all we did was conducted a discussion with him regarding aircraft? We had no other relationship regarding the prisoner."

Colonel Fironov in his two interviews with members of the Joint Commission apparently sought to distance himself from his earlier testimony that the American flyer he interrogated was killed by an irate crowd of North Korean civilians.

Current Status.

There is a high probability that [REDACTED] died in the crash of the RB-45 on which he flew. Furthermore, it is argued that the American flyer interrogated by Colonel Fironov was [REDACTED], the pilot of the RB-45, and not [REDACTED].

First, this assessment is based on an evaluation of Colonel Fironov's description of the man he interrogated. Fironov's description more closely fits that of [REDACTED] than it does of [REDACTED]. Second, Colonel Fironov inadvertently seems to have been influenced by a statement from a Russian journalist's daughter suggesting he had interrogated a [REDACTED]. Third, an American airman who occupied a cell with a man who identified himself at [REDACTED] strongly suggests that it was indeed [REDACTED] who survived the crash and not [REDACTED]. Fourth, this American airman, Lieutenant Shawe said that [REDACTED] told him that only he ([REDACTED]) survived the crash of the aircraft. The fact that [REDACTED] told his captors that the entire three man crew managed to bail out can be attributed to a conscious effort on [REDACTED] part to deceive his North Korean/Chinese captors. A further indication of this deceptiveness is the fact that [REDACTED] told his captors that there were only three men on the RB-45 and not four! Fifth, the fact that Colonel Andrianov, the man who shot down the RB-45, saw only one parachute supports the assessment that only one crew member bailed out. Sixth, the contemporary Russian documentary record shows that a [REDACTED] was interrogated. There is no mention in the Russian documents available to the U.S. side of the Commission suggesting that a colonel was captured on or about 4 December 1950. Had an American colonel been captured, especially one with an intelligence background, the senior Soviet leadership would have certainly been informed immediately.

Colonel Fironov's statement that the flyer he interrogated was killed by an angry North Korean crowd can not be verified although it is plausible. Fironov's veracity on this point is weakened by his apparent effort to back away from supporting this statement.

Although the U.S. side of the Commission firmly believes that there is a high probability that ██████████ died in the crash of the RB-45 and was not captured, the Commission will continue to seek additional information that will clear up any ambiguity surrounding this case.

CPT JAMES LOWE

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival." One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch." The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.⁴⁰ To date, no additional information has been provided.

⁴⁰ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

SGT PHILLIP MANDRA

A separate summary is being prepared

Summary of Incident. "On 8 July 1950, [REDACTED], Infantry, was killed in action in Chonan, Korea. He was the (34th Infantry) Regimental Commander and was leading a subordinate battalion of his unit in an effort to repel a severe attack by tanks and infantry against his positions. While endeavoring to single-handedly knock out a tank with a bazooka at a range of 15 yards, he was killed instantly by a tank projectile which struck him squarely in the body at close range."⁴¹

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 300-1 is a telegram addressed to Zakharov and signed by Shtykov (Soviet Ambassador to North Korea). This document is a progress report on the Korean War as of 24 July 1950. Most of the document is about the success the North Korean People's Army is having against the US Army's 34th Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division-lists of equipment captured, POW numbers, etc. This document states, "The 34th Regiment of the 24th American Division was routed during the battles for the town of Tajden. 108 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, among these was Commander of the American 34th Regiment."

U.S. According to CILHI and other sources, there were four separate commanders of the 34th IR prior to 24 July 1950. They were and their tenure as Commanding Officer are:

COL Jay B. Lovless	25 June - 7 July 1950	Relieved and returned to Japan
[REDACTED]	7 - 8 July 1950	Killed in action
LTC Robert Wadlington.	8 - 18 July 1950	Temporary Commanding Officer Never captured
COL Charles Beauchamp	18 July 1950 - 1951	Departed Korea approx. April 1951 for Tokyo

⁴¹ Headquarters, Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK), Battle Casualty Message and various reports. (12/13 July 1950)

Of the four possible candidates above, [REDACTED] is the only Commander who was at the appropriate place and time. He is currently listed on the CILHI list as KIA/BNR based on the eyewitness account of his being struck at point blank range by a tank projectile. Although his remains were not recovered, his death was never in question prior to receipt of this Russian report.

Current Status

It is possible that [REDACTED] did not die as reported and was captured. In the heat of battle, the eyewitness account could be in error. It is equally possible that the Russian report is in error and that the officer reported captured was not the Commanding Officer, but one of the staff officers for the regiment. This case has been presented to the Russian side of the Commission. The Russians maintain that their report must be in error, however, no additional information has been provided to substantiate either possibility.

██████████

Summary of Incident. ██████████, USMC is currently listed on the CILHI Korean War data base as MIA-BNR. According to the USMC casualty report, ██████████ status was changed to KIA-BNR due to evidence of death in 1953. This change is not reflected on current lists. It is likely that this evidence was the statements of repatriated crew members. ██████████ was one of three crew members on a TBM-3 that was shot down on 21 December 1951. Two crew members survived the crash, were held as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

██████████ MIA

Accounted for:

STILL, Richard L., LT RMC

THRASH, William G., LTC RMC

Archival Records

Russian. The Russians have provided us with the interrogation reports of several U.S. servicemen captured in North Korea. These reports were forwarded to the Russians by the Chinese. The majority of these individuals have been repatriated. Among these reports was the testimony of one of ██████████ crew members. According to the report, ██████████ was "killed in the aircraft."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary

Current Status

Based on the witness statements of his own crew, it seems highly probable ██████████ was killed in the aircraft.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 4 April 1952 at 0108 hours, a B-26 with ██████████ as the navigator departed Kunsan Airdrome, South Korea to perform a night combat mission. The aircraft arrived in the target area and reported to ground control that the mission could not be accomplished because of unfavorable weather conditions. Shortly after, at 0330 hours the control station again established radio contact with the B-26 and assigned it an alternate target. This was the last communication. The crew was reported missing in action when the aircraft failed to return to the base.

Personnel Involved.

VAN FLEET, James Alward Jr., LT MIA ██████████ MIA
██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. None

U.S. A report dated 26 May 1952 from Air Intelligence indicates "that a twin (engine) U. N. bomber crashed in the vicinity of Haeju at dawn on 4 April 1952. Records reveal that the subject B-26 was the only Air Force plane lost on that date. The intelligence report further indicates that an inhabitant of the area stated he observed the remains of one American lying thirty meters from the crash site...He had no knowledge of the fate of the other crew members or the identity of the deceased..."

Personal Accounts

Donets. On 22 June 1994, Task Force Russia members held an interview with former Soviet Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovich Donets. Donets had served as the Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64th IAK. Donets recalled hearing that the B-26 Bomber piloted by LT James Van Fleet (son of General Van Fleet) was intercepted and shot down during a bombing mission and that the entire crew had perished. ██████████ was a crew member of this B-26. Gennadii Donets is considered by some to be a credible and

knowledgeable source of information. His statements track with the facts as recorded by U. S. sources. Collectively, these events are highly suggestive of the fact that [REDACTED] and the entire crew of this B-26 perished.

Ananchenko. A recent interview by JCSD-Moscow has uncovered information that may indirectly be related to this case. The following information pertains to LT Van Fleet, the pilot of the B-26 on which [REDACTED] was a crew member. A former MVD Lieutenant Ananchenko informed JCSD personnel that in 1956, he was involved in escorting a group of prisoners from one Soviet camp to another Soviet camp. Ananchenko was told by the operations officer that one of the prisoners claimed to be the son of an American four star General. Ananchenko believed he was a spy who came to the Soviet Union during WWII and was captured.

The U.S. researched all four star generals in the U.S. Army starting from Pershing and the only one that had a son who is listed as MIA was General James Van Fleet, Sr.⁴² LT James Alford Van Fleet, Jr., son of General Van Fleet, graduated from West Point in 1949. This would make him approximately 28 years old in 1956. Ananchenko, who was approximately 25 in 1956 when this incident took place, recalls that the American prisoner was about his age or a few years older.

Current Status

There is insufficient evidence at this point to come to any firm conclusions about the fate of [REDACTED], LT Van Fleet or any other member of the crew. The Russians have been asked to provide any information regarding this case. To date, we have received no Russian archival records regarding this case. JCSD has investigated Ananchenko's statement, however, the information can not be verified at this time.

⁴² General Van Fleet was the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea and later Commander of the Far East Command.

██████████
Summary of Incident. On 4 December 1950 around noon time, ██████████
(AO 794-558) took off in a RB-45 from Yokota Air Base, Japan. At approximately 1250, the
RB-45 was intercepted by a flight of MiG-15 fighters and was shot down 70 km east of Andung.
At least one person managed to parachute from the aircraft.⁴³

Personnel Involved

██████████ Observer⁴⁴
██████████ AO 800-628, co-pilot
██████████ AO 928-027, navigator

Archival Records

Russian. ██████████ name does not appear on any of the lists of names provided to
the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

TFR 242: This is a set of two documents. Originally the Russians provided the U.S.
side of the Commission with one document that was in reality a sanitized, pasted together
version of the two. A contractor working for the Defense POW/MIA Office, however, was able
to provide the U.S. side of the Commission copies of the two original documents.

The first document is a message dated 17 December 1950. It is from General Belov, who
was then the commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, to Generals Shtemenko and
Batitskii.⁴⁵

The purpose of the message was to inform the senior Soviet leadership that for the first
time an RB-45 had been shot down. At the time, the RB-45 was seen as the “hottest”, light
bomber in the American inventory and General Belov was clearly pleased to inform Moscow of
his unit’s success. In the message, Belov reported, “An aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-
45 type fell in a region 70 km east of Andun. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling
to earth burned up completely. **The crew bailed out in parachutes** (emphasis added). The pilot

⁴³ Because of conflicting statements on the number of people who managed to bail out of the RB-45, the case of
is inextricably intertwined with that of ██████████, the aircraft’s pilot.

⁴⁴ ██████████ was a senior USAF intelligence officer stationed at Headquarters, USAF in Washington, D.C. but
sent TDY to Headquarters, Far East Air Forces.

⁴⁵ At the time General Sergie Shtemenko was the Soviet Minister of Defense and General Pavel Fedorovich
Batitskii was the first deputy commander of the Air Force.

██████████ was taken prisoner...The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out in parachutes. The navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to he did not see. The captive himself was burned and is in critical condition.” It is clear from this message that the Soviets did not know there were four and not three people on the RB-45.

The next day, General Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii, then a senior Soviet advisor to the North Koreans, sent a cryptic message to Moscow, “I report that the pilot from the shot down RB-45 died on route and the interrogation was not completed.”⁴⁶

TFR 76-31: This is the transcript of ██████████ interrogation. According to a note at the bottom of the document, a Major Kuznetsov prepared the questions. It is not clear who conducted the interrogation, but a Chinese official translated the original English text into Russian.⁴⁷

During the interrogation, ██████████ stated that the RB-45 ‘has a crew of three - a pilot, navigator, and radio operator.’ Later ██████████ recounted, “The plane caught fire and all **three** (emphasis added) crew members bailed out. I saw one run off, I don’t know where the other went to, and I landed where the plane crashed.” It is important to note that ██████████ did not mention during the interrogation that his RB-45 was carrying a fourth crew member - ██████████. Indeed, a close reading of the transcript strongly suggests that ██████████ was deliberately trying to conceal from his captors the fact there was a fourth man aboard the aircraft.

U.S. A document titled “Air Force Personnel Reported to Have Died in POW-Camp, Been Very Ill in POW Camp or Killed in Crash...” simply states “██████████ told another POW he was only survivor. Believed ██████████ was dead.”⁴⁸

21 September 1955: In a letter to a Mr. Joseph P. Nagoski, U.S. Department of State from LTC Richard A. Steele, USAF, Chief, Casualty Branch, Personnel Services Division,

⁴⁶ Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii (1897-1983) was promoted to Marshal of Aviation in 1959. From 1956 until 1970 he was commander of the prestigious Military Air Force Academy named after Iu. A. Gagarin.

⁴⁷ Colonel Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr., USAF, Ret for a short time shared a prison cell with ██████████. At the time, then Lieutenant Shawe was interrogated by a Soviet major accompanied by English and Russian speaking Chinese interrogators. Shawe stated in a letter to DPMO, “To the best of my recollections ██████████ ...was also interrogated by Russians.”

⁴⁸ The source of this information was Colonel Hamilton B. Shaw, Jr., USAF, Ret. who shared a cell with ██████████.

Directorate of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, LTC Steele provides the following details of the shoot down on the RB-45 carrying [REDACTED]. “[REDACTED] furnished the following details concerning his missing status to Captain Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr.⁴⁹

[REDACTED] indicated that while flying a B-45 (sic) along the Yalu River, the aircraft was attacked by five MiGs and two engines were shot out. He stated that **he was the only one who escaped from the aircraft** (emphasis added), having managed to get the canopy off and bail out at an altitude of about 1,000 feet. [REDACTED] landed in the burning wreckage and was severely burned about the hands and face. After evading capture, for 3 or 4 days without shoes, he turned himself in to the North Koreans...he was placed in a cell with Captain Shawe in Sinuiji, North Korea. Two days later they were removed from the cell and Captain Shawe joined a group of prisoners starting a march to another prison camp. [REDACTED] could not walk and was carried to an ox cart by fellow prisoners. The North Koreans said he was being taken to a hospital for medical treatment, because he was suffering from frostbite and gangrene of both legs. He was not seen again by repatriates after 16 December 1950, and they reported his condition was so bad at that time that he was not expected to survive.”

Propaganda Broadcast - On 21 May 1951 U.S. listening stations intercepted an enemy (no further information) propaganda broadcast “in which a Lieutenant Colonel Lorel, United States Air Force, was mentioned as being captured in northern Korea. The spelling of the name could not be verified, was believed to be phonetic, and resembled none of the names of Air Force personnel missing in Korea, with the exception of [REDACTED].”⁵⁰

Personal Accounts

Colonel Aleksandr Fedorovich Andrianov - He was the pilot who shot down the RB-45 that carried [REDACTED].⁵¹ He was first interviewed by a Department of Defense contractor and later by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs at the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow.

During the first interview, Colonel Andrianov described in detail the shootdown, “When I fired the first time, it was still too far. And then the distance was about 600 to 800 meters. I

⁴⁹ [REDACTED] was promoted to major posthumously.

⁵⁰ AFPMP-12-E 704 Missing (4 Dec 50) SR&D Case #80

⁵¹ Colonel Andrianov was born in 1919 and is a veteran of both the Second World War and the Korean War.

started firing. And here I saw that something fell from him...And during the second approach, he (the RB-45) burst into flames. And here he started to descend and **only the pilot** (emphasis added) jumped out of the aircraft. The crew was supposed to be three or four people, I don't remember exactly now. We probably got them when we were firing. The plane hit the hill before our eyes. An explosion. We kept circling above. The pilot landed with his parachute. He was picked up by a special team, the Korean team would pick up all the pilots who were shot down, including ours. And he went to prison."

In April 1995, Colonel Andrianov expanded up his earlier testimony, "At approximately 3,000 meters or lower, **I saw one parachute deploy from the aircraft. All of my colleagues saw only one parachute as well. None of us saw any other parachutes** (emphasis added). Although I have heard that others jumped, we did not note any other parachutes....However, I clearly saw the aircraft crash and explode."

Although Colonel Andrianov was not present, he was able to describe during the first interview how the pilot of the RB-45 ultimately died based on what a friend Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov told him. Fironov was a lieutenant colonel at the time and the regimental political officer. It was Fironov who interrogated the American pilot. "He (the pilot) was kind of arrogant", according to Andrianov. "...(T)he Koreans executed him the same way. They got a piece of plywood. They wrote down all he said on that plywood -- 'I am an American pilot. This is my third surveillance flight. According to my data such and such towns and plants were destroyed, such and such number of older people and children were killed'. And with it they let him go to Singisyu. They gave him a one man escort. That patrolman was given specific instructions not to interfere too much. First, he walked as if through a formation. People were on both sides. First, they only shouted at him, cursed him, threw sticks. The patrolman did not interfere too much. Then, they started to spit at him, hit him...he was finished."

Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov In early 1995, Colonel Fironov was interviewed in Moscow by an investigator from the Joint Commission. This was for Fironov at least his second interview. Not long before, he was interviewed by Igor Morozov, a Russian journalist working for the BBC. Apparently during this interview, Fironov was given background information on the shootdown of the RB-45 and in particular information on the crew members. As a result,

Fironov's testimony to the Joint Commission can be considered at potentially influenced or "tainted".

BBC Interview - In March 1996, the BBC television network aired on Time Watch a special report titled "Stalin's Secret War". One segment of this program discussed the case of ██████████. Colonel Fironov was introduced as the man who interrogated ██████████. Then for several moments Fironov was interviewed in Russian with an English voice over. Portions of the interview were edited out and replaced with the narrator's summary of what Fironov said.

Fironov describes his initial meeting with ██████████, the fact that he had a fact book on the Soviet Air Force (described by the narrator as a "highly classified document"), and the anger of the North Korean general, who was also present for the interrogation, over ██████████ perceived arrogance.

Then switching to a photograph of ██████████, the narrator says, "The North Korean general angered by ██████████ belligerence had him marched to the local town, a placard with the words "War Criminal" hung around his neck. ██████████ was beaten to death by the local people."

The program does not indicate how Fironov knew that the person he interrogated was ██████████ and not ██████████ or another airman. However, when an investigator from the Joint Commission interviewed Fironov a few months after his interview by the BBC, it seemed that Fironov's identification of ██████████ is less certain.

During the interview with the Joint Commission investigator, Fironov recounted that the man identified himself as "the commander of that crew, although he himself told me that he was a regimental commander." When asked if this man was ██████████, Fironov replied, "Yes, yes, yes." Then when asked, "And how is that you heard his name?", Fironov said, "Who? The regimental commander? Morozov's (the Russian journalist who first interviewed Fironov) daughter told me this."

Later during the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow, Colonel Fironov was interviewed by members of the Joint Commission. When asked to describe the man he interrogated, Colonel Fironov said, "I would say (he was) about 32 - no more than 32 years of

age". Asked if the man he met wore glasses, Fironov replied, "No". Finally when requested to describe his prisoner, Fironov said, "About like me. Regarding his physical characteristics, he was similar to me". Colonel Fironov is of slender build and about 5' 7" tall while [REDACTED] was 5' 6" inches tall and stout at 183 lbs. [REDACTED] was also forty-six years of age and wore glasses. [REDACTED], however, was 31 years of age, tall, and slender at 6' 2" and 195 lbs. He did not wear glasses.

It should also be noted that during Colonel Fironov's first interview with an investigator from the Joint Commission, Fironov was asked, "Tell me, did you hear what happened to him, this person with whom you talked?"

Fironov replied, "No, how would I know?"

Investigator, "You didn't hear that they killed him, or that he died?"

"No, no", Fironov responded.

A similar line of questioning was raised with Fironov at the April 1995 Working Group Talks by a Joint Commission staffer who asked, "When he (the RB-45 crewman) asked you to spare his life, was it within your power to do so?"

"We had no relationship whatsoever with the prisoner," Colonel Fironov answered. "Don't you understand that all we did was conducted a discussion with him regarding aircraft? We had no other relationship regarding the prisoner."

Colonel Fironov in his two interviews with members of the Joint Commission apparently sought to distance himself from his earlier testimony that the American flyer he interrogated was killed by an irate crowd of North Korean civilians.

Current Status

There is a high probability that [REDACTED] died either from wounds or at the hands of a hostile crowd. This conclusion is supported by Russian documents that state that the pilot of the RB-45 died "in route" before his interrogation could be completed. Precisely how [REDACTED] died, however, is not clear. Furthermore, it is argued that the American flyer interrogated by Colonel Fironov was [REDACTED], the pilot of the RB-45, and not [REDACTED]

First, this assessment is based on an evaluation of Colonel Fironov's description of the man he interrogated. Fironov's description more closely fits that of ██████████ than it does of ██████████. Second, Colonel Fironov inadvertently seems to have been influenced by a statement from a Russian journalist's daughter suggesting he had interrogated a ██████████. Third, an American airman who occupied a cell with a man who identified himself at ██████████ strongly suggests that it was indeed ██████████ who survived the crash and not ██████████. Fourth, this American airman, Lieutenant Shawe said that ██████████ told him that only he (██████████) survived the crash of the aircraft and that ██████████ was wounded and very ill. The fact that ██████████ told his captors that the entire three man crew managed to bail out can be attributed to a conscious effort on ██████████ part to deceive his North Korean/Chinese captors. A further indication of this deceptiveness is the fact that ██████████ told his captors that there were only three men on the RB-45 and not four! Fifth, the fact that Colonel Andrianov, the man who shot down the RB-45, saw only one parachute supports the assessment that only one crew member bailed out. Sixth, the contemporary Russian documentary record shows that a ██████████ was interrogated and that the pilot of the RB-45 died. There is no mention in the Russian documents available to the U.S. side of the Commission suggesting that a colonel was captured on or about 4 December 1950. Had an American colonel been captured, especially one with an intelligence background, the senior Soviet leadership would have certainly been informed immediately.

Colonel Fironov's statement that the flyer he interrogated was killed by an angry North Korean crowd can not be verified although it is plausible. Fironov's veracity on this point is weakened by his apparent effort to back away from supporting this statement. But whether ██████████ died of wounds or was killed by a crowd, it is nevertheless stated unambiguously in the Russian record that ██████████ died.

CPT ARA MOORADIAN B-29 SHOT DOWN 23 OCTOBER 1951

Summary of Incident. CPT Ara Mooradian B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.⁵² No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. CPT Ara Mooradian is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
████████████████████	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

⁵² The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty file.

STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MacCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on LT Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.

2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. He came from California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

LT ROBERT FRANK NIEMANN⁵³

Summary of Incident. On 12 April 1953, LT Niemann departed Kimpo Air Base as the number four pilot in a flight of four F-86 aircraft on an escort mission along the Sui Ho Reservoir, North Korea. Due to bad weather, the planes being escorted were forced to return to base. Nevertheless, LT Niemann's flight continued its patrol, but separated into two elements. Enemy aircraft were encountered by LT Niemann and his wing man and during the ensuing action he was heard to say, "Here he comes again." No further transmission was received from LT Niemann. Repeated attempts to contact him were to no avail and an air search of the area revealed no trace of him or his plane.

Personnel Involved.

NIEMANN, Robert Frank, LT MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 16: LT Niemann's name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled, List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. LT Niemann is one of the five from this list who is still "unaccounted for." The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the "interrogation" document was not actually an interrogation report but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e., ID card, ration card, etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement, as it is common practice in the U.S. and

⁵³ The spelling of the name Niemann is consistent throughout this summary. It should be noted, however, that his name has been spelled several different ways in U.S. and Russian records. (Neiman, Naiman, Najmann, etc.)

NATO militaries as well. Entry # 49 on this list states, "12 April 1953...LT Robert Niemann...Pilot perished..."

TFR 76-34: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, "Inventory of Pilot's Documents of an F-86 Aircraft of the 334th AA, 4th Air Group, 2LT Robert Niemann, Shot Down in Aerial Combat with a MiG-15 on 12 April 1953 in the Region South - West of Siodzio. Pilot Killed."

TFR 261: Operational Summary Number 102 of the Soviet 64th IAK for 12 April 1953 mentions several aircraft that were engaged and shot down on that day. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain from the Russian record which Soviet pilot shot down LT Niemann on that date.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

In 1992, a TFR contractor, Paul Cole, interviewed Viktor Bushuyev, a retired Soviet Colonel. During a discussion about the interrogation of crew members of a B-29, Bushuyev stated that at first two of the crew members were unwilling to talk but three days later "Niemann" wrote down answers. According to the notes from the interview, this was a misunderstanding. The interviewer immediately questioned the name. Bushuyev replied he was referring to Arnold, not Niemann⁵⁴. The Russian side of the Commission has also affirmed that it was Arnold and not Niemann. The Russian side of the Commission has steadfastly maintained that only LT Niemann's personal effects transited an interrogation site.

Current Status

Based on the documents we received from the Russians, both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability the LT Robert Niemann died in the crash.

⁵⁴ Colonel Arnold was the commander of a B-29 that was shot down on 12 January 1953. He was captured, held as a POW in China and subsequently repatriated to the United States following the war.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.⁵⁵ To date, no additional information has been provided.

⁵⁵ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 4 April 1952 at 0108 hours, a B-26 with ██████████ as the gunner departed Kunsan Airdrome, South Korea to perform a night combat mission. The aircraft arrived in the target area and reported to ground control that the mission could not be accomplished because of unfavorable weather conditions. Shortly after, at 0330 hours the control station again established radio contact with the B-26 and assigned it an alternate target. This was the last communication. The crew was reported missing in action when the aircraft failed to return to the base.

Personnel Involved.

VAN FLEET, James Alward Jr., LT	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA		

Archival records

Russian. None

U.S. A report dated 26 May 1952 from Air Intelligence indicates "that a twin (engine) U. N. bomber crashed in the vicinity of Haeju at dawn on 4 April 1952. Records reveal that the subject B-26 was the only Air Force plane lost on that date. The intelligence report further indicates that an inhabitant of the area stated he observed the remains of one American lying thirty meters from the crash site...He had no knowledge of the fate of the other crew members or the identity of the deceased..."

Personal Accounts

Donets. On 22 June 1994, Task Force Russia members held an interview with former Soviet Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovitch Donets. Donets had served as the Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64th IAK. Donets recalled hearing that the B-26 Bomber piloted by LT James Van Fleet (son of General Van Fleet) was intercepted and shot down during a bombing mission and that the entire crew had perished. ██████████ was a crew member of this B-26. Gennadii Donets is considered by some to be a credible and

knowledgeable source of information. His statements track with the facts as recorded by U. S. sources. Collectively, these events are highly suggestive of the fact that [REDACTED] and the entire crew of this B-26 perished.

Ananchenko. A recent interview by JCSD-Moscow has uncovered information that may indirectly be related to this case. The following information pertains to LT Van Fleet, the pilot of the B-26 on which [REDACTED] was a crew member. A former MVD Lieutenant Ananchenko informed JCSD personnel that in 1956, he was involved in escorting a group of prisoners from one Soviet camp to another Soviet camp. Ananchenko was told by the operations officer that one of the prisoners claimed to be the son of an American four star General. Ananchenko believed he was a spy who came to the Soviet Union during WWII and was captured.

The U.S. researched all four star generals in the U.S. Army starting from Pershing and the only one that had a son who is listed as MIA was General James Van Fleet, Sr.⁵⁶ LT James Alford Van Fleet, Jr., son of General Van Fleet, graduated from West point in 1949. This would make him approximately 28 years old in 1956. Ananchenko, who was approximately 25 in 1956 when this incident took place, recalls that the American prisoner was about his age or a few years older.

Current Status

There is insufficient evidence at this point to come to any firm conclusions about the fate of [REDACTED], LT Van Fleet or any other member of the crew. The Russians have been asked to provide any information regarding this case. To date, we have received no Russian archival records regarding this case. JCSD has investigated Ananchenko's statement, however, the information can not be verified at this time.

⁵⁶ General Van Fleet was the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea and later Commander of the Far East Command.

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival." One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch." The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.⁵⁷ To date, no additional information has been provided.

⁵⁷ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 31 May 1952 at 1957 hours, a B-26 on which ██████████ was a navigator departed South Korea to perform a night combat mission between Sinanju and the Yalu River in North Korea. Approximately one hour after departure, a routine report was received from the B-26 which revealed that it was experiencing no difficulty in flight and was proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was established with the B-26 and its crew was reported missing.

Personnel Involved

██████████ MIA ██████████ MIA
██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 249 is a 23 page document that entirely pertains to this particular case. The following excerpt is from page one, TFR 249-1, of this document:

“...A search group established that on 31 May 1952 a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region and crashed near the village An-Khari.

The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day. The force of the impact scattered aircraft fragments in a 50 - 100 meter radius.

At the crash, the search group gathered separate parts; documents; charred maps in English, scale 250000; plates from the plane and a pilot’s dog tag...”

The subsequent pages contain inventories of documents found at the crash site, photographs of the crash site, a photo of the dog tag, statements, air plane parts, etc.

TFR 249-5 states, “Copy of a Dog Tag of a Perished Pilot from the Downed Type B-26 Enemy Aircraft on 31 May 1952.” Below this title is a drawing of the dog tag of ██████████, the pilot, including serial number and blood type.

10 February 1994, The Washington Times ran an article that was quoted from Izvestiia, a Russian newspaper. The Russian article was the story of how the dog tags (probably the sketches) of [REDACTED] were found in a military archive in Russia. The Russian article and TFR-249 contained the same information.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary

Current Status

Based on the Russian report, photographs and physical evidence found in this case, there is little doubt that [REDACTED] and the crew perished in the crash.

██████████

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, a B-29 (44-62183) was reported destroyed in a mid-air explosion and observed falling to earth in three burning sections. According to statements of 16 witnesses from accompanying aircraft, no parachutes were observed and the possibility of anyone surviving was small. However, at least one member of the crew, Anton Brom, survived the explosion, was held as a POW and subsequently repatriated.

Personnel Involved.

██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
CPT BROM, Anton	RMC	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA		

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 272: Russian Operational Summary No. 00613 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64th IAK reports "the aircraft explosion and the retreat of two burning B-29s were observed by search light crews...according to Korean and Chinese comrades, one B-29 fell into the sea 20 km SE of Simni-do and exploded. Up to four cutters approached the area where the aircraft fell." A second paragraph confirms that "During the night of 11 June 1952, night fighters shot down three B-29 aircraft and damaged one other. The corpses of eight American pilots were found, as well as debris from one aircraft."

The following documents pertain to ██████████, a crew member of B-29 No. 44-62183.

TFR 16: ██████████ name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft

Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. [REDACTED] is one of the five from this list who is still "unaccounted for." The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the "interrogation" document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry # 24 on this list states, "10 June 1953... [REDACTED]"

TFR 76-39: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, "Inventory of [REDACTED], a gunner from the 19th Bomber Group. Shot down in a B-29 by a MiG-15 the night of 10 June 1952." Unfortunately, the fate of [REDACTED] is not specified.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Other. A passage in a Chinese book published by The Academy of Military Science History Department also confirms the B-29 shoot downs on the night of 10 June.⁵⁸

Current Status

The shoot downs mentioned in the Russian document correspond to the loss of two USAF B-29s. Servicemen from both crews are still unaccounted for. Unfortunately, it cannot be determined with certainty, which aircraft and crew were found by the Russian search team. The Russians maintain that [REDACTED] perished and only his personal documents transited an interrogation point. The Russian side of the USRJC has been asked to provide any documents that could clarify this case. To date, no additional information has been provided.

⁵⁸ *The War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Support Korea*, Academy of Military Science History Department (People's Liberation Army) December 1990.

LT TED ROYER

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival." One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch." The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.⁵⁹ To date, no additional information has been provided.

⁵⁹ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 23 October 1951, the F-84 piloted by ██████████ departed Taegu Air Base for a bomber escort mission over NW Korea. Upon approaching the target area, two MiG-15s were encountered and ██████████ attacked the planes. The flight was returning to escort position when ██████████ F-84 was attacked. A garbled message was received from ██████████ at this time and flames were observed coming out from under his aircraft. The aircraft was out of control. Efforts to contact ██████████ were to no avail. Circumstances prevented continuous observation and the aircraft was lost from view ██████████ was not seen to leave the aircraft during the brief period of observation. No organized ground search could be conducted since the incident occurred in enemy territory.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 76-26: The Russian side has provided to the U. S. side a document listing the personal effects of ██████████. This document is entitled "List of Captured Documents" These items have been verified as belonging to ██████████. Included on the list of items were an identification card, pilots license, and aviators qualification all in his name. According to the Russian's, in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. The Russian side maintains that ██████████ perished and only his personal effects transited an interrogation point.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ When this list of documents, TFR 76-26, was given to the U.S. side, it was attached to a cover sheet stating, "documents taken from a dead American flier ULLRIKH KHALBER", TFR 76-25. (see UNRUH, Halbert file) Neither a cover sheet for ██████████ nor additional documents for Unruh have been provided.

U.S. ██████████ name appears in the 77 page document entitled The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union. This document is actually a collection of studies and hypotheses compiled by the U.S. to use as a working tool. His name is mentioned in connection with a study conducted by TSGT Siedling as a Korean War POW on whom the Russian archives should contain information.

Personal Accounts

Task Force Russia members conducted a series of interviews with former Soviet Army Officer (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovich Donets. During the Korean War, Donets served as an Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64th IAK. Donets recalled personally seeing the ID card and other documents of an individual named "██████████." Additionally, he recalled that the pilot "██████████" perished in the crash.

Current Status

Both sides of the USRJC agree that based on Russian documents and testimonies, there is a high probability that ██████████ perished in the crash.

See the summary on "SGT Louis Bergmann"

██████████

Summary of Incident. ██████████ was a member of a two plane flight of F-86 aircraft which departed for a combat fighter mission on 3 May 1952. During an engagement with enemy aircraft, ██████████ aircraft was seen by the flight leader to dive away from an enemy MiG and execute evasive maneuvers at an extremely low altitude. ██████████ was informed of his low altitude and instructed to pull up. Immediately thereafter he leveled the wings of the F-86 which then struck the surface of the water in a low-angle high-speed glide approximately 3 miles off shore near the mouth of the Yalu River. According to the flight leader, ██████████ F-86 hit the water at too great a speed for a safe ditching. Enemy aircraft forced the leader to leave the area. Prior to his departure, he did not see ██████████ abandon the F-86 nor the aircraft sink beneath the water. Later in the day, search aircraft returned to the site of the crash-landing. North Korean surface craft were observed in the vicinity, but no trace of ██████████ or his aircraft were found.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 284: Operational Summary number 00124 of the Soviet 64th IAK for 3 May 1952 contains direct evidence concerning ██████████. The information in the Russian document describing the shoot down of ██████████ is consistent with USAF data. According to the document, "Senior Lieutenant Mazikin saw 2 F-86s ahead of him, which were pursuing one MiG-15 at 16:38 at the approach to the Myaogou airfield. Senior Lieutenant Mazikin attacked the enemy and shot down one F-86...The body of a pilot was found in the remains of one of the F-86s shot down in the area of Myaogou airfield. From documents, it has been established that the pilot is Captain Dzhil'bert Tenni who belonged to the 51st Fighter Air Group."

TFR 274: Operational Summary number 00132 of the Soviet 64th IAK for 11 May 1952 also mentions the shoot down of ██████████. According to part five of the document, "Captain

Dzhil'bert [REDACTED] of the 51st Group, who was shot down on 4 May, wrote in his log that ... (unrelated info.)”

TFR 76: The Russian side provided several documents listing the personal effects of pilots that were shot down. According to the Russians, the personal effects (i.e. ID card, license, money) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. In several cases, these documents state the fate of the pilot. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice. Document TFR 76-37,38 is entitled, “Documents from the F-86 flier CPT DZHIL’BERT Tenni shot down on 3 May 52 in the area of Myaogou Airfield (flier dead).”

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

In June 1994, Task Force Russia members and representatives from the Russian side of the Commission interviewed Russian Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovitch Donets who served as an air intelligence officer for the 64th IAK in Korea from 1950 - 1953. Donets recalled looking at the personal ID cards and other documents of someone named Tanney, Albert and another pilot. Additionally, he recalled hearing [REDACTED] on the radio with other U.S. pilots before he crashed. According to Donets, the pilot ([REDACTED]) died when his aircraft crashed.

Current Status

Based on documents that we received from the Russians and testimony of former Russian officers, both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that [REDACTED] died in the crash.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 20 July 1953 ██████████ was on a mission to attack the Yang Ni Dong bridge complex at Sinanju. Another pilot on the same flight stated, "I observed ██████████ F-86 receive a direct hit by AA and explode. I observed the right wing of the aircraft fall away engulfed in flame and other smaller pieces of the aircraft falling around a large mass that appeared to be the fuselage...I observed what appeared to be the fuselage hit the north bank of the river but observed no parachute." The serial number of ██████████ F-86 was 52-4469 and it crashed at YD 241890.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 323: The following information was found in a report written by a Russian search and rescue team from Field Post No. 77970. "On 19 July 1953, we received an assignment to conduct a search for an aircraft shot down by AA on 19 July 1953. We learned from the local inhabitants that at approximately 1900 hours (Korean time) an enemy aircraft engulfed in flames appeared from a northerly direction at low altitude and fell into the river 40-50 meters from the shore. When we arrived at the sight, we saw the aircraft. The nose section had sunk and approximately one and a half meters of the tail section was above the water. We swam up to the plane and saw that it was an F-86. On the tail section in big black numbers was written No. 24629."

U.S. The aircraft with the exact number mentioned in the Russian document 24629 (52-4629) belonged to an aircraft that was operational until September 1955-over two years after the Korean War. The following is a list of all the F-86 serial numbers that were lost in July 1953:

F-86E	51-2756	F-86E	51-2824
F-86E	52-2836	F-86F	52-4368
F-86F	52-4469	F-86F	52-4491

Although none of the numbers match exactly, only one serial number has all the elements of the one mentioned in the Russian document. This information has been recorded from English on the burnt aircraft, to Korean and finally to Russian. It was common practice not to display the first number of the production year on the tail. The actual number displayed would have been No. 24469. Therefore, the numbers mentioned in both documents only differ by one numeral. It is highly likely that this number was mistakenly recorded in the Russian document.

Furthermore, the pilot of the F-86 with the s/n 52-4469 was [REDACTED]. The circumstances in both the U.S. account and the Russian account of the shoot down of [REDACTED] are almost identical. A sketch of the crash site accompanied the Russian document. The location of the crash was the same in both the U.S. and Russian versions.

Current Status

The similarities outweigh the few discrepancies that exist between the two documents. It has been our experience in the past that dates, times and serial numbers may be off by a small margin. Hence, based on the comparison of the two documents, we believe there is significant evidence that the aircraft found by the Russians was piloted by [REDACTED]. There was, unfortunately, no mention as to the disposition of the pilot in the Russian document.

████████████████████
Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival." One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during "Operation Big Switch." The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

Personnel Involved.

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64th IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, "from 2235 - 0106, the 87th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues."

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.⁶¹ To date, no additional information has been provided.

⁶¹ Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

LT JACK TURBERVILLE

Summary of Incident. On 18 November 1952 at 1600 hours, a flight of four F-86s departed Suwon Air Base, Korea for a combat patrol mission over the Chongchong River, North Korea. During the return flight, LT Turberville radioed that he was having difficulty with his oxygen. The message was somewhat garbled and appeared to end abruptly. His plane was then observed to nose down sharply and disappear into an overcast. Subsequent search of the area failed to reveal any trace of the missing officer or his aircraft.

Personnel Involved.

TURBERVILLE, Jack, LT MIA

Archival Records

Russian. The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side several interrogation reports of American POWs. According to the Russians, the interrogations were conducted by the Koreans or Chinese and the information was then forwarded to Soviet advisors. When questioned about personnel losses, a former POW stated LT Turberville was presumed to have died due to a malfunction of his oxygen system.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

The statement in the Russian document is consistent with USAF records. Both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that LT Turberville perished.

CPT HALBERT UNRUH

Summary of Incident. 5 April 1951, a B-26 piloted by CPT Unruh departed Taegu Air Base for a night intruder mission in the Pyongyang area. Shortly after take off, a routine report was received from LT (rank at time) Unruh indicating that there were no difficulties and they were proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was made. The fate of the crew and aircraft is unknown.

Personnel Involved.

UNRUH, Halbert, CPT MIA

Archival Records

Russian. CPT Unruh's name appears on the list of 71 more formally known as List of U. S. Air Force Crew Members Participating in Combat Operations in North Korea 1950-53, and About Whom Information Has Been Found in Documents of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This list was compiled by the Russians and given to the U.S. side in 1992. Number 67 on this list states, "UL'RIKH KHAL'BERT-perished in crash."

TFR 76-25: The Russian side of the USRJC has provided an additional document which mentions the fate of CPT Unruh. TFR 76 -25 is a cover sheet which states, "I am submitting to you a translation of the document taken from the dead American flier ULL'RIKH KHAL'BERT, shot down by AAA on 4 April 1951 near KHAKUSEN..." Unfortunately, the attached document lists the personal effects belonging to [REDACTED] vice CPT Unruh. Regardless of the mix up, the cover letter states that the personal effects of CPT Unruh were retrieved. According to the Russians, in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well.

U.S. CPT Unruh's name appears in the 77 page document formally titled The Transfer of United States Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union. This document is actually a collection of studies and hypotheses compiled by the U. S. side to use as a working tool. CPT Unruh's name

appears in this document as part of a study conducted by TSGT Siedling on Korean War POWs on whom the Russian archives may contain information.

Current Status

Despite the obvious "mix up" of the [REDACTED] /Unruh files, there is little reason to doubt the veracity of the Russian documents. The Russian side has complied with our request to try to locate the "correct" documents belonging to CPT Unruh. Both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that CPT Unruh perished.

LT JAMES VAN FLEET

Summary of Incident. 4 April 1952 at 0108 hours, a B-26 piloted by LT Van Fleet departed Kunsan Airdrome, South Korea to perform a night combat mission. The aircraft arrived in the target area and reported to ground control that the mission could not be accomplished because of unfavorable weather conditions. Shortly after, at 0330 hours the control station again established radio contact with the B-26 and assigned it an alternate target. This was the last communication. The crew was reported missing in action when the aircraft failed to return to the base.

Personnel Involved.

VAN FLEET, James Alward Jr., LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA		

Archival Records

Russian. None

U.S. A report dated 26 May 1952 from Air Intelligence indicates “that a twin (engine) U. N. bomber crashed in the vicinity of Haeju at dawn on 4 April 1952. Records reveal that the subject B-26 was the only Air Force plane lost on that date. The intelligence report further indicates that an inhabitant of the area stated he observed the remains of one American lying thirty meters from the crash site...He had no knowledge of the fate of the other crew members or the identity of the deceased...”

Personal Accounts

Donets. 22 June 1994, Task Force Russia members held an interview with former Soviet Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovich Donets. Donets had served as the Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64th IAK. Donets recalled hearing that the B-26 Bomber piloted by LT James Van Fleet (son of General Van Fleet) was intercepted and shot down during a bombing mission and that the entire crew had perished. Gennadii Donets is considered by some to be a credible and knowledgeable source of information. His statements

track with the facts as recorded by U. S. sources. Collectively, these events are highly suggestive of the fact that LT Van Fleet and the entire crew of this B-26 perished.

Ananchenko. A recent interview by JCSD-Moscow has uncovered information that may indirectly be related to this case. A former MVD Lieutenant Ananchenko informed JCSD personnel that in 1956, he was involved in escorting a group of prisoners from one Soviet camp to another Soviet camp. Ananchenko was told by the operations officer that one of the prisoners claimed to be the son of an American four star General. Ananchenko believed he was a spy who came to the Soviet Union during WWII and was captured.

The U.S. researched all four star generals in the U.S. Army starting from Pershing and the only one that had a son who is listed as MIA was General James Van Fleet, Sr.⁶² LT James Alford Van Fleet, Jr., son of General Van Fleet, graduated from West point in 1949. This would make him approximately 28 years old in 1956. Ananchenko, who was approximately 25 in 1956 when this incident took place, recalls that the American prisoner was about his age or a few years older.

Current Status

There is insufficient evidence at this point to come to any firm conclusions about the fate of LT Van Fleet or any other member of the crew. The Russians have been asked to provide any information regarding this case. To date, we have received no Russian archival records regarding this case. JCSD has investigated Ananchenko's statement, however, the information can not be verified at this time.

⁶² General Van Fleet was the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea and later Commander of the Far East Command.

██████████

Summary of Incident. ██████████ was one of the 14 member crew of a B-29 shot down on 12 January 1953. The aircraft was engaged by an estimated 12 aircraft approximately 20 miles east of Uiju before it disappeared from the radar scope. According to U. S. records, "On 22 January 1953 Peking radio reported that all but three of the crew had been captured, those three having been killed. Only Colonel Arnold and Captain Vaadi...were mentioned as having been captured."

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for

██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA

Accounted for

ARNOLD, John K. COL	RMC
BENJAMIN, Harry, A1C	RMC
BAUMER, William, MAJ	RMC
BROWN, Howard, TSG	RMC
BROWN, Wallace, LT	RMC
BUCK, John W., LT	RMC
KIBA, Steve E, A1C	RMC
LLEWELLYN, Elmer, CPT	RMC
SCHMIDT, Daniel, A2C	RMC
THOMPSON, John W.	RMC

Archival records

Russian. TFR 37-23: A high level correspondence states, "according to the report from MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An'dun on 12 January 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT (Arnold) and staff officer of operational reconnaissance service Major BAUL (Baumer) were also on the aircraft..." The eleven crew members (nine plus Arnold and Baumer) that were mentioned as having been captured were confirmed as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side 30 sets of documents containing information on POWs. Some of the documents are full interrogation reports while others are summaries or lists. Nevertheless, the entire batch of documents is referred to as the "interrogation reports". This document is entitled "Register of POWs". It lists brief biographical data on the eleven members of the crew who were captured. The end comment on the document confirms that the remaining three crew members, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], were reported as having been killed in the crash.

TFR 182-25: This Russian document states, "I am forwarding a list of personal documents of ...LT Vuris" (Voorhis). This document is apparently a cover letter for the transmittal of items from the downed B-29 to Moscow. It is noted that the attached documents were taken from "our Chinese comrades." The attachments apparently included interrogation reports, captured documents, and some personal documents. According to the Russians, in cases where servicemen perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card, manuals, etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

██████████ is mentioned in three independent sources as having perished in the crash- U.S. reports, Peking reports and Soviet reports. Unless there are adequate grounds or subsequent information that challenges the veracity of these reports, the evidence implies that ██████████ perished in the crash.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 16 July 1953, ██████████ was the number four pilot in a flight of four F-84s which departed Taegu Air Base, Korea on an interdiction mission in the Sinanju-Anju area of North Korea. As the flight was leaving the target area, ██████████ radioed that his aircraft had been hit. Another call from ██████████ was heard which stated, "I'm getting out." This was the last transmission heard from ██████████. The remainder of the flight circled the area for approximately 25 minutes but saw no sign of ██████████, a parachute, or wreckage of an aircraft.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 138-235: TFR 138 is a 300 page document passed to the U.S. side of the Commission from the Russians. It contains various reports from units of the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps such as shoot down reports, operational summaries, and search reports. These documents are lacking chronological continuity. In some cases, entire months are missing. Page 235 is a report dated 18 July 1953. The report refers to an F-80 that was apparently shot down on 17 July 1953. The significant statement in this report is the second paragraph which states, "During the search for the parachutist who went down on 16 July 53, ...(unrelated info. follows)." We do not have the actual Soviet report from 16 July 1953. Nothing more is mentioned about the parachutist.

U.S. ██████████ was the only Air Force loss suffered on 16 July 1953. The statement in the Russian document tracks with the circumstances recorded in the U. S. records.

Current Status

Based on the comparison of the Russian and U.S. documents, we believe there is significant evidence ██████████ was successful in his attempt to bail out of the aircraft. However, there is no subsequent information that mentions the fate of ██████████. Whether he survived the

jump or not is unknown. The Russians have been asked to provide the report from 16 July 1953 and any other relative documents. To date, no additional information has been provided.

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] was one of the 14 member crew of a B-29 shot down on 12 January 1953. The aircraft was engaged by an estimated 12 aircraft approximately 20 miles east of Uiju before it disappeared from the radar scope. According to U. S. records, "On 22 January 1953 Peking radio reported that all but three of the crew had been captured, those three having been killed. Only Colonel Arnold and Captain Vaadi...were mentioned as having been captured."

Personnel Involved.

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA

Accounted for:

ARNOLD, John K. COL	RMC
BENJAMIN, Harry, A1C	RMC
BAUMER, William, MAJ	RMC
BROWN, Howard, TSG	RMC
BROWN, Wallace, LT	RMC
BUCK, John W., LT	RMC
KIBA, Steve E, A1C	RMC
LLEWELLYN, Elmer, CPT	RMC
SCHMIDT, Daniel, A2C	RMC
THOMPSON, John W.	RMC
VAADI, Eugene CPT	RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 37-23: A high level correspondence states, “according to the report from MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An’dun on 12 January 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT (Arnold) and staff officer of operational reconnaissance service Major BAUL (Baumer) were also on the aircraft...” The eleven crew members (nine plus Arnold and Baumer) that were mentioned as having been captured were confirmed as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side 30 sets of documents containing information on POWs. Some of the documents are full interrogation reports while others are summaries or lists. Nevertheless, the entire batch of documents is referred to as the “interrogation reports”. This document is entitled “Register of POWs”. It lists brief biographical data on the eleven members of the crew who were captured. The end comment on the document confirms that the remaining three crew members, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], were reported as having been killed in the crash.

U.S. USAF records as mentioned above in summary.

Current Status

[REDACTED] is mentioned in three independent sources as having perished in the crash - U.S. reports, Peking reports and Soviet reports. Unless there are adequate grounds or subsequent information that challenges the veracity of these reports, the evidence implies that [REDACTED] perished in the crash.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 31 May 1952 at 1957 hours, a B-26 piloted by ██████████ departed South Korea to perform a night combat mission between Sinanju and the Yalu River in North Korea. Approximately one hour after departure, a routine report was received from the B-26 which revealed that it was experiencing no difficulty in flight and was proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was established with the B-26 and its crew was reported missing.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA ██████████ MIA
██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 249 is a 23 page document that entirely pertains to this particular case. The following excerpt is from page one, TFR 249-1, of this document:

“...A search group established that on 31 May 1952 a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region and crashed near the village An-Khari.

The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day. The force of the impact scattered aircraft fragments in a 50-to-100-meter radius.

At the crash, the search group gathered separate parts; documents; charred maps in English, scale 250000; plates from the plane and a pilot's dog tag...”

The subsequent pages contain inventories of documents found at the crash site, photographs of the crash site, a photo of the dog tag, statements, air plane parts, etc.

TFR 249-5 states, “Copy of a Dog Tag of a Perished Pilot from the Downed Type B-26 Enemy Aircraft on 31 May 1952.” Below this title is a drawing of the dog tag of ██████████, the pilot, including serial number and blood type.

On 10 February 1994, The Washington Times ran an article that was quoted from Izvestiia, a Russian newspaper. The Russian article was the story of how the dog tags [probably sketches] of ██████████ were found in a military archive in Russia. The Russian article and TFR-249 contained the same information.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Based on the Russian report, photographs and physical evidence found in this case, there is little doubt that ██████████ and the entire crew perished in the crash.

██████████
Summary of Incident. On 13 April 1952 after radioing that his F-86 had been hit,

██████████ was seen heading south toward the Yellow Sea. Repeated efforts to contact him were to no avail. Minutes after the last radio message, the pilot of a friendly aircraft observed a huge splash in the waters of the Yellow Sea, followed by an oil slick. Subsequent search of the reported crash area failed to reveal any trace of the missing officer or his aircraft.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 16: We believe the name of ██████████ appears on two documents provided to the U.S. side of the Commission by the Russians. In 1992, JCSD received a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. All but one name on the list of 59 names were identified shortly after the list was received, despite the garbling of most names during transliteration from English to Korean to Russian and back into English. The unidentified name was "MAJ Dzhilliam."

The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the "interrogation" document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry # 26 on this list states, "14 April 1952...51st Wing...Major Dzhilliam, Chief Operations Department...Pilot died in the area 50 km north of Andung."

TFR 76-42: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, "Documents from Major Dzhilliam, the Chief of the Operations Section of the 51st Wing. He was shot down by a MiG-15 on 14 APR 52 over the territory of the Peoples Republic of Korea in an area 50 km north of An'dun." The 6th entry on the list is " a photo of the deceased Major Dzhilliam and the plane he was shot down in."

U.S. The two Russian documents identified "Dzhilliam's" rank, unit, duty position, date of shoot down, and area of shoot down. When compared with U.S. records, each of these references correlates with [REDACTED]. Moreover, [REDACTED] is the only casualty on or about this shoot down date that matches any of the information on the Russian list. The U.S. has since regarded this name as [REDACTED].

Current Status

Both documents describe "Dzhilliam" as having perished in the crash. Based on this analysis, both sides of the USRJC agree the evidence is highly suggestive of the fact that [REDACTED] perished in the crash.

██████████
Summary of Incident. On 31 May 1952 at 1957 hours, a B-26 on which

██████████ was a gunner departed South Korea to perform a night combat mission between Sinanju and the Yalu River in North Korea. Approximately one hour after departure, a routine report was received from the B-26 which revealed that it was experiencing no difficulty in flight and was proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was established with the B-26 and its crew was reported missing.

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA ██████████ MIA
██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 249 is a 23 page document that entirely pertains to this particular case. The following excerpt is from page one, TFR 249-1, of this document:

“...A search group established that on 31 May 1952 a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region and crashed near the village An-Khari.

The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day. The force of the impact scattered aircraft fragments in a 50-to-100-meter radius.

At the crash, the search group gathered separate parts; documents; charred maps in English, scale 250000; plates from the plane and a pilot’s dog tag...”

The subsequent pages contain inventories of documents found at the crash site, photographs of the crash site, a photo of the dog tag, statements, air plane parts, etc.

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10 February 1994, The Washington Times ran an article that was quoted from Izvestiia, a Russian newspaper. The Russian article was the story of how the dog tags (probably sketches) of [REDACTED] were found in a military archive in Russia. The Russian article and TFR-249 contained the same information.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Current Status

Based on the Russian report, photographs and physical evidence found in this case, there is little doubt that [REDACTED] and the entire crew perished in the crash.

██████████

Summary of Incident. On 12 April 1953 at 0630 hours, the F-84 piloted by ██████████
“went into a bomb run over the target. Approximately two seconds after the explosion of his
released bomb, an additional explosion was observed approximately 200 feet ahead of the bomb
burst. Search of the area revealed burning wreckage of what appeared to be a crashed aircraft.
No parachute or sign of life was observed.”

Personnel Involved.

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 261: Operational Summary Number 102 from the 64th IAK in Andung for
12 April 1953 states, “at 1604, eight MiG 15s from the 913th IAP (led by Captain Semenov)
flying in the Bikhen region at 500 m altitude, engaged four F-84s. One pilot, Captain Semenov,
fired and shot down one F-84 at a distance of 800 m on the target’s rear aspect.”

U.S. According to USAF records, two F-84s were lost on 12 April 1953. The one above
piloted by ██████████ and the other piloted by LT de Luna (see the case study of LT de Luna for
details). Both individuals are listed as MIA.⁶³

Current Status

Russian Operational Summary Number 102 most likely refers to one of these two
incidents. Unfortunately, the report does not contain sufficient details to narrow it down to one.
Moreover, the Russian report does not state the fate of the pilot of the shot down F-84. In any
case, the loss of at least one F-84 on 12 April 1953 is confirmed by this Russian document. The
possibility exists that this may have been ██████████ aircraft.

⁶³ According to Paul Cole, the Soviet records appear to be more consistent with the loss of ██████████. However, based on the documents available to the U.S., it is our assessment that the Russian data is inconclusive.

TRANSFER OF AMERICAN POWs TO THE SOVIET UNION

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs has collected a significant amount of information that suggests that there is a high probability that during the Korean War American POWs were transferred from Korea to the Soviet Union.

While information in support of this assessment that Americans were transferred is incomplete and sometimes ambiguous, it is, nevertheless, highly suggestive. Indeed, when viewed in a broad context, one can see a consistent pattern of events such that there is a high probability that some transfers took place.

The notion that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union was articulated in a preliminary 1993 study produced by the Defense POW/MIA Office and titled The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

The primary goal of the report was to show the Russians that a body of information exists suggesting that the Soviets had taken American POWs to the Soviet Union. The U.S. believed that once confronted with the evidence, albeit circumstantial, the Russians could no longer lightly dismiss American suggestions that the transfers took place.

The report succeeded in this goal. The Russians publicly went on record stating that the possibility of the transfer of American POWs could not be dismissed. The Russians did not confirm such transfers, but they did move away from an adamant denial of the possibility.

The 1993 Transfer report tied together disparate sources to suggest initially that hundreds, if not thousands, of POWs could have been taken to the USSR. The report reviewed numerous sources of information. It was, however, a tentative report because time prohibited a close and careful assessment of all the data then available. Over the past three years, U.S. analysts have analyzed the data collected, compared it with other, newer data, and refined its analysis. In the last several years, the information in support of the transfer question has grown stronger. However, the data does not support the notion that “hundreds” of Americans were transferred to

⁶⁴ This study is often popularly called “The 77 Page Report”.

the Soviet Union. Rather it suggests that perhaps only thirty to forty were transferred. The evidence in support of this conclusion is detailed later in this report.

Soviet Recollections

Information suggesting that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union can be divided into three categories. The first is recollections of former Soviet officers, soldiers, and citizens who played a role in the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. As a group, these individuals are the most persuasive sources. Although the recollections of some have been clouded by the passage of years, their fundamental thrust and outline remains consistent. Especially impressive is the fact that these men did not know one another. Yet, they have independently come forward of their own volition to offer their unique piece of the story. It should be noted that these sources are people who held respected and responsible positions in the Soviet military and civil society.

Since the original publication of The Transfer report, U.S. analysts have interviewed additional figures, re-interviewed others, and analyzed still more documents. The most striking development since the publication of "The Transfer" is that there is now testimony by the former commander of Soviet forces in Korea (as recounted in the notes of an interviewing Russian journalist) that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union. Perhaps even more compelling is the testimony of a former Soviet sergeant who claims he saw American POWs in a hospital in the Soviet Far East.

General Georgi Lobov, the senior Soviet commander in Korea, not long before his death recounted to a Russian journalist that he knew that at least thirty to forty American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union (see Appendix on General Lieutenant Georgi Ageyevich Lobov for additional details).

Sergeant Vladimir Trotsenko, a former Soviet NCO, was in 1951 in a hospital in the Soviet Far East. His hospital bed was placed outside a room that held four injured American flyers. The details of Trotsenko's testimony are compelling and point to the presence of

American servicemen within the borders of the Soviet Union (see Appendix on Sergeant Vladimir Trotsenko for additional details).

The testimony of these two men is buttressed by the recollections of two retired Soviet colonels. Colonel Pavel Derzskii recounted that there was a standing order to send all captured pilots to the Soviet Union. He also claims that in response to orders from his superiors, he had an assistant arrange the transfer of a captured American/British intelligence agent, an American pilot, and an American general to the Soviet Union (see Appendix on Colonel Pavel Derzskii for additional details).

Yet, another retired colonel, Gavril I. Korotkov, recounted how he interrogated American POWs on the territory of the Soviet Union. Moreover, he described how the MGB would have handled American POWs both during the transfer phase and later when they were being interrogated in the Soviet Union⁶⁵ (see Appendix on Colonel Gavril Korotkov for additional details).

Pavel Umnyashkin, an aircraft mechanic in Andung during the Korean War, claims that a captured American pilot spoke before an assembly of Soviet servicemen. The American serviceman supposedly said, "I no longer believe that the Soviets are the beasts they have been portrayed to be." The American was then, according to Umnyashkin, flown to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Nikolay Belyakov told a Commission investigator that an American pilot was captured when his F-86 was forced down. The American was sent to Moscow, according to Belyakov, "because Stalin wanted to speak with him". Moreover, Colonel Ivan Kozhedub, a Soviet regimental commander at the time, interrogated the American who told the colonel "he wanted to go to Moscow."

In another case, Nikolai Kazersky, a former gulag inmate and decorated Soviet soldier, told of meeting an American flyer in the gulag during the Korean War (see Appendix on Nikolai Kazerskii for additional details).

⁶⁵ It should be noted that Colonel Korotkov's testimony has changed over time. In a 1994 appearance before the Joint Commission, he would not venture beyond hearsay testimony.

A former Chinese officer Shu Ping Wa (also spelled Ping Hwa Xu) recounted that in 1951 he turned over three captured American flyers to Soviet officers. As befitting a bureaucracy, the Russians provided the Chinese with "hand receipts" for the American flyers.

Yurii Klimovich, a design engineer at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, recounted that a senior colleague told him that a captured American F-86 pilot lectured Soviet design engineers on the capabilities and handling characteristics of an F-86. The pilot was allegedly held in the Lubyanka prison and was occasionally driven to the design works for technical discussions with the engineers.

Valentin Konstantinovich Pak, although he did not have direct contact with American POWs, was a highly placed official in the North Korean government. He became First Deputy Foreign Minister of the newly independent North Korea although he was technically a Soviet citizen. Valentin Pak recounted to U.S. investigators that during the Korean War a Chinese foreign service officer named Lu told him that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union via China during the Korean War.

U.S. Intelligence Reports

U.S. intelligence reports constitute the second type of information. Throughout the Korean War and for several years afterwards, there were, according to one American colonel, "hundreds of prisoner reports".⁶⁶ One such report was by a Russian railroad worker who recounted seeing POWs passing from China to the Soviet Union at a small border station.⁶⁷

Reports such as these were so common, the American intelligence community in the early 1950s gave high priority to the collection of information on Americans held in the Soviet Union and behind the "Iron Curtain". By the mid-1950s a high level Inter-Agency Committee on Americans Held in the Communist Countries was founded.

⁶⁶ Statement by LTC Phillip Corso, USA, Ret. to Task Force Russia, 23 February 1993, "Bridging the Gap - 40 Years, 1952-1992" and video tape interview of LTC Corso conducted with Task Force Russia on 23 February 1993.

⁶⁷ Foreign Service Dispatch, Amcongeng Hong Kong, Desp. No. 1716, 23 March 1954.

The U.S. Government took these reports seriously. Indeed, John Foster Dulles, then U.S. Secretary of State, instructed the American ambassador in Moscow to present the Soviet Foreign Ministry an Aide-Memoire that said in part, "The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Soviet Union."⁶⁸

Soviet Technology Demands and Central Policy Direction

The third type of information documents the Soviet demand for foreign technology and expertise. In the late 1940s through the 1950s, the Soviet Union saw itself in a desperate race to develop its scientific/technological base. The Soviet leaders placed a great deal of emphasis on developing nuclear weapons, high performance aircraft, and rockets.⁶⁹ Since the Soviet Union had lost many of its best young minds in the Second World War, it was woefully short of scientists. Consequently, General Colonel Serov, then a senior NKVD official, ordered Soviet intelligence personnel to develop lists of German scientists who "worked in the past at design offices and research institutes on jet technology".⁷⁰

Not long afterwards, the NKVD began kidnapping German scientists and sending them to the Soviet Union to work in Soviet design bureaus on aircraft and rockets.⁷¹ This need for German scientists suggests the need for other Westerners with technological knowledge.

Closely related to documents that demonstrate the Soviet Union's acute need for technology are documents that provide insight into the thinking of the senior Soviet leadership. A document

⁶⁸ Aide Memoire (No. 947) from U.S. Embassy Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 5 May 1954

⁶⁹ David Holloway, **Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)

⁷⁰ Irina Shcherbakova, "NKVD Hostage" in **The Moscow News**, No. 35, 27 August 1993

⁷¹ Aldona Volynskaya, a former NKVD operative, described one such kidnapping: "Late at night we drove up to some house got off the truck. A German and his wife were inside the house. We offered him a paper saying that he wants to go to the USSR of his own free will, which he must sign...The officer, Melnik, was holding a pistol. The German trembles and signs. **That is the way specialists were taken to our country.**" from Irina Shcherbakova, "NKVD Hostage" in **The Moscow News**, No. 35, 27 August 1993.

that records the minutes of a meeting between Joseph Stalin and Cho En-Lai is the most revealing.

Stalin: "Concerning the proposal that both sides temporarily withhold twenty percent of the prisoners of war and that they return all of the remaining prisoners of war - the Soviet delegation will not touch this proposal and it remains in the reserve for Mao Tse-Tung."

This exchange clearly indicates that the Soviets and Chinese actively discussed the idea of holding back POWs.

As has already been discussed, these three disparate types of information do not prove that American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. However, when taken together and viewed as a whole, the information strongly suggests that the probability is high that transfers took place. But this still begs the key question, if the transfers took place, how many American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union?

Transfer of Only Thirty to Forty POWs: General Lobov's statement to a Russian journalist that possibly only thirty to forty Americans POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union seems compelling to the U.S. side. It seems unlikely to the U.S. side that thousands or hundred were transferred.

This assessment is based first on statements by people who would have been knowledgeable of the transfer. Second, it is based on a macro-analysis of the number of missing Americans.

Also a former high ranking KGB official told a U.S. Government contractor during an unofficial discussion that "the number of Americans taken to the USSR was quite small, 25 or 30 or so."⁷²

The information provided by these two men is buttressed by an analysis conducted by an U.S. government contractor who analyzed a list of 8,140 Americans missing in action from the

⁷² Paul Cole, **POW/MIA Issues: Volume 1 - The Korean War** (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 1944), p 183; the high level KGB source requested anonymity.

Korean War.⁷³ He discovered that most of the missing in action cases are really BNR [Body Not Recovered] cases. When a serviceman is listed as missing in action - body not recovered, it does not necessarily mean that the serviceman in question survived. Friends and comrades may have seen him fall and perhaps even buried him in a hasty grave. But because no remains were ever returned, the serviceman was listed as MIA-BNR.

Consequently, when he examined all 8,100 cases of American MIAs, he was able to eliminate 5,945 cases as BNR cases rather than true missing in action cases, leaving by his conclusion 2,195 cases of soldiers missing in action - body not recovered who theoretically could have gone to the Soviet Union. And no doubt, this number would be significantly smaller if one takes into consideration the lethality of the battlefield, if not Korean War era POW camps. Bombs and artillery exploding near a person cause the virtual disintegration of a soldier. Few if any distinguishable body parts can be found. As for POW camps, men died by the hundreds, victims of exposure, malnutrition, sickness, and by North Korean hands during so-called death marches to, and between, POW camps.

It is not possible to say with precision what proportion or percentage of the 2,195 missing are victims of catastrophic aircraft crashes or the nearby explosion of an artillery shell. But to the degree that recent conflicts are an indicator, the number is high.

The statements by General Lobov and the senior KGB official together with a macro-assessment of the number of Americans missing in action, strongly suggest that the number of Americans possibly sent to the Soviet Union is small, between thirty and forty. Moreover, those taken most probably were chosen for the technical expertise.

A more detailed discussion of the information passed on by various Russian citizens is provided in the following appendices. Also included in these appendices is a discussion of 262 interrogations of Americans supposedly conducted under the auspices of the Soviets as well as a discussion of the role of the Soviet security services with American POWs.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 182-183.

- Appendix A: Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko
- Appendix B: General Lieutenant Georgi Ageyevich Lobov
- Appendix C: Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov
- Appendix D: Colonel Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii
- Appendix E: Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky
- Appendix F: Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak
- Appendix G: Unraveling the Mystery of the 262 Interrogations
- Appendix H: The Soviet Security Services and American POWs

VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH TROTSENKO

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko is a sixty-seven year old pensioner and former Soviet Army sergeant. In the early 1950s when he was still in the Soviet Army, he served as an aircraft mechanic for C-47 aircraft. He was assigned to the aviation transport regiment of the 99th Airborne Division. Although the Division was based at Manziva, Chernigovka, Sergeant Trotsenko was assigned to an air base near the village of Starosyssoyevka. While not a paratrooper as such, Sergeant Trotsenko made airborne jumps.

In November 1951, while on a training exercise, Sergeant Trotsenko injured his leg. He was sent to Hospital 404 in the town of Novosyssoyevka in the Primorskiy Krai. Novosyssoyevka is a small village located near the city of Arsenyev. Hospital 404 was not an ordinary hospital. It provided above average medical care and was normally reserved for aircrew members and officers.⁷⁴

Hospital 404, according to Vladimir Trotsenko, was a very old rectangular building made of red brick. Other witnesses later clarified his recollection confirming that the red brick building had existed on the hospital grounds at the time of Trotsenko's hospitalization. This building was razed some time later. He felt certain that it was constructed prior to the Revolution of 1917. Vladimir Aleksandrovich remembered the hospital as set in a wooded area. Nearby the hospital were the railroad tracks to Arsenyev.

Because there was a shortage of space, Sergeant Trotsenko was provided with a bed in the corridor on the second floor of the hospital. (Initially Vladimir Trotsenko said the medical ward was on the second floor, but he later changed this to the third floor). His bed was next to a room that contained four Americans.

The Americans were kept in a room that was about 12 x 15 meters with a window on one end and a door at the other end. The side walls were of solid construction and did not have a door or window. However, the end with the door was really a lattice of metal bars.

⁷⁴ R 011207Z Jun 95 FM Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Task Force Russia Meeting with Vladimir Aleksandrovich Protsenko [Trotsenko]

Peering into the room, Sergeant Trotsenko could see five beds parallel to the walls. Just outside of the door was a desk behind which a guard sat. There was little sense of urgency or security. The guard was in reality a hospital staff member - an unarmed private detailed to watch the American flyers. When the guard needed to visit the restroom or eat, he would turn toward Trotsenko, whose bed was next to the room, and ask him "to keep an eye on the Americans".

Sergeant Trotsenko could see four patients in the room. Patient Number 1 had some sort of back injury. His left arm was in a plaster cast. In spite of his back injury, Patient Number 1 was ambulatory and able to speak. His bed was closest to the wall.

Trotsenko described Patient Number 1 as between 22 and 27 years of age with light color hair, blue eyes, and slender. He also had a noticeable limp. His height was approximately 1.68 to 1.7 meters.

Although unable to speak each other's language, the American still managed to communicate. Based on random words he recognized as well as gestures, Sergeant Trotsenko believes that the American was from Cleveland and had two children.⁷⁵

Patient Number 2 was in the bed directly next to Patient Number 1. He was in a prone position, on his back, unable to leave his bed. His arms were suspended in traction with padding on each side of his body to keep him from rolling to the right or left.

Endowed with a dark complexion, dark but not black hair, dark eyes, and with a height of about 1.70 meters, Patient Number 2 was heavy set with a weight of between 70 or 80 kg. He was also older - at least forty years of age.⁷⁶

As for Patient Number 3, he was in the bed next to the wall while Patient Number 4 was in the bed next to the window. Both Patients Number 3 and 4 had bandages on their faces. Patient Number 3 was about 1.68 meters in height. He showed some signs of life by moving

⁷⁵ In his 22 June 1995 testimony, Vladimir Trotsenko indicates that it was Patient Number 2 who had two children.

⁷⁶ 22 June 1995 Interview with Vladimir Trotsenko conducted by Task Force Russia members Michael Groh and Scott Fellows.

slightly. The face of Patient Number 4 was burned and most of the time he was unconscious. He was approximately 1.72 m in height.

There was a fifth American who Sergeant Trotsenko never saw. He had already died. One day, when Sergeant Trotsenko was able to get around, a hospital worker took him out to the graveyard near the hospital and showed him a grave where, the hospital orderly said, the American was buried.

Meanwhile, for the fifteen to twenty days he was in the hospital, Sergeant Trotsenko was able to observe the activity of the Americans and those that visited them.

The flyers were given excellent care. For instance, they ate the same rations as the Soviet patients. Moreover, the Americans were treated by one of the ablest doctors in the hospital - LTC Lypachev who at the time was about sixty years of age.⁷⁷

The Americans were also interrogated regularly by a lieutenant colonel and a captain. The colonel wore an air force uniform, and he arrived in an "Opel" car, i.e. a car of foreign manufacture. The captain also wore an air force uniform. During the interrogations, he served as the interrogator. He arrived at the interrogations in a ¾ ton Dodge truck.

The captain evidently spoke English, and it was he who spoke to the four flyers. The lieutenant colonel was about forty-five years old with medium to tall height - 1.72 meters.

The Americans were interrogated periodically while Trotsenko was in the hospital. The interrogations generally did not last long and Trotsenko saw no evidence of coercion.

There is one incident, however, that is prominent in Trotsenko's memory. On one occasion, the colonel came into the room, he "approached the second bed where the burnt older man was lying, and he pulled something out from under the sheet from around the neck of this patient. At first, I thought it was a cross. I did not really know what it was. It was some kind of

⁷⁷ Major Anna Lypacheva, the wife of LTC Lypachev, was an internist assigned to Trotsenko's unit.

medallion - a round medallion⁷⁸. He pulled it out, looked at it, and then stuck it back under the sheet. He went around to all of the other patients and did the same thing. He looked at the medallion on the neck of each patient. He did not make any comments or say anything. He simply looked and stuck them back under the sheet.”⁷⁹

Not long after meeting the Americans and while still a patient in the hospital, a hospital worker led Vladimir Trotsenko to a cemetery where the fifth American was buried. He remembers the hospital cemetery was only 1.5 to 2 km away from the hospital. Moreover, as he entered the cemetery, the ground rose in front of him. Trotsenko remembers this because he was still on crutches and had some difficulty walking up an incline that ran almost the entire length of the cemetery. There was, he recalls, a wooden fence, apparently constructed to keep out farm animals. The fence formed a corner with the left side running a ways down the length of the cemetery and the end side extending to the right. The grave was freshly dug in the far left corner with about 10 to 20 meters of clear ground before reaching the fence. Further identifying the location of the grave was a steep decline to the left of the grave.⁸⁰ The grave was fourth, from left to right, in a row of four graves side by side.

Is Trotsenko a Credible Witness?

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has come to the conclusion that Trotsenko is a highly credible witness. The Commission reached this conclusion after a thorough and exhaustive analysis of Mr. Trotsenko's testimony.

Mr. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko first came to the attention of the U.S. Russia - Joint Commission on 24 March 1995. During a routine visit to Khabarovsk by TFR, Anatoly

⁷⁸ Presumably this round medallion was a military dog tag or identification tag of the sort used by the U.S. Navy at the time.

⁷⁹ Testimony of Vladimir Trotsenko, Twelfth Plenary Session, U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, Joint Session/Trotsenko testimony, 28 August 1995, Moscow, Russia

⁸⁰ R 090550Z Aug 95 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: "JCSD-Moscow Trip to Novosyoyevka Cemetery, July 23 - August 2, 1995"

Follin, Director of the American Business Center in Khabarovsk, passed to the U.S. that a former Soviet Army sergeant claimed to have seen Americans in a military hospital.

Vladimir Trotsenko called the American Consulate in Vladivostok after an advertisement in a local Khabarovsk newspaper caught his eye. The U.S. placed the advertisement and asked the public to come forward with any information on American servicemen who may have been sent to the Soviet Union. Remembering his experiences forty-four years ago in the Novosysoyevka Hospital, Vladimir Trotsenko came forward. Motivated, it appears, only by a sense of public duty.

The U.S. was eager to interview Mr. Trotsenko and did so on 14 May 1995 in his home - a house that Trotsenko built himself and the very house where he raised two sons and a daughter.

Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony was so compelling that two days later on 16 May 1995, U.S. investigators visited the military hospital at Novosysoyevka. The visit only fueled more interest in Mr. Trotsenko's recollections. Consequently, on 20 May and again on 22 June 1995 Vladimir Aleksandrovich was re-interviewed.

During the first visit of the U.S. to the Novosysoyevka Military Hospital, the commander, LTC Evgeniy Nikolayevich Alsenshka, expressed some doubt about the accuracy of Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony.⁸¹ For example, LTC Alsenshka noted:

1. The Novosysoyevka Hospital while it is named Hospital Number 404 now was not so named in 1951 /1952.
2. He doubted that there had ever been lattice work or bars in the hospital since it was not a psychiatric hospital.
3. The hospital was small and unimportant and would not have been used to treat American POWs.

⁸¹ The first visit to the Novosysoyevka Hospital took place on 16 May 1995, the second on 29 June 1995, and the third, which included Mr. Trotsenko, on 26-27 July 1995. For details on the first visit see R 051140Z Apr 95 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Task Force Russia Trip to Khabarovsk March 23-24, 1995"

4. There had never been a cemetery on the hospital grounds.

These apparent contradictions in Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony were pause for some concern. The U.S. decided to return to the hospital for further investigation. Two MVD officers, Colonel Boltkov and LTC Aleksandr Mikhailovich, accompanied the U.S. during this second visit. They met with LTC Viktor Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, the acting hospital commander. The three Russian officers raised several points in refutation of Trotsenko's testimony:⁸²

1. The Novosysoyevka Hospital was built in 1936, nearly two decades after the revolution and not before the revolution as alleged by Trotsenko.
2. The hospital is "U" shaped and not a simple rectangle.
3. The hospital is not red bricked but plaster covered.
4. The cemetery used by the hospital is 4 to 5 km away with the next nearest cemetery 10-12 km from the hospital.

The criticism leveled by the Russian officers generated concern to the U.S. Yet, they still found Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony compelling. Consequently, in an effort to "get to the bottom" of the issue, the investigators decided to return to Novosysoyevka, but this time with Vladimir Trotsenko.

On Wednesday, 26 July 1995 after a forty-four year absence, Vladimir Trotsenko returned to Novosysoyevka. The experience was a revelation to both the Russians and Americans. Indeed, it was a turning point for it confirmed the acuity of Trotsenko's memory even after four and a half decades.⁸³

As the TFR team approached the hospital, Vladimir Trotsenko pointed to a spot and indicated that the path to the cemetery was there. And, indeed, it was, although it was not visible

⁸² Summary of Vladimir Trotsenko Testimony written by SSG Michael Groh, Task Force Russia, sent as e-mail message 12 July 1995.

⁸³ R 090550Z Aug 95 FM Amembassy Moscow, Subject: JCSD-Moscow Trip to Novosysoyevka Cemetery, July 23 - August 2, 1995

from the road. The path itself was overgrown and not in general use, but still clearly recognizable. Then in the company of LTC Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilkov, a local MVD officer, Trotsenko walked along the path to the cemetery - a distance of only about 2 km, not the 4 to 5 km the authorities described.

Two local residents accompanied them along the path to the cemetery. They confirmed that a fence had once existed along the left side of the cemetery and running east to west. One long time resident, Aleksei Yakovlevich Lazarenko, said not long after World War II he helped other villagers build the fence in order to keep animals out the cemetery.

Based on Trotsenko's earlier description, the grave of the alleged American and the four graves next to it were in the northern part of the cemetery. Moreover, these four graves laid north to south and not east to west as is the Russian Orthodox tradition. Once inside the boundaries of the cemetery, the U.S. found an area in the northern section which matched Trotsenko's recollections.

A long time resident of the area volunteered additional pertinent information. He stated that soldiers who died while at the hospital, who had no relatives to claim the remains, were buried in unmarked graves in the northern end of the cemetery. The area corresponded to where Trotsenko said the American was buried.⁸⁴

Next, the U.S. visited the hospital accompanied by a local policeman - Konstantin Mikhailovich Maksimov. LTC Viktor Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, the hospital commander, was hostile and argumentative. Once again, he pointed out that the hospital was stucco and not red brick. Also he maintained that two large wings extending from the main building had always been a part of the hospital, thus contradicting Trotsenko's description.

This inconsistency was resolved during a later visit to the hospital grounds by the U.S., Colonel Vasilkov, and Vladimir Trotsenko. During the visit, the group met Proskovya Fyoderovna who was working in the hospital laundry. Fyoderovna, who had lived in

⁸⁴ Aleksei Yakovlevich Lazarenko, R 090550Z Aug 95 FM Amembassy Moscow

Novosysoyevka since 1947 and had worked in the hospital since 1957, stated that there had previously existed a red brick building on the hospital grounds. This building was separate from the main hospital building and contained a barakamero⁸⁵ and vertushka.⁸⁶ She remembered these facts because as a young woman she had seen how the pilots were spun around in the vertushka.⁸⁷ Fyoderovna's earlier testimony is highly suggestive.⁸⁸ It is unclear why she later wavered in her testimony. Whether she felt pressure to do so from Popov's presence or whether she honestly changed her mind, is not clear. But even Popov's recollections do not contradict the fact that there may have been a barekamera on the hospital grounds in the early 1950s. The barekamera that Popov worked at was not installed until 1956.

In addition to interviews with Fedorova and Popov, the U.S. team was given a guided tour of the hospital. The U.S. investigators noticed several other interesting items:

- In places where the exterior stucco had fallen away, it was clear the building was made of red brick.
- The manner in which the exterior walls were joined, i.e. not interlaced and uneven suggests that wings were added later.

⁸⁵ A **barekamero** is a pressure chamber used to familiarize pilots with the various effects of pressure changes.

⁸⁶ A **vertushka** is a large wheel in which a person is spun to experience different "G" forces.

⁸⁷ R 3411308Z Oct 95 FM Amembassy Moscow, Subject: Joint Commission Expedition to Novosysoyevka Cemetery, 23 - 26 October 1995

⁸⁸ In March 1996, Joint Commission investigators interviewed Vasily Ivanovich Popov. In 1956 he installed and operated a barekamera on the grounds of Military Hospital 404. According to Popov, the barekamera he helped install - model SBK 48 - was placed in a wooden building and not a brick one. Later when Proskovye Fyoderovna was re-interviewed in the presence of Vasily Popov, she agreed that the barekamera was housed in a wooden building. When asked about her earlier testimony that it was in a brick building, she said she must have been wrong because "Popov worked there and he should know." R 121104Z Apr 96 FM Amembassy Moscow

The U.S. met with Mikhail Ivanovich Vasechko, a retired driver at the hospital. He started work at the Novosyssoyevka Hospital in 1942 and worked there until his retirement. He pointed out that during World War II the hospital was called 307 Military Hospital, but after the war was changed to 404 Military Hospital - the number that Trotsenko remembers it as.

Next, through the good graces of Colonel Vladimir Giorgiovich Raduzin, Deputy Chief of Correctional Affairs, U.S. investigators were able to meet with Colonel Aleksandr Pavlovich Lavrentsov, a KGB (now SVR) official who had been helpful to the U.S. in the past.

While interviewing Colonel Lavrentsov, U.S. investigators mentioned that Trotsenko said that the colonel who interrogated the Americans drove a German Opel. Colonel Lavrentsov responded that after World War II many German cars were confiscated and distributed to MGB and MVD officers for their use.⁸⁹

On 27 July 1995, the last day before returning to Moscow, the U.S. members, Vladimir Trotsenko, and LTC Vasilkov returned to the cemetery for one last look. They came to a mutual agreement that the most likely spot for the American's grave is an unmarked grave in the northwest corner of the cemetery, near where the old fence once stood and with three other graves that lay in a north to south manner.

What Were The Results?

The trip to Novosyssoyevka was revealing. Doubt about the veracity and accuracy of Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony disappeared. Even local Russian authorities who had viewed Trotsenko with great skepticism seemed convinced as to the authenticity of his recollections.

As a result of this trip, the following became clear to all sides:

1. Trotsenko's description of the cemetery with a wooden fence, a handful of graves lying north to south, and a short path leading to the cemetery was confirmed.
2. The existence of a "red brick" building with a barekamera in which Trotsenko saw the four Americans was confirmed on the fourth visit to the hospital grounds.

⁸⁹ R 090550Z Aug 95 FM Amembassy Moscow

3. Trotsenko's description of the hospital in 1951 as a three story, red brick, rectangular hospital was confirmed.
4. Trotsenko's recollection of the German "Opel" driven by one of the interrogators was confirmed.

Other aspects of Trotsenko's testimony have been confirmed by other sources. For example, Trotsenko recounted how a Soviet colonel, "...pulled something out from under the sheet from around the neck of this patient...some kind of medallion - a round medallion." Clearly this was a dog tag or military identification tag.⁹⁰ Yet, the description of it as a round medallion was confusing. We believed that American dog tags were rectangular. However, the U.S. Navy Artifacts Historian revealed that from 1940 until approximately 1956, the U.S. Navy employed round dog tags.

Russian Response

On Monday, 28 August 1995, Vladimir Trotsenko addressed a general session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs. His testimony was moving and convincing. The Russians made no serious attempt to discredit Trotsenko. Colonel Semin from the National Archives of the Ministry of Defense, however, did point out that a review of the admission records for Hospital 404 indicated that Sergeant Trotsenko was a patient there from 24 March to 4 May 1951 and not in the October/November 1951 time frame.

At the end of the 12th Plenum in his closing remarks, General Volkogonov summed up the Russian position when he publicly stated, "I agree with the remarks of Ambassador Toon that the witness Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko is the first witness who displays a sufficient degree of reliability and honesty."⁹¹

Subsequent Trips

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Closing Remarks - Plenary Session, 12th Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, 30 August 1995, Moscow, Russia

In an effort to find the grave that reputedly contained the remains of the fifth American, the Joint Commission sent a team of American and Russian investigators out to Novosysoyevka Cemetery for the period 24 - 26 October 1995.

Working together, American and Russian soldiers commenced digging the first of three pits in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery on 24 October. Despite the use of modern anthropological methods the digging was slow and uneventful. Then, towards the end of the day in an effort to square off the left corner of the pit, one American jumped into the pit. As his boots hit the ground of the pit, they made an odd sound. The other soldiers noticed this and asked him to jump to the right side of the pit. It then became apparent to everyone that the sounds were different. Something was under the dirt in the left corner of the pit.

The next morning the excavation continued. It was soon apparent that the odd sound was caused by a coffin under the dirt. Further digging uncovered a coffin, but it was not lying north-south as expected, but east-west. The excavation continued in such a manner that any graves oriented north-south would have been revealed.⁹²

Nevertheless, Russian and American forensic specialists opened the coffin. With respect and care, they examined the remains. Based on an analysis of the overall condition of the teeth, it was clear to both countries' specialists that these were not the remains of an American. Moreover, the lay of the grave substantiated the conclusion that this was not the area Trotsenko remembered.

The forensic specialists replaced the remains and decided to halt the operation for the present time. Both the Russians and Americans agreed to seek additional information that would help any future excavation teams to more precisely locate the graves described by Trotsenko.

⁹² R 311308Z Oct 95 Fm Amembassy Moscow

Then a few months later, 17 March - 3 April 1996, the Joint Commission sent out another team of Russian and American investigators. This time the team came with a ground radar set provided by CILHI.⁹³

As a result of the efforts of the Joint Russian-American team using the ground radar, two graves buried in a north-south configuration and a third grave which lay in an east-west configuration were uncovered.

Of the two graves oriented north-south, according to the CILHI anthropologist on the scene, one contained the remains of an Asian. These remains were returned to the grave. The second set was identified as probably the remains of a Caucasian male. The teeth of this unidentified male did not match the dental records of any of the missing crew members of a 6 November 1951 Navy P2V shot down by the Soviets. Nevertheless, with Russian permission, a small bone sample was taken for possible DNA testing. The remains were re-buried and their location carefully noted.

Although the remains of the American reputedly buried in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery could not be located, the U.S. side of the Joint Commission still places much credibility in Vladimir Trotsenko's recollections. The focus of the U.S. side of the Commission has changed from trying to find the one set of remains said to be in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery to a search for clues on the names and fates of the four men seen alive in Military Hospital 404.

Conclusions

There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the testimony of Vladimir Trotsenko:

- Vladimir Trotsenko quite probably saw four American servicemen in the Novosysoyevka Hospital in 1951.
- These four American servicemen did not return to U.S. military control.

⁹³ Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii - a U.S. Army laboratory dedicated to retrieving and identifying remains.

While Trotsenko's testimony requires verification, similar testimony from other witnesses reinforces his credibility and the possibility that American servicemen were held in the Soviet Union during the Korean War. The U.S. will continue to investigate these allegations.

GENERAL LIEUTENANT GEORGI AGEYEVICH LOBOV

General Lieutenant Georgi Lobov was the commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps in China/North Korea during the Korean War. As such, General Lobov was the senior Soviet unit commander in the Theater of Operations. Only Generals Krasovsky, Razuvaev, and Shtykov were more senior.

From October 1951 until the end of 1952, General Lobov commanded the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. It was an enormous command encompassing virtually all the Soviet troops engaged in combat operations in the Korean Peninsula.⁹⁴ The 64th Fighter Aviation Corps included not only air divisions but anti-aircraft and search light divisions as well. It reached its peak strength with 26,000 personnel in 1952.⁹⁵

Given the political sensitivities surrounding Soviet involvement in the Korean War, the commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps did not answer to the normal military chain of command. General Lobov stated it succinctly, "I took my orders directly from Moscow."⁹⁶

Below is an extract of an interview conducted with Lobov. It contains that portion of the interview where Lobov discusses the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. General Lobov's seniority, access, and unique command position gave him insight into virtually all aspects of the war - military operations, intelligence operations, military-civilian relations, etc. Little went on in the Korean theater of operations that Lobov was not aware of.

Unfortunately, General Lobov passed away a few years ago. However, before his death in February 1992, he consented to an interview. The person who interviewed him is a native

⁹⁴ S. Ruban, "Sovetskie letchiki v nebe korei" This is a short, informal history of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps in Korea written by a Russian archival official.

⁹⁵ Yefim Gordon and Vladimir Rigmant, **MiG-15: Design, Development, and Korean War Combat History** (Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International Publishers & Wholesalers, 1993), p. 120.

⁹⁶ Jon Halliday, "Secret War of the Top Guns" in **The Observer** [London], unknown date.

speaker of Russian and a Russian citizen - Igor Morozov. In 1995, Mr. Morozov provided by the U.S. with a transcript of his interview with the General.

During the interview, the General discussed the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union:

Question: Were not one-half of the (American) prisoners transferred to Soviet territory?

General Lobov: I don't have any accurate information about POWs. But I can testify to the following; I know that in summer 1952 at least 30-40 American POWs were placed in a separate and closely guarded carriage, attached to a goods train, and sent to the USSR. The most 'valuable goods' on this train was the American pilot of Russian origin Colonel Mahurin - he was a wing commander in the USAF, and by Soviet standards a 'wing' amounts almost to a division. I know that Mahurin agreed to work with our intelligence people, and he helped us a lot. In particular, he explained details of the 'Sabre', which we were greatly interested in at the time. We have to presume that the other 30-40 prisoners were also of some value to our intelligence. They must have been a treasure-trove. I imagine that it was specifically from these people that the GRU's remarkable knowledge of our adversary came. If necessary, I could request from Moscow information on any squadron and that information would be supplied immediately. Furthermore, it was surprisingly detailed - right down to what brand of whisky the commander of the squadron preferred, and even what sort of women he preferred - blondes or brunettes. Incidentally, I know that it was accurate information of this sort, gathered from these Americans held on Soviet territory, which in 1951 helped us seize a Sikorsky helicopter from the Americans. This was something Moscow was extremely interested in at the time. You have to guess that this helicopter helped our military-industrial complex greatly in producing our own Soviet military helicopter.

That is what I know for certain. As regards the subsequent fate of those 30-40 Americans, I, like yourself, can only guess..."

Given the political sensitivity of General Lobov's statement, it is not surprising that controversy surrounds this statement.

Igor Morozov, the Russian journalist who interviewed General Lobov, did not tape record nor video tape the interview. Instead, he took detailed notes, and then went back to his office where he wrote up the interview. Once he reconstructed the interview, he failed, however, to obtain Lobov's signature on the transcript verifying the accuracy and authenticity of the interview.

For several years the Lobov interview lay in Morozov's files. Then in 1994, the prestigious Russian newspaper *Komsomolskaia Pravda* published a long article by Igor Morozov on the Korean War.⁹⁷ A close reading of Morozov's article in *Komsomolskaia Pravda* shows that it follows point-by-point the transcript of the Lobov interview. Indeed, the article follows in the same order the issues that Lobov discussed in his interview. First, he describes the size of his command, then the number of American aircraft shot down, next the merits of the MiG-15, the POWs issue, background political issues, etc. Often quotes are taken directly from the transcript.

However, when the POW issue is addressed, the article departs from the Lobov transcript. Rather than quoting directly that "at least 30-40 American POWs were ... sent to the USSR", the article takes a speculative turn. After noting the ability of the GRU to provide details on such matters as the type of whiskey that American squadron commanders' drank or their preference for blonde or brunette women, the article suggests:

"Even if there would have been in the American Army on the Korean Peninsula hundreds of intelligence agents at work (and it is agreed that there is little probability of this) - even then to collect such detailed and exhaustive formation for us it would have been hardly possible. In such a case there remains one plausible explanation as to how the Soviet GRU was so well-informed about the enemy - information this complete could only be received from tens or hundreds of American POWs already on the territory of the

⁹⁷ Igor' Morozov, "Koreiskii poluostrov: skhvatka vnich'iu" in **Komsomolskaia Pravda**, 16 July 1994, p. 4

Union. By the way, we repeat - this is above all only a hypothesis which demands documentary evidence.”

This passage is very revealing for two reasons. First, the editors of the Komsomolskaia Pravda, a respected newspaper not known for sensationalism or yellow-journalism, obviously found Morozov’s interview of Lobov credible otherwise they would have rejected the article for publication.

Second, the Komsomolskaia Pravda article closely followed the form and content of the original Morozov transcript of the interview. The only deviation from this pattern is when the article addresses the POW/MIA issue. No doubt realizing the political sensitivity of the issue, the editors dropped General Lobov’s statement “at least 30-40 American POWs were...sent to the USSR.” In its stead, the editors replaced Lobov’s direct statement with a more speculative one, that perhaps “tens or hundreds of American POWs (were) already on the territory of the Soviet Union.”

As a consequence of these two factors, the U.S. side of the KWWG believes that the interview with General Lobov accurately reflects what the General knew to be the case, i.e. the Soviets indeed sent some American POWs from Korea to the Soviet Union.

COLONEL GAVRIL IVANOVICH KOROTKOV

Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov is a retired senior Soviet military officer who, while serving in the Soviet Far East, helped collect intelligence on the morale of U.S. servicemen.

In the first of several interviews with U.S. investigators, Colonel Korotkov related how he had interrogated two American POWs in Khabarovsk during the Korean War. He also discussed the system whereby American POWs would be screened in North Korea and selected for further interrogation in the Soviet Union.⁹⁸ Later suggesting he had been pressured by Russian authorities, Colonel Korotkov retracted some of his earlier statements. However, the central core of his testimony remains consistent, i.e. Americans were interrogated by Soviets and some were taken to the former Soviet Union.

Gavril Korotkov is a soldier-scholar, a man who has dedicated much of his career to Far Eastern issues. He has served as a staff member at the Institute U.S. and Canada, Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and is currently at the Ministry of Defense's Scientific Research Institute.

He was first introduced to Far Eastern affairs in 1950 upon his graduation from Institute of Foreign Languages. As a young lieutenant, he was assigned to the Special Analytical Group of the General Staff reporting to Marshall Rodion Yakovlovich Malinovskiy, then the Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. Lieutenant Korotkov was a psychological warfare officer.

Lieutenant Korotkov's responsibility at the time was analyzing the morale of American fighting men. But such analysis required intelligence on the values, perceptions, and concerns of American military men and such data was not readily available. Consequently, Korotkov and his colleagues were eager to interrogate American POWs in order to learn first hand the answers to these vital questions.

⁹⁸ R 241259A August 1992 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA Team Interview with Colonel Korotkov

Colonel Korotkov asserts that Soviet military specialists were given permission to conduct interrogations of American POWs. However, these interrogations were conducted in a covert manner. The Soviet interrogator, for example, would wear a Chinese military uniform. The Soviets were concerned that open, blatant interrogation of Americans would reveal the level of their involvement in the Korean War.

While some interrogations of Americans by Soviet officials did take place, the Russians maintain that such interrogations were prohibited. To stress this point, the Russian side of the commission has produced several directives signed by senior Soviet officials expressly forbidding the interrogation of Americans. Nonetheless, Colonel Korotkov remains firm in his statement that the Soviets routinely conducted interrogations of Americans.

Korotkov described an interrogation system that resembles medical triage methods. The first stage took place in North Korea. Newly captured Americans would be interrogated. Those deemed of value due to their technical skills and knowledge would be tagged for further interrogation in the Soviet Union. Second stage interrogations usually took place in the Soviet Union. Apparently, during this stage, technical experts would question the Americans in an effort to obtain the most detailed information possible.

Those Americans selected for interrogation in the Soviet Union would normally be sent to the Soviet naval base at Pos'yet⁹⁹. From there, they would be flown to Khabarovsk, where the second stage interrogations took place.

The NKVD, forerunner of the KGB, maintained control over the American POWs sent to the Soviet Union. Generally the Soviet military interrogators had only a few hours with the Americans, but on occasion they had several days in which to interrogate the POWs. After interrogation, the NKVD would spirit them away to some unknown destination. From this point on, Gavril Korotkov had no further knowledge of the fate of these American servicemen.

⁹⁹ The Pos'yet Naval Base is located in the Soviet Union near the tri-border region [China, North Korea, and the USSR].

Colonel Korotkov stated clearly in his first interview with the U.S. that he personally interrogated two Americans in Khabarovsk. He can not remember precisely the names of the two men. However, he recalls that one was an Army officer from the 24th Infantry Division.

In a subsequent interview, Colonel Korotkov described the interrogation point as a pre-detention facility or "KPZ".¹⁰⁰ He would arrive in the morning and the prisoner who was to be interrogated would already be there. He never saw any Korean or Chinese guards, just Soviet Border Guards. Gavril Korotkov does remember seeing, however, one female North Korean interrogator at the facility.

Once they completed the interrogation of a POW, a report would be written and sent on to Far East Military District Headquarters. Another copy was also sent to Moscow and to the Main Political Administration's Seventh Directorate. The reports from the technical group were sent through GRU channels to Moscow.

Based on the information he obtained from the interrogation of American POWs, Gavril Korotkov wrote a Psychological Operation (PSYOP) study entitled "Morale of U.S. Service Men in Korea". This analytical work outlined the psychological vulnerabilities of American fighting men and served as a guide to Soviet psychological warfare specialists in the field.

Visit From the Security Services

On 29 September 1992, several members from the U.S. side re-interviewed Colonel Korotkov. The interview was held at the old Central Committee building - Ilyinka 12.

At the very start of the meeting for all to hear, Colonel Korotkov recounted a late night visit to his apartment the night before. The visitor came to discuss Korotkov's forthcoming testimony. What was said is unknown, but he behaved in such a manner, Korotkov said, as to leave one with the impression he was from the "special services", a Russian euphemism for secret police.

¹⁰⁰ In Russian *kamera predvoritel'nogo zaklyucheniya*

Korotkov was raised under the old repressive Communist system which was characterized by late night police visitations. Such a visit by a man who comported himself in the "old manner", must have been a source of concern.

By mention of this visit, Colonel Korotkov put the Commission on notice. Henceforth, his subsequent testimony became tentative, contradictory, and more equivocal. For example, he now said that American POWs were not held in Kharbarovsk, contradicting what he had said earlier. Rather, the Americans were held in a mountainous area near where the borders of the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China meet.¹⁰¹ He could not definitely identify the country because no border marking were present. However, he suspected that it was in North Korea, or, perhaps, in an unclaimed zone. He also now claimed that he had been in North Korea whereas earlier he said he had not.

Had Colonel Korotkov simply retracted his earlier statements or amended them consistently, then his subsequent testimony would have been less troublesome, more understandable. But after saying in September 1992 that no Americans were taken to Khabarovsk and implying that none were sent to the Soviet Union, he contradicted himself eighteen months later. In another interview, Korotkov stated, "Yes, I think I knew then and state now that part of these (American) POWs, a certain group of them, of course, found themselves in the Soviet Union."¹⁰²

Then less than a month later, Gavril Korotkov appeared before a plenary session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission in Moscow. And he again changed the tenor of his testimony.

"In June 1950, I was sent to the Far East for service, to the headquarters of the military district...You should know, that I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war...There were rumors to the effect that prisoners, who could have been Americans, and who could have been taken to the USSR, were captured. But I never saw them. These were just

¹⁰¹ R 261132Z Oct 92 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Follow-up Interview with Colonel Gavril Korotkov

¹⁰² BBC interview May 1994

rumors...I can say it again. I never saw Americans taken to the Soviet Union. I saw U.S. prisoners of war in China and Korea.”¹⁰³

Then a month later, in an interview with a South Korean newspaper, Gavril Korotkov, again reversing himself, is quoted as saying that many South Korean and American captives (from the Korean War) were sent to POW camps in the Soviet Union and China, with many of the South Koreans going to camps in Soviet Central Asia.¹⁰⁴

Conclusions

The critics point to these contradictions in Korotkov’s testimony as evidence that he is an unreliable and unstable witness. Furthermore, Korotkov can not provide documentary evidence to support his earlier statements. Much of what he purports to know is based on hearsay.

Indeed, these are valid criticisms. It is, however, quite possible that many of the shifts in testimony by Korotkov can be traced to real or imagined intimidation by authorities, especially when he was requested to testify before official bodies. Nevertheless, Colonel Korotkov has stated and restated when not in official venues that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union.

¹⁰³ 9th Plenary Session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission, 1 June 1994

¹⁰⁴ "Many ROK Prisoners of War Reportedly Sent to Central Asia", R 221237Z Jul 94 Fm FBIS Seoul KOR

COLONEL PAVEL GRIGOREVICH DERZSKII

In September 1993, U.S. team members visited the Kiev War Museum to take photographs of captured American war equipment. While there, museum officials suggested they contact a Colonel Derzskii, a World War II and Korean War veteran.

Consequently, on 17 September 1993, the U.S. interviewed Colonel Derzskii in his small Kiev apartment. He revealed to the U.S. investigators that he helped arrange the transfer of American fliers from Korea through China to the Soviet Union during the Korean war.¹⁰⁵

Colonel Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii is an old man now - born before the First World War in December 1913. He had a long and distinguished military career.

Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii graduated from the Kiev Infantry School in 1934 and went on to serve in the Soviet Army through World War II and the Korean War leaving military service only in mid-1957. During the Second World War he served with Terenty Famich Shtykov - then a Soviet general officer. Shtykov was a rising star in both military and party circles.

In 1950 Shtykov was both a general-colonel and ambassador to North Korea. More importantly, he was Stalin's trusted advisor and his eyes and ears in Korea. As Shtykov was Stalin's trusted advisor, Derzskii was Shtykov's trusted advisor. Colonel Derzskii summarized his relationship with General Shtykov as, "He trusted me completely. He didn't trust anyone else. He felt he could trust me and tell me everything that he couldn't tell anyone else."¹⁰⁶

For reasons that still are not clear, whether it was Shtykov's intervention or just the caprice of Soviet military bureaucracy, Colonel Derzskii in early 1949 found himself and his family in a GRU villa near Moscow - held virtually incommunicado. Then in March 1949, he

¹⁰⁵ R 271401Z September 1993 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Trip to Kiev, 14-18 September 1993

¹⁰⁶ Transcript September 1993 Interview with Colonel Derzskii

received orders to report to North Korea and to the chief of staff of the 4th Infantry Division.¹⁰⁷ His family, meanwhile, moved to a settlement in China not far from the Korean border.

One of Colonel Derzskii's first duties was to write the Operations Order (OPORD) for the 4th Division's role in the attack on South Korea. It was an act that Derzskii considered shameful, but one he executed nonetheless. Later, he encouraged an aide to provide a copy to U.N. officials in order to unmask the Soviet Union's dishonesty in the war. As a consequence, Colonel Derzskii was denied a promotion to general and transferred to lesser duties.

In the course of several interviews with Colonel Derzskii, he made three points. First, he helped arrange the transfer of a captured U.N. intelligence agent to the Soviet Union. Next, he said there was a standing order to send all captured F-84 pilots, later changed to all pilots, to the Soviet Union. Third, and finally, he said he helped arrange the transfer of General Dean, the captured commander of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Derzskii was unable to provide many details on the U.N. intelligence agent other than his name being Andreiko. Derzskii was not certain of the intelligence agent's nationality, but believed he was either British or American. Andreiko was captured in Seoul in June of 1950. Based on the nature and number of documents found on Andreiko, the Soviets were convinced he was a "rezident" or senior agent.

The NKVD, forerunner of the KGB, was deeply interested in Andreiko and ordered that he be sent to the Soviet Union. Colonel Derzskii appointed another colonel - a political officer named Colonel Nikolaev - to accompany Andreiko to the Korean/Soviet border. There, in Derzskii's words, "He was taken to the Soviet Union. He was taken to the border, met there, and taken to the Soviet Union."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ It should be noted that there is some uncertainty over exactly what dates Colonel Derzskii served in Korea. In his first interview he gave the dates 1950 to 1951. In a second interview he said he served in Korea from March 1949 to June 1951. When this apparent contradiction was pointed out to him, Colonel Derzskii replied, "Yes. I wanted to be more accurate."

¹⁰⁸ Transcript September 1993 Interview with Colonel Derzskii

In his several interviews with U.S. staffers, Colonel Derzskii noted that there were standing orders to send captured pilots to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Derzskii made this point several times. On each occasion, however, he varied the story somewhat. During his first interview, he said the GRU ordered all captured F-84 pilots be brought to the Soviet Union. Later, he said the orders were to send "all pilots". This time, however, he attributed the order to the General Staff, but said it was General Shtykov who told him personally of this directive.

In spite of the apparent contradictions in Derzskii's recollections, much of it tracks with what is already known, especially when viewed in a broader context. For example, at one point Derzskii said that the GRU ordered that pilots be sent to the Soviet Union. Later he says the General Staff issued the order. However, it is important to note that technically the GRU is part of the General Staff. It is the intelligence support apparatus in direct support of the General Staff.

Colonel Derzskii originally said that all captured F-84 pilots were ordered sent to the Soviet Union. He made this statement, however, in the broader context of a discussion of the GRU's desire to capture an intact F-84. At a later interview, he broadened the statement to include all pilots.

There is no doubt that during the Korean War the Soviets wanted to capture a high performance American jet. It is, however, unlikely that they wanted a F-84 since it was a ground attack aircraft rather than an high performance air superiority fighter. While modern, the technology of the F-84s was not the most sophisticated. The Soviets wanted an F-86, then the top-of-the-line fighter in the American inventory.

In an effort to capture an intact F-86, the Soviets formed a special group under LTG A. Blagoveshchensky. Composed of test pilots and other elite pilots, the so-called Blagoveshchensky Group had the unenviable mission of forcing an F-86 to land at a Soviet controlled airfield.¹⁰⁹ They were not successful.

¹⁰⁹ Yefim Gordon and Vladimir Rigmant, **MiG-15: Design, Development, and Korean War Combat History** (Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International Publishers and Wholesalers, 1993), p. 113.

Colonel Derzskii does relate the capture of an "F-84".¹¹⁰ When returning from a visit with his family in China, he saw a plane make a forced landing in a rice paddy not far from the road on which he was traveling. Initially, he thought it was a Soviet plane, but upon reaching the site, he realized that it was an American aircraft. Derzskii immediately sent his interpreter to call Colonel General Shtykov with the news. Then together with his driver, he helped the American pilot out of his aircraft and administered first aid to him.¹¹¹

The interpreter returned a short while later with instructions from General Shtykov. They were to stand by and wait for a truck to transport the plane to place where it could be examined more safely. Also, Soviet specialists from Andung would escort the pilot to an undetermined location. Later, a truck showed up and took the aircraft and pilot away.

This aircraft was most likely the same F-86 taken to Moscow where Pavel Antonovich Koval'skii and three other engineers at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute disassembled the aircraft. The key components of the F-86 were dispatched to the relevant engineering institutes so that they could be studied in detail. Meanwhile, Pavel Koval'skii and his associates took apart the aircraft and produced detailed drawings so that a similar aircraft could be reconstructed.¹¹²

The fact that Colonel Derzskii confuses an F-84 with an F-86 is the result of his advanced years, lack of technical expertise, and the passage of more than four and a half decades. He is correct on the central issue: the Soviets wanted to capture a high performance jet fighter in order to study its advanced engineering capabilities.

¹¹⁰ Colonel Derzskii has described this aircraft as both an F-84 and later an F-86. In his September 1993 interview, he said it was "an F-84, this I remember." Then in early 1994 he said it was an F-86 because General Shtykov told him it was.

¹¹¹ R 240820Z Mar 94 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Re-interview of Colonel (Ret) Derzskii

¹¹² Minutes of the 9th Plenary Session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, 1 June 1994

While the F-86 was clearly evacuated to the Soviet Union, the fate of the pilot is less certain. When asked whether higher headquarters in the Soviet Far East ordered the pilot sent to the Soviet Union, Colonel Derzskii replied, "Yes, (we were ordered) to send the pilot to China and to the Soviet Union".

Derzskii recounts that direct orders to "transfer American pilots to China for further travel to Moscow" were conveyed to him by two very senior General Staff officers who had come to Korea to review the military situation. One used the cover name Pavlov. In reality, he was General Pavlovskii, future Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. The other man used the cover name of Matveyev, but in reality was Army General Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.¹¹³

In the course of several interviews, Colonel Derzskii stated that he believed approximately 100 American were taken to China and another thirty or so taken to the Soviet Union. It should be noted, however, in all of these events, Colonel Derzskii had "knowledge of" transfers of American POWs, but he did not directly witness the events. As befits a senior officer, he directed subordinates such as Colonel Nikolaev to actually conduct the transfers.

Colonel Derzskii is steadfast in his insistence that Major General William F. Dean, commander of the U.S. Army's 24th Infantry Division, following his capture was sent to the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴ General Dean was a distinguished and courageous American fighting man. He was captured early in the war during the first desperate weeks of fighting when he went forward to set the example and to rally the soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division. Major General Dean was repatriated and at no time did he state that he went to the Soviet Union.

¹¹³ Colonel Derzskii said in his first interview that "Matveyev" was in reality General Maximov. Derskii, however, recounted his story from memory. He did not have access to notes. A scholar with recent access to the archives revealed more details behind the surprise visit of the Soviet delegation to Korea. See Alexander Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the War Sept 16- Oct 15 1950, New Evidence From the Archives" from paper delivered to the Cold War History Project, Washington, DC, 13 December 1995.

¹¹⁴ Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich (Kil-Yong) Pak, a Korean/Soviet and former deputy to Kim Il Sung in a recent interview stated that the North Koreans tried to convince General Dean to make propaganda broadcasts against the UN, but he refused to do so.

Colonel Derzskii recounts his efforts to interrogate General Dean under the guise of a Red Star reporter. But General Dean recognized Derzskii from an earlier pre-war encounter, and the interrogation came to an abrupt end. A short time later General Shtykov told Derzskii to arrange for General Dean's transfer to the Soviet Union.

Derzskii, who was, no doubt, busy with affairs at the front, instructed Colonel Nikolaev to carry out the transfer of General Dean. This is the same Colonel Nikolaev who arranged the transfer of the intelligence agent Andreiko. Of course, Colonel Nikolaev complied with his orders. When he returned from his mission, he described to Derzskii in some detail how the transfer of General Dean was actually conducted.

According to Colonel Derzskii, Nikolaev escorted the General to a bridge that spanned the Soviet/Chinese border. There he was met by several Soviet generals with vehicles. They took control of General Dean and delivered him to a nearby airport for further transportation within the Soviet Union. From this point on both Derzskii and Nikolaev washed their hands of General Dean.

Conclusions

Colonel Pavel Derzskii enjoyed a unique position during the Korean War. He was a senior officer, entrusted with important state secrets. Moreover, he was a close advisor to Colonel General Shtykov, then Ambassador to North Korea and de facto governor-general of the region.

As a consequence, Colonel Derzskii was informed of much that went on in North Korea. This is especially true given that he was a close and trusted associate of the Soviet Ambassador - Colonel General Shtykov. But also, as befits a senior officer, Colonel Derzskii instructed other, more junior officers to carry out orders.

Consequently, much of what Colonel Derzskii related to U.S. investigators is "hearsay evidence". Moreover, it is possible to point to the lack of documentary evidence to support Derzskii's assertions. And, there are errors in the various months and dates that Colonel Derzskii cites.

In spite of this, we find the testimony of Colonel Derzskii to be highly credible. This is not to say that we accept all aspects of his testimony. We are reluctant, for example, to accept his recollections on General Dean. Nevertheless, he is very convincing. Colonel Derzskii is not, for instance, the only former Soviet military officer to come forward with recollections of transfers of American POWs - at least three other retired Soviet officers have done so as well. Moreover, details such as the capture of the F-86 - which he first related to U.S. investigators in 1993 - have since been confirmed.

NIKOLAI DMITRIYEVICH KAZERSKY

Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky is a veteran of the Second World War. He was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner as well as numerous other decorations. In 1950, he was arrested on felony charges, convicted, and sentenced to twenty years in the gulag.¹¹⁵

In the fall of 1952 or spring of 1953, while serving time in the Zimka Camp, he had a single encounter with an American pilot whose plane had been badly shot up over North Korea and forced to land in the Soviet Union near Vladivostok. The American pilot told Kazersky that his plane had a crew of three.

The Zimka Camp was an appropriate place to "hide" American POWs. Located in a desolate portion of Siberia on the Veslyana River, it was far from civilization and other population points. It was a work camp. And the American worked in the Consumer Goods Section making frames for greenhouses. The discipline was strict and it was hard for inmates to mix and talk with other inmates.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, Nikolai Kazersky had one fleeting opportunity to meet with the American pilot. The pilot had been in isolation for a year or more and had learned little Russian, and Kazersky knew little English. Yet they managed to communicate.

The pilot told him that there were two other crew members from the plane. His radioman had been at Zimka with him, but the American pilot thought the radioman had been transferred to another camp - named "Yaser". As for the other crew member, the American pilot had no idea what fate had befallen him. The American also told Kazersky that he was from California.

According to Nikolai Kazersky, the American pilot remained at the Zimka Camp for three to six months and then was transferred to another, unknown camp.

¹¹⁵ Nikolai Kazersky was released after four and a half years upon receiving an amnesty following the death of Stalin.

¹¹⁶ R 301715Z Oct 92 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview with Nikolay Dmitriyevich Kazersky

In spite of the passage of many years, Kazersky was able to provide a description of the American pilot. He was about thirty years of age at the time. He was approximately 5' 7" tall, slender, with dark hair and complexion. Unlike most Soviets, he did not smoke. Kazersky remembers that the American had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks. He was, Kazersky believes, of Southern European ethnic extraction, possibly Greek or Italian.

Task Force Russia provided Nikolai Kazersky's description of the American to the Air Force Casualty Office. After a computer search, Air Force Casualty concluded LT Mooradian came the closest to fitting the description for several reasons:

1. LT Mooradian's shootdown date (23 October 1951) would place him in the time frame such that he could have been sent to Zimka at the same time as Kazersky.
2. LT Mooradian fit the physical description to include a round scar on one cheek.
3. LT Mooradian was Armenian with the typical the dark hair and dark complexion associated with that ethnic group.
4. LT Mooradian came from California.

There were only a few minor points that did not match with the information Kazersky provided to TFR:

1. LT Mooradian aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea on the opposite side of the Korean Peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. LT Mooradian was a bombardier and not a pilot.
3. LT Mooradian crew had thirteen members and not three.

On 17 December 1992, Nikolai Kazersky was shown sixteen photographs of American airmen who had disappeared during the Korean War. After reviewing all the photos, Kazersky chose three that he thought looked like the American he met in the gulag. LT Mooradian picture was among them.

Conclusions

There are numerous people who claim to have seen American POWs in the Soviet gulag. Nikolai Kazersky is one of those who said he saw Americans. The details of his description, moreover, increase the plausibility of his testimony. Unfortunately, it is not possible to be certain that the man Kazersky saw in the gulag was in fact LT Mooradian although his identification of LT Mooradian photograph is highly suggestive.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Unfortunately the U.S. investigators did not use the most scientifically valid methods. Nikolai Kazersky should have been shown more and varied photographs rather than being asked to choose from a pool of only sixteen. The scientific validity of the identification would have been increased significantly.

DR. VALENTIN KONSTANTINOVICH (KIL-YONG) PAK

Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak is a Moscow pensioner. An ethnic Korean, but of Soviet, now Russian citizenship, Dr. Pak was drafted into the Soviet Army during World War II. In 1945 he accompanied the Soviet Army into Manchuria and Korea. He then served in the Soviet occupation forces in Korea until 1948. He was next ordered to demobilize and to become a North Korean citizen. As a good communist, he followed orders.

While in Pyongyang, Valentin Pak became a trusted deputy to Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea. He soon became First Deputy Foreign Minister, the second highest post in the North Korean Foreign Ministry. During this time, he became privy to many of the secrets of the then nascent North Korean government. And, indeed, Pak knew about or participated in many of the most important policy decisions made in North Korea at the time.

Near the end of the Korean War, he left Pyongyang to serve as North Korean Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and then to East Germany. He returned to Moscow in the early 1960s to attend the Higher Party School. By that time, he had fallen out of favor with Kim Il Sung and he chose to remain in Moscow.

Dr. Pak was interviewed recently in his Moscow apartment.¹¹⁸ He said he was told by a Chinese foreign service officer named LU (NFI) that American POWs were sent through China to the Soviet Union. In an earlier interview, he was less specific but did say he heard rumors during the Korean War that the Chinese took their POWs to a camp in Mongolia and then sometimes the Chinese did transfer some U.S. prisoners of war to the Soviets. The Soviets would then in turn exploit the POWs for their knowledge of U.S. technology.¹¹⁹

While this is hearsay information, what gives this unconfirmed testimony greater than normal importance is that it comes from a former highly placed official in both the North Korean

¹¹⁸ MFR date 5 March 1996 "Interview with Valentin Konstantinovich Pak"; interview took place on 7 February 1996.

¹¹⁹ R 151245Z September 1995 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: JCSD-Moscow Interview with Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak

and Soviet governments. For Valentin Pak was no mere functionary at the time, but a trusted aide and advisor to President Kim Il Sung.

Obviously the testimony of one man is not sufficient to make the case that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. But when taken in the broader context, here is yet again another person, and a senior figure as well, who has heard about or had knowledge of the transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union.

262 INTERROGATIONS

A few days before Christmas 1954, General Slyusarev, commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, sent a long ciphered telegram to Moscow. Addressed to the Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union N. A. Bulganin and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Marshal of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev, the message outlined the accomplishments of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps in the Korean War. It was a dry, detailed report written in Soviet bureaucratic style full of statistics and facts.

Buried in this rather lengthy report was a brief, matter-of-fact statement, "During this period (the Korean War), 262 American flyers, shot down in air battles or by anti-aircraft artillery, were taken prisoner and processed through an interrogation point."¹²⁰ The report went on to explain that the interrogation point was established so that tactical and technical information could be gleaned from captured airmen.¹²¹

The message did not identify the location of the interrogation point, but did indicate that "the interrogations were conducted under the direction of the (64th Fighter Aviation Corps') intelligence department."¹²² The Chinese and North Koreans actually conducted the interrogations, according to the message, but the Soviets provided overall direction. And, of course, the Soviets received copies of all the interrogation reports.

That the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps conducted 262 interrogations during the Korean War raised more questions than it answered. In late 1992, the Russian side provided the Americans with the so-called "List of 59" along with interrogation reports. The List of 59 was supposedly a list of fifty-nine American airmen who were interrogated during the Korean War. On closer analysis, the List of 59 was really a list of 56. Two of the names on the list were duplicates and

¹²⁰ Deciphered Telegram entry No. 307717/sh

¹²¹ The precise words used in the message were, "An interrogation point was organized for captured fliers who were shot down in air battles over the territory of northern Korea and China in order to obtain enemy operational tactics, radar sets, and radio information."

¹²² Ibid.

one of those listed was an Australian. Moreover, when one examined the accompanying "interrogation reports", it was clear that only thirty were really full interrogation reports. Some of the reports were extracts from larger reports, others were merely mentions of people seen, still others were short, simple one paragraph biographies, and finally some were just lists of personal effects.

Upon learning that 262 American flyers transited the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps' interrogation point, the key question therefore became - where are the remaining 206 interrogations?

Consequently, at the 9th Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs held in Moscow, Russia, the U.S. side brought up this question directly. The Russian response to the question was tentative and vague.

"Not all interrogations, or let's say answers, were of great interest. Some, let's say, that had the most valuable information, or were from the most valuable pilots, these interrogations were forwarded to higher headquarters. Regarding other pilots that didn't have valuable information, or were not themselves of great value, their interrogations were most likely retained at an interrogation point. They might have been destroyed there and the only thing that was reported to higher headquarters, was that such and such an individual, or pilot was interrogated, and they would attach any documents that they picked up from him."¹²³

Another Russian commissioner added,

"I am convinced that we are not going to find 262 interrogation reports. Why? Because I remember, specifically the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps and the aviation section of it, we made summaries out of the interrogation reports, and the reports themselves were sent back to the Koreans or Chinese. Brief summaries of the interrogation reports were

¹²³ Minutes of the Ninth Plenary and Working Group Sessions, U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, 2 June 1994, Moscow, Russia, p. 33.

forwarded up to another headquarters. Therefore, the interrogation reports that we have, are from 1952-1953, when it was more formalized.”¹²⁴

While the Russians were no doubt sincere in explaining the absence of 206 interrogation reports, their explanations are not entirely satisfying. For example, one of the Russian representatives stressed that only “...the most valuable information, or [interrogations that] were from the most valuable pilots, these interrogations were forwarded to higher headquarters.”¹²⁵ Yet, the aforementioned report to Marshal Bulganin makes special mention of Colonel Walker “Bud” Mahurin, “commander of the 4th Fighter Aviation Group” and Major Richardson, “chief of staff of the 33rd Aviation Group” as being “among those captured and processed” through the interrogation point.¹²⁶ Clearly General Slyusarev viewed these interrogations as important and surely they must have been forwarded to Moscow. While the U.S. side can not say that these interrogations exist, it seems likely that they do. Moreover, it seems probable that many of the two hundred or so other unaccounted for interrogations exist as well.

A further reason that the U.S. side of the Korean War Working Group is inclined to believe that there are still some interrogation reports yet to be provided to the American side rests on an assessment of the nature of Soviet bureaucratic culture. A hallmark characteristic of Soviet communist culture was the demand that all collectives at least meet or better yet over fulfill the plan. Quantity rather than quality counted. Even the military could not escape this emphasis on meeting quantitative goals.

Consequently, it is certain that the intelligence chiefs of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, not to mention its commander, were interested in producing the maximum number of interrogations and forwarding them to GRU [military intelligence] headquarters in Moscow as well to Far East Military District Headquarters in Khabarovsk.

¹²⁴ Minutes of the Ninth Plenary and Working Group Sessions, p. 36.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 33

¹²⁶ Deciphered Telegram entry No. 307717/sh

Indeed, the fact that General Slyusarev was able to state with precision that 262 interrogations took place is indicative of not only good record keeping but an interest in numbers and quantity.

The interest of the U.S. side in the 206 unaccounted for interrogations derives from a fundamental hypothesis. That is, if any Americans were sent to the Soviet Union, they were no doubt first pre-screened. During this pre-screening process that probably took place in North Korea or China, those judged of value to the Soviet Union would be pulled aside. And, of course, interrogations were the basis of this pre-screening.

The American side considers the review of any extant interrogations of particular value. This is not so that former American POWs can be prosecuted for providing aid and comfort to the enemy, but rather because the reports may be an indicator of Soviet efforts to select out some American POWs for transfer to the USSR.

Given the Soviet penchant for producing as many reports as possible as well as its emphasis on record keeping, the U.S. side finds it difficult to accept that only 56 interrogations are available and that 206 still remain unaccounted for.

THE SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES AND AMERICAN POWs

In the nearly seventy-five years of the Soviet Union's existence, the KGB, or MGB as it was known then, was one of the pillars of the Soviet state.¹²⁷ Charged with domestic political security, counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence collection, border security, signal intelligence, and the protection of political leaders, the security organs were given the most sensitive missions.¹²⁸

In 1992 a retired Soviet colonel - Gavril Korotkov claimed that American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union for interrogation. Colonel Korotkov recalled that while on the territory of the Soviet Union the NKVD maintained control over the Americans. Soviet military interrogators were given only a few hours with the Americans and then they were returned to NKVD control.

In part, because of Colonel Korotkov's testimony, a working hypothesis by the American side has been that the MGB and/or its subordinate organs played an important role in any transfer of Americans to the Soviet Union and almost certainly had control over Americans on the territory of the Soviet Union.¹²⁹ Moreover, because the MGB was a political agency subordinate directly to the Central Committee and the Politburo, it did not report to or through the military chain of command. Hence, directives from Moscow that military officials were to have no direct contact with American POWs did not pertain to MGB officials.

In the course of conducting research over the last three years, the U.S. has found from time to time indications of MGB activities. The evidence is not conclusive but it is highly suggestive. For example, there is evidence that MGB organized the interrogation of American

¹²⁷ The Soviet security services have gone by numerous names in its history - Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, MVD, and KGB. At the start of the Korean War, it was still known as the NKVD, but by the end of the war it was called the MGB.

¹²⁸ Russians often refer to the MGB/KGB as the **spets-sluzhba** or special services. The plural is used because of the magnitude of all the responsibilities that fall to the MGB/KGB.

¹²⁹ See discussion of Colonel Gavril Korotkov in preceding section.

POWs as well as participated in the interrogations. Unlike the military's GRU intelligence department, the MGB does not seem to have faced a prohibition against contact with Americans. There are, moreover, strong indications that the MGB had, and quite probably still has, interrogation reports in its possession.

Indicative of MGB involvement with American POWs is a long report sent to Moscow by General Slyusarev, commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, on 26 November 1952. Addressed to Colonel General Malinin and Colonel General Batitskii and marked "urgent", the message was a summary of the interrogation of an RB-29 assigned to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron that was shot down over North Korea in the summer of 1952. The Soviets obviously placed great emphasis on interrogating the crew because at the end of the document the statement was made,¹³⁰

"Representatives from the MGB USSR and China have arrived from Peking to conduct further prisoner interrogations, to gain more precise information on spy centers, landing strips, and incidents of overflights of the territory of the Soviet Union. The interrogation will be continued in Pekton."

"I consider it advisable as well to send specialists on other matters."

"I request your instructions as to the procedures for sending you the materials and advisability of our participation in the interrogations."

At the very bottom of the document was a note penned by Colonel General Malinin that contained instructions to organize immediately a supplementary interrogation of the Strieby crew.

This message indicates that the MGB was involved in the interrogation of American POWs. Second, the statement, "I request your instructions... and advisability of our participation in the interrogations" confirms that Soviet military officials were prohibited to interrogate American POWs without permission. Yet, the statement "Representatives of the MGB USSR

¹³⁰ TFR 300-15 & 16, Deciphered Telegram Msg No. 503826/sh, Correspondent 3

and China have arrived to conduct further prisoner interrogations” clearly suggests that the MGB, which is not part of the military, did not need permission to conduct interrogations of Americans.

There is yet another example where the MGB played a role in the interrogation of American POWs:

“I am reporting that, according to the report of the MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft shot down from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the An’dung region on 12 January 1953, were taken prisoner...On the instructions of the TsK (Central Committee) of the Communist Party of China, they will be sent to Peking and subject to interrogation.”

“The Minister of Public Safety of China, having reported on 27 January 1953 to our advisor on this decision of the TsK KPK (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and check their work.”

“The MGB USSR advisor was ordered to render us such help.”¹³¹

The shoot down mentioned above refers to the so-called Arnold crew. Colonel John K. Arnold, Jr. was the commander of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and senior officer aboard a B-29. On 12 January 1953 Colonel Arnold’s B-29 was on a PSYOP leaflet drop when it was attacked at approximately 2245 hours by MiG-15s and radar controlled anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft was hit and crashed.

Eleven of the fourteen member crew were repatriated. The Chinese, who captured the crew near Andung, China, sent them to Beijing for interrogation - an interrogation organized by the MGB.

Both of these reports clearly show that the MGB was active in the interrogation of American POWs. Moreover, one of the documents (TFR 300-15/16) suggests that the MGB,

¹³¹ TFR 37-23

unlike the Army, was not restricted from establishing direct contact with American POWs. Furthermore, since the MGB helped organize the interrogations, it seems probable that the Chinese would have given the Soviets at least a courtesy copy of the interrogations.

There is in fact direct evidence that the MGB did receive at least some of the interrogations. One of the documents provided to the U.S. side is titled "A List of Documents on the Testimonies of the Prisoners of War; Colonel Arnold, Captain Llewellyn, and A1C Kiba".¹³² The U.S. side received the interrogation of Colonel Arnold but not the interrogation of Captain Llewellyn or of A1C Kiba. The U.S. received only short one paragraph biographies on each, but not interrogations.

Moreover, A1C Kiba, who returned to military control after the war, distinctly remembers being interrogated by Russians, and Soviet records such as the one above clearly indicate they had possession of Kiba's interrogation. Furthermore, it seems quite likely that these and other interrogations are still extent in the archives of the Russian security services.

In summation, a review of the evidence of MGB (KGB or security service) involvement with American POWs is not conclusive. However, it is highly suggestive that the MGB was more deeply involved with American POWs than previously recognized. While the MGB cannot be directly linked with any transfers, it can be linked with interrogations. The MGB also appears to have had unfettered access to prisoners. Finally, there is a high probability that the Russian security service archives still hold interrogation reports on American POWs.

¹³² TFR 182-25

1992-1996 FINDINGS
OF THE
WWII WORKING GROUP

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INTRODUCTION: THE WORLD WAR II WORKING GROUP

The Co-chairmen of the Joint US-Russia Commission on POW/MIAs, Ambassador Malcolm Toon and General Dmitrii Volkogonov, established the World War II Working Group in December 1994 under the Co-chairmanship of Dr. Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Acting Archivist of the United States, for the US side, and Colonel Sergei Osipov, Assistant to General Volkogonov and the Executive Secretary of the Russian side. Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov recognized the need to discuss further World War II issues prior to the 50th Anniversary of Victory in Europe Day in May 1995 and created the World War II Working Group to examine four areas of interest to the American side and one issue of great concern to the Russian side:

- Determine why and how US prisoners of war came into Soviet military custody at the end of World War II;
- Describe what happened to these POWs while in the hands of the Soviets;
- Describe the process by which the POWs returned to US military control;
- Determine whether thousands (as alleged in some accounts) or even any live American prisoners of war were not returned by the Soviets;
- Reach a final Soviet casualty accounting for World War II, including the numbers of Soviet military personnel and displaced persons who did not return to Soviet territory following the war.

The first meeting of the Working Group took place in Washington, D.C. at the 11th Plenary Session, held during December 1994. Prior to this meeting, some World War II issues had been addressed, although there had not been a specific working group for that conflict.

Dr. Peterson retired from Government service prior to the 12th Plenary Session held in August 1995. Her successor, Dr. Michael Kurtz, also of the National Archives, was unable to attend the 12th Plenary Session. He recognized that Dr. Peterson was the most logical choice to head the US World War II Working Group and invited her to represent him at the 12th Plenary Session.

In September 1995, Mr. R. Michael McReynolds of the National Archives was named the successor to Dr. Kurtz as the new commissioner representing the Archives.

Throughout these personnel changes at the top-level of the World War II Working Group, the analysts have remained the same, most notably Dr. Timothy Nenninger of the National Archives, and Mr. Danz Blasser, Lead World War II Analyst for the Defense POW/MIA Office.

Since the initial meeting of the working group, there has been one additional meeting during the 12th Plenary Session held in Moscow in August 1995 and three Technical Talk sessions held during February 1995, April 1995, and February 1996. The normal course of events during a meeting consists of the presentation of new issues, a review of outstanding issues, and then a summarization of the working group's activity in preparation of a report to the Co-chairmen of the Joint US-Russian Commission at the closing session of the Plenary.

There have been several notable bilateral achievements during the short tenure of the World War II Working Group; these include:

Sergeant Herman Kerley (US Army)

During World War II, the United States maintained a military mission at the US Embassy in Moscow. This mission was headed by Major General John Deane, USA. Part of General Deane's duties included dealing with Soviet General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, Chief of Soviet Repatriation Affairs. Copies of Deane's correspondence with Golikov are in the records of the US Military Mission to Moscow, now at the National Archives.

While reading General Deane's correspondence, an analyst from the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) discovered a letter to General Golikov reporting that "Staff Sergeant Herman Curley" had died on 3 February 1945, while under Soviet control near Kustrin, Germany. General Deane was requesting information about his death and burial site. Deane also sent messages to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) asking for more information on "Curley." The only information SHAEF could provide was that "Curley" had been assigned to the 9th Infantry Division.

An examination of the Master List of WWII Deceased, the records of POWs held by Germany, and of personnel records at the National Personnel Records Center for a "Staff Sergeant Herman Curley" were all negative.

During the February 1995 Technical Talks in Moscow, Colonel Osipov provided us with copies of documents from General Golikov's files. DPMO staff, after translating and analyzing the documents, discovered a request for information from the Chief of Repatriation Affairs of the 1st Belorussian Front addressed to General Konstantin Dmitrievich Golubev, General Golikov's deputy. This document reported that an American sergeant, "German Kerla," and another unknown US serviceman were killed during a bombing attack. Included with this document was a diagram of the burial location at Stalag III-C, Kustrin, Germany. The diagram also indicates that these two individuals were buried in a common grave with identification tags placed in their pockets.¹

The similarity between the two names, "Herman Curley" and "German Kerla," was striking. Additional research now produced the name Herman L. Kerley on the master list of WWII deceased, in the records of POWs held by Germany, and from the National Personnel Records Center. All three sources agreed that Kerley was in German captivity and had never been repatriated. Additionally, the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) verified that Kerley's body had never been recovered. His name is memorialized at the ABMC cemetery in the Netherlands.

Although a search for Kerley's remains was unsuccessful in 1945, the map that we received from our Russian colleagues may assist in recovering his remains. All of this information has been forwarded to the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI).

Missing Soviet P-40 Aircraft

Dr. Khalil Mingalievich Karimov, a veterinarian in the Magadan Oblast, contacted the staff of Defense POW/MIA Office in Moscow. Karimov has long been engaged in the reindeer

¹ Appendix III: "What's in a Name?" discusses some of the problems encountered in identifying American service personnel caused by differences between Russian and English.

breeding industry in the Magadan Oblast. His duties have involved extensive travel in the enormous Chukhchi Autonomous Okrug of Magadan Oblast.

Dr. Karimov reported that during World War II there was a well established ferry flight route to deliver US Lend-Lease airplanes from Nome, Alaska, to the Soviet Union. While working in Chukota in 1975, Dr. Karimov came upon the wreckage of an American-manufactured airplane north of Egikvinot which still contained the remains of the pilot. He gathered these remains, buried them in a shallow hole, and then collected aircraft debris and piled it on the grave as a memorial to the pilot.

Dr. Karimov kept a number of souvenirs from the site, including the metal aircraft identification plate with the aircraft type, serial number, order number and date accepted, as well as several bullets and a flying boot. He still has the identification plate and the bullets and would surrender them if they would aid in identifying the pilot.

Dr. Karimov says that he knows the exact location of this aircraft and will be pleased to help recover the remains of the aviator.

The information that Dr. Karimov provided was given to the US Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. They were able to determine that the aircraft in question was a P-40 (Curtiss "Warhawk") manufactured at Buffalo, New York. It had been accepted by the Army Air Force on 15 August 1942, when it left Buffalo en route to Alaska. By 10 September 1942, the aircraft had arrived at Ladd Army Air Force Base, Alaska, where on the same day the Soviet Union signed for the aircraft. There is no information when the P-40 departed Alaska for the Soviet Union. DPMO analysts have concluded that the remains found in the aircraft are most likely those of the Soviet pilot who was ferrying the aircraft to the Soviet Union. This information should assist in resolving the fate of a missing Soviet serviceman.

At least eleven other Soviet servicemen and one civilian died and were buried in Alaska during World War II from various causes. These people and all known information about them, including burial sites, have been brought to the attention of our Russian colleagues.²

² This information is included as APPENDIX IX: "Russians Buried in Alaska."

Bilateral Document Exchange

The Russian side of the Joint Commission has presented the US side with copies of almost 6,000 pages of Russian archival documents dealing with World War II. Even though these documents have not resulted in the resolution of as many cases as we would like, they are nevertheless a valuable research tool. Similarly, copies of over 4,000 pages of US archival materials given to the Russian side also have had an impact. These documents aided them in arriving at a more accurate accounting of Soviet losses during World War II. This culminated in May 1995 when Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced during the victory celebration in Moscow that Soviet World War II losses from all causes amounted to 26,452,000 Soviet citizens.³

In order to answer the general and specific questions that the World War II Working Group was charged with addressing, an in-depth review of the history of the World War II POW experience was required. This historical review allowed us to place into perspective what was known about the World War II experience of American POWs who fell into the hands of the Red Army, to furnish additional information for use in analyzing discrepancy cases and other disputed issues, as well as provide us a foundation from which to develop new issues.

The historical review and conclusions are followed by a section relating to ongoing issues and seven appendices.

³ Appendix IV: "Soviet Citizens In Custody of the Western Allies After WWII" describes some of the documentation from American archives that we furnished to our Russian colleagues and discusses some possible conclusions that can be reached from the material.

THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN POWS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIETS, 1944-45

The principal effort of the American side of the World War II Working Group has been to research, using Russian and US archival sources, and analyze the wartime experience of those American prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army.⁴ The remainder of this report is an account of our findings to date.

This report will describe the process that brought thousands of United States military personnel who were prisoners of war held by the Germans (and one group held by the Japanese) into the hands of Soviet forces in the concluding weeks of World War II. Because those Americans liberated from German POW camps in Poland and central Germany constitute the largest number, the report will concentrate on that experience, although it also will examine the ordeal of POWs and internees who elsewhere had contacts with Soviet authorities. The report will describe in some detail the experience at specific German POW camps, some evacuated in the face of the Soviet advance, and some overrun by the Red Army. It will discuss what happened to those American prisoners whom the Germans tried to keep out of Soviet hands by marching them west, as well as what happened to those POWs the Soviets liberated. The narrative will address such issues as how the liberated prisoners were treated by the Soviets and how they were returned to US military control. The report will review those measures undertaken by both the Soviets and Americans in 1944 and 1945 to plan for, document, and account for the liberated prisoners and, importantly, will point out those organizational and practical problems that served to frustrate, complicate, and confuse an accurate accounting. It will analyze the contemporary evidence on the numbers of US POWs freed from German camps in the Soviet zone in the context of the overall postwar American casualty clearance and accounting process. This report will focus on what the documentary and other evidence indicates actually happened to American prisoners of war. It will not address Soviet motivation, hidden agendas, or possible political machinations.

⁴ APPENDIX I: "Roles, Missions, and Definitions" provides information on some of the more important organizations involved in recovering POWs during World War II and definitions of frequently used terms.

American POWs Repatriated from Rumania and Bulgaria, 1944

From 1 August 1943, the date of the first major American air raid on the Ploesti, Rumania, oil refineries, American aircrews downed in air operations over southeast Europe were held in Rumanian and Bulgarian POW camps. There were at least three camps administered by Bulgarian and seven by Rumanian military authorities, plus several military hospitals which held wounded prisoners. All of the POWs captured as a result of these air operations over southeastern Europe remained in Bulgarian or Rumanian, not German, custody. These camps, generally near Sofia or Bucharest, were in the area ultimately occupied by the Soviet Army during August and September 1944.

As the Red Army advanced westward during late summer 1944, Rumania and Bulgaria, both allied with the Germans, faced inevitable occupation by the Soviets. Rumania, which had quietly been negotiating with the western Allies since the spring, essentially dropped out of the war on 23 August. Two days later Rumania declared war on its erstwhile ally, Germany. Unfortunately, from a Rumanian perspective, this did not forestall Soviet occupation of the country. Bulgaria, a military ally of the Germans against Great Britain and the United States but not against the USSR, on 26 August ordered German forces within its borders disarmed, affirmed its neutrality toward the Soviets, and sought an armistice with the Americans and British. These political moves saved neither the Rumanians nor Bulgarians. The Red Army shortly occupied both countries.⁵

Almost simultaneously with the Rumanian and Bulgarian capitulations, the British and American POWs held in those countries were released and evacuated. Because Soviet troops were moving into the area, Soviet authorities were informed of these movements, but played no active role in the evacuation. On 23 August 1944, the US 15th Air Force provided aerial evacuation from Bucharest to Italy for 1,109 US POWs. The Swiss government and International Red Cross had made the necessary diplomatic arrangements with the Rumanian government to

⁵ Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-45 (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 467-501; Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1968), pp. 346-371.

effect the transfers.⁶ In early September a similar effort recovered 251 US POWs from Bulgaria, arranged through diplomatic channels by the American Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. On 10 September, British and American prisoners subsequently proceeded by truck convoy from Bulgaria across Turkey to a Royal Air Force base in Syria from where they were flown to Cairo.⁷

There were a few stragglers, mostly sick or wounded, among the US prisoners in Rumania and Bulgaria, who did not come out in the initial, 23 August and 10 September releases from those countries. The Soviets assisted in the eventual recovery of these men. The US Military Mission to Moscow reported on 4 November 1944: "As far as we are able to judge, all American prisoners of war have been evacuated from RUMANIA and BULGARIA."⁸

Soviet Internment and Repatriation of American Fliers Downed in the Far East

During wartime a neutral country is obliged under international law to intern for the duration of the war combatants from belligerent countries who come into its custody within its borders. Release of such internees before the termination of hostilities is a violation of neutrality and could involve the neutral country in the war.

On several occasions during World War II, American fliers operating in the Pacific against Japan were forced to land within the borders of the Soviet Union, until August 1945 a neutral in the war against the Japanese. These fliers created a dilemma for the Soviet Union. On the one hand, premature release of the internees could prompt hostilities or at least rupture diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan. Yet the Soviets, because of their alliance with the United

⁶ Casualty Branch AGO to Distribution, "Air Force Personnel Recovered from Rumania," 19 September 1944; also series of State Department telegrams dated 23 August, 8 September and 11 September 1944, PWIB Subject File, "Camps-Rumania," box 2155, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

⁷ Casualty Branch AGO to Distribution, "Air Forces Personnel Recovered from Rumania and Bulgaria," 14 October 1944, "Camps-Rumania," box 2155; US Military Attaché Turkey, "Report on Treatment of Allied POWs in Bulgaria," 23 September 1944; and State Dep. telegrams dated 7,8,11,14,19 and 27 September 1944, "Camps-Bulgaria," box 2139, PWIB Subject File, entry 460A, RG 389; Lt.Col. John W. Richardson to A-2 15th Air Force, "Evacuation of Allied POWs from Bulgaria," 19 September 1944, File 200.6, AAG Classified Decimal File, 1945, box 17, entry 294A, RG 18, NA.

⁸ Deane to SHAEF, Message 21613, 4 November 1944, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "383.6," box 25, entry 6, RG 331, NA.

States in the war against Germany and their long-standing enmity toward Japan, had considerable sympathy for the internees and desired to see them returned to American control as soon as possible.

On 16 April 1942, the first American aircrew came down on Soviet territory, in the Far East, 25 miles north of Vladivostok. The plane, a B-25 piloted by Captain Edward J. York, was one of the "Doolittle Raiders" which had just bombed Japan. Between April 1942 and September 1945, as a result of air operations against the Japanese, 291 American fliers (37 crews) landed and were interned in the USSR. (Three other crew members died in the crashes, and a fourth died later as result of injuries sustained in the crash.) All of the crews landed in the Soviet Far East, near Vladivostok, Kamchatka, or Petropavlovsk. Most were Army Air Forces crews, although eleven were crews of Navy planes. All of the Navy and 20 of the 26 Army Air Forces crews were flying missions from the Aleutians against the Kuriles or the northern Japanese home islands. Weather, mechanical problems, or enemy action forced them down on Soviet territory. During 1944-45, five B-29 crews operating from bases in China also were among those interned.

The Soviets held these airmen in accordance with international conventions, with the exception of the York crew, who were treated royally, they were all held in conditions considered primitive to Americans. All but one of the crews ended up at an internment camp in the town of Verevsk, in Uzbekistan, 60 kilometers south of Tashkent. The detention facility was a large, one-story brick building which previously had been a school. The crews remained in custody an average of five months, with the longest internment lasting thirteen months. But eventually the Soviets released, albeit unconventionally, all of the American internees.

Although its obligations under international law prohibited the USSR from repatriating or otherwise releasing these internees, that did not prevent the internees from "escaping." The Soviet Foreign Commissariat and the Internal Affairs Commissariat staged a series of elaborate operations, "escapes," by which the American internees got out of the Soviet Union and returned to US control, most went by way of Tashkent to Teheran, Iran. The five operations occurred 11 May 1943 (five men), 18 February 1944 (61 men), 30 January 1945 (130 men), 27 May 1945 (43 men) and 24 August 1945 (52 men). In order to preserve the pretense of Soviet neutrality, both

the Russians and the Americans tried to conduct the releases in great secrecy, without even releasing the names of the returned fliers. In this regard they were not entirely successful.

The documentary record relating to the circumstances by which these fliers came into Soviet control, to the details of the detention, and to their release is extensive. The entire story is told in Otis Hays, Jr., Home From Siberia, which contains detail on the experience of each of the 37 crews and an accounting, by name, of all of the detainees. There are no unanswered questions regarding the fate of the 291 American airmen detained during World War II by the USSR after being downed in the Soviet Far East.⁹

Liberation of American POWs from the Japanese in Manchuria

On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and the following day launched a massive offensive into Japanese occupied Manchuria.

The Japanese held American prisoners of war at two sites in Manchuria. The largest camp was at Hoten, three miles northeast of Mukden, in an industrial area adjacent to the main rail line leading to the city of Harbin. At the time of liberation, this camp held 280 US officers and 1,038 enlisted men.¹⁰ A smaller, satellite camp at Hsian, approximately 100 miles northeast of the Hoten camp, held several dozen British, Dutch, and American VIP prisoners, including Lieutenant Generals Jonathan Wainwright and A.E. Percival, the American commander in the Philippines and the British Singapore commander, respectively.¹¹

⁹ Otis Hays, Jr., Home From Siberia: The Secret Odysseys of Interned American Airmen in World War II (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1990). The Report of the US Military Mission to Moscow, 18 October 1943 - 31 October 1945, ID 929087, Top Secret Intelligence Documents, 1943-59, RG 319, NA, contains two long segments relating to the internees. The basic documentation is filed under "Internees" in the USMMM Subject File, box 11, entry 309, RG 334, NA; the report of Maj. John F. Waldron, on the " Trip to Tashkent, 2-30 December 1943, Verevsk Internment Camp," nicely describes the conditions under which the internees were held.

¹⁰ Capts. James L. Norwood and Emily Shek, "Prisoner of War Camps in Areas Other Than the Four Principal Islands of Japan," Liaison and Research Branch, PWIB, 31 July 1946, pp. 30-34; copy in reference collection, Military Reference Section, National Archives.

¹¹ LtCol Harry W. Little, Jr. (Field Service Division, OSS, China Theater), POW Humanitarian Teams, 4 October 1945, PWIB Subject File, "Manchuria," box 2134, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

On 16 August 1945, a six man Office of Strategic Services (OSS) team parachuted into Mukden. They contacted Colonel Matsuda, the Japanese camp commandant, and immediately began efforts to contact Wainwright at Hsian and coordinate the evacuation of the main camp at Hoten. One member of the team left by train on 18 August for Hsian; on 26 August he returned to Mukden with Wainwright and his party.

In the meanwhile, the Soviet Army moved into the area. The first Red Army troops arrived in Mukden on 19 August by air. By 21 August the 6th Guards Tank Army of the Trans-Baikal Front had arrived in force. A number of incidents between Americans and Soviet troops, involving harassment and robbery, occurred in the early days after the Soviet arrival. According to Lieutenant Colonel James F. Donovan, the eventual leader of the US evacuation effort, most of the incidents stemmed from a few "ignorant" and often drunken Russian soldiers not identifying the Americans as such. By contrast, Donovan noted that most Russian soldiers were "universally enthusiastic about Americans and loudly proclaimed their friendship when passing in the streets." None of the incidents seriously interfered with the evacuation of the American POWs. In fact, the Soviets were instrumental in assisting the American POW contact team with the evacuation effort. The Soviets were especially helpful in procuring transportation used in the evacuation and in providing general manpower support, a crucial need given the large number of prisoners to be evacuated and the small number of Americans in the contact team. That a number of Russian officers, including the Soviet commander, Major General Pritula, were recommended for American decorations gives some indication of the level of cooperation between the US and Soviet authorities in Mukden.

On 29 August 1945, the nineteen-man POW Recovery Team No. 1 arrived in Mukden to reinforce and assist the initial OSS contact team. With the arrival of the larger team, processing of the liberated POWs began in earnest. Much of this effort involved paperwork; POWs filling out identification forms and completing questionnaires concerning possible war crimes violations by their Japanese captors. It also involved immunizations and other medical treatment of the prisoners and graves registration work. Remains of POWs buried in the camp cemetery were

identified and prepared for exhumation and eventual reburial in permanent American military cemeteries.

Evacuation of American POWs from the Mukden area began shortly after the initial OSS team arrived and ended by mid-September. The first group left by air on 21 August, eighteen POWs needing immediate medical assistance. Another thirty medical cases were evacuated by air on 24 August. On 27 August General Wainwright and the other VIPs departed by air. But most of the POWs went by train from Mukden to the port of Darien, where they boarded US Navy ships, the hospital ship USS Relief and the transport USS Colbert, for evacuation to Okinawa and then home. Aboard ship they were deloused, issued new clothing, and received additional medical and dental treatment as needed. The railroad movements from Mukden to Darien occurred on 10 and 11 September. Relief sailed from Darien for Okinawa on 12 September, Colbert departed on the 13 August. The POW Recovery Team closed out its operation on 19 September 1945 and left Mukden by air for China Theater headquarters in Kunming.

The early arrival of the OSS contact team (even before Soviet troops were on the scene), the additional assistance of POW Recovery Team No. 1, and the cooperation of the Soviet forces in the area assured the timely and comparatively smooth evacuation of the US prisoners of war from Manchuria.¹²

Diplomatic Planning for POW Repatriation from German Occupied Europe

On 11 June 1944, the US Military Mission to Moscow first informed Soviet authorities of the possibility that the Red Army advance into eastern and central Europe would uncover German prisoner of war camps and result in the liberation of US POWs who would require repatriation; that prospect seemed, particularly in light of subsequent events, not to have occurred to the

¹² The most detailed account of the effort, including rosters of the evacuated POWs, is LtCol. J.F. Donovan's, Report of Recovery Team #1 Evacuation of Camp Hoten, Manchuria, 22 September 1945, AG Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, "383.6 (2 November 1945)," box 2437, entry 360, RG 407, NA. Additional information can be found in USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Prisoners of the Japanese," box 23, entry 309, RG 334, NA. The recently published book by Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1994), pp. 333-45, includes some information relating the liberation of the POWs in Manchuria.

Soviets. The military mission requested that the Red Army promptly inform American authorities when US POWs were liberated. Over the next several months the Americans made additional entreaties to the Russians on the subject but received little response. The Americans wanted to establish regular channels of communication for exchange of information on impending and actual liberations, to stockpile POW relief supplies in reasonable proximity to those areas containing camps likely to be liberated, to insure Soviet agreement that American contact teams would be admitted promptly to the areas where liberated POWs were located, and to guarantee the quick evacuation and repatriation of the prisoners.¹³

On 4 September 1944, General Deane, head of the military mission, appointed a board of officers led by Colonel James C. Crockett to prepare a comprehensive evacuation and repatriation plan. The plan they formulated incorporated in considerable detail the basic information exchange, supply, contact team, and evacuation concerns previously indicated.¹⁴ Even though on 8 September Deane had invited the Soviets to participate in a joint planning effort, there was virtually no Russian interest in the subject for several months. General Deane, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, and American Charge' d' Affaires George F. Kennan (who headed the American diplomatic mission in Moscow whenever Harriman was absent) frequently reiterated the American position on POW repatriation to their Soviet colleagues. Finally, on 30 November, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, V.M. Molotov, informed Kennan that his government agreed in principle to the American proposals. Still nothing further happened for another seven weeks.

¹³ The records of the US Military Mission to Moscow and of various SHAEF staff sections contain considerable documentation relating to bilateral US-USSR diplomatic exchanges on POW repatriation. There are two excellent summaries of these proceedings: Report of the US Military Mission to Moscow, 18 October 1943 - 31 October 1945, ID 929087, pp. 93-96, Top Secret Intelligence Documents, 1943-59, RG 319, NA; and, "Memorandum for Ambassador Harriman," 23 March 1945, [this is a chronological listing of communications relating to POWs between the military mission and Soviet authorities between 11 June 1944, and 23 March 1945] USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 24, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

¹⁴ "Plan for the Evacuation of POW from Territories under Russian Control" [includes five appendices], USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

On 21 January 1945, following liberation of the first US POW camp by the Red Army, General Deane met with Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, deputy chief of the Soviet Repatriation Commission, to negotiate a POW agreement. They discussed terms of reciprocal treatment of liberated POWs. Their discussions formed the basis for a final agreement reached and signed on 11 February 1945, at the Yalta Conference between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. The principal provisions were:

1. Liberating forces would maintain freed POWs in camps or at concentration points until turned over to their own governmental authorities.
2. Liberating forces would immediately notify the home governments that the prisoners had been freed.
3. Representatives of the governments of the liberated prisoners would have immediate access to the camps or points of concentration where they were held pending repatriation.
4. The liberating country would be responsible for outside protection of the camps, while the internal administration would be under control of officials from the country of those liberated.
5. The liberating country would provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical attention, until the prisoners returned to the authorities of their own country.
6. Each country could use its own means of transport to repatriate its POWs held by the liberating power.

The USSR and United Kingdom also signed a similar POW agreement at Yalta.¹⁵ From the time the agreement was signed in early February until the end of March 1945, by which date the bulk of American POWs liberated by the Red Army in Poland had been evacuated from Odessa, diplomatic and military officials at the US embassy in Moscow worked to get Soviet compliance. In particular, the Americans wanted admission of contact teams to the Soviet zone of operations and rapid air evacuation of liberated prisoners. The effort, which included at least one letter from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin on the subject, had little effect: "The actual

¹⁵ Appendix IV, pp. 135-38, includes the text of the Yalta Agreement, Chief Historian, European Command, RAMP's: The Recovery and Repatriation of Liberated Prisoners of War (Frankfurt-am-Main: European Command, 1947).

implementation of the agreement broke down in nearly all respects because of Soviet failure to live up to any terms of the agreement.” Thus, although “...all of the American prisoners known to have been liberated by the Red Army were eventually evacuated...”, this was accomplished “under the most difficult conditions imaginable.”¹⁶

The Yalta POW accord specified that liberated prisoners would be transported promptly to agreed upon transfer points. Until late April 1945, Odessa was the only such transfer point. As Soviet forces moved westward, Odessa became further and further removed from the area where additional Allied prisoners likely would be found. US and British authorities did not want their liberated POWs moved eastward over a thousand miles to be repatriated through Odessa, when the front-lines of the Soviet Army and those of SHAEF forces were separated by only a hundred miles or less and were rapidly converging. The Russians agreed that overland exchanges of prisoners, not continued evacuation to Odessa, were the most practical solution as the war in Europe drew to a close. As the converging armies met in late April and early May, arrangements worked out between local commanders governed POW exchanges between the Soviets and the US and British.¹⁷

For those many more Allied prisoners to be exchanged across front-lines than had been already evacuated through Odessa. (SHAEF saw the need for consensus with the Russians on how to practically effect the detail of repatriations in the West) Between 16 and 22 May 1945, Major General Ray W. Barker, the SHAEF Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), and Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, representing the Soviet repatriation authority, met at Halle, Germany. The general principles agreed to at Yalta provided the framework for the Halle discussions. With respect to the return of western Allied prisoners, the Halle meeting centered on working out the administrative details for the prompt release and return to SHAEF control of all British and American POWs, using available air or motor transport. Despite the seemingly straight forward-

¹⁶ Report of the US Military Mission to Moscow, 18 October 1943 - 31 October 1945, pp. 95-96, ID 929087, Top Secret Intelligence Documents, 1943-59, RG 319, NA.

¹⁷Troopers [the British Military Mission in Moscow] to SHAEF, Message 87815, 23 April 1945; Troopers to SHAEF, Message 90386, 2 May 1945, SHAEF AG Decimal File, "383.6-1," box 185, entry 56, RG 331, NA.

nature of this problem, the Soviets prolonged the negotiations, citing practical and administrative obstacles and tying rapid release of American, British, and other Allied POWs to repatriation of all Soviet prisoners and displaced persons in the West, many of whom did not want to return to the Soviet Union. The conferees finally reached agreement on a plan in the early morning hours of 22 May. They finalized delivery and reception points for each side, transportation plans, daily transit capacities of each of the reception-delivery points, and other details. Barker and Golubev signed the Halle Agreement on 22 May 1945. Its impact for US POWs, however, was not that significant. Most Americans liberated by the Soviets in central Germany and along the Baltic coast (23,421 according to 12th Army Group), had been exchanged by local arrangement prior to implementation of the Halle Agreement on 23 May.¹⁸

German Evacuation of Allied Prisoners from POW Camps

During 1945, the Soviet Army overran, in two sequences, German camps that held US POWs. The experiences of the prisoners released by the Soviets was considerably different depending on whether they were liberated during late-January to early-February in Poland and East Prussia, or during April and May in central and northern Germany.

Most of the US prisoners in the early sequence came from Oflag 64 at Schubin, Poland, Stalag III-C near Kustrin, Poland, with a few from Stalag II-B, Hammerstein, Germany. The Soviets evacuated these men to the east and most of them eventually came out through Odessa. They comprise a relatively small portion, about ten percent, of all American prisoners that were in Soviet hands; contemporary accounts have 2,858 evacuated by way of Odessa. But because of the smaller numbers, the more direct involvement of the US Military Mission to Moscow, and the

¹⁸ Memorandum for General Barker, "British/US/Russian POW Exchange Arrangements," 13 April 1945; Memorandum for Colonel Straub, "British/Russian POW Exchange Arrangements," 13 May 1945, File 370.05-12 ("Delivery Thru Army Lines of POWs and Civilians..."), SHAEF G-1 PWX Decimal File, box 76, entry 7, RG 331, NA. Barker to SHAEF Chief of Staff, "Report on Conference with Russian Officials Relative to Repatriation of POWs and DPs," 23 May 1945; Barker to SHAEF Repatriation Planning Group, "Repatriation of Russian and Allied Personnel," 17 May 1945, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "337/2-Conferences-Halle," box 21, entry 6, RG 331, NA. SHAEF to AGWAR, Message S-89142, 23 May 1945, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "383.6," box 25, entry 6, RG 331, NA. "Memorandum to Colonel Borden," 26 May 1945 [annotated to 2 June], 12th Army Group G-1 Subject File, "103-A/PW (US/BR), box 23, entry 165, RG 331, NA.

somewhat more routine evacuation procedures, the Odessa evacuation is better documented and more frequently written about than the liberation of POWs which took place later in central Germany.

As the Russians moved into western Poland and East Prussia during January and February 1945, the Germans began evacuating the POW camps in that area and moved the prisoner populations into camps further west. These movements had a significant, negative impact on the POWs and on the orderly recovery of liberated prisoners by the western Allies. Some of the POWs who were marched west came out of the Soviet zone without ever really having been in Red Army custody, that is being controlled administratively and physically by the Soviets. By far most of the US POWs liberated by the Soviets came from about a half dozen camps in central and northern Germany, which by late-April and early-May 1945 were overcrowded with large numbers of men previously evacuated from the camps further east. This group of US POWs, totaling about 25,000, returned to military control across the front-lines from the Soviet to the SHAEF sectors.

The Allied POWs whom the Germans marched west suffered from extreme weather conditions, including subfreezing cold and blizzards, shortages of food and shelter, and from the sheer exertion required in the movement, most of which was by foot. The movements of US and British prisoners from Stalag Luft III (Sagan), Stalag Luft VIII (Bankau), and Stalag III-B (Furstenburg) to Stalag III-A (Luckenwalde) during late-January and early-February 1945 created special hardships. Because of concern for the prisoners being evacuated, SHAEF authorities attempted to keep track of the movements, as well as tried to adjust estimates on the changing prisoner populations in individual German camps. Reports from the International Red Cross and the protecting powers (the neutral Swedes and Swiss) were important sources for this information. But even as the moves concluded in April 1945, SHAEF admitted that it had inadequate, incomplete information as to the numbers and purpose of the evacuations: "It is impossible to assess what is the purpose of this attempt to retain PW to the last." Speculation included use as hostages in the Alpenstellung (the suspected, but not real Alpine redoubt), or even

that the Germans planned to massacre them in the end.¹⁹ Allied authorities foresaw another consequence of the evacuations: "In view of conditions of evacuation, large numbers of stragglers must be anticipated." The number of actual stragglers, of course, affected the accuracy of contemporary estimates on the numbers of POWs evacuated who actually reached another camp.²⁰

The consequences of the German movements included not only hardships during the marches, but significant overcrowding at the camps to which the POWs were moved. At Luckenwalde, Albert Kadler, a Swiss observer, noted: "There is excessive overcrowding in all compounds.... The floor space... is supposed to accommodate 200 men, while at present 400 men are living in each room."²¹ The overcrowding negatively affected nearly all aspects of camp life, causing in particular health and safety problems. In order to alleviate the suffering caused by the evacuation marches, in mid-February 1945 Major General Ray Barker, the SHAEF Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel and the officer responsible for recovery of Allied POWs, recommended that the US and British governments approach the German government, through the Swiss or Swedish governments, to urge ending the evacuations; as German forces withdrew,

¹⁹ SHAEF PWX Fortnightly Bulletin No. 8, 18 April 1945, 12th Army Group G-1 Subject File, "114," box 24, entry 165, RG 331, NA.

²⁰ War Office to 30 Military Mission Moscow, 7 February 1945, Message 66400 PW-2, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "254," box 13, entry 6, RG 331, NA. Detailed accounts of the evacuation marches are enclosed with Cyril Gepp to Maj. Gen. R.W. Barker, 22 March 1945, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "383.6," box 25, entry 6, RG 331, NA; "Information Relating to Movements of POWs in Eastern Germany and Austria," War Office Serial Report 0103/6753/P.W.2. with amendments, 20 February to 26 April 1945, SHAEF G-1 PWX Decimal File, "370.05-24 Allied POWs in Russian Zone," box 75, entry 7, RG 331, NA; and, "Statement or Report Of Interview Of Recovered Personnel," 2Lt. Robert O. Hochritt, 12 August 1945, and 1Lt. Leland J. Harp, 30 July 1945, AGO Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, "383.6 (21 Aug. 45) and (7 Sept. 45)", box 2438, entry 360, RG 407, NA. Two published works contain extensive accounts of the evacuation marches from Oflag 64, both to the east with the Soviets and to the west with the Germans: Howard Randolph Holder, *Escape to Russia* (Athens, Georgia: Iberian Publishing Company, 1994), and Clarence R. Meltesen, *Roads To Liberation From Oflag 64* (San Francisco: Oflag 64 Press, 1990).

²¹ Albert Kadler, Report on Stalag III-A, 15 February 1945, enclosure to Gepp to Barker, 22 March 1945, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "383.6," box 25, entry 6, RG 331, NA.

POWs would simply “stay put” in the camps to be liberated by the advancing armies, whether Soviet in the east or the other allies in the west. Eventually the Germans adopted this “stay put” policy. But because it did not take effect until 21 April 1945, the migration of the POW population continued for some time. During those intervening weeks, the Germans moved more than a 100,000 POWs of various nationalities westward away from the Red Army. At least a few thousand perished in the process. Others suffered serious health problems as a consequence. SHAEF never determined the exact numbers variously affected and had only estimated the actual numbers moved. But the evacuations did put many western Allied prisoners in camps more likely to be liberated by American and British forces than had they “stayed put” in Poland and East Prussia.²²

German POW Camps, the Red Army Advance, and American Prisoners

By 1945 most of the American POWs in German custody were concentrated in a dozen camps with prisoner populations of several thousand each. A somewhat smaller number were scattered in dozens of small camps, transit camps, work kommandos, and hospitals. In order to make successful escape as difficult as possible, the Germans tried to locate the large camps holding western Allied military personnel as far east as possible. This placed these POWs in the zone most likely to be liberated by the Soviet Army advancing from the east.

Although Allied authorities, at SHAEF, the War Office in London, the War Department in Washington, and the military missions in Moscow actively gathered information about these camps, the Soviet Army apparently had little prior knowledge about the locations, numbers, and conditions of the Allied POWs they would overrun. An American officer who served as liaison with the Soviets in Poland declared frankly: “... the Russian front lines had no knowledge of the

²² MajGen Ray W. Barker to Chief of Staff, 17 February 1945, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "383.6," box 25, entry 6, RG 331, NA; and SHAEF G-1 to 12th Army Group, 6th Army Group, and COMZ, 21 April 1945, Message S-85780; British Military Attaché Berne to SHAEF G-1, 26 April 1945, Message MAS 0/807, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6," box 87, entry 1, RG 331, NA.

camps prior to their capture.”²³ This lack of knowledge must explain in part the seeming unpreparedness of the Russians to provide for those Allied prisoners they did liberate. German actions, namely evacuation of many POWs to the west, further served to confuse and complicate the problem.

In the event, the Red Army liberated about five camps that included considerable numbers of American POWs. It liberated about a dozen more camps that still contained a few US prisoners, mostly stragglers too sick to be moved west. But most of the American prisoners initially in camps in the area overrun by the Red Army had been evacuated west by the Germans from January through April 1945, and were liberated by British or American forces.

An examination of what happened at the principal camps is essential to understand the process. In particular, the following account will emphasize the confusing conditions, the fluidity of the POW population as groups of prisoners were moved from one camp to another, and the difficulty authorities (German, Soviet, and Allied) had with maintaining accountability of numbers of POWs. These contemporary difficulties are only exacerbated when we attempt to understand what happened fifty years after the events.

²³ Lt.Col. James D. Wilmeth, "Report on a Visit to Lublin, Poland, 27 February - 28 March 1945," USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

A. PARTIAL EVACUATION BY GERMANS AND SOVIETS

A.1.

Camp. Oflag 64, Schubin, Poland (Alzburgund in German)

Location. 3 kilometers northwest of Schubin; 53°01'N-17°44'E.

Camp population. At the time of its evacuation in January 1945 the camp strength was about 1,600 American POWs, mostly ground forces officers.

Population gains or losses. One of the more complicated accounts of POW camp evacuations relates to Oflag 64. It is essentially two stories: one involves POWs evacuated westward by the Germans; the other concerns POWs who moved eastward into the Soviet zone, including sick and immobile prisoners left behind at the camp and about 200 others who had escaped the westward evacuation and returned to the camp. The eventual liberation of each group was a long and arduous process.

Circumstances of liberation. On 21 January 1945, the Germans evacuated most of the US POWs in Oflag 64 to the west, away from the advance of the Soviet 2nd Belorussian Front.²⁴ But of the nearly 1,500 who began the march, only 500 completed the 345 mile trek that ended in exhaustion

²⁴ Much of the information relating to Red Army units that liberated specific German POW camps is from the series German Armed Forces Situation Maps, "Lage Ost (Russia)," January-May 1945, Record Group 242, National Archives. These order-of-battle maps were maintained by the operations section of the Army General Staff ("Generalstab des Heeres") to keep track of unfolding operations on the Eastern Front.

Information from this source on dates of liberation and Soviet units involved, however, is at best tentative. Some of the information originally compiled by the Germans was inaccurate. In addition, the information from the maps required interpretation, also subject to error. Although the maps appear to have been updated daily, information about when a specific Russian unit overran a particular locale undoubtedly was not recorded immediately by the Germans as the event occurred. Neither do the maps provide clear evidence that a particular Soviet army liberated a specific town; the information reflects what appears to have been the likely liberating unit. Similarly, the precise command relationship between Soviet fronts and armies is not obvious from the original maps; information was derived from the physical proximity of organization symbols and inferred unit boundaries as they appear on the maps.

at Oflag XIII-B, Hammelburg, on 9 March. From 21 January to 1 March these prisoners walked westward; on 6 March they boarded railroad freight cars for the remainder of the journey to Hammelburg. Food and drinking water were in short supply during the evacuation, and shelter at night usually consisted of hay barns, stables, cow sheds, or machine sheds. Despite the cold and wet weather, the Germans often prohibited fire for warmth, to dry out shoes and clothes, and cook food. The Germans provided no medical supplies until 17 February.

Those survivors of Oflag 64 who reached Hammelburg on March 9 became part of the evacuation of that camp which began abortively on 27 March. That day, a small American armored task force reached Stalag XIII-B but lacked sufficient transport to evacuate the POWs. Most of those briefly liberated from Hammelburg on 27 March were soon recaptured by the Germans and sent to another camp, Stalag VII-A at Moosburg. This camp, the largest German concentration area for Allied POWs, was liberated by the Americans on 29 April 1945. A smaller group from Hammelburg, which included some of the original Oflag 64 POWs, went to another camp at Nuremberg.

When the Germans evacuated Oflag 64 on 21 January, they left behind 86 Americans under command of Colonel Frederick W. Drury, who were sick or otherwise unable to travel. Within two days Russian forces arrived to liberate these men. But it required prolonged discussions between Drury and the Soviet corps commander, Colonel General Belov, before evacuation plans proceeded. Finally, on 28 January the sick POWs left Schubin by truck for Rembertow, Poland, where they arrived on 31 January. They remained at Rembertow, a refugee processing center, for three weeks.

Meanwhile, about 200 Americans escaped from the group the Germans had evacuated westward from Oflag 64 on 21 January. Those who escaped headed east, toward the Soviet lines. Some returned to the site of the camp and were taken by the Russians to Rembertow with Col. Drury and the sick POWs. Others made their own way, with more or less help from Poles and Soviets, to Rembertow. Still others walked, hitchhiked, or found other means to get to Lublin, Warsaw, and eventually to Moscow, Poltava, or Odessa in the Soviet Union.

On 22 February the Russians sent Drury's group of POWs from Rembertow by train to Odessa. They reached that the Black Sea port on 1 March for eventual return by ship and plane to the US.²⁵

In microcosm, the Oflag 64 experience demonstrates the difficulty in accounting for the American POWs who were in the area eventually occupied by the Soviet Army. Large groups of POWs by their own actions, because of sickness and other physical problems, and by German design, over a period of weeks, fragmented and became small groups and individual stragglers. They were indeed at the mercy of the enemy, the elements, the local population, and even their allies, the Soviets.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 1,040 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Oflag 64 (code 045).²⁶

²⁵ Appendix II describes the information in and the limitations to the machine-readable data used for the accounting of POWs liberated from each camp. The POWs in this database listed as returned to military control (RMC) underrepresents, as explained in the appendix, the actual number for each camp. Despite this undercounting, these numbers have been used in this study to provide a minimum number of recovered POWs and to indicate some comparison of the numbers among the several camps.

²⁶ TK Nenninger telecon with Brooks E. Kleber (former POW at Oflag 64), 26 July 1995. EX Report No. 576, March 29, 1945, "LtCol. Frederick W. Drury (Oflag 64)," EX Report No. 677, 1 July 1945, "2ndLt. Richard D. Englehart (Oflag 64)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA. Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 35-43 and pp. 93-99, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389. MIS-X, WDGS, "Statements of Evacuees from German P/W Camps Reporting Experiences in Russia," 3 April 1945, ETO MIS-X Decimal Correspondence, "383.6-POWs(Allied)", box 9, RG 332. Statement of Colonel F.W. Drury, enclosed with TAG to USMMM, 3 April 1945; LtCol J.D. Wilmeth, "Report of 3 POWs at ESCOM," 21 February 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23, entry 309, RG 334. Capt. F.C. Fitchen, "Report of 8 Officers from Oflag 64 at Poltava," March 6, 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA. Published accounts of the varied experiences of those liberated from Oflag 64 include Howard Randolph Holder, Escape to Russia (Athens, Georgia: Iberian Publishing Co., 1994), and Clarence R. Meltesen, Roads to Liberation From Oflag 64 (San Francisco: Oflag 64 Press, 1990).

A.2.

Camp. Stalag III-C, Kustrin, Poland

Location. In Drewitz, northeast of Kustrin; 52°40'N-14°50'E.

Camp population. At its peak, prior to evacuation, Stalag III-C held about 2,000 US ground forces enlisted personnel.

Circumstances of liberation. When Soviet forces approached Kustrin on 31 January 1945, the Germans evacuated the Allied POWs by foot to the west. The evacuation column got only a mile or two from the camp before running into Soviet troops, who fired on the POWs killing five before clear identification was made. After this firefight the German guards fled. The Soviet combat troops continued their advance toward the west, uninterested in the POWs who returned to the camp they recently had evacuated.

The US POWs remained at Stalag III-C under their own control for several days before other Soviet troops arrived, about 1-2 February 1945; but even then, the Soviets did virtually nothing to provide for or to exercise control over, the American POWs. The liberating Soviet unit was likely the 5th Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. In early February 1945, the Soviets ordered the POWs to leave Stalag III-C and go to Warsaw, Poland, a distance of more than 200 miles. The Soviets provided no food, shelter, or transport; most of these POWs organized themselves into small groups, perhaps half a dozen men each, and found their own way to Warsaw, walking much of the way, but catching occasional rides on Soviet army trucks. In Warsaw the Soviets organized the Allied POWs into larger groups and moved them by train to Odessa.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Germans evacuated to the west perhaps as many as 200 to 300 of the US POWs from Kustrin. The remaining group was evacuated to the east by the Soviets, straggling under little control, therefore precise accounting from this camp is problematic. But the largest group was liberated by the Russians and eventually repatriated through Odessa, although a few Americans from III-C returned by way of Moscow or Poltava.

The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 1,420 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag III-C (code 005).²⁷

A.3.

Camp. Stalag II-B, Hammerstein, Prussia

Location. In west Prussia, east of Neustettin; 53°41'N- 16°58'E.

Camp population. At its peak, in January 1945, this camp was responsible for about 7,200 American ground forces enlisted men. In actuality over 5,000 of these POWs were out in nine work kommandos, not physically housed in the main camp.

Population gains or losses. On 29 January 1945, the Germans began evacuating POWs from the main camp and the kommandos; this became one of the more disorganized and protracted of the evacuation marches.

Circumstances of liberation. A contemporary American observer of the Allied POW situation in Poland stated that few (he estimated 100) of the US POWs at Hammerstein fell into Soviet hands when the Red Army occupied Stalag II-B and the surrounding area on 26 February. The occupying troops were from the 2nd Belorussian Front, probably the 19th Army.

As the several evacuation columns from Stalag II-B marched west, the Germans dropped groups of POWs at other camps and at other work kommandos. The largest of these groups ending up at Marlag X-C, Westertimke, which was liberated by the British Army on 28 April. Russian forces were also in this area along the Baltic coast. But the Russians ignored many of the

²⁷ TK Nenner, Interview with Kenneth H. Bargmann (former POW from Stalag III-C), 9 May 1995, Washington DC. Spaatz to Deane, February 25, 1945, Message UA-64907; USMMM to USSTAF, 27 February 1945, Message M-22952, ETO MIS-X, Decimal Correspondence, "383.6-POWs(Allied)," box 9, RG 332. Hall (Odessa) to USMMM, 7 March 1945, Message O-52355, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23, entry 309, RG 334, NA [on casualties at Kustrin]. Capt. W.C. Fitchen, "Report of Interview With 3 POWs at EUSCOM [Poltava]," 6 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA. EX Report No. 672, 3 April 1945, "1st Sgt. Leroy Coleman (Stalag III-C)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

Allied POWs, which led the prisoners to liberate themselves. One former POW from Hammerstein, who spent the last month of the war at a large farm near Rostock, remembered: "The Russians swept through the area on 1 May. We received absolutely no help from them, so we made our way to the British outpost at Wismar on V-E Day. The next day the British moved us to Lubeck where U.S. B-17s picked us up and flew us out of Germany."

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 5,782 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag II-B (code 003).²⁸

²⁸ Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 54-63, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389, NA. Lt. Col. James D. Wilmeth, "Report on a Visit to Lublin, Poland, 27 February - 28 March 1945," USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA. EX Report No. 592, 20 April 1945, "Pfc. Billy H. Prichard (Stalag II-B)," EX Report No. 610, 17 May 1945, "MSgt. John M. McMahan (Stalag II-B)," EX Report No. 611, 17 May 1945, "Cpl. Alfred C. Carroll (Stalag II-B)," EX Report No. 612, 17 May 1945, "Pvt. Gunnar S. Drangsholt (Stalag II-B)," EX Report No. 613, 22 May 1945, "Sgt. Warren O. Allen (Stalag II-B)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA. Bob Ryan, "For You the War is Over," in Jane E. Thierry (ed.), Looking Back at War: National Archives Volunteers Remember World War II (Washington: National Archives, 1995), pp. 119-21.

**B. CAMPS EVACUATED BY THE GERMANS IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET
ADVANCE AND POWS MOVED WEST**

B.1.

Camp. Stalag III-B, Furstenburg, Brandenburg, Prussia

Location. About 20 kilometers south of Frankfurt-am-Oder; 52°9'N- 14°42'E.

Camp population. In January 1945, the POW population had reached nearly 5,000 American enlisted men, mostly ground forces NCOs.

Population gains or losses. On 31 January 1945, with two hours notice, the Germans marched the entire camp population westward, in the face of the advancing Soviet 33rd Army, 1st Belorussian Front. Conditions on the march were difficult, through snow, ice, and deep puddles on the road. Food was in short supply. After seven days, and a 108-kilometer march, the POWs reached Stalag III-A, Luckenwalde.

Circumstances of liberation. The Americans who completed the march spent the remainder of the war at Luckenwalde. The Red Army liberated Luckenwalde on 22 April, but most POWs from this camp did not begin to return to military control until about 6 May (see the section on Stalag III-A).

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. So far as is known, no American POWs remained at Furstenburg after evacuation, although there were an undetermined number of casualties and stragglers during the march. Some of the stragglers probably went to camps other than Luckenwalde or were liberated outside of any camp.

The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 3,873 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag III-B (code 004).²⁹

²⁹ Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 64-73, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389. ETO Provost Marshal Section, "Nominal Rolls of American POWs-Hildesheim," box 1, RG 332, NA; the Hildesheim list identifies POWs liberated from III-A who appear on the VA list as RMC from III-B.

B.2.

Camp. Stalag Luft III, Sagan, Silesia

Location. About 120 kilometers southeast of Berlin; 51°35'N- 15°19'E.

Camp population. The largest officer's camp in Germany; in January 1945 the International Red Cross reported Sagan held over 6,800 Americans. It also included a large British contingent, mostly fliers.

Population gains or losses. On the evening of 27 January, the Germans gave the POWs at Sagan 30 minutes notice to evacuate and move west, away from the advancing Soviets of the 4th Guards Tank Army, 1st Ukrainian Front. The entire camp population, except for about 200 sick stragglers too weak to walk, began to march out of Stalag Luft III shortly before midnight on 27 January.

Circumstances of liberation. The POWs from the south and center compounds of Luft III went directly to Stalag VII-A, Moosburg, where they arrived on 31 January. Part of their journey had been in railroad freight cars. The north and west compounds marched and moved by train to Stalag XVIII-D, Nuremburg, which they reached on 4 February. Conditions at Nuremburg rapidly deteriorated as the influx of POWs from other camps, including Dulag Luft, Luft IV, and Oflag 64, sometimes reached a thousand a day. The Germans evacuated the American POWs from Nuremburg on April 3 and moved them toward Stalag VII-A, Moosburg. During that march, the German guards lost control and authority over the prisoners, many of whom dropped out of the column at will. Intimidated by the approach of the American Army, the Germans did little to stop the disintegration the bulk of the column, however reached Moosburg on 20 April, and was liberated by American units (on 27 April). But many POWs, especially stragglers, the sick, and escapees, who had been in Stalag Luft III in January 1945, returned to military control after being recovered in small groups or singly, often on the road or in the woods or at a private residence, and not from large masses liberated at Moosburg in April.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 6,123 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag Luft III (code 033).³⁰

B.3.

Camp. Stalag Luft IV, Gross Tychow, East Prussia

Location. Northeast of Berlin, near the Baltic coast, 53°51'N-16°15'E.

Camp population. This was a large camp, estimated in February 1945 to hold 8,600 US POWs, mostly Army Air Forces NCOs and enlisted men.

Population gains or losses. As Soviet troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front (probably 19th Army) advanced on the area, the Germans evacuated this camp beginning 6 February 1945, and marched the prisoners west. The final destination was to be Stalag XI-B, Fallingbostal.

Circumstances of liberation. Most of the POWs from Luft IV did not reach XI-B, but were liberated when the columns made contact with British and American units in late April and early May. Many prisoners had escaped the German columns and found freedom on their own. An American medical officer accompanying one of the columns tried to keep a record of the rations received from the Germans as well as of the sick and dead POWs, in order to later account for casualties and to "aid in establishing the guilt of our German captors as war criminals." Of the experience he reported: "On 6 Feb 1945 we were evacuated by foot. We marched to Stalag II B at Fallingbosted [sic] where we arrived 30 March 1945. It was a march of disease, suffering, filth, and starvation. On 6 April 1945 we were again evacuated by foot and we were still on the road when the English evacuated us on 2 May 1945."

³⁰ Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 22-34, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389, NA. EX Report No. 585, 16 April 1945, "Maj. Charles H. Diamond (Stalag Luft III)," EX Report No. 646, 17 May 1945, "Col. Delmar T. Spivey (Stalag Luft III)," EX Report No. 652, 26 April 1945, "Lt.Col. Wilbur W. Abing (Stalag Luft III)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA. Arthur A. Durand, Stalag Luft III (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1988), pp. 326-56.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 6,100 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag Luft IV (code 091).³¹

³¹ MIS-X, WDGS, 15 February 1945, "German Prisoner of War Camps With American PWs"; EX Report No. 619, May 15, 1945, "TSgt. Francis S. Paules (Stalag Luft IV)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA. Sgt. Mark N. Davis, 9 August 1945; TSgt. William P. Hurley, 14 August 1945; SSgt. James A. Lires, 11 September 1945; SSgt. Paul E. McNally, 11 September 1945; SSgt. June E. Roberson, 28 July 1945, "Statement or Report Of Interview Of Recovered Personnel," AGO Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, "383.6 (21 August 1945) (31 August 1945) (18 September 1945) (7 September 1945)", box 2438, entry 360, RG 407, NA. Capt. Leslie Caplan (MC) to Casualty Branch AGO, "Report on Stalag Luft IV," n.d., AG 704(2 April 1946), AGO Central Decimal File, 1946-48, box 1543, Entry 363, RG 407, NA.

C. CAMPS LIBERATED LATE BY SOVIETS, OR BY US AND SOVIETS

C.1.

Camp. Stalag Luft I, Barth, Prussia

Location. On the Baltic, 23 kilometers northwest of Stralsund, Rostock district; 54°22'N-12°42'E.

Camp population. US and British air force personnel, mostly officers.

Population gains or losses. There was no significant influx from other camps in 1945, but there had been a large increase during 1944; at the time of liberation the POW population approached 9,000 (US, UK, and other nationalities).

Circumstances of liberation. Because of its location further west and north than most German POW camps, Stalag Luft I was not evacuated in the face of the Soviet advance during March and April 1945. When on 30 April, the German commandant did order the Senior Allied Officer (SAO) to prepare the prisoners for evacuation, the SAO stated the Germans would have to use force in order to get the prisoners to move. Faced with the advancing Soviets, recalcitrant prisoners, and the prospect of bloodshed, the Germans abandoned the camp. On 1 May 1945 the SAO, who upon the German departure had assumed responsibility for maintaining order in the camp, sent out contact parties to meet with advancing Soviet troops. Soviet liberating forces were from the 65th Army (Colonel General Pavel Batov) of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Initially the Soviets showed little interest in the camp or the needs of the POWs for food and water, nor did they cooperate with Allied authorities to effect relief efforts or a timely evacuation of the prisoners from the camp. In fact, Soviet troops prevented such actions until 12 May when SHAEF began an aerial evacuation of the POWs; this operation was completed on 15 May.³²

³² Not all liberated Allied POWs at Barth, however, suffered significant deprivations. One American later reported to a former crew member held at a different POW camp: "After we were liberated by the Russians on May 1st were living the life of Riley at camp. Have roll-call at 8:30 A.M. & then have the rest of the day off. The B-17s came in on the 13th of May so we were there two weeks after being liberated. All the food we want and nothing to do but play ball & lie in the sun." "K.C" Micko [F/O Kenneth C. Micko] to "Bill" [1st Lt. William E. Shinn], 7 July

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. As late as 25 June 1945, one recovered POW, SSgt. Anthony Sherg, reported: "Possibility of several hundred American prisoners of war liberated from Stalag Luft One, Barth, are now confined by the Russian Army in the Rostock area..." Sherg indicated that he also had been held for several weeks at Rostock. Follow-up inquiries to the Soviets and further investigation, however, produced no confirmation of Sherg's information.

The postwar debriefing of Colonel Hubert Zemke, Senior American Officer at Barth, includes copies of important contemporary documents relating to conditions at the camp just before and subsequent to the Soviet liberation. One of the documents, dated on 14 May 1945, and signed by Soviet, British, and American officers, is essentially a receipt for 8,498 POWs (1,415 British and 7,083 Americans) turned over to the British and American authorities by the Soviets.

The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 4,298 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag Luft I (code 032). A Military Intelligence Service analysis, dated 1 November 1945, indicates that 7,717 US and 1,427 British POWs returned to military control in May 1945 from Stalag Luft I; the higher numbers probably reflect those POWs who made their own way west from Luft I and were not part of the formal exchange completed 14 May.³³

1945, in "Reports of Death of F/O Alfred H. Janss..." AG 704-Dead (18 March 1945), AGO Central Decimal File 1940-45, box 4120, entry 360, RG 407, NA.

³³ EX Report No. 678, 19 July 1945, "Col. Hubert Zemke (Stalag Luft I)", CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A; Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 13-21, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389. G-1 Ninth Army to G-1 12th Army Group, 11 May 1945 Message, 12th Army Group G-1 Subject File, "103-A/PWs(US & Br.-General Policy), box 23, entry 165, RG 331. SHAEF to USMMM, 12th AG, 21st AG, 6th AG, 25 June 1945, Message S-92930, 12th Army Group Adjutant General Decimal File, "383.6-POWs Vol. VII," box 200, entry 198, RG 331, NA. CG Ninth Army to SHAEF G-1, 7 May 1945, Message KX-21057, SHAEF AG Decimal File, "383.6," box 186 entry 56, RG 331, NA.

C.2.

Camp. Stalag II-A, Neubrandenburg, Mecklenberg

Location. About 100 kilometers due north of Berlin; 53°35'N- 13°15'W.

Camp population. At the end of April 1945, Stalag II-A held about 1,100 US POWs, among other nationalities. Additionally there were about 2,600 Americans at satellite work camps within a 50-kilometer radius.

Population gains or losses. Neubrandenburg was one of those overcrowded camps in the Soviet zone that received POWs evacuated from camps further east. During March and April 1945 the Germans partially evacuated II-A, established a number of new work kommandos in the area, and marched other groups of prisoners from the advancing Russians, either west toward the Elbe River or north toward Rostock. Consequently, many of the Americans from Stalag II-A were liberated from the satellite work camps (such as the one at Parchim, D-601, overrun by the Soviets on 3 May) or while they were on the march, not from the main camp.³⁴

Circumstances of liberation. By late April 1945, conditions at Stalag II-A were critical because of overcrowding and lack of medical supplies. On 24 April SHAEF requested and the Allied military mission in Moscow received Soviet clearance to airdrop supplies into the camp. The Red Army, probably the 70th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front, overran Neubrandenburg on 28 April.

Hubert Zemke (as told to Roger A. Freeman), Zemke's Stalag (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), pp. 83-114, provides a detailed account of conditions at Barth during the Red Army's occupation of the camp. Zemke makes clear that although conditions were not ideal, the Russians mostly were cooperative in arranging evacuation of the liberated prisoners; but, "Understandably our situation was a low priority in the scheme of things" (p. 108). Nor does Zemke give any indication that any Allied POWs were not repatriated, as the report from Sergeant Sherg suggested. Had the Soviets held back any POWs, it is almost certain that Zemke, as Senior Allied Officer, would have known and would have commented on the situation. That he did not, either in his contemporary reports and debriefing or in his postwar memoir, strongly suggests it did not happen.

³⁴ File 100-401, JAG War Crimes Branch, boxes 10-11, entry 144, RG 153, NA. These records in entry 144, RG 153, are a good source of information for conditions in particular POW camps and usually include some information about who liberated the camp and when. There are separate files for each of the principal camps.

Liberation brought additional problems, including reports of Red Army soldiers harassing sick prisoners, continuing food shortages, and other incidents.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. US POWs from this camp were returned to military control during the period approximately 10-14 May 1945.³⁵ The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 2,395 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag II-A (code 002).

C.3.

Camp. Stalag III-A, Luckenwalde, Brandenburg,

Location. Central Germany, 50 kilometers south of Berlin; 52°10'N- 13°20'E.

Camp population. In early 1945 US personnel consisted of about 1,500 ground forces enlisted men.

Population gains or losses. The POW population grew significantly from February to April 1945 as the Germans marched prisoners from camps further east to Stalag III-A. On 7 February for instance, 5,000 American POWs from Stalag III-B, Furstenburg, virtually the entire population of that camp, arrived at Luckenwalde. Because of this influx, the number of POWs reported at Stalag III-A varied considerably depending on the source and the date reported; for example: MIS-X War Department, 17 March 2,890 US; 69th Infantry Division, 2 May 5,500 US, 3,600 UK, 4,000+ other nationalities; Ninth Army G-1, 5-6 May 5,000 US; Wing Commander Collard, 7 May 16,000 total; Captain Gay, 11 May 4,500 US, 4,200 UK, 1,200 other nationalities; Staff Sergeant Gasperich, 9 June 5,000 US, 6,000 UK.

Circumstances of liberation. On 22 April 1945, the Red Army, probably troops of the 4th Guards Tank Army from the 1st Belorussian Front, arrived at Luckenwalde. But liberation for the Allied

³⁵ SHAEF to 30 Mission for Deane and Archer, 23 April 1945, Message FWD-19796, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6," box 88, entry 1, RG 331. Bomber Command Advance to HQ Bomber Command, 24 April 1945, Message BCA.118; CG Ninth Army to SHAEF FWD, 10 May 1945, Message KX-21203; SHAEF Main to CG Ninth Army, 13 May 1945, Message S-87885; CG Ninth Army to SHAEF MAIN, 14 May 1945, Message KX-21400, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6-7," box 87, entry 1, RG 331, NA.

POWs was by no means immediate; for most of the Americans in the camp it eventually came despite, not because of, Soviet efforts. From 22 April until 20 May, when the Soviets agreed to the formal evacuation of the camp, Soviet troops, on several occasions, reportedly used force to keep Allied prisoners in Stalag III-A. As Wing Commander R.C.M. Collard, the Senior Allied Officer, put it to the Russian officer purportedly responsible for the repatriation: "... we have had to continue to all intents and purposes as prisoners." The Russian commander would not allow evacuation until he received specific orders from Moscow. On at least four occasions between 6 and 8 May, the Soviets turned away American truck convoys, dispatched from the US Ninth Army zone west of the Elbe, to evacuate prisoners.

Despite Soviet resistance, nearly all of the US POWs, as well as many of the British, evacuated themselves during this period. They simply walked away from the camp and, on their own initiative, made their way to Allied lines, about 25 miles to the west. During the period 5 to 7 May, about 5,000 US POWs from Luckenwalde arrived in the Ninth Army zone; their evacuation from Germany was arranged through Airfield 16 at Hildesheim. When the Soviets finally agreed to formal evacuation on 20 May, less than 200 American prisoners remained in the camp.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 1,115 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag III-A (code 062).

The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 3,873 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag III-B, Furstenburg (code 004); these too, logically, were in fact liberated from Luckenwalde since all of III-B had been evacuated to III-A on 7 February 1945.³⁶

³⁶ 69 INF DIV to SHAEF, 2 May 1945, Message X52/02; "Report of Wing Commander R.C.M. Collard, RAF, to Russian Commandant for Repatriation at Stalag III-A," 7 May 1945, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "254," box 13, entry 6, RG 331, NA. ETO Provost Marshal Section, "Nominal Rolls of American POWs-Hildesheim," box 1, RG 332; other rosters of POWs from III-A are included in PWIB Subject File, "ETO Letters, May-June 1945," boxes 2182A-2183, entry 460A, RG 389, NA. Capt. Lawrence S. Cruickshank to CO 6801st MIS-X Detachment, 9 June 1945, ETO MIS-X, Decimal Correspondence, "383.6-Reports on E & E and

C.4.

Camp. Stalag IV-D, Torgau

Location. On the Elbe, northeast of Leipzig; 51°32'N- 13°0'E.

Camp population. Included about 300 US prisoners, most in work detachments, including doing factory work in nearby Halle.

Circumstances of liberation. The significance of this camp is that it was on the Elbe, near the meeting point of the Soviet and American armies. The US 69th Division, the first American unit to make contact with the Soviets, liberated Stalag IV-D on or about April 25, 1945. SHAEF had ordered the division commander to make arrangements with Soviet authorities for transfers of prisoners based on local conditions. The 5th Guards Army, which eventually occupied the area containing Stalag IV-D, controlled Soviet forces in this area.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 367 names of US prisoners of

RAMPs," box 8, RG 332, NA. Statement of SSgt. Joseph C. Gasperich (US Man of Confidence at III-A), nd.; Capt. S. Hamilton Gay (SHAEF G-2 officer at RAMP Camp No. 8) to Maj. P.S. MacCallum (SHAEF G-2), IS9/R8/GHQ21 11 May 1945; IS9/R8/GHQ24, 12 May 1945; IS9/R8/GHQ32, May 18, 1945, ETO MIS-X, Decimal Correspondence, "383.6-POWs(Allied)," box 9, RG 332, NA [series of reports on conditions at III-A and gradual evacuation by Americans]. Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, November 1, 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany" [p. 73 on Furstenburg evacuation]; War Department MIS-X, "German POW Camps W/American POWs, 17 March 1945, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2239, entry 460A, RG 389, NA. G-1 Ninth Army After Action Report (1-15 May 1945), G-1 Diary (5-6 May 1945), Ninth Army 109-11.4, World War II Operations Reports, box 2903, RG 407, NA. EX Report No. 645, 18 May 1945, "Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr. (Stalag III-A);" EX Report No. 673, 5 July 1945, "SSgt. Joseph C. Gasperich (Stalag III-A);" EX Report No. 679, 2 July 1945, "Capt. Lewis R. Meiserhelter, Jr. (Stalag III-A)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

A detailed account providing essential information on how the US POWs freed themselves from the Soviets at Stalag III-A is in Clarence R. Meltesen, Roads to Liberation From Oflag 64 (San Francisco: Oflag 64 Press, 1990), pp. 284-302 and 349-68.

war who were returned to military control from Stalag IV-D (code 095).³⁷

³⁷ MIS-X, WDGS, "German POW Camps With American PWs," 1 February 1945, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2239, entry 460A, RG 389, NA. CG Vth Corps to CG First Army, et al., 25 April 1945, Message R-7248, 12th Army Group Adjutant General Decimal File, "255-POW Camps, Vol.III," box 86, entry 198, RG 331. SHAEF to CG 69th Div., 4 May 1945, Message S-89987, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6-7," box 87, entry 1, RG 331, NA. EX Report No. 680, 24 July 1945, "Sgt. David T. Colin (Torgau, Germany)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA. File 100-406, JAG War Crimes Branch, box 14, entry 144, RG 153, NA.

C.5.

Camp. Stalag XVII-B, Gneixendorf, Austria

Location. 6 kilometers northwest of Krems; 48°27'N-15°39'E.

Camp population. The US prisoner population was mostly Army Air Forces enlisted men.

Population gains or losses. In the last weeks of the war the number of US POWs grew to over 4,200 as evacuees from other camps swelled its ranks. The entire camp approached nearly 30,000 POWs of various nationalities.

Circumstances of liberation. On 8 April 1945, about 4,000 able-bodied US POWs from XVII-B began an 18-day, 280-mile march under German guard to Braunau, Austria (on the Austrian-German border about 70 miles east of Munich).³⁸ Some 200 sick POWs remained behind in the camp hospital; on 9 May Soviet troops (likely from the 4th Guards Army, 2nd Ukrainian Front) overran Krems and liberated these men. Meanwhile, about 75 other Americans had escaped from the march columns and returned to XVII-B, also to be eventually liberated by the Soviets. Their treatment, while briefly in Red Army custody, was reported to have been "good."

On 3 May 1945, troops from the US 13th Armored Division, Third Army, arrived at the prison camp north of Braunau to which the American POWs from Stalag XVII-B had been moved. American and Soviet troops also liberated some POWs originally from Gneixendorf, who had escaped from the march columns headed to Braunau.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 2,983 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag XVII-B (code 025).³⁹

³⁸ Greg Hatton, Stories My Father Never Told Me: The Journal of the "San Antone Rose" (Brooklyn: Greg Hatton, 1993), pp. 85-89, plus one page of maps and three pages of photographs, relate to the march from XVII-B to Branau.

³⁹ Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 100-08, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389. ETO MIS-X Interviews with SSgts. Kenneth Kurterbach and Jos. A. Dillard, 29 May 1945, ETO MIS-X, Decimal Correspondence, "383.6-POWs(Allied)," box 9, RG 332. SSgt. Isaac Abeyta, 5

C.6.

Camp. Stalag IV-B, Muhlberg, Saxony

Location. On the Elbe River, 18 kilometers north-northwest of Riesa, in the Dresden district; 51°26'N-13°13'E.

Camp population. By early 1945 this camp included over 5,000 ground forces enlisted men.

Population gains or losses. This camp grew significantly after December 1944, in the wake of the Battle of the Bulge; evacuees from the east also added to its population in the period leading up to liberation in late April 1945.

Circumstances of liberation. Soviet forces, probably 5th Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reached the vicinity of Muhlberg on 23 April 1945. Most of the American POWs at this camp remained under Russian control until 4 May, when evacuated by the US 69th Division.⁴⁰ Despite the general link-up on 25 April between US troops and the Soviets in this immediate area, some of the British and US POWs remained in Soviet hands as late as mid-May. Others had escaped to American control beyond the Elbe soon after the Russians arrived. For those who remained in Russian custody, conditions and morale were reported as "bad."

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 7,614 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag IV-B (code 006).⁴¹

September 1945; TSgt. Richard Tuttle, 16 September 1945; TSgt. George P. Smith, 14 August 1945, "Statement or Report Of Interview Of Recovered Personnel," AGO Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, "383.6 (18 September 1945) and (31 August 1945)", box 2438, entry 360, RG 407, NA. EX Report No. 661, 5 June 1945, "SSgt. Kenneth J. Kurtenbach (Stalag XVII-B)," CPM Branch, WDGS MIS-X, "Interrogations," Subject File, Prisoner of War Information Branch, box 2006, Entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

⁴⁰ File 100-423, JAG War Crimes Branch, boxes 32-33, entry 144, RG 153, NA, contains accounts of POWs from IV-B; see particularly 100-423-79, testimony of Pvt. Howard T. Kennedy (37490643) on liberation by the Russians.

⁴¹ CG 69th Division to SHAEF, 1 May 1945, Message FS-IN-379; CG NINTH ARMY to SHAEF, 17 May 1945, Message KX-21617, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6/7," box 8, entry 1, RG 331, NA. SHAEF G-1 to PWX, 18 May 1945, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "383.6," box 25, entry 6, RG 331, NA.

D. LIBERATED LATE BY US FORCES; CAMPS RECEIVING EVACUEES FROM THE EAST

D.1.

Camp. Stalag VII-A, Moosburg, Bavaria

Location. On the Isur River, northeast of Munich; 48°21'N-11°57'E.

Camp population. Originally a camp for ground forces enlisted men; in the spring of 1945, Moosburg became the largest gathering place for American POWs in Germany.

Population gains or losses. Eventually, 15,000 American officers, NCOs, and enlisted men were concentrated at Moosburg. As many as 100,000 Allied POWs of other nationalities were also in the area. The first large influx came in early February when 4,000 officers from Stalag Luft III, Sagan, reached Moosburg. Many POWs from other camps throughout Germany moved to the vicinity of Moosburg during the early part of April. This created nearly overwhelming conditions of overcrowding and confusion.

Circumstances of liberation. The 14th Armored Division, US Third Army, liberated Moosburg on 27 April 1945, after a two-hour firefight.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 7,628 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag VII-A (code 013). This total does not include most of the large influx of POWs from February to April 1945; as explained in Appendix II, the PWIB/VA database sometimes significantly underrepresents numbers of POWs liberated from particular camps, because the "camp codes" included are for the initial camp to which a POW went and does not reflect transfers to other camps.⁴²

D.2.

Camp. Stalag IX-B, Bad Orb, Hesse-Nassau

⁴² Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 74-85, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

Location. About 51 kilometers northwest of Frankfurt-am-Main; 50°14'N-9°22'E.

Camp population. Ground forces enlisted personnel; initially most had been captured by the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge.

Population gains or losses. A large influx occurred in early March 1945, when over 1,000 POWs from Stalag XII-A, Limburg, were evacuated into IX-B. The camp population was then over 3,000.

Circumstances of liberation. American troops liberated the camp on 12 April 1945.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains 3,789 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag IX-B (code 089).⁴³

D.3.

Camp. Stalag XI-A, Altengrabow, Brandenburg, Prussia

Location. Northwest of Dessau; 51°50'N- 12°5'E.

Camp population. In mid-April 1945 SHAEF believed this camp held large numbers of Allied POWs, including as many as 8,000 Americans.

Population gains or losses. During March 1945, many American prisoners from XI-A were sent to work kommandos; the largest was at Stendal, holding about 2,000 men.

Circumstances of liberation. The camp was in the western reaches of the Soviet zone, only 18 miles from the US Ninth Army bridgehead on the Elbe River. Because sanitary conditions reportedly had deteriorated and because of the camp's close proximity to US forces, SHAEF wanted an early liberation of Stalag XI-A. On 4 May 1945, before the camp was overrun by the Soviets (probably the 28th Army, 1st Belorussian Front), a PWX contact team from Headquarters XIX Corps, Ninth Army, went in under a flag of truce arranged with the local German commander and brought out the American prisoners. There turned out to be considerably fewer

⁴³ Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, 1 November 1945, "American Prisoners of War in Germany", pp. 86-92, Subject File POW Information Bureau, box 2197, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

Americans than originally estimated. The total camp population, however, was very large, consisting of about 16,500 of various nationalities.

Accounting of US POWs & other remaining questions. The number of US POWs liberated by from Stalag XI-A was reported on 4 May as 747 by XIXth Corps, but as 1,241 by Ninth Army. The higher number likely included those from outlying work camps.

The Veterans Administration list prepared from the Prisoner of War Information Bureau IBM cards contains only 53 names of US prisoners of war who were returned to military control from Stalag XI-A (code 094).⁴⁴

⁴⁴ SHAEF G-1 PWX to SHAEF G-3, "Aid to Allied POWs at Altegrabow, 19 April 1945; SHAEF G-3 to Chief of Staff, "Aid to Allied POWs at Altegrabow," 24 April 1945; SHAEF FWD to SAARF Rear, 24 April 1945, Message FWD-19854, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6-7," box 87, entry 1, RG 331, NA. Ninth Army to SHAEF FWD, 4 May 1945, Message X-21974; XIX Corps to 12th Army Group, 4 May 1945, Message M-49009, 12th Army Group Adjutant General Decimal File, "255-POW Camps, Vol. III," box 86, entry 198, RG 331, NA. Information about liberation of the camp can be found in File 100-481, JAG War Crimes Branch, box 47, entry 144, RG 153, NA.

REPATRIATION OF AMERICANS THROUGH ODESSA

Over 2,800 American POWs, liberated from camps in Poland that were overrun by the Red Army in January 1945, were eventually evacuated through the Black Sea port of Odessa. Most accounts of US-USSR POW exchanges in 1945 describe at length the Odessa evacuation process.⁴⁵ It is the best documented aspect of those exchanges by far, largely because of the role played by representatives of the US Military Mission to Moscow. Despite problems in the Odessa operation and the reluctant assistance of the Soviets, it was nearly the single positive experience of the US-USSR POW exchanges. The only one to function anything like originally planned. As one contemporary account put it: "Odessa was the only really cooperative concentration point, and, sole transit camp. It was opened to American contact officers on 26 February, the same day that the first echelon of prisoners arrived. Although very hastily organized, the Odessa camp was quite satisfactory even by American standards. It was one of the few positive contributions the Soviets made to the Repatriation Plan."⁴⁶

The POWs evacuated from Odessa came principally from two German camps—Oflag 64 (Schubin, Poland), overrun 21 January 1945, and Stalag III-C (Kustrin, Poland), overrun 31 January. A few Americans (about 100) from Stalag II-B (Hammerstein, Prussia), overrun 26 February, also came through Odessa. Information about the liberation of these camps did not reach the Military Mission in Moscow until early February, in part an indication of the Russian unpreparedness to deal with freed Allied prisoners in their zone of operations. Some of the first accounts to reach the Moscow mission came directly from ex-POWs who had made their way, largely by their own means and initiative, the almost 1,000 miles from Oflag 64 to Moscow. Other information came from the Polish Foreign Office in Lublin. By mid-February the American

⁴⁵ See, for instance, Mark R. Elliott, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), pp. 56-74.

⁴⁶ Report of the US Military Mission to Moscow, p. 283, 18 October 1943 - 31 October 1945, ID 929087, Top Secret Intelligence Documents, 1943-59, RG 319, NA.

mission had contact teams organized and ready to proceed to Lublin to prepare the freed POWs for air evacuation from the US Army Air Force's shuttle bombing base at Poltava in Ukraine.⁴⁷

The Soviets, however, had other plans. They limited the access of American contact teams and made clear that the evacuation of the POWs was to be on Soviet terms and from the Black Sea port of Odessa. From the time of the initial liberation of the camps until late February 1945, the Soviets gradually gathered the freed prisoners at a series of concentration points, including Cracow, Lodz, Lublin, Praga, and Rembertow. On 22 February the Soviets started rail movements of POWs from these points south to Odessa. On 26 February the first group of prisoners arrived, almost simultaneously with the contact team sent from the Moscow embassy to coordinate repatriation and shipment out of the USSR. Within the first day, 252 POWs had arrived; so did food, medical, and clothing supplies. Facilities and treatment at Odessa remained spartan, lacking all amenities and some necessities, such as heat and hot water. But the Soviets exhibited at least a measure of cooperation with the American contact team in the evacuation effort.⁴⁸

That cooperation did not, however, extend to the American contact team sent to Poland to assist in locating, transporting, and evacuating the freed POWs scattered throughout the countryside. Despite prior agreement that several US contact teams would be permitted in the Soviet zone of operations in Poland where the overrun camps were located, the Soviets allowed only one team, headed by Lieutenant Colonel James D. Wilmeth, at Lublin. Wilmeth arrived in Lublin on 27 February and departed 28 March. During this month, the Soviets were uncooperative, evasive, and generally unhelpful to Wilmeth's mission. Although Wilmeth

⁴⁷MajGen. Edward W. Hill (Air Division, USMMM) to MajGen. N.V. Slavin (Asst. Chief of Staff, Soviet Army), 14 February 1945; LtCol. Andre Lord, "Statement of Capts. Frank Olevsky and Eugene M. Witt," ca. 19 February 1945; Deane to Marshall, Radio Message M-22715, 14 February 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23, entry 309, RG 334, NA; Elliott, Pawns of Yalta, p.59.

⁴⁸The following are a sample of reports describing the POW transit camp and conditions at Odessa: Crockett to Deane, 28 February, 5 March 8 March and 17 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23; and Maj. Paul S. Hall to USMMM, 8 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

acquired from the Soviets some information regarding Allied prisoners, they did not allow him to perform the active coordination of POW repatriation. His frustration with these Soviet actions was manifest in his subsequent reports to Major General John Deane, head of the Military Mission in Moscow. "I received no cooperation, no help from the Soviets—only hindrance and annoyance. They refused to accept the help I had to offer them." ⁴⁹

Throughout the period during which POWs were moving towards Odessa, the estimate of numbers likely to be evacuated fluctuated. Officers at the US Military Mission in Moscow initially believed that most of the POW population, about 4,600 men from three camps (Schubin, Kustrin, and Hammerstein), were headed east and south to Odessa. But in fact, many of the prisoners from those camps, including all but a handful from Hammerstein, actually went west with the Germans. Those freed POWs who did head east, moreover, did not travel in large groups, even after the Soviets finally made some effort to concentrate them at Cracow, Lodz, Lublin, Praga, and Rembertow, prior to shipment to Odessa. The groups awaiting transport or who were en route often numbered in the dozens, not the hundreds; this further confounded accurate accounting. Because of disinterest and disorganization, Soviet authorities were in no position to provide accurate estimates until the prisoners actually arrived at Odessa. ⁵⁰

The problems of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the numbers of POWs liberated in Poland and evacuated through Odessa is encapsulated in the experience of Wilmeth at Lublin. On 28 February he met with a Lieutenant Colonel Vlasov, representing the Soviet POW repatriation mission in Poland, who said 2,422 Americans already had arrived at Odessa, with another 519 POWs en route or soon to be shipped. Although Vlasov had accounted for 3,361 Americans, he stated he did not know the total number liberated by Soviet forces. Vlasov's figures clearly were in error. In fact, the first Americans had only just arrived at Odessa on the 26th, about the same

⁴⁹ Lt. Col. James D. Wilmeth, "Report on a Visit to Lublin, Poland, 27 February - 28 March 1945;" "Memorandum to General Deane: Lublin Trip," 13 April 1945; Wilmeth, n.d., "Report on the Soviet Reaction toward American participation in evacuation of American prisoners of war from Poland;" USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁵⁰ AGWAR from Deane, Radio Message 22990, March 1, 1945; Hall to Crockett, Radio Message 042355Z, 6 March 1945; Golubev to Deane, 16 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23, entry 306, RG 334, NA.

time Vlasov insisted there were 2,422 already at the port. At a minimum, his numbers of “shipped” and “arrived” must have counted some POWs more than once. Vlasov’s only accurate claim was acknowledging that he did not know the total number of prisoners the Red Army had liberated. At a second meeting with Wilmeth on 12 March, Vlasov furnished “corrected” numbers, reduced by about half to 1,774 arrived at or en route to Odessa. Vlasov said he still did not know the total number liberated.⁵¹

By 27 March 1945, most (but not all) of the Americans who would be, had been evacuated from Odessa. By that date they had departed in three shipments; on 7 March, 1,207 aboard Moreton Bay, bound for Port Said; on 15 March, 482 aboard Duchess of Bedford, bound for Malta; and on 27 March, 860 aboard Circissia (Duchess of Richmond), bound for Naples. For over two months thereafter, however, the “stragglers,” some from hospitals, some previously AWOLs, some who had otherwise been delayed or detained, departed Odessa as space became available on merchant ships or on foreign vessels engaged in the ongoing embarkation of foreign POWs. For example, there were 17 aboard Bergensfiord on 7 April, 16 aboard Brand Whitlock on 18 April, eight aboard Staffordshire on 21 April, and so forth.⁵²

On 20 April 1945 Wilmeth provided his accounting of American prisoners from the POW camps liberated in Poland and evacuated from Odessa. Wilmeth based his assessment on evidence from returned prisoners, as well as from Soviet and Polish officials with whom he had dealt. He concluded that about 2,800 US POWs (1,000 from Oflag 64, 1,700 from Stalag III-C, and only 100 from Stalag II-B) “fell into Red Army hands.” American officials had accounted for about 2,700 of this 2800 by 20 April. The remaining 100, Wilmeth concluded, were “people sick in

⁵¹Lt. Col. James D. Wilmeth, “Report on a Visit to Lublin, Poland, 27 February - 28 March 1945,” p.4 and p.7, USMMM Subject File, “POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa,” box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁵²Col. James C. Crockett, “Memorandum For General Deane,” 27 March 1945, provides the accounting as of March 27. This memo also indicates that Odessa was the point of embarkation for US POWs coming out of Poland; only 22 other POWs had been evacuated by air from Poltava and 8 from Moscow. Regular memos of telephone conversations with the contact team in Odessa in the same file document the continuing, but much smaller, evacuations, after 27 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, “POWs,” box 23, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

private homes, in Polish hospitals, or in some cases Russian hospitals...; or disgruntled, able-bodied Americans who are hiding out until they get some assurance that they will be evacuated back home. A small percentage have married- probably not more than 10 men." Wilmeth believed that "except for these small numbers of stranded personnel" the POW problem in Poland was finished. The Soviets had returned to US control the American POWs they had liberated.⁵³ This accounting was from an officer harshly critical of the general level of Soviet cooperation and treatment of liberated US POWs.

A month after Wilmeth's assessment, the US Military Mission in Moscow prepared a list of all American POWs evacuated from Poland through the USSR. There were 2,983 names on the list; this, unfortunately, included both POWs and non-POW Army Air Forces personnel evacuated from Odessa, but with no distinction between categories.⁵⁴ The "official" tally of US prisoners evacuated through Odessa, first reported on the 12 May 1945, daily SHAEF report "Data on Evacuation of Recovered Prisoners of War," was 2,858. This is the same number used in the official European Theater history of the POW recovery operation. Allowing for stragglers, late returnees, and other recovery problems, this number is remarkably consistent with Wilmeth's 20 April analysis and the 18 May listing from the Moscow mission. There is no concrete evidence to challenge its basic accuracy.⁵⁵

⁵³LtCol. James D. Wilmeth to General Roberts, "Status of POW Evacuation," 20 April 1945 USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁵⁴Maj. G.C. Rich, AC/S G-1 (Personnel), "Master List of American Prisoners of War," 18 May 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁵⁵ Report No. 3, 12 May 1945, "Daily Evacuation Cables," 370.05/1, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, box 22, Entry 6, RG 331, NA; Chief Historian, European Command, RAMP's: The Recovery and Repatriation of Liberated Prisoners of War (Frankfurt-am-Main: European Command, 1947), p. 26.

STRAGGLERS: THE EFFORT TO RECOVER LIVE POWS IN 1945

The circumstances surrounding the evacuation and liberation of German POW camps in early 1945 resulted in innumerable American "stragglers" throughout the area eventually occupied by the Red Army. These included those sick, wounded, and otherwise immobile prisoners who had to be left behind when the Germans evacuated the camps. Some of these men subsequently went into Polish or Soviet military hospitals. Other POWs fell out or escaped along the route of the evacuation marches. Still other groups of POWs were abandoned as their German guards simply walked away from work kommandos, POW hospitals, and other satellite installations, in the face of the Soviet advance. The fragmentation of the POW population in Poland and East Prussia continued even after the Red Army overran the area, because of the manner in which prisoners were moved east, deeper into the Soviet zone.

The US Military Mission to Moscow and SHAEF made considerable effort to enlist Soviet cooperation in locating and repatriating these stragglers. From early 1945 through the summer of that year, they continually queried Soviet authorities for information on specific individuals known to have been POWs of the Germans but who had not "returned to military control" (RMC). The requests usually were based on information provided by ex-POWs who had been debriefed on their captivity.

A number of problems plagued the search for these stragglers. American officials wanted accurate identification of all POWs who were evacuated, in order to prevent Germans, Poles, Russians, or other nationalities from passing themselves off as Americans. A report of the Odessa contact team described one such problem: "Hall is holding one man named Kelbinski because he is not properly identified. Hall is not at all sure he is an American. The man did not know what unit he had been in." Until the War Department verified identification, such individuals were held at Odessa, or at Camp Lucky Strike, near Le Havre, before receiving final clearance for transportation to the United States.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Col. James C. Crockett, "Record of Conversation with Major Hall at Odessa," 6 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

Inaccurate information also hampered identification. SHAEF, the European Theater Provost Marshal, and the Military Mission to Moscow received many inquiries regarding individuals believed to have been POWs but who apparently had not returned to military control. But often the inquiry was dated (the man had already returned), or did not clearly identify the correct individual (misspelled names and incorrect service numbers were a serious problem). In July 1945, for example, there were a number of exchanges about "Captain P.C. Ghaffagnino," reported to have been in Oflag 64. No one had information on the release of this officer. But in fact, "Peter C. Graffagino" (with the same service number and obviously the same man) had been released and returned.⁵⁷

The effort to locate stragglers continued on several fronts throughout 1945. The Military Mission to Moscow coordinated inquiries from other Allied sources and passed them through Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, the Soviet Administrator for Repatriation; for instance: "Inclosed is a list of Americans previously reported to be in Poland who, according to our records, have not yet been evacuated. It is urgently requested that a search be made to locate these men and evacuate them as soon as possible. I would greatly appreciate early information concerning your findings as we are, of course, anxious to contact and evacuate every American still remaining in Poland."⁵⁸

More proactive measures were also underway. During the early summer of 1945, for instance, just beyond the Third US Army area of occupation, SHAEF POW Executive Branch personnel physically searched in the Soviet zone as far east as Prague, Tabor (Czechoslovakia), Melnik (Czechoslovakia), Loeben (Austria), and Vienna, recovering a number of British and American personnel. Although the American POW contact team departed Odessa on 14 June 1945, the Office of the Assistant US Naval Attaché at the port continued to receive and pursue, as

⁵⁷ See messages dated 27 June, 1 July and 5 July 1945, regarding this case in 12th Army Group Adjutant General Decimal File, "383.6-POWs, Vol. VII," box 200, entry 198, RG 331, NA.

⁵⁸ Deane to Golubev, 18 May 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

late as 1946, inquiries regarding ex-POWs reported to have been in that area. Despite these efforts, few stragglers were recovered after June 1945.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Third Army (signed Craig) to 12th Army Group PWX, Cable M-67091, 5 July 1945, 12th Army Group Adjutant General Decimal File, "383.6-POWs, Vol. VII," box 200, entry 198, RG 331, NA; there are a number of letters and cable of this type in Office of Naval intelligence, Naval Attaché-Moscow, ANA-Odessa Subject File, 1945-7, "POWs," box 45, RG 38, NA.

RECORD-KEEPING AND DOCUMENTATION OF POW STATUS

With the large numbers of POWs being liberated from German camps at the end of the war, including inter-Allied transfers, creation and maintenance of records was essential for an accurate final accounting. Although the Allies carefully planned for this and attempted to verify identification of released POWs against known information, in execution, the process did not work smoothly.

On 29 December 1941, the War Department established the Prisoner of War Information Bureau (PWIB) in the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Among other responsibilities, the bureau was to handle all information concerning American military personnel in enemy hands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and merchant marine), as well as those interned in neutral territory. The PWIB received information about recently captured or interned Americans from the State Department, the American Red Cross, and the International Red Cross.

Normally, notification that an individual had been captured began with the enemy government. German authorities, for instance, would inform one of the neutral "protecting powers," Switzerland or Sweden, that they had captured an American. This information was then passed by cable to the US State Department and forwarded to the PWIB. One cable would likely have contained basic information (name, rank, service number, etc.) on dozens of recently captured Americans. The bureau would break down the long lists of names received by cable, prepare individual files and other records, and disseminate information to the next of kin. As the PWIB received additional information about an individual POW, it would update the files.

Two unique record keeping procedures were utilized. "Flex-o-line" strip files were loose single file line entries, similar to a teletype message, showing last known information about a POW. The entries would be sorted alphabetically by surname and additional names easily could be added. Periodically, the PWIB would prepare photostatic copies of these strip files in order to create lists of known POWs for use by overseas theater Provost Marshal and casualty accounting personnel.⁶⁰ The bureau also prepared IBM machine record cards on every reported POW,

⁶⁰ The preparation of these files is described in Assistant Provost Marshal General to ETO Provost Marshal General, "Microfilm Records-American Prisoners of War," 27 September 1944, PWIB Subject File, "POWs-Strength Reports," box 2239A, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

indicating name, rank, service number, branch, detaining power, camp location, and other personnel information. The camp location codes allowed authorities to sort the cards and create rosters of POWs believed to be in particular camps, a useful measure when German POW camps were being overrun late in the war. Unfortunately, the movement of prisoners from camp to camp, particularly the mass evacuations begun in January 1945, seldom were reflected in the coding of the machine record cards.⁶¹

Planning for the recovery of POWs at the European Theater level took cognizance of the need to account for and document thoroughly the liberated POWs; the contemporary acronym was "RAMP," recovered Allied military personnel. The operative planning documents were the ECLIPSE plans, prepared by SHAEF for postwar operations in Germany, especially ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 8, "Care and Evacuation of POWs in Greater Germany," and ETO Standard Operating Procedure No. 58, "Reception, Processing, Maintenance, and Disposition of Recovered Allied Military Personnel." These documents emphasized the need to identify POWs positively, by interrogations, check of personal papers and unit personnel records, and by check against PWIB and War Department casualty records. Thorough identification was necessary because planners anticipated that Germans and other nationalities would attempt to pass themselves off as American POWs. Once positive identification was established: "All personnel included in the scope of the ETO-SOP will, when recovered,... be reported by nominal roll as prescribed hereunder." These rolls, in effect rosters, became the principal documentary record accounting for and controlling groups of POWs during the repatriation process.⁶² The US-Soviet agreements governing delivery of POWs through army lines did not specify which side was responsible for preparing transfer documentation, such as the nominal rolls. In fact, although regulations required

⁶¹ Office of the Provost Marshal General, World War II: A Brief History (Washington: PMGO, 1946), pp. 525-43.

⁶² ETO SOP No. 58, 3 April 1945, ETO MIS-X, Decimal Correspondence, "388-Post Hostilities Planning," box 11, RG 332, NA.

the nominal rolls for recovered US and British POWs, they were not mandatory for other allied prisoners. Evidence suggests that the US and British did the rolls, not the Soviets.⁶³

Although there were some problems, the process of identification and documentation of liberated US POWs worked reasonably well, much as stipulated in SOP 58 and under the ECLIPSE plans, for those prisoners who came out through Odessa. The numbers involved were small and there were Prisoner of War Executive Branch (PWX) contact team personnel in place to monitor the process. It did not work nearly so well, nor was it done systematically, for the large numbers of POWs liberated in western and southern Germany by US units. Finally, it certainly did not work well for those Americans who were liberated by the Red Army in central and northern Germany from mid-April to early-May and who were repatriated across the front lines.

The biggest problem was keeping up with the large flow of POWs liberated in a brief period of time. Nominal rolls, the principal means of control and accounting for released POWs, were not always prepared and forwarded in a timely way to European Theater headquarters. The rolls sometimes were compiled at the liberated camp, but were more often done at the large POW collection points along the western front in such cities as Erfurt, Halle, Hildesheim, and Luneburg. Because of the desire to get the liberated POWs evacuated from Germany quickly, almost always by air, records creation sometimes suffered. As reported by one American corps headquarters on its liberation of a POW work camp (kommando): "Since the Group was not under complete control, this headquarters was unable to make an accurate count of the kommando."⁶⁴

Despite such problems, nominal rolls were key documents in reporting on the liberation and evacuation of US POWs. Copies of these rolls are extant today in the National Archives as part of the records of the European Theater of Operations Provost Marshal Section. The lists for Erfurt, Halle, Hildesheim, and Luneburg appear most relevant for those men liberated by the

⁶³ SHAEF Plan for Delivery Through Army Lines of Former POWs, 27 May 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 25, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁶⁴ AC/S G-1, HQ V Corps to AC/S FUSA, 20 April 1945, 12th Army Group Adjutant General Decimal File, "383.6-Nominal Rolls," box 201, entry 198, RG 331, NA.

Soviets. Most of the lists are arranged by date of evacuation, thereunder alphabetically by surname; each entry also includes service number, rank, military organization, POW number, and camp name or number.⁶⁵

There was another important aspect of the identification and documentation process. The War Department and the War Office furnished SHAEF officials with lists of known British and US POWs in Germany, against which to check and verify the RAMPS. But there also existed large numbers of "missing" personnel, "concerning whom it has not been possible to obtain any information." In order to determine the status of MIAs, POW contact officers were instructed to search records in the German camps.⁶⁶

As Allied forces overran German territory, they captured, nearly intact, the German Army Information Center for War Losses (the German acronym was WAST), located at Saalfeld and Meiningen (near Erfurt). The records of Bureau VIII, which maintained documentation on Allied POWs in German custody, were exploited in the efforts to recover POWs, identify and verify missing-in-action, and locate burial sites of previously unaccounted for personnel.

On 23 April 1945, Bureau VIII at Meiningen reopened, operated largely by the original German staff but under US Army authority and supervised by personnel of the Adjutant General, Headquarters European Theater. The basic German documents for enemy POWs, the personnelkarten, which included all relevant information about a particular prisoner, normally were maintained at the camp in which the POW was held. These documents were sent to Bureau VIII only when the Germans released or repatriated the POW or upon his death. However, lists of prisoners recently received, POW rosters, and similar documents prepared at the camps were sent to Bureau VIII for transmission through neutral or Red Cross channels to the POW's home government. Using these WAST sources, Bureau VIII personnel created 85,000 identity cards on

⁶⁵ ETO Provost Marshal Section, "Nominal Rolls of American POWs," boxes 1-12, RG 332, NA. For information relating to nominal rolls see Col. C.R. Landon, AG 12th Army Group, to CG ETO, 3 April 1945, 12th Army Group AG Decimal File, 383.6-POW Policy Vol. I, box 197, entry 198, RG 331, NA; SHAEF MAIN to 12th Army Group, 23 May 1945, Message S-89125, SHAEF MAIN to 12th Army Group, May 25, 1945, Message S-89273, SHAEF AG Decimal File, "383.6-1," box 186, entry 56, RG 331, NA.

⁶⁶ ECLIPSE Memo No. 8, 19 March 1945, 13-14, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6," box 87, entry 1, RG 331, NA.

US POWs, 58,000 after the 23 April reopening. The reconstituted bureau also accumulated 10,000 burial records for American personnel. Most were not POWs, but aircrew killed-in-action and buried on German-controlled territory. Finally, Bureau VIII did receive the personnelkarten for about 10,000 Americans held at Stalag IV-G and Stalag XII-A, two camps overrun by US forces.⁶⁷

Some of these German records relating to Allied POWs survive as part of the POW Information Bureau, General Subject File, Record Group 389, others are in the National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, Record Group 242. The original personnelkarten from Stalags IV-G and Stalag XII-A are in this record group. Most of the other relevant captured German records are microfilmed as part of the records of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) (on National Archives Microfilm Publication T-77) and Oberkommando des Herres (OKH) (on T-84).

⁶⁷ Adjutant General ETO to G-1 SHAEF, 5 May 1945, "Records of Allied Personnel at Meiningen,;" Adjutant General ETO to G-1 SHAEF, 11 June 1945, "German Records of Allied Prisoners-- Summary Report," SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "383.6," box 25, entry 6, RG 331, NA. Adjutant General ETO to Adjutant General War Department, 11 June 1945, "German Records of Prisoners of War," AG 383.6 (11 June 1945), AGO Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, box 2439, entry 360, RG 407, NA.

“THE FOG OF WAR”: FACTORS AFFECTING POW RECOVERY

The contemporary record indicates that American and Allied authorities at the War Department, SHAEF, and the US Military Mission to Moscow were concerned with the lack of accurate information regarding Allied prisoners of war. There were questions about exact locations where the Germans held American POWs, where they moved Allied prisoners, the number under German control, and especially the number liberated by Soviet forces. The end of the war in Europe on 8 May 1945, did not lead to immediate clarification of these several points. There were several reasons for these problems, not the least of which were the extremely confusing and rapidly changing conditions in Germany as the fronts collapsed during the early months of 1945 and the war drew to a close. There were bureaucratic reasons, as well.

Under the best of circumstances, confirmation of an individual's POW casualty status normally lagged several weeks behind the actual event. After capturing an American soldier or airman, the Germans would inform the International Red Cross or representatives of one of the neutral “protecting powers” (Switzerland or Sweden) that the individual was a POW. Through diplomatic channels, these sources passed the information to the American State Department who forwarded it to the military authorities. Although the personnel departments of the respective services were involved in the process, the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Office of the Provost Marshal General at the War Department was the centralized repository for information about all US POWs, regardless of service. The several channels through which information passed contributed to the slowness of the process. The evacuation of POW camps by the Germans and their movement of entire prisoner populations toward the west compounded the difficulties of this reporting process. Finally, with respect to US prisoners liberated by the Soviets, the seeming lack of clearly defined procedures, general disorganization, and indifference to the POWs on the part of the liberating forces, further exacerbated an already confused situation.

Gathering accurate and, more particularly, up to date statistics on the number of American POWs held by the Germans was increasingly difficult by the end of the war. The situation was not limited to POWs in areas overrun by the Soviet Army. Disruption of German communications by Allied action was a significant factor in the delayed transmission of POW

information to the Swiss and Swedes, which by the spring of 1945 was "months behind."⁶⁸ By mid-April 1945, confusion reigned. The SHAEF POW Executive Branch reported: "Owing to the rapidity of the advance on the Western Front it has become exceedingly difficult to obtain quick and even accurate information on PW recovered, and it will inevitably be some little time before a detailed picture is available."⁶⁹ The US Military Mission to Moscow reported in a similar vein: "The accuracy of the information we have on locations of POW camps and numbers of prisoners is open to question." The Mission did know that the Germans evacuated many of the prisoners and speculated that consequently the Soviets were likely not to liberate as many American POWs as initially estimated.⁷⁰ The British faced similar problems. On 23 April 1945, the War Office declared that because of the transfer of prisoners by the Germans it was "impossible [to] make any reliable estimate [of] numbers of British Commonwealth PW likely to fall into Russian hands."⁷¹ Reporting problems continued well after VE Day. On 30 May, the War Department complained that European Theater authorities were not always reporting promptly the movement back to the United States of liberated POWs. Over 4,000 had just arrived with no authorizing order or prior notification of the War Department.⁷²

Documenting the experience of US POWs liberated by or in Red Army custody is made even more difficult because of the lax Soviet administrative procedures for dealing with them. Numerous contemporary observers commented on this problem. Consequently, estimates or even specific numbers of Allied POWs furnished by the Soviet authorities must be examined critically. One American POW, released in February 1945 from a camp in Poland, commented that Soviet

⁶⁸History of the Theater Provost Marshal, 1 October 1944-8 May 1945, ETO Historian File, ADM 567, RG 332, NA.

⁶⁹ SHAEF PWX Fortnightly Bulletin No. 8, 18 April 1945, 12th Army Group G-1 Subject File, "114," box 24, entry 165, RG 331, NA.

⁷⁰USMMM to AGWAR, Cable M-24009, 22 April 1945, Outgoing Cables, box 59, entry 310, RG 334, NA.

⁷¹War Office to 30 Military Mission Moscow, 23 April 1945, Message 87814 PW-5, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6-11," box 88, entry 1, RG 331, NA.

⁷²AGWAR from Marshall to COMZONE for Lee, 30 May 1945, Message WX-90358, SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6-7," box 87, entry 1, RG 331, NA.

troops observed no sanitary rules and displayed "little discipline" of any sort."⁷³ Other observers noted the complete unpreparedness of the Soviets to deal with liberated POWs or with displaced persons in their zone, even weeks after VE Day.⁷⁴ Perhaps the crux of the problem, at least in terms of attempting to document the process, was that for the Red Army "paper work seemed to be a forgotten thing along the front."⁷⁵

Kenneth Bargmann, a former POW, who in early February 1945 was liberated from Stalag III-C, Kustrin, confirmed the Soviet Army's inattention to paperwork and general disinterest in liberated Allied prisoners. Following initial liberation, US POWs remained at Stalag III-C for several days before Soviet troops finally exercised complete control over the area, about 1-2 February 1945. But even then, the Soviets did little to provide for, or to exercise control over, the American POWs. Nor did Bargmann recall any attempt by the Soviets to document or account for the POWs. From the time the Soviets liberated Stalag III-C until he returned to US custody, Bargmann said he was never asked to provide any basic identification or personal information to any Soviet official. He believed the Soviets with whom he had contact neither made, acquired, nor kept records on US POWs, although they did take occasional "head counts."⁷⁶

The western Allies recognized the problems these practices would create in terms of identifying liberated POWs in Soviet Army custody. The SHAEF staff section responsible for POWs cabled the War Department on 23 May: "Observation shows that due to loose

⁷³ Crockett to Harriman, 1 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 23, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁷⁴ Maj. DeRosen to Col. Koltick, 15 June 1945, File 112, G-1 Misc. Branch, 12th Army Group, box 24, entry 165, RG 331, NA.

⁷⁵ Capt. Wm. Fitchen, Report on Interviews with Former POWs, 6 March 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁷⁶ Kenneth Bargmann interview with TK Nenninger, 9 May 1995, Washington DC.

administrative system in Red Army we cannot expect to get any worthwhile information on men in their custody for some time.”⁷⁷

⁷⁷ SHAEF G-1 to AGWAR, 23 May 1945, Message S-89142, SHAEF G-1 Decimal File, "337-2, Conference-Halle," box 22, entry 6, RG 331, NA.

Treatment of Liberated American POWs by the Soviet Army

Following return to military control, the Military Intelligence Service had about half of the POWs freed by the Soviets in late January and early February 1945 complete questionnaires relating to their entire POW experience. For the most part, these POWs were among the 2,858 who came out through Odessa.

There was no consensus among the American POWs as to the quality of treatment the Soviets provided. A few wrote of extremely harsh, brutal treatment, including beatings, robbing prisoners of watches and other personal possessions, and conscious denial of food, shelter, transport, and medical supplies. Some thought this harsh attitude on the part of Soviet soldiers stemmed from a more general attitude toward the countries the Red Army had liberated: "Prisoners are spoils of war won by Soviet arms. They [sic] may be robbed, starved, and abused... an [sic] no one has the right to question such treatment." ⁷⁸

Many others, however, commented on an entirely different quality of Soviet treatment: "They wanted to give me everything they had." A fairly common experience seems to have been that once the Soviets determined a freed POW was American, the treatment improved. Probably the most balanced assessment is summarized by one American lieutenant who declared: "In my opinion we were treated well according to Russian standards. This must be kept in mind because their standards are far below ours..." Another POW later reflected: "The Russians oversimplified their support of liberated kriegys [POWs]. It could be characterized as striking the least common denominator of using one solution for all cases.... At least some of them seem to have been inserted between bedlam and chaos where there was little evidence of Russian management and little opportunity for Allies to obtain services. Agreeing to transport groups to the rear and then forgetting about it created much hard feeling." ⁷⁹ Clearly, cultural differences

⁷⁸ Lt.Col. James D. Wilmeth, "Report on a Visit to Lublin, Poland, 27 February - 28 March 1945," USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁷⁹ Col. H.E. Hixon to AC/S G-1, 19 April 1945, forwarded to Chief of US Military Mission to Moscow, USMMM Subject File, "POWs-Personnel Evacuated Through Odessa," box 22, entry 309, RG 334, NA; Clarence R. Meltesen, Roads to Liberation From Oflag 64 (San Francisco: Oflag 64 Press, 1990), p. 346.

played a role in how Soviet troops treated liberated Allied prisoners. That the Soviet Union had lost 24 million people during the war also likely affected their concern for and interest in the POWs they freed.

Analysts from the Military Intelligence Service evaluated information contained in the questionnaires in order to reach some general conclusions on Soviet treatment of US POWs. The MIS determined that 56% of the respondents thought the Soviets treated them well in light of Soviet standards and the tactical situation. Slightly less than seven percent thought the treatment was bad, reflecting varying degrees of physical hardship and outright mistreatment. About one-third of the respondents believed their treatment to have been indifferent, because the Soviets were preoccupied with other matters; and thus, they left the POWs to fend for themselves.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ MIS-X, WDGS, "Statements of Evacuees from German P/W Camps Reporting Experiences in Russia," 3 April 1945, ETO MIS-X Decimal Correspondence, "383.6-POWs(Allied)", box 9, RG 332, NA.

WORLD WAR II AMERICAN POW AND MIA STATISTICS AND CASUALTY
ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES

For a number of reasons, it is difficult to determine accurate, consistent, and reliable POW and MIA statistics relating to American World War II-era service personnel. As POWs were recovered from captivity after VE and VJ Day the number in each category changed.⁸¹ The numbers changed further as the services learned additional information about specific cases and issued "presumptive findings of death" or "reports of death" for personnel who did not return to military control and whose bodies were not recovered. For example, the number in each casualty category would be significantly different on 8 May 1945; 2 September 1945; 1 January 1946 or 1 January 1950.

The July 1991 Department of Defense POW-MIA Fact Book states: "...approximately 78,750 Americans were unaccounted for from World War II..."⁸² Even though this statement is in the past tense and "unaccounted for" is not synonymous with MIA, its meaning can be and has been misinterpreted. What happened to those servicemen is known; they are dead. The circumstances surrounding the deaths also is known in more or less detail, depending on the individual case. But the remains for those individuals, unfortunately, have not been recovered.

During World War II approximately 359,000 deaths occurred among American military personnel overseas. As of 1955 a total of 280,835 remains had been recovered from all theaters of war. Of this total 270,479 were identified, but 10,356 of the recovered remains were not identified.⁸³ The remains of a much larger number of the dead, over 78,000, were never recovered. The reasons should be evident - amphibious and naval operations on a vast scale;

⁸¹ War Department authorities had serious difficulties reconciling the sometimes conflicting sources of information. Other problems resulted because chaotic conditions in Europe, particularly beginning early in 1945, interrupted the previously accurate and relatively prompt German system of reporting Allied casualties (both POWs and deaths) through neutral channels. These difficulties are described in Brig. Gen. R.B. Lovett (AG ETO) to Maj. Gen. A.L. Lerch (PMGO), 14 July 1945; and Lerch to Lovett, 30 July 1945, PWIB Subject File, "Death Lists-Germany; Folder 1," box 2172, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

⁸² Department of Defense, POW-MIA Factbook (Washington: DOD, July 1991), p. 35.

⁸³ Erna Risch and Chester L. Kieffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Vol. II: United States Army in World War II (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), pp. 402-04.

ground fighting in dense jungles, over mountainous terrain, and on remote islands; and air combat and other flight operations over oceans, jungles, and mountains. Locating and recovering remains of the dead from such areas often was not possible, despite massive wartime graves registration efforts and continuing search and identification endeavors in the postwar period. The devastating effects of high explosive munitions and fire on the fragile human anatomy further compounded recovery and identification of war dead.

The American Battle Monuments Commission identified 78,954 servicemen who died during World War II whose remains still have not been recovered (38,439 Army/Army Air Forces; 35,713 Navy; 4,141 Marine Corps; 661 Coast Guard).⁸⁴ These men are not currently “missing in action,” nor are they “unaccounted for.” With more or less certainty, all 78,954 have been determined to be dead or are now officially reported as dead. The 1,103 sailors and Marines entombed on December 7, 1941, aboard USS Arizona, for example, are among this total. There is no doubt as to the fate of those men, although their bodies cannot be recovered. Service personnel lost at sea, in circumstances similar to those aboard Arizona, as well as other dead buried at sea comprise a large percentage of the total; over half of the total are Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Many of the 38,439 Army/Army Air Forces personnel were aircrew aboard planes that disintegrated in flight, went down over water, or crashed in inaccessible areas. Other soldiers were buried in unmarked graves or even lost at sea; for example, on 24 December 1944, over 700 soldiers of the 66th Infantry Division died and 500 of their bodies were never recovered when the transport SS Leopoldville sank off Cherbourg, France.⁸⁵

The War Department and Navy Department did not (by law could not) “write off” whole categories or large groups of servicemen who did not return from the war alive and for whom remains had not been recovered. Presumptive findings of death were determined on an individual case by case basis. Under authority of Section 5 of the “Missing Persons Act,” Public Law 490, 77th Congress, 7 March 1942, as amended, service personnel previously reported as missing or

⁸⁴ Information provided by American Battle Monuments Commission in telecon with TK Nenninger, 3 February 1995.

⁸⁵ HQ ETO to The Adjutant General, 1st Ind., 2 March 1945, AG 704 (15 February 1945), AGO Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, box 3142, entry 360, RG 407, NA.

missing in action and who were no longer presumed to be alive could be declared dead. But such findings of death were made only upon or subsequent to 12 months in a missing or missing in action status, were withheld so long as there was some presumption the person was living, and were based on analysis of known information in each case.⁸⁶ In 1944 Congress amended the Missing Persons Act to authorize official "reports of death" in cases where "conclusive" information as to death could be established. Just as in a Section 5 finding, under Section 9 it was not necessary that the remains of the deceased be recovered and identified. But some conclusive first hand proof, such as testimony from eyewitnesses, was required. Frequently, after twelve months an individual previously MIA would be declared dead under Section 5. Later, as more information became available, this finding would be changed to an official report of death under Section 9.⁸⁷

The classification "missing in action" is the most elusive of casualty categories, not least because it was a temporary designation. Everyone at anytime categorized as MIA eventually was determined to be in another final casualty status, based either on his return to duty or on the findings of a casualty status review board. Nearly all MIAs eventually were either "returned to duty," "declared dead," or "reported dead." During the war and even for some time thereafter the number of MIAs continually changed, as an individual's status migrated from MIA to POW or to "declared dead" or to "reported dead" (which in most cases eventually meant KIA). As a consequence, it could be misleading to declare that there were a specific number of American MIAs during the war; in fact, the number continually changed.

As indicated in the following table, many American servicemen initially listed as missing in action in the European Theater of Operations eventually were determined to have died as result of hostile action or accident. Often they were never POWs of the Germans or ever in Soviet

⁸⁶ Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II: Final Report: 7 December 1941 - 31 December 1946 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1 June 1953), p. 4; also 56 Stat 143, United States Statutes At Large: 1942: Vol. 56, Part 1 (Washington: GPO, 1943), p. 145, contains Section 5.

⁸⁷ 58 Stat. 679, United States Statutes At Large: 1944: Vol. 58, Part 1 (Washington: GPO, 1945), pp. 680-1 contains the amended Section 9.

custody. The final determination of their status was largely the result of the postwar casualty clearance process.

**CASUALTY STATISTICS FOR ARMY/ARMY AIR FORCES PERSONNEL; EUROPEAN,
MEDITERRANEAN, & AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST THEATERS (WAR AGAINST
GERMANY)**

	MIA(current status)	Declared/Determined Dead	Returned to Duty
5/1/45	54,864	4,278	17,783
7/1/46	433	14,432	21,550
6/1/53	0	2,430	21,488

	POW/Internee	Died	RMC
5/1/45	52,823	270	13,873
7/1/46	0	1,239	96,691
6/1/53	0	1,124	94,407

	KIA
5/1/45	123,549
7/1/46	142,411
6/1/53	153,270 ⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Numbers calculated from data in: Machine Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Battle Casualties of the Army: 1 May 1945 (Washington: Statistics Branch, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1945), p. 5; Strength Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Battle Casualties of the Army: 1 July 1946 (Washington: Central Statistical Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1946), p. 5; Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II: Final Report: 7 December 1941 - 31 December 1946 (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1, 1953), pp. 8-9.

In several categories the 1953 figure is smaller than the 1946 number. For the categories "declared/determined dead" and "died" that is because individuals were changed to a final casualty status of "KIA," particularly as the casualty resolution process continued and more information

Even before VE Day, Army "search teams" began combing the battlefields of Europe for soldiers listed as missing in action, to locate burial sites of military personnel, and to obtain further information on men killed in action. During the summer of 1945, by which time nearly all live American POWs in Europe had returned to military control (RMC), the effort was well underway. On 12 July 1945, the War Department issued a casualty clearance plan to the theater commanders for Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa-Middle East, which would govern solution of unresolved casualties in those areas for the next several years.

The categories subject to investigation included missing, missing in action, prisoner of war, and interned. The basic objectives were to determine whether "persons" in any of these categories were dead or alive; to recover and return to military control persons found alive; to terminate, initiate, clarify, or correct the casualty status of any "individual," including death or finding of death; to add new information to already resolved cases regarding time, place, or circumstances of death; and "to convey to families such new information as is obtainable concerning individuals carried in any casualty status, carried as deceased, or in whose cases finding of death has been made."⁸⁹

The special search teams consisted of five men, at least one of whom spoke the local language. The team would cover one small geographic area at a time, interviewing local officials and other citizens, identifying grave sites, and searching hospital and local government records. The European field excavation included general area searches followed by specific searches for isolated remains. In the year following the end of the war, the casualty clearance process in

about a particular case developed, thus leading to a report of death which would replace the previous determination or declaration of death. For the categories "returned to duty" and "RMC" (returned to military control) the smaller 1953 number reflects moving some individual cases to another final casualty status, such as KIA or died of wounds. It also reflects the final audit of all casualty information and statistics, assuring that duplication and similar administrative discrepancies were resolved.

⁸⁹ "Army Search Teams" Comb Battlefields for Personnel Missing in Action," 21 September 1945, Press and Radio News Releases, War Department Public Information Division, Box 109, entry 498, RG 165, NA;TAG to CG European Theater et. al., "European Casualty Clearance Plan," 12 July 1945, AG 704 (19 June 1946), AGO Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, box 3544, entry 360, RG 407, NA.

Europe received considerable resources and support from the military leadership. Individual case searches, indicating the thoroughness of the effort and providing a key link between the graves registration search for remains and the resolution of MIA cases, continued into the early 1950s.⁹⁰

Soviet cooperation in this effort was less than complete; in fact the Soviets sometimes obstructed progress. But from 1945 to 1949 field investigation teams did get into the areas of Germany and Austria controlled by the Red Army and were able to resolve cases. By contrast the teams had good cooperation from the Czech, Polish, Rumanian, and Hungarian governments and from local authorities in those countries.⁹¹

The US Government spared little cost or effort to come to a full accounting of American World War II casualties. Most significantly this involved attempting to determine the fates of those previously in missing or missing in action status. Final accounting was done on an individual basis. It did not, it is important to reiterate, involve "writing off" whole categories of missing. A significant endeavor was underway to uncover bodies, identify remains, and resolve discrepancies. The documentary results of this effort are extensive and are extant today in the National Archives.⁹²

⁹⁰ Edward Steere and Thayer M. Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead: 1945-51: QM Historical Studies, Series II, No.4 (Washington: Office of the Quartermaster General, Department of the Army, 1957), pp. 178, 194, 198. There are a number of important files relating to this effort filed under "AG 704," for example "Progress Reports and Casualty Clearance Plans," AG 704 (13 December 1945)(35), AGO Central Decimal File, 1940-45, box 4067, Entry 360, RG 407, NA, contains informative statistical and narrative reports covering the effort through December 1946 (the file is dated 1945, the information continues through 1946).

⁹¹ Steere and Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead, pp. 254-63. APPENDIX VI: "Deceased US Servicemen in the Soviet Union" describes in more detail the frustrating postwar experience of recovering remains, mostly of merchant seamen, buried on the territory of the USSR and recent identification efforts of Task Force Russia and the Defense POW/MIA Office.

⁹² "AG 704," boxes 3116-3237; "AG 704 Dead," boxes 3238-3290; "AG 704 Missing," boxes 3291-3311, AGO Classified Decimal File, 1943-45, entry 360; "AG 704," boxes 3544-3548, AGO Classified Decimal File, 1946-47, entry 360; "AG 704 Casualty," boxes 4066-4104, AGO Decimal File, 1940-45, entry 363; "AG 704 Dead," boxes 4105-4137, AGO Decimal File, 1940-45, entry 363; "AG 704," boxes 1524-1552, AGO Decimal File, 1946-48, entry 363; "AG 704 Dead," boxes 1553-1574, AG Decimal File, 1946-48, entry 363, RG 407, NA.

Many of these case files include instances of information and documentation added to cases years after resolution; for example, although a pilot was known to have died in an air crash and declared dead in 1945, additional information from a witness to the crash is obtained, perhaps in connection with investigation of another case, and in 1947 added to the 1945 file relating to the initial determination. Despite their extent, the records are difficult to search for information on a particular individual because they lack a reliable index or other means of name access.

APPENDIX XII: "The AG 704 Files" summarizes in somewhat more detail the creation, arrangement, and content of these records and their value as a source of information relating to POWs and MIAs.

FINAL WORLD WAR II CASUALTY ACCOUNTING

Army/Army Air Forces

On 1 June 1953, the Army's Statistical and Accounting Branch published its final report on World War II Army and Army Air Forces casualties, based on information available as of 31 December 1949. The number of "captured and interned" from all theaters of war included in that report is 124,079; of that number 111,426 returned to military control and 12,653 died (KIA, DOW-died of wounds, and non-battle dead). The report included 30,314 under the category "missing in action;" but 24,098 eventually returned to duty and 6,058 were "declared dead" and 158 "died of other causes (non-battle)".⁹³

By VE Day Allied authorities knew that the Germans held more, by many thousands, American POWs than had officially been reported. The difference, however, was not and could not be determined with any precision until after Allied armies had overrun the German camps and actually recovered the prisoners. A significant percentage of American POWs held by the Germans were captured during the last six months of the war, including nearly 25,000 from the Battle of the Bulge (December 1944-January 1945) alone. Losses from heavy air operations during early 1945 also contributed to the rapidly growing POW total. The peak number of American POWs reported by Germany, 72,193, was reached 30 April 1945. These were POWs officially reported through International Red Cross and diplomatic channels and recorded by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau of the Provost Marshal General's Office. The number the Germans had reported also was consistent with the number estimated by intelligence sources, although the numbers were not identical. The last Military Intelligence Service survey during the war of German camps and other POW facilities accounted for 71,877 Americans as of mid-March 1945.⁹⁴

⁹³ Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II: Final Report: 7 December 1941 - 31 December 1946 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1 June 1953), p. 5.

⁹⁴ The Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Reports: Section 11: Administration for January through May 1945 indicate that the number of US POWs held by the Germans steadily increased until the April peak, this despite the liberation of POWs beginning in January; "Progress Reports,

Navy/Marine Corps

The Navy and Marine Corps POW and MIA population was considerably smaller than that of the Army and Army Air Forces; most Navy and Marine Corps personnel in these categories resulted from the loss of Guam, Wake, and the Philippines, to the Japanese in 1941-42.

As of 23 November 1945, the Navy had accounted for "all known Naval Prisoners of War totaling 552 officers and 2,746 enlisted men" (this number did not include Marine Corps personnel). Of the 3,298 total, 2,427 "returned to naval jurisdiction" and 871 were found to be deceased. During that same period (October-November 1945), the Navy still carried approximately 9,000 personnel in a "missing status." But within a few months they resolved these as "presumed dead" or "determined to be dead," as they involved casualties at sea with little chance for survival or recovery of remains.⁹⁵

Published in 1950, the Navy's medical history of the war contains little information that is useful for determining POW or MIA status. Although the work contained exhaustive and official casualty statistics for the Navy and Marine Corps, POWs are not included as a separate category and "all of those reported as missing in action and later declared dead" have been included with

1943-46," PMGO Historical File, 1941-58, box 42, entry 439A; "German Prisoner of War Camps (With American PsW)," CPM Branch, Military Intelligence Service, 17 March 1945, PWIB Subject File, "POW Camps Germany-Strength, Welfare, Movements," box 2235, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

The rapid growth in the POW and MIA populations can be tracked in the monthly Battle Casualties of the Army from January through July 1945; a nearly complete run of this publication is filed under OPD 704, Operations Division Security Classified Correspondence, 1942-45, Entry 418, box 1684, RG 165, NA.

⁹⁵ There are several important documents including Lt. T.P. Price to Chief of Naval Personnel, August 3, 1945, "Recovery of Prisoners of War;" Cdr. Walter W. Finke to Director of Welfare, 23 November 1945, "Prisoners of War;" Bupers to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, nd. (ca. November 1945), "Final Determination of Status of Missing Naval Personnel and Unrecovered Prisoners of War;" and the weekly status reports of recovered POWs during the period August-November 1945, in the file "General Records Relating to POWs," Casualty Branch, Bureau of Naval Personnel, box 1, RG 24, NA.

the numbers for “killed in action.” There are 1,419 listed under the category “died, prisoner of war.”⁹⁶

The official Marine Corps history of the end of the war in the Pacific also provides an accounting of final Marine Corps casualties. There were 2,274 Marine Corps prisoners of war; 1,756 returned to military control of the United States, 268 died in captivity, and 250 were known to have been captured but were otherwise unaccounted for and were presumed to have died. This source included an additional 795 Marines as “missing, presumed dead;” these would not have been POWs.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Division of Medical Statistics, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department, The History of the Medical Department of the United States Navy in World War II: The Statistics of Diseases and Injuries: Vol. 3 (Washington : GPO, 1950), pp. 75-76, 170-71.

⁹⁷ Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Victory and Occupation: History of US Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Volume V (Washington: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1968), pp. 731-32.

"THE NUMBERS GAME": HOW MANY US POWS DID THE RED ARMY LIBERATE AND REPATRIATE?

On 21 July 1945, Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, a political commissar accredited by the Soviet Army General Staff to negotiate with the US Military Mission to Moscow, reported to Major General John Deane, head of the mission, that the Soviets had repatriated 22,010 Americans to Allied authorities. His report indicated that the return of US prisoners of war had been completed.⁹⁸ With certainty, Golubev's figure was too low by several thousand. Part of the problem was the one of Red Army administrative disorganization, shoddy record keeping, and lack of accountability, which has already been discussed in this report. It also was in part a matter of definition. Golubev's numbers likely were only those Americans who clearly had been in Soviet Army administrative and physical custody; his numbers probably did not include those thousands of POWs loose in the Soviet zone who largely on their own, with little or no Soviet assistance, reached Allied lines.

According to American sources, the total number of US prisoners of war received from the Soviets by 12th Army Group, the principal US Army field command in the European Theater, was 25,140 through 2 June 1945.⁹⁹ In May 1945 the 12th Army Group consisted of Ninth, First, and Third Armies, arrayed north to south in the central portion of the SHAEF front. Its geographical location and wide frontage, from Linz, Austria, to within 100 miles of the Baltic, assured that 12th Army Group would receive the bulk of freed US POWs, whether liberated at

⁹⁸ Golubev to Deane, Letter No. 04997, 21 July 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 25, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

⁹⁹ "Memorandum to Colonel Borden," 26 May 1945 [annotated to 2 June], "File 103-A/PW (US & BR)(General Policy & Misc.)," Subject File, 1944-45, Miscellaneous Branch, G-1 Section, 12th Army Group, box 23, Entry 165, RG 331, NA.

Most of the American POWs recovered from the zone of the Red Army came into the hands of the US Ninth Army. That organization, in fact, handled the largest number of liberated Allied prisoners, either recovered from the Soviets or overrun by US and British units. On 4 April 1945, the 692nd Field Artillery Battalion became the Ninth Army special troop unit principally responsible for administration and evacuation of liberated Allied POWs. It performed those duties, including operation of the important US-Soviet POW transshipment point at Hildesheim, until 31 May 1945. Journal 692nd FA Battalion, April-May 1945, FABN-692-0.7, World War II Operations Records, RG 407, NA.

Moosburg in Bavaria by Third Army troops, or assisted across the Elbe at Torgau by First Army, or received by elements of Ninth Army at Hildesheim from the Soviet Zone. The 25,140 reported received by 12th Army Group, consequently, includes nearly all American POWs passed across the front line or evacuated by air from the Soviet zone. It does not, however, include the 2,858 shipped from Odessa, or the other eastern evacuations such as by air from Moscow and Poltava. At least 28,000 American prisoners of war previously held by the Germans, therefore, came from the zone controlled by the Soviets if not from Red Army custody and were returned to US military control.

By way of comparison, Soviet authorities repatriated 25,102 British and 294,699 French POWs, as well as several hundred thousand other Allied nationals; as with the Americans, most were exchanged across the front-lines in Germany and Austria. There were 4,300 of the British and 27,000 French POWs who came out through Odessa.¹⁰⁰

Three recent accounts argue that many--as many as 23,000--American POWs liberated by the Red Army were never returned to US control, but rather were held after VE Day in Soviet prisons as bargaining chips to get back from the Western Allies liberated Soviet POWs who did not want to return to the USSR and as further leverage in the incipient Cold War.¹⁰¹ The authors of these accounts rest their arguments on assertions such as: thousands of American POWs at Stalag III-A (Luckenwalde) were never repatriated but remained in Soviet control¹⁰²; although Soviet authorities reported they shipped 5,159 US POWs to Odessa, only 2,858 ever came

¹⁰⁰ Mark Elliott, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), p. 76, footnotes 35 and 36.

¹⁰¹ John M.G. Brown, Moscow Bound: Policy, Politics and the POW/MIA Dilemma (Eureka, California: Veterans Press, 1993), pp. 119-330 deal with World War II issues; Jim Sanders, Mark Sauter, and R. Cort Kirkwood, Soldiers of Misfortune: Washington's Secret Betrayal of American POWs in the Soviet Union (Washington: National Press Books, 1992), pp. 31-114 relate to World War II; and, Patricia Louise Wadley, "Even One Is Too Many: An Examination of the Soviet Refusal to Repatriate Liberated American World War II Prisoners of War," Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1993.

¹⁰² John M.G. Brown to Trudy Huskamp Peterson (Acting Archivist of the United States and Commissioner on the Joint Russia-US Commission on POW/MIAs), 31 March 1995.

home¹⁰³; and, in late May 1945, there were 15,597 US and 8,462 British prisoners being held in Austria under control of Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front and these POWs also never were exchanged.¹⁰⁴

As previously described in this report, the several thousand American POWs who were at Luckenwalde did return to US military control. Although for many POWs their Soviet liberators were of little assistance in the repatriation, Americans at Luckenwalde by and large liberated themselves and made their own way to Allied lines. The names of those returned to military control (RMC) from Luckenwalde appear on nominal rolls, on the POW Information Bureau IBM cards, and in other documentation.

The previous discussion in this report of the German POW camps in Poland and East Prussia overrun in late January 1945 by the Red Army emphasized the difficult, chaotic conditions faced by the liberated prisoners. The unconcern and inability of Soviet authorities to deal with those they had freed was obvious. As numerous contemporary observers reiterated, the Soviets were unable to provide accurate, consistent numbers of the Allied prisoners they had overrun. To accept as accurate the Soviet report that 5,159 Americans were shipped to Odessa and then conclude that, since only 2,858 were evacuated from the port, 2,301 must have disappeared forever into Soviet prisons, ignores considerable contradictory evidence; which includes the assessment of Lieutenant Colonel Wilmeth, a harsh critic of the Soviets, that only 2,800 (not 5,159) Americans fell into Red Army hands from the POW camps in Poland and East Prussia.

A British Air Ministry message, dated 29 May 1945, was the first and only report raising the possibility of 15,597 Americans and 8,462 British in the hands of Marshal Tolbukhin's forces. This message, widely disseminated at SHAEF, the Moscow military missions, and in Washington, spawned additional documentation and generated requests for action in repatriating the POWs. Eventually someone at the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington questioned whether the

¹⁰³ James Sanders to Trudy Huskamp Peterson, 30 March 1995, "World War II: Soviet Retention of US POWs in 1945," footnote 12. Another of Sanders' contentions, that the Soviets did not return many of the American POWs they liberated from Stalag Luft I (Barth), is examined in APPENDIX VI: "The Sanders List."

¹⁰⁴ Wadley, "One Is Too Many," pp. 216-19.

information in the original message was correct; because by late May most US and British POWs had been recovered, therefore 24,000 additional was a surprisingly high number. On 3 June Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in the Mediterranean, the ultimate source of the original information, clarified the matter. The numbers should have referred to Soviet POWs still in US and British hands, not the reverse as originally reported. Copies of these documents, including the clarifying message, exist at both the Public Record Office in London and the National Archives in Washington. The US Government has attempted in the past to explain the confusion. Despite these efforts, allegations that there were 15,597 American POWs being held in late May 1945 by the Soviets in Austria persist.¹⁰⁵

If there had been 15,000 US POWs in Austria in late May 1945, whence had they come? Allied intelligence estimated in February 1945 that there were only 4,000 American prisoners in Austria, most in Stalag XVII-B, the largest camp in Austria. But the Germans evacuated that camp and moved the POWs westward, away from Marshal Tolbukhin's advancing forces. On 3 May 1945, US troops liberated 3,000 American POWs at Branau, on the Austrian-German border, who had been evacuated and marched westward from XVII-B. By late May, clearly there were few American POWs remaining in Austria and certainly not 15,000 to be held by the Red Army or anyone else.¹⁰⁶

For it to be true (as Brown, Sanders, and Wadley allege) that the Soviets liberated but never repatriated 23,000 US prisoners of war, all of the following, among other unlikely possibilities, also had to be true:

¹⁰⁵ Air Ministry Special Signals Office (AMSSO) Top Secret Cipher Telegram to Joint Staff Mission Washington (JSMW), OX 3431, 29 May 1945; JSMW to AMSSO, IZ 5768, 31 May 1945; War Office to Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), BM 3928/PW2, 2 June 1945; AFHQ to War Office, FX 87043, 3 June 1945; all from WO 32/13749, Public Record Office, Kew, London. A similar series of radio messages can be located in SHAEF SGS Decimal File, "383.6/11," box 88, entry 1, RG 331, NA. Also see DOD Public Information Series, "DOD Response to Unfounded Allegations that the US Government Abandoned POWs in World War II and Korea," PC 20J (1988).

¹⁰⁶ "Appendix A," Pamphlet 9, 21 Army Group ECLIPSE Plan, ETO MIS-X Correspondence, "388-Post-Hostilities Planning," box 11 (NND 745001), RG 332, NA.

1. A substantial part of the historical documentary record from World War II not only is completely inaccurate, but has been deliberately falsified.
2. Discrepancies in the numbers of American POWs liberated and not recovered simultaneously and identically appear in US, Soviet, German, and British data.
3. The Soviets had almost twice as many US POWs than they claimed or than Allied and German records indicated, and these 23,000 were transferred and imprisoned in the Soviet Union without a trace.
4. The families of the 23,000 allegedly left behind participated in the cover up, because there was no public outcry from these people regarding the status of their missing relatives.¹⁰⁷

There is no documentary evidence that could lead to a conclusion that significant numbers of American prisoners of war disappeared into Soviet prisons after World War II. The historical record in that regard is neither inaccurate, nor has it been deliberately falsified. In the contemporary debriefings, interrogations, and similar documentation, and in the postwar POW memoir literature, there are no verifiable accounts that claim the Soviets held back 23,000 or any other substantial number of US prisoners. Such numbers, furthermore, are not consistent with the final postwar casualty resolution and accounting.

¹⁰⁷Paul M. Cole, POW/MIA Issues: Volume 2, World War II and the Early Cold War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1994), pp. 29-31.

As the information developed in several of the case studies and other material presented in APPENDICES VII, IX, and X will demonstrate, not only are the generalizations of these authors questionable, but many of the cases relating to individual POWs upon which they have built their arguments do not hold up under critical analysis either.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

It remains to be determined whether any American prisoners of war liberated in 1945 by Soviet forces were not returned to US military control but were held in Soviet prisons. There were individuals known to have been POWs of the Germans who did not return to US military control after VE Day. Military authorities expended considerable effort, including inquiries to the Soviets, in determining what might have happened to these men.

On 27 July 1945, the Provost Marshal General of the European Theater sent a list of 492 names identified as "unrecovered American prisoners of war" to the POW Information Bureau in Washington.¹⁰⁸ Not all of the POWs on this or subsequent lists of discrepancy cases would necessarily have been in Soviet hands. Most on this ETO list eventually were accounted for and otherwise identified; others had died during the harsh conditions early in 1945, especially on the marches westward when the Germans evacuated the POW camps in the east. In December 1945 the Machine Records Branch of the Adjutant General's Office produced a somewhat refined listing, which included 207 names of "Unaccounted for American Prisoners of War Held by the German Government (CFN 74)."¹⁰⁹ A further refinement produced on 14 March 1946, by the POW Information Bureau of the Provost Marshal General's Office, included 31 unrecovered prisoners known to have been held by the Japanese and 77 held by the Germans.¹¹⁰

At an early date in its research into World War II questions, the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCS D) of the Department of Defense POW/MIA Office identified the "207 List" as a significant "find" and as a possible source for names of American POWs who might have been in Soviet custody at the end of the war. JCS D compared the names on this list against a variety of other documentary sources; the process has further accounted for and reduced to 87 the number of unresolved cases on this "207 List." Cases were resolved by identifying individuals

¹⁰⁸ ETO Provost Marshal General to PWIB, War Department, "Unrecovered American POWs," 27 July 1945, "383.6," ETO PMG Decimal File, 1943-45, box 43, RG 332, NA.

¹⁰⁹ CFN 74, "Unaccounted for American POWs Held by the German Government," Machine Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office, RG 407, NA.

¹¹⁰ PWIB to TAG Casualty Branch, 14 March 1945, PWIB Subject File, "POW Unrecovered from Enemy (Japan & Germany)," box 2241, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

who did return to military control, or who had died in captivity, or who were killed in action, or who were not actually POWs.¹¹¹ We are continuing to pursue leads to resolve the fate of the 87 from the "207 List" and other World War II discrepancy cases.

We developed files on all of the individual cases examined; a description of several of the more significant cases is included in our report.¹¹² The discrepancy cases we pursued, in which an individual POW or MIA was identifiable, all led to a conclusion that the person died or had been returned to military control, not that they had been incarcerated in a Soviet prison. Our conclusions, in effect, are consistent with the original findings of death issued by the War Department nearly fifty years ago and with the other earlier efforts at casualty resolution. Evidence supporting our conclusions comes from several sources including official personnel files, deceased personnel files, reports of the casualty resolution boards, from other American military records, and from Soviet-era documents.¹¹³

The evidence in the case studies we pursued does not indicate that liberated American POWs were held against their will by the Soviet Government after VE Day. We uncovered no evidence from Russian or American archives that conclusively demonstrates such a finding, although research on several cases is still underway that could indicate otherwise. There is certainly no evidence that the Soviets held thousands of American POWs in the GULAG, or that the US Government participated in a cover-up of such an operation. We located ample evidence that contradicts such contentions and that demonstrates the "good faith effort" of military authorities following the war to resolve individual casualty status, including that of MIAs.

¹¹¹ APPENDIX VII: "The 207 List" provides the names and an accounting of our findings.

¹¹² APPENDIX VIII: presents our findings in twelve of these cases.

¹¹³ APPENDIX XIII: "Archival Sources Examined" describes the more important series of records used in compiling this report.

ONGOING ISSUES

The work of the World War II Working Group is complicated by a number of factors:

1. The lack of an activist constituency. There are very few immediate family members still living who lost loved ones in World War II. There are no parents, wives, or children of former World War II POWs asking us the whereabouts of their loved ones. Any leads or issues that were developed have been done so primarily from information contained in archival documents;
2. Lack of living eyewitnesses. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to locate actual participants in the events, both Russian and American;
3. The vast volume of information to review and the lack of access. World War II is the most extensively documented twentieth century conflict. There are still literally tons of documents that should be reviewed for POW information. The same is true in the former Soviet Union. The issue is compounded in Russia by the lack of access to this material by JCSD analysts. Presently we rely heavily on Russian archivists to search for information. Not only is there a lack of Russian manpower dedicated to this project, but Russian archivists are not always aware of the types of documents that would aid our project and do not always provide us with archival citations in case a promising holding is found. Full access to unclassified archives is paramount.

We would like to propose an archival research exchange program to the Joint Commission. Under this program, JCSD analysts would be allowed to do active, long-term research in unclassified holdings in the former Soviet Union, and Russian researchers would have the same rights in the United States archives. Experience has shown that key documents are found in the most unlikely of places. Presently, members of Task Force Russia, the Moscow-based branch of the Joint Commission Support Directorate, have been allowed some limited access to some Russian archives, but have never been allowed to devote the time or obtain the access required to perform team research.

There are a number of ongoing issues of concern to the US side of the Joint Commission. These deal primarily with servicemen, whose names have either appeared in Russian archival

documents, in documents generated by the wartime US Military Mission to Moscow, in various publications, or are among the 87 on "The 207 List" that we have not yet resolved. From our Russian colleagues, we have requested information or documents relating to a number of cases. We will continue to pursue these requests. As other names or issues arise, they will be addressed through Commission channels.

APPENDIX I: ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

Definitions¹¹⁴

MIA ("Missing in action"): Essentially an "unknown" status given to personnel whose whereabouts or actual fate could not be determined and whose disappearance was presumed to be the result of enemy action. Most cases originally reported MIA later were transferred to killed in action, wounded and injured in action, or captured (POW) and interned, as established by subsequent information. The remainder of those initially MIA later had their casualty status changed to declared dead, died of other causes (non-battle), or returned to duty.

POW ("Prisoner of war"): All military personnel who fell into enemy hands and were detained as prisoners of war; all prisoners who remained in detention, who were on the strength roll of overrun or recovered POW camps, and those who otherwise were not deemed "escapers."

RAMP ("Recovered Allied military personnel"): A term that applied to all members of the United Nations who, having been captured and made prisoners of war, were released from the custody of the enemy and came again into the midst of their own or friendly forces.

RMC ("Returned to military control"): The status that "RAMPs" acquired after they actually came into custody of friendly forces.

Repatriation: Those procedures which effected the return of Allied personnel, military or civilian, to the custody of authorities of the individual's own country.

Roles & missions

POW Information Bureau (PWIB), Provost Marshal General's Office, War Department: Established 29 December 1941, to handle all information concerning American POWs and civilian internees held by the enemy. It coordinated information flow between all elements of the military establishment, the overseas theater of operations headquarters, the State Department, the International Red Cross, and the neutral protecting powers.

¹¹⁴ The definitions, by and large, came from information in ETO SOP No. 58, 3 April 1945, ETO MIS-X Decimal Correspondence, "388-Post Hostilities Planning," box 11, RG 332, NA.

US Military Mission to Moscow (USMMM): Established 18 October 1943, under Major General John R. Deane to serve as a means of liaison and a channel of communication between Soviet and US military forces. Among other duties, the mission represented the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to policy and strategic issues, assisted in coordination of deliveries of American military aid to the Soviets, and served as the principal US means to coordinate POW repatriation with the Soviets.

Soviet Repatriation Commission (ColGen. Filipp Ivanovich Golikov): The Soviet General Staff entity with which the US Military Mission worked on POW issues.

PWX G-1 SHAEF (Prisoner of War Executive Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force): The staff agency charged with the coordination of plans and supervision of implementation of the recovery of US, British Commonwealth, and other Allied POWs located in Greater Germany and the SHAEF sphere. PWX also was responsible for collecting information pertaining to location, population, and status of POW camps, as well as to information on movements of the POW population. PWX personnel staffed the detachments, contact teams, and served as liaison officers with the field forces under SHAEF control and in the Soviet zone.

RAMP Division, Theater Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations: On 19 December 1944, the ETO commander charged the Theater Provost Marshal with overall supervision of all activities concerning the care, processing, and evacuation of "recovered allied military personnel" (recently liberated American POWs) "from the time of their entry into the Communications Zone until their evacuation homeward." The field operational units, who actually liberated the POWs or received them from Soviet and other Allied units, transferred them to the ETO authorities who carried out administrative, medical, and intelligence processing, and provided transportation to the United States.

"Protecting power": As neutrals in the war between the Axis and Allies, the Swiss and Swedish governments served as channels of communications between the belligerent powers. They also sent observers to both German and Allied POW camps to assure compliance with the Geneva convention regarding treatment of prisoners.

APPENDIX II: MACHINE-READABLE DATABASE OF POWS RETURNED TO
MILITARY CONTROL

During World War II, the Prisoner of War Information Bureau (PWIB), Office of the Provost Marshal General, compiled data on individual American prisoners of war from information furnished by the Red Cross, the neutral "protecting powers," and other sources. The PWIB created an IBM punch card for each POW as a mechanism for centralizing and controlling this information. Data entered on the cards included: POW name, rank, service number, arm or branch, dates of report (not necessarily dates of capture and release), race, state of residence, POW camp, and detaining power. Complete data were frequently not available for each POW, especially "latest report date" and camp location. The POW camp location apparently pertained to the first permanent camp at which the prisoner was detained; some POWs, however, never were in a permanent camp, but were assigned to itinerant agricultural, industrial, and other labor details. In addition, the "latest report date" sometimes reflected the date a file was closed, not the date the POW actually "returned to military control."

In 1950 the Army loaned the punch cards and other PWIB records to the Foreign Claims Commission. The records were returned to the Office of the Provost Marshal General in November 1957, at which time they were transferred to the Departmental Records Branch of The Adjutant General's Office. The DRB and its records became part of the National Archives in 1968. In the late 1970s the Veterans Administration borrowed two series of the IBM cards relating to repatriated American POWs and read them to computer magnetic tape in order to analyze the records for its report POW: Study of Former Prisoners of War.¹¹⁵ The VA offered the National Archives a copy of the electronic datasets they had produced. These data sets are now preserved by the Center for Electronic Records of the National Archives.

There are 85,541 records in the European theater dataset and 19,202 records in the Pacific theater dataset. These datasets are a significant research tool for studying segments of the POW population and as a source of information on individual prisoners. But they have limitations and

¹¹⁵ Office of Planning and Program Evaluation, Veterans Administration, POW: Study of Former Prisoners of War, May 1980, pp. 17-18.

problems and must be used with caution. There are eleven subseries of the IBM cards, including such categories as "deceased American POWs (Germany)," "American escapees (never POWs-Germany)," and "neutral internees." Because it only was interested in ex-POWs likely still to be alive, the VA only converted two of the eleven subseries to electronic form- "American POWs Returned to Military Control by the Japanese" and "American POWs Returned to Military Control by the Germans."

A review of the alphabetical listing by surname of the records of the repatriated POWs indicates that in the dataset for the European Theater some records are missing. Although the appropriate IBM cards exist, only a small portion of the cards were transferred to electronic form for personnel whose surnames begin with the letters "V" through "Z."¹¹⁶

In July 1988 the Center for Electronic Records of the National Archives further enhanced the value of this file when it made an electronic sort by the data element "place of detention," which generally corresponds to POW camp, for those records in the subseries "American POWs Released to Military Control by the Germans." The resulting printout includes lists of names of Americans the PWIB confirmed had returned from a particular German POW camp. But the camp for each individual POW is likely the first permanent camp he was in, not necessarily the camp from which he was liberated (particularly in light of the camp evacuations of January-April 1945). Additionally, the largest single segment contains 13,157 names for which there is no camp information on the IBM cards. Other records have garbled data for the machine readable "camp code." Finally, this sort by camp includes only the 85,541 names the VA scanning project read from the IBM cards in the late 1970s; again, surnames beginning "V" to "Z" are almost totally omitted.¹¹⁷

The printout sorted by POW camp, consequently, does not include names of all American prisoners known to have returned from a particular camp. The numbers indicated as "returned to

¹¹⁶ Ben DeWhitt and Jennifer Davis Heaps, *Records Relating to Personal Participation in World War II: American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees: Reference Information Paper 80* (Washington: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), pp. 6-8.

¹¹⁷ Memo by Margaret Adams, NNSR, 7 July 1988, "A Guide to Reading Printout: US Military POWs, World War II, Europe," in Volume I of the three volume printout: Military Reference Section, National Archives.

military control" from a particular camp in fact underrepresent the actual number from that camp. Nonetheless, the list can serve as an useful tool to confirm whether a specific individual returned from a particular camp and can provide some indication of the general number returned from a camp. If a name is on the list, the POW returned. If a name does not appear on the list, there is still the possibility the POW returned, but that the data relating to him was among that garbled or among that which lacked a "camp code".

APPENDIX III: WHAT'S IN A NAME?

One of the most perplexing problems that has complicated the search for U.S. servicemen who might have been in the hands of the Soviet Army at the end of World War II is the spelling and transliteration of names. Russian names are usually rendered in the following order: first name, patronymic - which is a variation on the individual's father's name, and last name. The gender of a person is usually apparent by the spelling of his or her name. For instance, last names that end in "ov" or "sky" are always men. Likewise, last names that end in "a", "ova", or "skaya" are always female.

All Russians have patronymics. These names are formed from the name of his or her father's first name. The American idea of middle names is virtually unknown in Russia. A person whose father was named "Ivan" (the equivalent of John) would have a patronymic of "Ivanovich" or "Ivanovna" depending on their gender. We have seen American names rendered in Russian with middle names in the patronymic form.

On the other hand, there is no such thing as an "American" name. The United States is the great melting pot with a population made up of immigrants from every country on the Earth. The same is true of the population that comprised the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II. There were many soldiers of eastern European and Germanic ethnicity that served in the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II. We have seen documents containing German sounding names that are purported to be German soldiers, but who could possibly be American.

American names rendered into Russian are another problem. Russian is a phonetic language while English is not. A good example to illustrate this point is an ongoing issue that we are examining. The historical data connected to this person is accurate and not something that is common knowledge. The information came from a witness who had to have lived in a particular area and had intimate knowledge of that area.

This case involves an individual, possibly American, by the name of Rom (as transliterated from the Cyrillic). All records have been searched and this name cannot be found. Since Russian is a phonetic language, Rom is just the way it sounds. How else could the sound Rom be spelled in English? We have searched for names spelled Rom, Rome, Rhom, Rhome, Rhoem, Rohem,

Romey and so forth. All with negative results. We think there is merit in this case, but are unable to find a likely candidate.

When a Russian hears a name, all he can do is spell the sounds that he hears. There are sounds in the English language for which there is no equivalent in Russian. For instance the letter H. The closest sound to H would be transliterated as a Kh. This Harry becomes Kharry. In actuality the transliteration for the way a Russian would spell Harry would come out as Khari.

The same is true with the English letter J. To spell the name John, the transliteration of the Russian would come out as Dzhon. When common names such as Harry and John appear in the Russian language, it is usually quite evident what the name referred to is. The same is not true for last names which are generally much more unique. There are some particularly egregious examples of this.

In transliterated Russian

Actual English spelling

Khaber Vinter Khuber

Hubert Winter

Fred Beney

Frederick A. Lang

Les Hake Denton aka Prad Lesli Denton

Leslie C. Denton

Sometimes the names of American servicemen are translated into Russian. These were names that had an equivalent in the Russian language. Some of these names are:

Russian

English

Ivan

John

Pavel

Paul

Feodor

Frederick

Sometimes a Russian who was aware of these equivalents would translate an English name into Russian. This further exacerbates our difficulties.

APPENDIX IV: SOVIET CITIZENS IN CUSTODY OF THE WESTERN ALLIES AFTER WWII

There is considerable information, in published and documentary sources, about Soviet displaced persons (DPs) and refugees following World War II. The sources, however, often do not agree and in fact are contradictory with respect to numbers of DPs and refugees. The difficulty is one of precise accounting and even definition. Determining nationality was often a matter of self-identification; for political and other reasons, DPs would routinely provide misleading information regarding their nationality. In addition, both the numbers and the definitions changed over time. In some totals, for example, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were included as Soviet citizens, yet in other accountings they were separate categories. As one result, the number of Soviet DPs repatriated by the Western Allies at end of 1945 had exceeded by many thousands the number thought to exist on VE Day in areas liberated by the British, French, and Americans.

1. The estimates on specific categories of Soviet refugees and DPs include:
2. Number on VE Day in areas liberated by the Western Allies: 2.3 million (includes 156,000 Balts)
3. Repatriated to the USSR between May and December 1945: 2 million
4. Nonreturners: 529,000 (includes 220,000 Balts)
5. Admitted to the United States between 1946 and 1959: 120,169 (includes 76,341 Balts)

In the course of the work of the Joint Commission, we have furnished to our Russian colleagues copies of several thousand pages of archival documents, most from the records of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which relate to the numbers, identification, administration, and processing of Soviet displaced persons by the Western Allies. The sources indicated provide specific information regarding these several topics:

Estimated number of Soviets in areas liberated by the Western Allies on VE Day

1. File 2912/1, SHAEF G-5, Record Group 331, National Archives
2. WDCSA 319.1 UNRRA, 1945-6, Sec. I, Record Group 165, National Archives

3. WDCSA 383.7 Reports, 1945-6, Sec. I, Record Group 165, National Archives

Estimated number of DPs and refugees assisted by SHAEF and UNRRA during 1945 and 1946

1. George Woodbridge, UNRRA: History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration: Vol. III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 423
2. 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report 950, Displaced Persons in Europe (Washington: GPO, 1948), pp. 12-13
3. File 2912/1, SHAEF G-5, Record Group 331, National Archives
4. WDCSA 319.1 UNRRA, 1945-6, Sec. I, Record Group 165, National Archives
5. WDCSA 383.7 Reports, 1945-6, Sec. I, Record Group 165, National Archives
6. WDCSA 383.7, 1945-6, Sec. IV, Record Group 165, National Archives

Estimated number of DPs by nationality repatriated by SHAEF and UNRRA from areas liberated by the Western Allies

1. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on the Judiciary, House Report 1507, Displaced Persons in Europe and Their Resettlement in the United States (Washington: GPO, 1950), pp. 22-30
2. Senate Report 950, Displaced Persons in Europe, pp. 23-24

Estimated number of former Soviet citizens who did not return to the USSR following WWII

1. Mark R. Elliott, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), pp. 174-75
2. George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 108-13
3. Elliott summary of information in selected publications
4. House Report 1507, Displaced Persons in Europe and Their Resettlement in the United States, p. 30

Immigrants, DPs, and refugees by nationality admitted to the United States from 1946 to 1959

1. Letter No. 1448 from RADM Maples to LT GEN Golubev, dated 2 October 1945
2. "Immigration by Country of Origin," excerpts from Statistical Abstract of the United States
3. DPs and refugees admitted to the United States; US Immigration and Naturalization Service statistical breakdown of those admitted by nationality and specific authorities

Other sources of information

1. House Report 1507, Displaced Persons in Europe, pp. 47-48; describes the efforts of the International Tracing Service
2. Earl Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-46 (Washington, US Army Center of Military History, 1975), an official account of the US Army's efforts to assist, repatriate, or otherwise resettle POWs, DPs, and refugees
3. Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration: Vol. II; the official UNRRA account of its work in Europe

APPENDIX V: DECEASED US SERVICEMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION

A handful of US Army and Navy servicemen, as well as US Merchant Mariners were known to have been buried in the Soviet Union during the World War II era. These men died as a result of either combat action, accident, or suicide and can be placed into several distinct categories:

1. US Merchant seamen (Serial numbers either begin with a "Z" or "Bk. No.").
2. US Army Air Corps buried in the Soviet Far East.
3. US Army Air Corps buried at Poltava.
4. US servicemen buried at Odessa.

Presently, a total of 33 individuals have been identified that fit this criteria.

In 1949, the U.S. Government contracted with the Soviet Government to pay 204,000 Rubles to recover and repatriate the remains of 24 American servicemen buried in the Soviet Union. The Soviets returned 15 bodies in 1950 and said that they could not find the rest. The complete list of names corresponding to these 15 specific sets of remains repatriated in 1950 have not been found at this time.

In 1950, the U.S. Government paid the Soviets an additional 4,000 Rubles to search for the remaining nine bodies. After several months had passed, the Soviets reported no success in locating them. This search took place in the midst of the Cold War, and no Americans were permitted on the search team.

APPENDIX VI: LIST OF KNOWN US ARMY, NAVY, AND MERCHANT MARINERS BURIED IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, PERTINENT INFORMATION, AND DISPOSITION¹¹⁸

Bold indicates that the body was not recovered.

Name	Rank	Serial Number	Original Burial Location
1. ALLEN, Keith N.	LTC	O-303121	American-English Cemetery, Murmansk, USSR
Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Philadelphia National Cemetery, Pennsylvania			
2. BETANCOURT, Juan	Fireman	Bk. No. 109 177	Archangel, USSR
Remains still unrecovered. Fireman aboard the SS Exford. According to a document in his 293 file dated 26 October 1942, he committed suicide by jumping overboard with a weight tied around his neck on 23 October 1942. A message was sent to Task Force Russia on 31 December 1992 directing them to ask Russian Officials to conduct another search for his grave. No response received. Task Force Russia personnel have searched cemeteries in the Archangel area with no success.			

¹¹⁸RG 92 Entry 1892, Boxes 484-486, Office of the Quartermaster General Correspondence Geographic File, 1946-1948, Russia. TFR 133-21. **NOTE:** TFR in document citations stands for Task Force Russia document. In the earliest days of the Commission's existence, the TFR numbering system was adopted to account for all Russian language documents that were received. These documents came from the Russian side of the Joint Commission, newspaper articles, or letters from private citizens. They were assigned a one up TFR number based on the order that they were received. Each page within a batch of documents then received a one up number. Thus, the first page of the first batch of documents received the number "TFR 1-1". Most of the Russian language documents received did not have archival citations attached. This has complicated our work to some degree. TFR batches 1-67 inclusive are available in the public record through the National Archives or Library of Congress. All other TFR numbers are still under control of the Defense POW/MIA Office.

3. COLLINS, Edward A.	GM3c	7111492	Murmansk, USSR
Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in New York.			
4. DAILEY, Domingo	Messman	Z384506	American-English Cemetery, Murmansk, USSR
Remains still not recovered. Did not die during WWII, but later in December 1945 when his ship, the SS William H. Webb ran aground near Murmansk. His body was recovered and buried in Murmansk. Subsequent efforts to retrieve his remains were unsuccessful as they could not be found by Soviet authorities. Task Force Russia personnel have searched cemeteries in the Murmansk area with no success.			
5. DENTON, Leslie C., Jr.	Cpl	34607983	Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, USSR
Remains repatriated and buried in South Carolina. Aircrew member of B-25 No. 44-29148 that was shot down by a battery of the Pacific Ocean Fleet on 9 June 1945 ¹¹⁹ north of Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka Peninsula.			
6. EISER, J. Nathan	Capt	O-724028	Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, USSR
Remains repatriated and buried in Ohio. Aircrew member of B-25 No. 44-29148 that was shot down by a battery of the Pacific Ocean Fleet on 9 June 1945 ¹²⁰ north of Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka Peninsula.			

¹¹⁹TFR 19-118

¹²⁰TFR 19-118

7.	ERNSER, Roland R.	S/Sgt	16046137	Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, USSR
Remains repatriated and buried in Wisconsin. Aircrew member of B-25 No. 44-29148 that was shot down by a battery of the Pacific Ocean Fleet on 9 June 1945 ¹²¹ north of Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka Peninsula.				
8.	ESTLE, Raymond C.	1LT	O-753279	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, near Poltava ¹²²
Died on 22 June 1944 as a result of German bombing raid on Poltava airfield and buried on 25 June 1944 ¹²³ . Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Fort McPherson National Cemetery, Nebraska.				
9.	GESTIDO, Jose	Fireman	Z16402	Archangel, USSR
Remains still unrecovered. According to his 293 file, he was a fireman aboard the SS Hollywood and died of "tuberculosis [of the] left lung, degenerate heart and liver" and was buried in a local cemetery. A message was sent to Task Force Russia on 31 December 1992 directing them to ask Russian Officials to conduct another search for his grave. No response received. Task Force Russia personnel have searched cemeteries in the Archangel area with no success.				

¹²¹TFR 19-118

¹²²Poltava served as a shuttle base for US heavy bombers under Operation FRANTIC. On 21 June 1944, 73 US B-17s that had landed earlier at Poltava were attacked by 75 German bombers. 47 US heavy bombers were destroyed and most of the remainder were damaged.

¹²³TFR 133-2

10. GLODEK, Matthew M.	Sgt	42020135	Petropavlovsk area
Remains repatriated and buried in New York. Deceased crew member of an Army bomber that landed in the Soviet Union on 10 June 1945. Sergeant Glodek was wounded by Japanese gunfire and died shortly after his airplane landed in the Soviet Union. Remains shipped from the Soviet Union for repatriation on 12 July 1947. ¹²⁴			
11. HALL, Edward, Jr.	Oiler	Z11561	Archangel, USSR
Remains still unrecovered. According to his 293 file, he was aboard the SS Washington when it was torpedoed in early 1942. He survived the sinking of his ship and managed to make it to Archangel where he died in Hospital #191 on 20 July 1942 of acute Myeloid Leukemia and gastric hemorrhages. He was buried in a local cemetery with appropriate ceremonies. A message was sent to Task Force Russia on 31 December 1992 directing them to ask Russian Officials to conduct another search for his grave. No response received. Task Force Russia personnel have searched cemeteries in the Archangel area with no success.			
12. HEINDEL, George J.	Ch. Engineer	Z27455	American-English Cemetery, Murmansk, USSR
Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in California.			
13. HENDRICKSEN, Jacob	Ch. Engineer	Z215668	Foreign Cemetery, Archangel, USSR
Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Neuville-en-Condruz Permanent Cemetery, Belgium.			

¹²⁴TFR 2-130 to 2-142, Documents dated July and October 1947, on the repatriation of Ring, Glodek, and Wutchic.

14. IRVING, Edward J.	Capt	O-396038	Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, USSR
Remains repatriated and buried in Virginia. Aircrew member of B-25 No. 44-29148 that was shot down by a battery of the Pacific Ocean Fleet on 9 June 1945 ¹²⁵ north of Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka Peninsula.			
15. HIBBARD, Paul R.	1LT	O-758565	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, near Poltava
Died on 18 September 1944 from enemy action while on a B-17 combat mission and buried on 20 September 1944. ¹²⁶ Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Neuville-en-Condroz Permanent Cemetery, Belgium.			
16. JOHANNSON, Eric A.	Bosun	Z137504	Small Island, NW of Molotovsk, USSR
Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Ardennes, Belgium.			
17. KERCHNER, Richard G.	PFC	6947136	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, near Poltava
Committed suicide on 6 October 1944 and buried on 9 October 1944. ¹²⁷ Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Pennsylvania.			
18. LANG, Frederick A.	S/Sgt	34275916	Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, USSR
Remains repatriated and buried in Mississippi. Aircrew member of B-25 No. 44-29148 that was shot down by a battery of the Pacific Ocean Fleet on 9 June 1945 ¹²⁸ north of Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka Peninsula.			

¹²⁵TFR 19-118

¹²⁶TFR 133-2

¹²⁷TFR 133-2

19. LARSEN, Richard C.	Ch. Officer	Bk. No. 105458	Second Christian Cemetery, Odessa, USSR
Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried at Neuville-en-Condroz Permanent Cemetery, Belgium.			
20. LORD, Orvil H.	2LT	O-784739	Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, USSR
Remains repatriated and buried in Labrador, Canada. Aircrew member of B-25 No. 44-29148 that was shot down by a battery of the Pacific Ocean Fleet on 9 June 1945 ¹²⁹ north of Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka Peninsula.			
21. LUKACEK, Joseph G.	F/O	T-61544	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, near Poltava
Died on 1 July 44 as a result of German bombing raid on Poltava airfield and buried on 2 July 1944 ¹³⁰ . Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Beverly National Cemetery, New Jersey.			
22. NEIGHBOURS, Fleet B.	Steward	Z112406	Archangel, USSR
Remains still unrecovered. Second cook aboard the SS Alcoa Ranger when it was torpedoed on 7 July 1942. He survived the sinking and managed to make it to Archangel where he died on 16 August 1942 of Arterial Sclerosis. ¹³¹ A message was sent to Task Force Russia on 31 December 1992 directing them to ask Russian Officials to conduct another search for his grave. No response received. Task Force Russia personnel have searched cemeteries in the Archangel area with no success.			

¹²⁸TFR 19-118

¹²⁹TFR 19-118

¹³⁰TFR 133-2

23. NIES, Walter	S/Sgt	37307545	Heydekrug, POW Camp 6, East Prussia
Remains still unrecovered. Heydekrug is located in contemporary Lithuania. According to his 293 file, he was a member of the 96 th Bomb Squadron, 2 nd Bomb Group and was shot by a guard on 28 May 1944. Buried in grave 3. Requests have been made of Lithuanian officials for any information they may have regarding his burial location.			
24. RING, Thomas E.	T/Sgt	14073557	Petropavlovsk area
Remains repatriated and buried in North Carolina. Deceased crew member of an Army bomber that landed in the Soviet Far East on 12 August 1943. Remains shipped from the Soviet Union for repatriation on 12 July 1947.			
25. ROBINSON, Roy A.	S1c	6110637	City Cemetery, Murmansk, USSR
Remains still unrecovered. Killed in action on 27 February 1943 in Murmansk harbor when his ship, the SS Eli Oriente, was attacked by German planes. He was buried in the Murmansk City Cemetery in a lot reserved for foreigners. The grave was unnumbered but marked with a cross. On 29 February 1952, the U.S. Government declared his remains as non-recoverable. Task Force Russia personnel have searched cemeteries in the Murmansk area with no success.			
26. ROLAND, Donald R.	Lt (jg)	175115	British Plot, Koosnechefskeye Cemetery, Archangel
Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Neuville-en-Condroz Permanent Cemetery, Belgium.			
27. SIMPSON, Donald C.	Sgt	38412844	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, near Poltava
Died on 6 August 1944 from enemy action while on a B-17 combat mission and buried on 8 August 1944. Remains repatriated on 29 December 1950 and buried in Neuville-en-Condroz Permanent Cemetery, Belgium.			

28. TEAFF, William F.	T/Sgt	35586750	Heydekrug, POW Camp 6, East Prussia
Remains still unrecovered. Heydekrug is located in contemporary Lithuania. According to his 293 file, he was a member of the 351 st Bomb Squadron, 100 th Bomb Group and died of an unspecified illness on 10 July 1944 and was buried in grave 4. Requests have been made of Lithuanian officials for any information they may have regarding his burial location.			
29. TIMMERMAN, Lyle E.	Cpl	12138246	Second Christian Cemetery, Odessa, USSR
Died on 19 March 1945 at Transit Camp 139 in Odessa while awaiting repatriation when a brick wall collapsed on him ¹³² . Remains repatriated and buried in Canajoharie, New York.			
30. WALKER, George B.	S/Sgt	34147240	Heydekrug, POW Camp Stalag Luft 6, East Prussia
Remains still unrecovered. Heydekrug is located in contemporary Lithuania. According to his 293 file, he was assigned to the 369 th Bomb Squadron, 106 th Bomb Group and incarcerated in Stalag Luft 6. He was shot while attempting to escape on 29 April 1944 and buried in Grave 2. Requests have been made of Lithuanian officials for any information they may have regarding his burial location.			
31. WALRAVEN, Eugene	Unk	Z259143	Unknown ¹³³
Remains repatriated and buried in Neuville-en-Condroz Permanent Cemetery, Belgium.			

¹³²TFR 336-20

¹³³TFR 133-21

32. WUTCHIC, Paul W.	Sgt	13111686	Petropavlovsk area
Remains repatriated and buried in Golden Gate National Cemetery, San Bruno, California. Deceased crew member of an Army bomber that landed in the Soviet Union on 11 May 1945. Remains shipped from the Soviet Union for repatriation on 12 July 1947.			
33. YATES, Ted	Sgt	38148940	Second Christian Cemetery, Odessa, USSR
Died on 19 March 1945 at Transit Camp 139 in Odessa while awaiting repatriation when a brick wall collapsed on him ¹³⁴ . Remains repatriated and buried in Rocky Ford, Colorado.			

¹³⁴TFR 336-20

APPENDIX VII: THE SANDERS LIST

Several authors and researchers have alleged that the Soviet Union recovered thousands of American and Allied prisoners of war from German POW camps in Eastern Europe and consigned up to 23,000 of the Americans, and hundreds of thousands of the Allies, to the GULAG. One of the foremost among these authors is Mr. James D. Sanders.

Mr. Sanders is sincere in his concern for missing US servicemen, has done important research on the issue, and has been helpful in bringing several POW/MIA issues to our attention. But he lacks the assets available to the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) and has not always been able to pursue thoroughly an issue to its logical conclusion.

In July 1995, Mr. Sanders provided to DPMO a list of 162 US POWs from Stalag Luft I (Barth). He derived the names from US-generated camp rosters which he had checked against names in Veteran's Administration files of repatriated soldiers. It was Mr. Sander's supposition that the names making up his list were of POWs never repatriated from Stalag Luft I after it was liberated by the Red Army on 2 May 1945.

Mr. Sanders' list contained names, ranks, and full or partial serial numbers. The Joint Commission Support Directorate arranged with the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis to locate any information about the 162 men on the list. The results were conclusive and contradicted Mr. Sanders' original contention.

Of the 162 names on the list, information was available on 142. All 142 were repatriated. Information was even available on some individuals who completed a career in the armed forces and was dated as late as the 1960's. There were only 20 names on the list for which there was no available information.

We discovered numerous errors on the original camp rosters, including misspellings, incorrect initials, or erroneous service numbers; not surprising considering the circumstances of the time. The attached table clearly illustrates these problems.

In 1973 a fire destroyed about 80-85% of the World War II-era Army/Army Air Forces records maintained at the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri. It is likely that the

records of the 20 individuals for whom there was no information available were destroyed in that fire.

Discrepancies in the Sanders' List

Bold indicates a discrepancy between the Sanders' List and research conducted by JCSD.

Dates provided by the National Personnel Records Center were in a MMDDYY format and the dates from the Provost Marshal's POW Roster were in a DDMMYY format these formats were maintained in their original format.

Following the date in the column marked date the letter "R" denotes the repatriation date of the individual; the letter "D" denotes the individual's date of discharge.

<u>Actual Name</u>	<u>Name in Sanders' List</u>	<u>Actual Serial #</u>	<u>Serial # in Sanders' List</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>
Abel, Charles F.	Abel, C.E.	O-830689	O-820689	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Adler, Clifford W.	Adler, W.C.	O-886220	O-886220	1LT	11 05 45R ²
Allen, John L.	Allen, J.L.	O-756143	O-756143	1LT	01 03 45R ²
Anderson, Alton D.	Anderson, A.D.	O-799220	O-799220	1LT	01 03 45R ²
Anderson, Marvin D.	Anderson, M.D.	O-741824	O-741824	2LT	13 05 45R ²
Anderson, Ralph M.	Anderson, R.M.	T-002882	T- 2882	F/O	01 04 45R ²
Apostolos, John	Apostolos, J.	O-751868	O-751868	2LT	18 05 45R ²
Armstrong, John E.	Armstrong, J.E.	O-752041	O-752041	2LT	16 05 45R ²
Not found	Ashbridge, J.B.		O-5?2306	2LT	
Not found	Auemuth, L.M.		O-524542	2LT	

Ball, Howard George	Ball, R.G.	O-734297	O-734297	1LT	09 30 64D ¹
Ball, William F. Jr.	Ball, W.E.	O-1296624	O-1296624	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Ballard, Jerome J.	Ballard, J.J.	O-822609	O-822609	1LT	01 05 45R ²
Barton, Donald W.	Barton, D.W.	O-747565	O-747565	1LT	01 05 45R ²
Basye, Paul E.	Bayse, P.E.	O-2061125	O-2061125	2LT	10 02 45R ²
Not found	Bennett, L.		O-225891	CPT	
Berman, Marvin A.	Berman, M.A.	O-832994	O-832994	2LT	13 05 45R ²
Brazdons, Donald L.	Bratdzons, D.L.	O-711326	O-711326	1LT	11 30 45D ¹
Brown, Cleve M. Jr.	Brown, C.M.	O-661184	O-661184	1LT	01 05 45R ²
Boyce, Marvin S.	Boyce, M.S.	O-759563	O-759563	2LT	10 05 45R ²
Not found	Bush, C.		T-155??	F/O	
Cammer, Robert A.	Cammer, R.A.	O-708648	O-708648	2LT	01 04 47D ¹
Carlson, John K.	Carlson, J.K.	O-1995936	O-1995936	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Carlson, John M.	Carlson, J.M.	O-674463	O-674463	2LT	02 05 45R ²
Cselton, William J.	Caselton, W.J.	T-132852	T-132852	F/O	01 05 45R ²
Clarke, Keylon W.	Clarke, K.W.	O-821961	O-821961	2LT	12 11 45D ¹

Connolly, Joseph F.	Connelly, J.F.	O-739544	O-739544	2LT	09 22 45D ¹
Not found	Connors, E.B.		O-698266	2LT	
Not found	Czarota, L.C.		0-697194	2LT	
Day, Burchard	Day, M.B.	O-809550	O-809550	1LT	01 05 45R ²
Decker, Richard P.	Decker, R.P.	O-815661	O-815661	1LT	02 05 45R ²
Delgado, Genaro	Delgado, G.	O-781243	O-781243	1LT	02 05 45R ²
Dwyer, Martin Jr.	Dwyer, M.	O-833057	O-833057	1LT	01 05 45R ²
Not found	Dykes, H.N.		O-682082	2LT	
Eastman, Phillips Jr.	Eastman, P.	O-026082	O-26082	1LT	13 05 45R ²
Fiack, John F.	Flack, J.F.	O-743231	O-743231	2LT	04 11 53RD ¹
Fielschmidt, Hugo	Fieldswick, H.	O-352331	O-352331	CPT	01 23 46D ¹
Flotron, Paul J.	Fletrom, P.J.	O-778453	O-778453	2LT	01 22 46D ¹
Frederick, Jack L.	Frederick, J.L.	O-758329	O-756329	2LT	09 05 45R
Fyler, Carl J.	Fyler, C.J.	O-730443	O-730443	1LT	01 05 45R ²
Garner, Dorance	Garner, D.	O-696763	O-696763	2LT	12 05 45R ²
Gesicki, Leon J.	Gesicki, L.T.	O-2065978	O-2071827	1LT	13 05 45R ²

Goodson, Ray M.	Goodson, B.M.	O-776535	O-776535	2LT	02 05 45R ²
Gose, Thomas A. Jr.	Goss , T.A.	O-684314	O-684314	2LT	11 30 45D ¹
Gould, Cornelius P. Jr.	Gould, E.P. Jr.	O-1692875	O-1692875	2LT	14 05 45R ²
Gower, Richard L.	Gower, R.L.	O-803603	O-803603	1LT	13 05 45R ²
Greenberg, Henry	Greenberg, M.	O-723065	O-723063	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Gregory, Homer	Gregory, M.	O-709353	O-709353	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Hamilton, Howard B.	Hamilton, R.B.	O-731372	O-731372	2LT	15 05 45R ²
Hanzl, Joseph E.	Hanzel, J.E.	35307207	O-753702	2LT SSG	13 05 45R ²
Hardstedt, Harold F.	Halstedt , H.F.	O-1998571	O-1998571	2LT	01 18 61D ¹
Jaynes, Jay	Jaynes, J.	O-024813	O-24813	CPT	13 05 45R ²
Middleton, Cecil J.	Middleton, Cecil J.	O-740869	O-740869	2LT	13 05 45R ²
Paes, I.M.		O-392??		1LT	
Sabol, Emil M.	Sabol, E.M.	T-005249	T-5249	F/O	01 05 45R ²
Santomango, Anthony	Santomango, F.	T-121810	T-1218	F/O	02 05 45R ²
Schold, George B. Jr.	Schold, S.B.	O-862601	O-862601	2LT	13 05 45R ²
Schuerman, Arthur M.	Schuerman, A.M.	T-134244	T-134244	F/O	13 05 45R ²

Schwikert, John W.	Schwikert, J.W.	O-834033	O-834033	2LT	13 05 45R ²
Shumake, Glynn F.	Shumake, G.F.	O-431050	O-431050	MAJ	13 05 45R ²
Simonton, W.M.	Simmonton, W.M.	O-829324	O-829324	2LT	13 05 45R ²
Sluga, E.L.	Slugz, E.L.	O-409366	O-409366	LTC	01 05 45R ²
Smith, John S.	Smith, J.S.	T-131325	T-131325	F/O	01 05 45R ²
Suprenant, Charles E.	Suprenant, Charles E.	O-796911	O-796911	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Swain, Roger L. Jr.	Swain, R.L.	O-399581	O-399581	CPT	01 05 45R ²
Swiger, William F.	Swiger, W.F.	O-701018	O-701018	1LT	11 29 45D ¹
Thomas, William H.	Thomas, W.H.	O-751490	O-751490	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Thompson, John J.	Thompson, J.J.	O-781710	O-781710	2LT	01 05 45R
Todd, Wilson P.	Todd, W.P.	O-430638	O-430638	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Vogler, George L.	Vogler, G.L.	O-755798	O-755798	1LT	01 05 45R ²
Vokaty, Alfred E.	Vokaty, A.E.	O-803717	O-803717	1LT	13 05 45R ²
Volet, Leonard	Volet, L.	O-807083	O-807083	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Voorhies, James W.	Voorhies, J.W.	O-717308	O-717308	2LT	08 05 45R ²
Voska, Gerald H.	Voska, G.H.	O-747112	O-747112	2LT	01 05 45R ²

Watters, Ronald A.	Waters, R.A.	O-683218	O-683218	2LT	01 05 45R ²
Wilson, William W.	Wilson, W.W.	O-825353	O-825353	1LT	13 05 45R ²
Winslow, Edward P.	Winslow, E.P.	O-730834	O-730834	2LT	08 05 45R ²
Wyand, Joseph L.	Wyland, J.L.	O-761490	O-761490	2LT	02 05 45R ²

Enlisted Personnel

Agius, Vincent J.	Aguis, V.J.	36119990	36119990	SSG	11 15 45D ¹
Alexander, James W.	Alexander, James W.	33342767	33342767	SSG	13 05 45R ²
Not found	Attamaz, Walter L.		2080649	SGT	
Basiden, Forse	Barsden, F.	15394358	15394358	TSG	05 29 53RD ¹
Beltmann, Clarence	Belemann, C.	16048737	16048737	SGT	10 17 45D ¹
Not found	Bertelio, P.J.		38538009	SSG	
Bess, Oliver E.	Bess, O.E.	34529855	32392516	T/4	01 05 45R ²
Binagia, Dominic	Binagi, D.	18191495	18191495	SSG	01 05 45R ²
Not found	Bishop, G.R.		170069094	SGT	
Not found	Black, J.		1853504	SGT	
Not found	Bordon, R.		39098725	SSG	

Not found	Bordon, R.B.		6978816	SSG	
Brininstool, Forrest W.	Brinstool, F.W.	36459119	36459119	SSG	11 19 45D ¹
Brod, Irving S.	Brodi, S.	19177385	19177385	SSG	10 29 45D ¹
Bujalski, Edwin	Buvalski, H.	16149889	16149889	SSG	10 17 45D ¹
Caporali, Joseph	Caparali, J.	16082792	16082792	SSG	09 26 45D ¹
Clay, Charles R.	Clay, C.R.	19165159	19165159	SSG	09 05 45R ²
Collins, Benjamin	Collins, R.	13044457	13044457	PVT	10 21 45D ¹
Comps, William D.	Coombs, W.D.	35558929	35558929	SSG	10 10 45D ¹
Corrieri, Leo	Corrieri, L.	36345131	36345131	PFC	10 19 45D ¹
Craver, Luther S.	Craver, L.S.	34598092	34598092	SSG	12 05 45R ²
Cronin, Eugene R.	Cronin, E.R.	37535683	3753683	SSG	03 05 45R ²
Donahue, William C.	Donohue, W.C.	32778056	32778056	SGT	13 05 45R ²
Dolan, John S.	Dolan, J.I.	12220945	12220945	SGT	01 05 45R ²
Eickemeyer, Harry H.	Eichemeyer, W.N.	37454581	37454581	SSG	01 05 45R ²
Ernharth, John F. Jr.	Erhart, J.F.	33264689	33264689	TSG	10 09 45D ¹
Evans, Jack C.	Evans, J.C.	18192565	18192565	TSG	10 05 45R ²

Evert, Herman G.	Evert, H.G.	35281681	35281681	CPL	01 05 45R ²
Feltus, Edward H.	Feltus, E.H.	42008001	42008001	SSG	01 05 45R ²
Fieden, Nathan	Fielden, N.	42072250	42072250	SSG	11 23 45D ¹
Fjeld, Robert	Field, R.N.	17154923	17154923	SSG	10 25 45D ¹
Not found	Foster, R.L.		6379324	SSG	
Fretz, Edmond A. Jr.	Fretz, E.A. Jr.	18118883	18118883	SSG	12 05 45R ²
Fugatt, Ralph J.	Fugat?r, J.	34409559	34409559	TSG	13 05 45R ²
Garber, Walter T.	Garber, W.T.	18149170	18149170	TSG	01 05 45R ²
Gavron, A.	Garron, A.	32341460	32341460	PVT	09 27 45D ¹
Greer, Donald	Grier, D.	11111490	11111490	SSG	01 05 45R ²
Gribbin, John J.	Gibben, J.J.	32084310	32084310	TSG	10 17 45D ¹
Handel, Edward W.	Mandal, R.W.	36687789	36687789	SGT	11 08 45D ¹
Hendricks, W.H. Jr.	Hendricks, W.H.	38366085	38366085	TSG	03 05 45R ²
Herrmann, Robert J.	Herman, R.	36361735	36361735	CPL	11 14 45D ¹
Hobgood, Richard M.	Hopgood, R.M.	14049691	14049691	TSG	23 10 45D ¹
Horval, John	Horral, J.	35304376	35304376	CPL	12 05 45D ¹

Jenkins, Richard N.	Jenkins, R.N.	32816782	32816782	SSG	01 05 45R ²
Kolby, Carl Edward	Kalby, C.E.	16049583	16049583	SSG	30 04 45R ²
Keenan, Alan W.	Keenan, A.W.	13200624	13200624	SSG	03 05 45R ²
Kosta, Anthony	Kost, A.A.	32231192	32231192	TSG	13 05 45R ²
Kulak, John J.	Kulak, J.J.	11101954	11101954	SGT	01 05 45R ²
Kvocka, Eli E.	Kuocka, E.E.	35046730	35046730	SGT	12 07 46D ¹
Lafata, Guy A.	Lafata, G.A.	17160807	17160807	SSG	12 05 45R ²
Leonhardi, Fredric M.	Leonardi, E.M.	19126098	19126098	SGT	02 20 53RD ¹
Long, David G.	Long, D.G.	32547688	32547688	TSG	13 05 45R ²
Moore, Paul B.	Moore, P.B.	35385087	35385087	SGT	01 05 45R ²
Morgan, Robert	Morgan, R.N.	15334667	15334667	SSG	01 05 45R ²
Murray, Billy J.	Murray, B.J.	18162953	18162953	SSG	17 05 45R ²
Pavlic, Stanley	Paylie, S.	32371308	32371308	SGT	11 10 45D ¹
Pavlowich, Ernest C.	Parlowich, E.C.	36840051	36840051	PFC	12 16 45D ¹
Not found	Perlinsasky, J. Jr.		12208825	SSG	
Patano, Salvatore	Patano, S.	36739809	36739809	CPL	08 29 45D ¹

Not found	Reemts, J.		273125	SGT	
Rollett, James C.	Pollet, J.C.	36586757	36586757	SGT	11 15 45D ¹
Schofield, James G.	Schoeffel, J.G.	14172903	14172903	TSG	08 05 45R ²
Not found	Schulman, W.W.		38419932	SGT	
Sink, Howard Melvin	Senk, H.	13180771	13180771	SGT	01 05 45R ²
Shepard, William P.	Shepard, W.P.	13172029	13172029	SGT	01 05 45R ²
Sheston, Harry	Sheston, H.	39531518	39531518	SSG	24 05 45R ²
Shilts, Wilfred R.	Shilts, W.R.	36828398	36828398	SSG	02 05 45R ²
Silvestro, Stephen L.	Silvestro, S.L.	33746719	33746719	SSG	13 05 45R ²
Smyth, Fredrick A.	Smith, F.A.	32276195	32276195	PFC	10 11 45D ¹
Spencer, James P.	Spencer, J.P.	39704294	39704294	SGT	01 05 45R ²
Sweitzer, Donald J.	Switzer, D.J.	35618838	35618838	SGT	31 10 45D ¹
Tsivis, Andrew	Tisivis, A.	12014858	12014858	SGT	04 09 45D ¹
Not found	Ulich, G.R.		17060706	SSG	
Not found	Valra, A.		39120364	SSG	
Vajda, Steven	Vatd, S.	33022582	33022582	CPL	20 09 45D ¹

Vitrano, Frank A.	Vitrano, F.A.	38172622	38172622	TSG	01 05 45R ²
Voelz, Warren M.	Voelz, W.M.	39206592	39206592	SGT	13 05 45R ²
Volkman, Robert E.	Volkman, R.A.	16173457	16137457	TSG	14 05 45R ²
Volpp, Spencer A.	Volpp, S.A.	16141452	16141452	SSG	01 05 45R ²
Von Castleberg, E.H.	Von Castleberg, E.	32867810	32867810	TSG	01 05 45R ²
Vores, Robert R.	Vores, R.R.	3375892	3375892	CPL	01 05 45R ²
Voss, Raymond J.	Voss, R.J.	19163299	19163299	SSG	13 05 45R ²
Vosters, Floyd G.	Vosters, F.G.	16086530	16086530	SSG	09 19 45D ¹
Vrban, Vance P.	Vrban, V.P.	37043273	37043273	TSG	02 05 45R ²
Walstrom, Arthur C.	Walstrom, A.C.	19139693	19139693	SSG	15 05 45R ²
Winner, Charles H.	Winner, C.H.	17133434	17133434	SSG	01 05 45R ²

1. Date denotes that the individual was discharged from US military service.

2. Date denotes that the individual was a repatriated US POW.

APPENDIX VIII: THE "207" LIST

In December 1945, the Machine Records Unit, the Adjutant General's Office, compared known American POWs who were in German captivity with repatriated American servicemen.

Discrepancies were included in a listing titled "Unaccounted for American POWs Held by the German Government."¹³⁵

There are a total of 207 names on this list. Of these 207 names, there are handwritten notations that state six of the persons were returned to military control, two were dead, two were British, and one was a Canadian; these entries were crossed off of the original listing. (One name, Ray T. Caldwell, bears the annotation "Dead Per Col Duke," but is not crossed out.) This brings the number unaccounted for down to 196. This list is attached.

Analysts from the Joint Commission Support Directorate, Department of Defense POW/MIA Office, have further accounted for and reduced to 87 the number of cases on this "207 List" requiring further research, by identifying individuals who did return to military control, or who died in captivity, or who were killed in action, or who were not actually POWs. The analysts checked the names on the lists against names in American Battle Monuments Commission lists of dead, other lists of casualties and returned POWs, and official military personnel files at the National Personnel Records Center, to resolve these cases.

¹³⁵ CFN-74, "Unaccounted For American POWs Held By the German Government", Strength and Accounting Branch, Machine Records Unit, Adjutant General's Office, RG 407, NA.

Unaccounted for American POWs Held By The German Government CFN 74

[NOTE:

1. The list consists of 207 names.
2. The 87 bolded names require additional research to clarify their final status.
3. For the other 120 names we have sufficient documentation to conclude with certainty what happened to the individual.
4. The entries marked with an asterisk (*) were those annotated on the original list as RMC, dead, British, or Canadian, and were crossed out on the original list.
5. The underlined entries were the 13 names handwritten at the end of the original document.]

NAME	RANK	SERVICE NO
ABORN, JOSEPH	CPL	31426729
ACRI, VINCENT J	PFC	33503154
ABNEY, ROBERT	SSG	35458066
AHO, EDWARD W	SGT	36831090
ANDERSON, EDGBERT H	PFC	34283182
ANDERSON, LEE E	PVT	37586615
ANSCHUTS, GEORGE D	SSG	37470789
ARRINGTON, HERMAN B	PVT	34818655
ASSESSOR, RICHARD E	PVT	36890764
BEAVIS, P T HARTHELL
BECKETT, PAUL G	PFC	33426863
BEIOLEY, R F	SGT
BELLI, THOMAS F	PVT	42062616

BELLIN, ALFRED R	TEC4	37089823
BELLITT, IRVING	SGT	32208988
BENNETT, K. A. M.	LT
BERRY, LAWRENCE J	SSG	39840357
BERTRAM, FRANK L	PVT	31470059
BIGELOW, ROBERT (USAAF)	2LT	O-811520
BIGI, EDWARD .	PFC	330894.6
BIGLEY, JOSEPH	PFC	32944612
BLAN, SIDNEY H JR	PFC	34806244
BLOCH, DE	FLO	T-069028
BOLT, EARNEST W	PFC	33648317
BOSTON, ROBERT F	PVT	31178990
BOURAS, SAM J	SSG	36645353
BOWEN, ARVO P	PVT	34827877
BREWER, ROBERT R	SSG	14163552
BRIGGS, GEORGE W	SSG	39193615
BRINK, FRANCIS	2LT	O-328683
BRODIE, GEORGE W	SSG	31329300
BROWN, H	PVT	32175254
BROWN, HENRY	PVT	21152154
BROWN, JOHN L	SGT	6394922
BROWN, ROBERT A	2LT	O-778400
BRUNTY, BYRON L	SSG	16051490

BRYK, JOHN A	PVT	36662550
BUCKMASTER, CALVIN O	SSG	15374233
<u>BUNDY, ED</u>	<u>SSG</u>	<u>15055976</u>
*BUNDY, FREDERICK C	SSG	11071938
BURTON, WILFRED G	2LT	O-719883
BUTLER, ARTHUR NMI	PFC	34002912
BYERS, GLENN E	CPL	6938619
CADLE, WARREN S (USAAF)	SSG	39539003
CAMPBELL, HENRY R	PFC	33579620
CARLTIN, MARTIN	PFC	38996277
CASON, ROY L	SGT	38348736
CASTLE, JOHN C	PVT	35072353
CALDWELL, RAY T	TEC5	38339287
COTHRAN, CHARLES B	TSG	18040338
CRAWFORD, WALLACE D	2LT	O-736130
CURRAN, JOSEPH J	TSG	12009163
DAHL, ERLING N	PFC	37578968
DEAL, EUGENE W	PVT	38530747
DELMAS, JEAN	SGT	59529
DICKSON, DOYLE E	PFC	39295728
DIKEMAN, LEVI A	SSG	37333470
DOANE, BURT M	PFC	37479813
DONOVAN, ROBERT C	2LT	O-671304

DONOVAN, TIMOTHY J	PVT	31421525
<u>DOTZLER, DENNIS</u>	<u>PVT</u>	<u>37118614</u>
<u>DOVE, J D</u>	<u>SSGT</u>	<u>6967396</u>
DUJMOVIC, MARK M	SSG	37344433
DUNLAP, WALTER A	PVT	16010619
ERICKSON, BERNARD G	PVT	37021176
FARMER, PAT	PVT	18031779
FENDLER, WILFRED J	PFC	37052263
FEUCHT, GEORGE L	2LT	O-830440
FLORA, AUBRIN E	PVT	33659331
FORD, LOUIS	PVT	32164390
FOREMAN, HARRY W JR	SGT	33562898
FOSTER, JOSEPH	PVT	34554560
FRISCH, RUDOLPH	PFC	36890648
FUNK, ROGER J	PVT	42056747
<u>GALLAGHER, M J SR</u>	<u>PVT</u>	<u>1015433</u>
GAXIOLA, GUS J	SGT	19109524
GENTRY, JOHNNIE	PFC	38401235
GERALD, RABIE	1LT	O-207039
GERSTNER, JACOB A	TEC5	6982037
GIBB, HAMILTON L	SGT	35521941
GITLIN, EDWARD E	PFC	42036976
GLADEK, FRANCIS I	PVT	33509759

<u>GLASS, LOUIS</u>	<u>PFC</u>	<u>32508854</u>
GODFREY, RICHARD R	PVT	35752351
GOLDHAGEN, SAMUEL M	ILT	O-749615
GORDON, WILLIAM H	PVT	35739221
*GORE, LAWRENCE J	PFC	6396610
*GRANT, WILLIAM	SGT	116118
*GREGORY, NORMAN E	SGT	1473815
*GROVES, PERCIVAL C	PVT	16146248
HAGEN, GLENN O	PFC	37269763
HARKINS, THOMAS B	PFC	32067781
HARNETT, ROBERT J	PVT	20620531
HARRIS, HARRY C	SGT	20704284
HARRY, WILLIAM R	ILT	O-515826
HELME, FREDERICK	SGT	01675318
HENDRICKS, WILFORD W	PVT	33119574
<u>HERRON, ROBERT L</u>	<u>PVT</u>	<u>38692862</u>
HIGNETT, ROBERT J	PVT	42142098
<u>HILLO, WILLIAM</u>	<u>PFC</u>
HINES, JAMES E JR	PVT	34548390
HINTON, LEONARD C	PVT	6271031
HOLEMO, DONALD M	CPL	36586967
HOLLAND, DUTCH I	PVT	39421650
HOLLAND, NORBERT J	PVT	37683509

HOLLAR, DAVID G	PFC	35917406
<u>HOLLINGER, FRANKLIN T</u>	<u>PVT</u>	<u>33510495</u>
HOLLINGSHEAD, LLOYD G	SGT	16171775
HORN, SHERWOOD J	SGT	33488217
HUCKEL, RUSSELL W	PFC	32273219
HUGHES, HENRY W	1LT	O-444032
HUMBLE, HOWARD E	PFC	36780018
JACKSON, ROBERT L	PVT	36648570
*JARVIS, JOHN	PVT	14621500
JOHNSON, KENNETH G	TEC5	37167584
JONES, AVIS B	PFC	31334872
*JONES, VAN T	PVT	35212725
JUNTILLA, JAMES	1LT	O-815712
KAISER, WILSON K	PFC	34515689
KELLY, JAMES H	TSG	32481674
KEOUGH, JOSEPH W	TSG	6137030
*KIMBREL, ALTON E	PVT	38698574
KIMBREL, RUSSEL V	PVT	15042362
KING, RICHARD P JR	PVT	35609967
KIZAK, STAM	PVT
LA FRANCE, NORMAN L	CPL	31327215
LAMONT, ERWIN E	SSG	31196474
LEINWEBER, MARVIN	1LT	O-686756

LYNCH, JOSEPH E JR	CPL	31303823
MACAGNONE, FRANK	PFC	32214043
MACDONALD, DONALD L	PVT	36562706
MADRIL, JUAN O	PVT	37352330
MAGILL, WILLIAM A	TSG	36559430
MAGYARI, GEORGE M	PVT	32366366
MARIOTT, JACK B	PVT	39283305
MAYNE, FRANK L JR	PFC	33900497
MC COMBS, WILLIAM E	PVT	36514269
MC INTIRE, WILLIAM E	PFC	33272567
MC LEAN, ALOYSIOUS J	PVT	36042935
MC NEELY, JAMES E	PFC	37516672
MILLS, HENRY L	MAJ	O-885187
MOORE, MARVIN J	PFC	14043436
MORGAN, FLOYD B	TEC5	36002913
*MORGON, FRANCIS P	PFC	314.771.
MULLICAN, JOSEPH R	PVT	34810112
NELSON, RICHARD H	PVT	33710728
OBERG, GUNNARD	PFC	37024191
OFER, JOHN H	PVT	35109909
OLSZANSKI, THEODORE E	PVT	20130384
ORDWAY, LAWRENCE L	PFC	33433338
OSBORN, LAWRENCE L	PFC	38445250

PAINTER, LESLIE W	CPL	34334638
PALAIA, MICHAEL D	PFC	33802017
PARKER, ARTHUR D	PFC	33563067
PATZKE, JACK D	TSG	19170297
PAYTON, HOWARD S	SGT	35493395
PEERY, DEWARD N	SSG	37002715
PEMBERTON, JOE C	PVT	14036084
PETERS, LLOYD	FL O	T-086323
PETERSON, MAROLD G	PFC	37589813
PHIPPS, DAVID R	TEC5	31234583
PODDOM, THOMAS
PORTER, COLEMANN	2LT	O-702140
PRIEGO, MICHAEL	PVT	81905
PURDY, GEORGE W	PVT	34982923
QUILLMAN, CHARLES J JR	PFC	33827635
RADLINGER, RICHARD J	SSG	36815362
RANDALL, JAMES F	PFC	37672828
RANSBURG, EDWARD C	1LT	O-362143
<u>RAPHEAL, GEORGE</u>	<u>TSGT</u>
RICKER, WILLIAM G	2LT	O-1823208
RITENOUR, ELMER T	PFC	33885033
ROBERSON, ERNEST R	PFC	34824060
SANBOWER, LLOYD E	SSG	33203207

SASACKA, ITSUMI	SGT	30101548
*SCHROYER, JOHN V	PVT	4327.89
SCHULASKI, HARRY F	TEC5	32174124
SCOTT, JAMES R.	PVT	33649513
SHERMAN, DONALD S	SSG	16100996
SHIPE, CLETIS P	SSG	6944175
SLAVENS, AUBREY W	SSG	37055388
SMITH, WALTER A	PFC	35295481
SPOTO, JOHN	PVT	32356066
SPRING, MERRILL T	2LT	O-695383
STANLEY, MARION E	PVT	20809114
STEWART, HARLEY D	PFC	33403257
STINSON, CORNELIUS W	SSG	32608417
<u>STINZIANO, ANTHONY J</u>	<u>PFC</u>	<u>35534940</u>
STOHRY, HAROLD H	CPL	35171102
<u>SUMMEY, BENNIE</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>34013087</u>
TANNLER, THOMAS K	1LT	O-026158
TOLLEFSEN, F G M	SSG	39385783
TREMPER, WILLIAM J	SSG	19055583
VAN ART, LAWRENCE H	PFC	13053316
WACKOWSKI, ALFRED F	PVT	42021926
WAGNER, ROY E	PFC	33707415
WALKER, THOMAS L	PFC	35400101

WALLACE, HUGH J	PVT	36885376
WARREN, DEXTER H	2LT	O-812019
WATSON, SIDNEY T	2LT	O-776838
YURKA, EDWARD R	SGT	37034682
<u>ZAHA, GEORGE JR</u>	<u>PFC</u>	<u>36357352</u>
<u>ZANGER, GEORGE</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>.....</u>
ZELLMER, WALDEMAR F	PVT	36287059
ZIEMER, GEORGE J	PFC	37170983
ZIRN, RICHARD H	TEC5	35289235

APPENDIX IX: STUDIES OF DISCREPANCY OR INTERESTING CASES

The Joint Commission Support Directorate, Defense POW/MIA Office, has accumulated information and developed case files on several discrepancy or interesting individual POW and MIA experiences. Several of these cases are among those noteworthy for the attention they have received from POW activists. Others were developed as we attempted to resolve the discrepancy cases listed in "The 207 List" (CFN-74). Information and documentation provided by the Russians to the Task Force Russia/DPMO-Moscow staff and documents located in Russian archives formed the basis for other of those cases. Summaries of a number of the case files developed in this effort follow.

Technical Sergeant Lawrence Edward Reitz

Service. US Army Air Corps

Serial Number. 16027151

Date Captured/Missing. 1 August 1943; MIA Ploesti, Rumania.

Current Status. Casualty files indicate Reitz was declared dead, non-recoverable.

Remarks. On 1 August 1943, Technical Sergeant Lawrence E. Reitz was a radio operator on a B-24D (No. 42-60655-S) of the 343rd Bombardment Squadron, 98th Bombardment Group (Heavy), which was shot down in a low level attack on the Rumanian oil fields at Ploesti. Reitz' plane "was observed by Sergeant William A. Cornut and Sergeant Robert C. Lindsey of another crew, to be hit by ground fire over the target, burst into flames and crash to the ground."¹³⁶ None of the ten man crew survived; eventually four were positively identified and their remains returned to the US for burial.

Overall casualties on the raid were very high; aircraft losses totaled 54 planes out of the 177 on the mission, which included 41 shot down in the target area. Total personnel casualties (Dead,

¹³⁶ AGO Casualty Branch, Status, Review, and Determination Report No. 1170, p. 7, AG 704-Dead (2 August 1944), AGO Classified Central Decimal File, 1940-45, box 3275, Entry 360, RG 407, NA.

MIA, & POW) among the aircrew were 532.¹³⁷ After the raid, the Rumanians buried 214 Americans, including 101 found so "carbonized" they could not be positively identified.¹³⁸ Within weeks, the Rumanians reported (by name) as POWs another 200 Americans who had been wounded and hospitalized in Rumania.¹³⁹

Based on this evidence and a review of missing aircrew reports, POW reports, and operational records, on 2 August 1944, the AGO Casualty Branch issued a determination of death, under Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act, on Reitz and 148 other aircrew, who previously had been listed as MIA, from 23 of the aircraft downed at Ploesti.¹⁴⁰

On 23 January 1948, the Casualty Section of the Adjutant General's Office, based on additional information and analysis, issued an "official report of death" for Reitz and the other members of his crew under Section 9 of the Missing Persons Act. For official and legal purposes this was confirmation that Reitz had in fact died at Ploesti. As part of its analysis, the Casualty Section had tabulated aircraft by aircraft the number of dead resulting from the 1 August 1944, raid; compared the numbers of identified dead, unidentified dead, and those returned to duty to the total aircrew on the downed planes; and, concluded that: "...the total number of dead buried by the Romanians closely approximates the number of men lost in Romania who cannot be accounted for otherwise." Thus they determined it was nearly impossible mathematically for Reitz to have survived the crash of his plane in 1944.

The 1948 report of death also incorporated information developed the previous year in response to the firmly held belief of Reitz' mother, Mrs. Ida M. Stichnoth, that he survived the Ploesti raid, was sent to a POW camp in Germany, in 1945 was taken by Soviet forces from Stalag III-A, and

¹³⁷Earl F. Cruickshank, "The Ploesti Mission of 1 August 1943," pp. 99-100 [on casualties], Historical Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-Intelligence, 1944, copy in Military Reference Section, Reference File No. 2000, NA.

¹³⁸Harrison (Bern) to State Department, 6 August 1943, PWIB Subject File, "Camps-Rumania," box 2155, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

¹³⁹Headquarters USAAF-Middle East to AGO, 30 October 1944, Ibid.

¹⁴⁰AGO Casualty Branch, Status, Review, and Determination Report No. 1170, RG 407, NA.

was alive in a Soviet prison camp. In large part her belief rested on a photograph which was taken at Stalag II-B in Germany and which she said included Reitz and several of his fellow crew. From a former POW who was in the photograph, the Casualty Section determined that none of the people in the picture were from Reitz' crew, but more significantly that the photograph in question had been taken in February 1943-- five months before the plane was shot down. The investigation by the Casualty Section, incorporating photographic identification and the accounting of the remains recovered at Ploesti should have "resulted in completely exploding [Mrs. Stichnoth's] belief that her son [was] still living and held as a prisoner of the Russians."¹⁴¹

Several years later, however, other witnesses offered information that reinforced Mrs. Stichnoth's belief Reitz was alive. As a result, she continued to petition the State Department over a period of years to get them to get the Soviets to release her son. In 1956 a soldier, who had been a POW, saw a fifteen-year old photograph of Reitz in a recent Stars and Stripes article about the efforts of Reitz' mother to locate her son. On the basis of the photo, he testified that he had seen Reitz in Stalag III-A, Luckenwalde, on average once or twice a week from mid-February to mid-April 1945.¹⁴²

Other information came from a German, repatriated from the USSR in 1956, who reported to American officials that from the summer of 1952 to the spring of 1954 he was confined in Vorkuta with an American he believed to be Reitz. As the camp barber he twice a week shaved Reitz and once a month cut his hair. In the spring of 1954 Reitz was transferred from Vorkuta.

¹⁴¹ AGO Casualty Section, Reports of Death- Hadcock et al., AG 704-Dead (23 January 1948), AGO Central Decimal File, 1946-48, box 1557, Entry 363, RG 407, NA. Individual Deceased Personnel ("293") Files, "Lawrence E. Reitz," (R-4), box 7939, Accession 92-70A-001, Washington National Records Center; an extensive file on the Reitz case including the correspondence between his mother and the government, copies of the several reviews and determinations done by the AGO Casualty Section, copies of the photographs in question, letters from the purported witnesses, and newspaper accounts of the saga.

¹⁴² Jim Sanders, Mark Sauter, and R. Cort Kirkwood, Soldiers of Misfortune (Washington: National Press Books, 1992), pp. 137-51; Sanders' entire chapter 11 is devoted to Reitz, whose mother Sanders calls the "first POW activist." Most of Sanders' section on Reitz is based on State Department records from the late 1940's and early 1950's, which reflect the official inquiries to the Soviet government on behalf of Reitz' mother. There is nothing in this account examining what might have happened to Reitz in Rumania.

On 22 September 1956, the American Embassy in Moscow again requested information concerning Reitz. Based on Mrs. Stichnoth's pleas, earlier inquiries had been made to the Soviets in 1953 and 1954, with negative results. The American Embassy requested that the Soviets conduct another investigation based on the above mentioned information in order to "determine the location of Sergeant Lawrence Reitz and return him to his family and friends." On 12 October 1956, the Deputy Chief, 2nd Main Directorate of the Committee for State Security (KGB) replied that Reitz was not among the numbers of prisoners of war and internees. He also reported that Reitz had never been detained and was not at that time detained in the Vorkuta Camp MVD, and not to count Reitz among those "who have been arrested, convicted and serving sentences in different hard labor camps of the MVD."¹⁴³

Conclusion. Two witnesses saw Reitz' plane go down in flames. None of the other crew survived. Neither Reitz nor any of the crew were among those Americans reported alive on the ground in Rumania after the raid, either in a POW camp or hospital. Finally, throughout the war the Rumanians kept captured Americans in POW camps in Rumania; they were not sent to Germany.¹⁴⁴ (The Rumanian government freed and repatriated over 1,000 of these POWs on 23 August 1944.) Reitz almost certainly died in the crash of his plane at Ploesti and was not at Luckenwalde to be "liberated" by the Soviets and sent to the GULAG. The witnesses who placed him at those places were mistaken in the identity of the individual(s) with whom they dealt; other

¹⁴³ TFR 77-32,33, & 34. **NOTE:** TFR in document citations stands for Task Force Russia document. In the earliest days of the Commission's existence, the TFR numbering system was adopted to account for all Russian language documents that were received. These documents came from the Russian side of the Joint Commission, newspaper articles, or letters from private citizens. They were assigned a one up TFR number based on the order that they were received. Each page within a batch of documents then received a one up number. Thus, the first page of the first batch of documents received the number "TFR 1-1". Most of the Russian language documents received did not have archival citations attached. This has complicated our work to some degree. TFR batches 1-67 inclusive are available in the public record through the National Archives or Library of Congress. All other TFR numbers are still under control of the Defense POW/MIA Office.

¹⁴⁴ Cruickshank, "The Ploesti Mission," pp. 114-15, Reference Collection 2000; and, Harrison (Bern) to State Department, 12 September and 13 October 1943, PWIB Subject File, "Camps-Rumania," box 2155, entry 460A, RG 389, NA.

evidence accumulated in the case contradicted their testimony. The case continued for over ten years only because of the efforts of Mrs. Stichnoth. Correspondence between her and the Army makes clear that based on no concrete evidence at all, she had determined as early as February 1944 that Reitz was still alive. No contrary evidence presented in subsequent years shook her belief. Nonetheless, the 1944 determination of death for Reitz was entirely justified.

Major Wirt Elizabeth Thompson

Service. US Army Air Corps

Serial Number. 0425939

Date Captured/Missing. 4 December 1944; MIA on a flight from Myitkyina, Burma, to Kunming, China.

Current Status. Declared dead under Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act, 5 December 1945.

Remarks. In 1955 an official in the bureau of European affairs at the State Department concluded that there was a "strong likelihood" that Major Wirt Elizabeth Thompson was alive and in a Soviet prison camp. The principal source that led the official to this conclusion was a German, recently released from Soviet captivity, who stated that while in prison he had known an American from San Antonio by the name of "Major William Thompson." The State Department believed "William Thompson" to be "Wirt Elizabeth Thompson." But the official who reached this conclusion was not certain that his supposition was correct, and consequently advised against notifying Thompson's family.¹⁴⁵ The military authorities concerned with resolving the casualty status of Thompson would have endorsed the caution exhibited by the State Department official, but would not have agreed with the "strong likelihood" Thompson was alive in the USSR in 1955.

Major Wirt Elizabeth Thompson was born in Italy, Texas, 8 August 1920, and attended high school in San Antonio. Thompson, assigned to the 317th Troop Carrier Squadron as pilot of a C-47A, tail number 43-15821, departed the airfield at Myitkyima, Burma on 5 December 1944, at

¹⁴⁵ Crawford to Barbour, "Five American Citizens in Soviet Custody," 1 July 1955, File 611.61241/7-1555, State Department Central Files, box 2524, RG 59, NA.

0800 and was not heard from or seen since that time. He was on a mission to Kunming, China - ferrying Chinese personnel in his aircraft when he went down north of the village Ta Hsueh Shan (25.17-98.02 Quadrant). Three other American servicemen were identified as being on this aircraft with Major Thompson - 2nd Lieutenant Dorsey W. F. Beauchamp (0700892, Air Corps, Caucasian, Protestant, BNR), Technical Sergeant William Weil (12141962, Air Corps, Caucasian, Hebrew, BNR), and Staff Sergeant William S. Weaver JR (33535937, Air Corps, Caucasian, Protestant, BNR).

On December 6, 1944, another aircraft of the 317th Troop Carrier Squadron spotted wreckage believed to be Thompson's plane on a mountain top less than an hour's flying time due east of Myitkyina. Ground search parties dispatched immediately after the crash could not reach the site because of the difficult, mountainous terrain. But in March 1945 search and rescue teams again deployed to find the aircraft and were successful in locating wreckage of a C-47A located near the village of Ta Hsueh Shan. Although this team could not identify the tail number of the wreckage, they did bury five remains found at the site. A search two years later, however, could not locate the remains. Graves registration analysts concluded that the original team buried the remains in too shallow a grave and animals dug them up and scattered the bones. They also concluded the crash occurred because Major Thompson was unable to achieve sufficient altitude in his aircraft to clear the high peaks of surrounding mountains.

On 6 December 1945, under Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act, the AGO Casualty Branch issued a determination of death for Thompson and his crew. The wreck on the mountain peak in western China along Thompson's planned flight route to Kunming and the lack of any information about them alive for one year were the determining factors in the case. A review of the case in 1948, which incorporated additional information for the subsequent search and rescue and graves registration efforts, confirmed the original finding.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ AGO Casualty Branch, Status, Review, and Determination Report No. 4846, AG 704-Dead (6 December 1945), AGO Central Decimal File, 1940-45, box 4107, Entry 363; AGO Casualty Section, "Review of Circumstances...; Case 536," AG 704 (9 March 1948), AGO Central Decimal File, 1946-48, box 1526, Entry 363, RG 407, NA.

Despite this finding, this case, based on information derived from individuals who claimed to have seen Thompson in the USSR has become an important element in the argument of those who claim there were American World War II POWs in the GULAG.

In 1954 a German civilian returnee from the USSR reported that he had known "Thompson" in a Soviet prison and that after a forced landing in 1944, Thompson was arrested by the Russians and subsequently sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for alleged espionage. He was reported seen in Budenskaya prison near Moscow from 1944 to 1948, and later was reported transferred to Tayshet camp (compound 026). The witness said that the POW he believed to be Thompson had informed him that he formerly lived in San Antonio.¹⁴⁷

Conclusion. No one on Thompson's plane survived the crash, or were reported alive after the crash, as POWs, internees, or otherwise. The crash occurred in difficult, remote, almost inaccessible terrain. There were no Japanese in the area. Any Chinese troops likely to be in the area would have been Nationalists, not Communists, and not likely to turn over an American to the Soviets. The crash site was at least 1,600 miles from the nearest Soviet territory. Despite the witnesses who came forward in the early 1950s and claimed to have seen someone believed to be Thompson in a Soviet prison, it is unlikely that Thompson, even if he had survived the crash, could have been "rescued" from a remote mountain peak in southern China and end up in Moscow.

Private Aloysious J. McLean

Service. US Army

Serial Number. 36042935

Date Captured/Missing. captured by the Germans on 4 October 1944; MIA from Stalag III-C on 31 January 1945.

¹⁴⁷ Jim Sanders, Mark Sauter, and R. Cort Kirkwood, Soldiers of Misfortune (Washington: National Press Books), pp. 112-13.

Current Status. Casualty files indicate that McLean was declared dead and non-recoverable. McLean's name also is included on the list of 207 servicemen who were known to be in German POW camps but were never repatriated.

Remarks. Private McLean's last known location was in the prison hospital of Stalag III-C in the city of Kustrin, Germany (later Alt-Drewitz, Poland). There were six other servicemen in the same prison hospital including Staff Sergeant Robert R. Brewer. After the Red Army liberated Stalag III-C, the care and treatment of these seven servicemen transferred from Captain Louis Nash (O-440671), also a POW and a doctor in the US Army Medical Corps, to a Soviet major who was the Chief of the Field Hospital at Stalag III-C. ¹⁴⁸

On 1 March 1946, the War Department issued a finding of death in McLean's case based on information from witnesses who were with him when POWs being evacuated by Germans from Stalag III-C were overrun and caught in a cross-fire between German and Soviet troops. The finding was that McLean and seven other POWs died as result of the firefight. Recovery and identification of remains of Americans who died at Stalag III-C were hindered by lack of Soviet records and because several days after the Soviets liberated and evacuated the camp, they burned it. This further helped to obliterate whatever previously extant cemeterial identifications may have existed. ¹⁴⁹

American Graves Registration Service personnel made several efforts in the postwar years to identify the remains of the prisoners who died and were buried at III-C, including exhumation of known grave sites. Mass and unmarked graves, lack of documentation, and bodies without clothing or identification tags, all frustrated these efforts. In 1953 McLean and nine others who had died at Kustrin were declared "non-recoverable." Two men not covered by the original 1 March 1946, determination of death which had included McLean, had been added to the list of

¹⁴⁸ TFR 19-2; TFR 33-1.

¹⁴⁹ AGO Casualty Branch, Status, Review, and Determination Report No. 5506, AG 704-Dead (1 March 1946), AGO Central Decimal File, 1946-48, box 1569, Entry 363, RG 407, NA. This file actually contains three separate SR&D reports, dated 1 March 1946; 24 January 1947; and 6 June 1949. All three reviews considered the cases of McLean and seven other POWs from Stalag III-C. Each review added information about the circumstances of their deaths and validated the original "finding" of death under Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act. But because no remains were recovered an official "report" of death under Section 9 could not be issued.

American POW deaths at Stalag III-C. The Graves Registration Service teams that conducted the search and exhumation effort were certain that these ten POWs had died in the 31 January 1945, firefight and were buried in the vicinity of the camp; they simply could not accurately identify the remains. Several summary reports in McLean's "Individual Deceased Personnel (293) File" state this certainty, but also indicate their frustration.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ "Aloysius J. McLean," Individual Deceased Personnel ("293") Files, box 6388, (M-4), Accession 92-70A-001, Washington National Records Center.

Staff Sergeant Robert R. Brewer

Service. US Army

Serial Number. 14163552

Date Captured/Missing. captured by the Germans 11 June 1944; on 15 January 1946, reported dead as of 8 February 1945.

Current Status. Casualty files indicate that Brewer was declared dead and non-recoverable. Brewer's name is included on the list of 207 servicemen who were known to be in German POW camps but were never repatriated.

Remarks. Brewer's last known location was in the prison hospital of Stalag III-C at Kustrin, Germany. Brewer had been seriously wounded when the Germans bombed Stalag III-C shortly after the Soviets liberated the camp. Six other servicemen were in the same prison hospital, including Private Aloysious J. McLean. After the Red Army liberated III-C, the care and treatment of these seven servicemen transferred from Captain Louis Nash (O-440671), also a POW and a doctor in the US Army Medical Corps, to a Soviet major who was the Chief of the Red Army field hospital at the camp.¹⁵¹

On 6 February 1945, the Soviets withdrew from the camp evacuating all POWs except Brewer and two other seriously wounded Americans. At least one of those two survived the war and later reported that Brewer died, probably on evening of 8 February. He further reported that the Soviets burned the camp, including the hospital which he believed still contained Brewer's body. On the basis of this information, on 15 January 1946, the War Department reported Brewer dead under Section 9 of the Missing Persons Act. Extensive searches for the remains of Americans who died and were buried at Stalag III-C continued for several years, but were especially intensive during May, July and October 1948. Finally, on 17 September 1953, Brewer and 54 other Americans known to have died in Poland were declared "non-recoverable."¹⁵²

¹⁵¹TFR 19-2; TFR 33-1.

¹⁵² "Robert R. Brewer," Individual Deceased Personnel ("293") Files, box 1048, (B-3), Accession 92-70A-001, Washington National Records Center.

Private First Class Howard E. Humble

Service. US Army

Serial Number. 36780018

Date Captured/Missing. captured by the Germans 3 January 1945; declared dead 1 June 1946.

Current Status. Private Humble was at Stalag IV-A near Dresden when liberated on 7 May 1945, by the Red Army. While in Soviet custody Humble suffered from a severely sore throat, received medical treatment from Russian doctors, and eventually was hospitalized at a Soviet military hospital. Humble never returned to American control. Casualty files indicate Humble was declared dead, non-recoverable. In the master list of deceased for World War II, Humble's name has the notation "pending" next to it. Humble's name is included on the list of 207 servicemen who were known to be in German POW camps but were never repatriated.

Remarks. Because he did not return alive with other liberated POWs who had been in Red Army hands, European Theater headquarters requested that the US Military Mission in Moscow seek information about Humble from the Soviets. Repeated requests to Soviet authorities during the late summer and fall of 1945 yielded only the information that Humble's name did not appear in their records.¹⁵³

Although the Soviets provided no information, on 1 June 1946, the War Department issued a finding of death for Humble, under Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act, based on statements from fellow POWs and witnesses who had visited him at the Soviet hospital during May 1945. A British soldier acted as leader of the group of 130 Allied POWs, including Humble, held in Dresden by the Soviets. That British soldier and others who had seen Humble in the hospital concluded that he had diphtheria, was in a very poor state of health, and doubted he could

¹⁵³ Message E-83192, 31 August 1945, and response of 1 September 1945; Deane to Golubev, 1 September 1945; Message M-25694, 2 September 1945; Maples to Golubev, 2 October 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 25, entry 309, RG 334, NA.

survive. On the basis of this evidence the War Department declared Humble had died while in the Soviet hospital.¹⁵⁴

American Graves Registration Service personnel conducted a field investigation in Dresden in November 1947, but did not recover the remains of Humble, largely because they lacked specific burial information. Subsequent field investigation also failed because of restricted access to the Soviet zone in East Germany. On 19 October 1953, the Army declared Humble's remains "non-recoverable."¹⁵⁵

Private First Class Lawrence Van Art

Service. US Army

Serial Number. 13053316

Date Captured/Missing. captured by the Germans on 19 September 1944; on 15 January 1946, declared dead as of 5 March 1945.

Current Status. Van Art's name is included on the list of 207 servicemen who were known to be in German POW camps but were never repatriated.

Remarks. On 25 December 1945, in letter No. 07814, General-Major Basilov, of the Office of the Commissioner for Repatriation Affairs, wrote General-Major Khodorkov, Chief of the Medical-Evacuation Directorate, Main Military Medical Directorate of the Red Army, requesting information on Van Art. According to the American Embassy, Van Art died in a Soviet hospital in the city of Landsberg, Germany (renamed Gorzow, Poland) sometime between 2 and 5 March 1945. The doctor in charge of Van Art's case was reported to be Soviet Major Georgij Davydovich Arois. The embassy requested information on the exact date and cause of Van Art's death, as well as a death certificate and burial location. General-Major Khodorkov's response

¹⁵⁴ AGO Casualty Branch, Status, Review, and Determination Report No. 6005, AG 704-Dead (1 June 1946), AGO Central Decimal File, 1946-48, box 1565, Entry 363, RG 407, NA.

¹⁵⁵ "Howard E. Humble," Individual Deceased Personnel ("293") Files, box 4437, (H-6), Accession 92-70A-001, Washington National Records Center.

indicated that according to the Chief of the Medical Directorate - Northern Group of Forces, Van Art did "not appear in the lists of hospital deaths."¹⁵⁶

Subsequent investigation by American authorities yielded further information confirming the fact of Van Art's death in the Soviet hospital, but did not lead to recovery of his remains. He was declared dead on 15 January 1946, and, after prolonged efforts at recovery, on 2 November 1951, his remains were determined to be "non-recoverable."¹⁵⁷

Colonel Marshall Bonner

Service. US Army Air Corps

Serial Number. 018967

Date Captured/Missing. MIA 26 June 1944, while on a bombing mission near Vienna.

Current Status. Colonel Bonner is on the master list of World War II deceased. His remains are listed as "non-recoverable."

Remarks. While there are several Bonners listed in the master list of deceased for World War II in the category of "non-recoverable", Colonel Bonner is the only one listed with the additional notation that his status was pending. This probably derives from the belief by a ranking Army Air Forces officer that Colonel Bonner might have survived the war.

The Joint Commission Support Directorate of the Defense POW/MIA Office has received documents from the Russian side of the Joint Commission relating to an individual named variously as Karl Karl Bonner, Karl Zheri Boner, Karl Karlovich Bonar, Karl Karl Bonar, and Karis Karis Bonner. All these names appear to be used for an individual that these Soviet-era documents initially refer to as an American prisoner of war. By and large these Russian documents originated as result of the 1945 inquiries to Soviet authorities regarding Colonel Marshall Bonner from the US Military Mission in Moscow. The "Bonner" referenced in the Russian documents spent time in a variety of Soviet camps before he was apparently "identified"

¹⁵⁶ TFR 19-3; TFR 19-4.

¹⁵⁷ "Lawrence Van Art," Individual Deceased Personnel ("293") Files, box 9580, (V-4) Accession 92-70A-001, Washington National Records Center.

as a German, exploited, and repatriated to Germany. Most interesting is TFR 39-194 which mentions that he was probably identified as being of a different nationality and shipped to another camp under a different name. One intriguing aspect of this case, however, is that the Soviet era documents we received from the Russian archives refer to American POWs in Soviet camps during 1946 and 1947 in a seemingly matter of fact way.

We obviously were most interested in determining the relationship, if any, between Colonel Bonner and the individual(s) named in the Russian documents. The Bonner of these documents was born in 1919, while Colonel Bonner was born in 1911. Marshall Bonner and the Bonner cited in the Russian archival documents clearly are different individuals.¹⁵⁸

In the end, however, there is no real mystery surrounding Colonel Marshall Bonner. On 27 June 1945, the AGO Casualty Branch prepared a finding of death in his case under Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act. But it was not immediately approved because of the intervention in the case by Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander of the Army Air Forces, who believed there was a possibility Bonner could have "survived, and hid out and that he will return to military control." (Eaker's interest in the case probably stemmed from the fact that Bonner's father-in-law was retired Major General James E. Fechet, formerly Chief of the Army Air Corps, 1927-31). The case was continued as MIA. This high level interest undoubtedly prompted the several inquiries about Bonner from the Military Mission in Moscow to Soviet authorities during the summer and fall of 1945. Based largely on information from surviving members of the crew with which Bonner flew, on 12 November 1945, he and four others from that crew were declared dead under Section 5. Additional evidence, mostly from German records, led on 9 September 1946, to an official "report of death" under Section 9 of the Missing Persons Act, although remains still were not recovered. The search continued, however, until 25 September 1953, when Bonner's remains were determined to be "non-recoverable."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Message EX-70454, 19 July 1945, and response of 21 July 1945, USMMM Subject File, "POWs," box 25, entry 309, RG 334, NA; and TFRs 39-181,182,183,185,188,193,194, & 195.

¹⁵⁹ AGO Casualty Branch, Status, Review, and Determination Report No. 3146, AG 704-Missing (27 June 1945), AGO Classified Central Decimal File, 1943-45, box 3293, Entry 360; AGO Casualty Branch, Status, Review, and Determination Report No. 3146-A, AG 704-Dead (12 November 45), AGO Central Decimal File, 1940-45, box 4109, Entry 363; AGO Casualty

Sergeant Harry G. Stube

Service. US Army Air Corps

Serial Number. 19088507

Date Captured/Missing. N/A

Current Status. Closed Issue.

Remarks. Interest in this case initially stemmed from a document, a file card, supplied by the Russian side of the Joint Commission, telegraph No. 129 (no date given, with only a notation of Commo Center NKO USSR) indicating a Gerri Stubi (Gary Stuby? hand underlined), SGT, "died during the accident number 1/2711= Comrade Zhukov." This name did not appear on US Casualty lists from World War II. There were several individuals with the surname Stuby on the master list of World War II deceased for which the circumstances of loss are unknown.

Update. A search of the casualty files for any variations on the name Stubi resulted in finding Sergeant Harry G. Stube. Sergeant Stube was a member of a B-17G of the 303rd Bomb Group based at Molesworth, England. Sergeant Stube's plane was shot down near Chojnice, Poland on 28 March 1945 after bombing Berlin, Germany. A letter was received by the American Embassy in Warsaw, Poland in December 1946 from Dr. Jan Lukowicz. Dr. Lukowicz's letter reported that there was an American buried in the Russian cemetery near Chojnice, Poland. The inscription on the cross read:

Sgt. Harry Stube

U.S. Army Air Corps

1909-1945

Killed in Action

28.3.1945

Branch, Report of Death, AG 704-Dead (9 September 1946), AGO Central Decimal File, 1946-48, box 1563, Entry 363, RG 407, NA. "Marshall Bonner," Individual Deceased Personnel ("293") Files, box 1025, (B-3), Accession 92-70A-001, Washington National Records Center.

One of Sergeant Stube's dogtags was nailed above this inscription. It read:

Stube, Harry G.

19088507 T 42 45 A

P.

Sergeant Stube's remains were exhumed, positively identified, and temporarily buried at Neuville en Condroz, Belgium. At the request of Sergeant Stube's mother, his remains were again exhumed and the body was shipped to Pasadena, California, where he was interred at the Pasadena Mausoleum in Altadena, in June 1949. Curiously, although the initial determination of death based on an autopsy performed by a Soviet doctor revealed that Stube died instantly in the crash of his plane when a "broken rib punctured his liver," one post-war investigation made in 1948 reported that he died while fighting with Soviet troops against the Germans.¹⁶⁰

Private Ioni Boos

Service.

Serial Number.

Date Captured/Missing.

Current Status. Leads being followed in Russian archives. Reported on as died, 20 December 1944. Buried in cemetery No. 3, Section 5, Row 4, Grave 20. The cemetery is reported to be "1.5 kilometers east of Parkommune Voroshilov city (now MRA...J) oblast." We require more information on the accident cited above to determine who this individual was. There are several individuals with the surname Boos on the master list of World War II deceased for which the circumstances of loss are unknown.

Remarks. This case is based on a card file provided by the Russian side of the Joint Commission on 27 March 1992. The information on the card mentions a Private Ioni Ionn Boos (Boas), with

¹⁶⁰ TFR 19-30; TFR 336-31 & 32. AGO Casualty Branch, Report of Death, AG 704-Dead (7 August 45), AGO Central Decimal File, 1943-45, box 3243, Entry 360, RG 407, NA.

the year and place of birth listed as 1914 Lancaster. The Camp No. listed is 5929. The card form lists two archive numbers: 320641 and 320488.¹⁶¹

Oliver Rom and Lipay Blehk

Service.

Serial Number.

Date Captured/Missing.

Current Status. Leads being pursued in US and Russian archives.

Remarks. In April 1995 JCSD-Moscow received letters and two rings which supposedly belong to two American aviators, Captain Oliver Rom and Lipay Blehk.

The author of the letters, who wishes to remain anonymous, stated that in February 1949 while at the transit point in Petrozavodsk, he met two alleged American pilots he knew as: Oliver Rom and Lipay Blehk. Rom and Blehk said that they were stationed near Rochester, England in a bomb group (Rochester, east of London and south of the mouth of the Thames was not a US bomber base during the war). Rom said that his plane had been shot down while on a bombing mission over Hamburg, Germany and he had been imprisoned first at Otvertin, Belgium, then in Valenbruk, Germany (Neither of these locales is identifiable as having a German POW facility).

In 1945 British forces reportedly liberated the camp, but for reasons unknown, Oliver Rom and Lipay Blehk were turned over to the Soviet authorities. They were sent to Beryeza Kartyzkaya in the Belorussia, the staging point at Petrozavodsk, and then to the Rudnik-Plotina Labor camp in Kareliea, where he worked in Mine Shaft 1/2. While at Rudnik-Plotina, Oliver Rom's prisoner number was 8007. On 12 December 1958, a guard allegedly shot Rom who was buried at the Zelenaya Sobka site near the camp in plot number 11234. The author of the letter was unsure of the fate of Lipay Blehk, as he had little contact with him and saw Blehk for the last time in 1954.

According to the letters, Captain Oliver Rom was born in 1923 and was a native of Minnesota, United States. Rom's father was a Colombian who had experience working in mines in Fort

¹⁶¹ TFR 5-16 a, b & c.

Francis, Canada and Minnesota. Rom's mother was a native Russian whose maiden name was Olga Garshkova (Gorshkova). Rom was stationed in England as a bomber pilot, possibly with the 8th Air Force.

Although little is known about Lipay Blehk, he apparently experienced frequent troubles with camp authorities and spent a lot of time in Vyborg.

After Rom's burial, Blehk gave the author some of Rom's belongings, which included a small black address book, and a ring with the head of a Trojan warrior on it. Blehk also gave the author his own ring, which had a lion's head on it, and claimed that the symbols on the rings corresponded with the insignia that had been painted on the sides of their bombers. Camp authorities confiscated Rom's address book, but did not take the rings.

Initial analysis on the rings was done by an expert in "trench art" from the US Army Institute of Heraldry, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He concluded: Rom's ring (Trojan warrior) was made from a brass nut; the warrior's profile is affixed to the brass with an epoxy substance that was common during WWII; Blehk's ring (Lion's head), was made from a double stroke die. Experts in London have been faxed an image of the rings and are currently studying them for more information.

The U.S. side of the Commission has not been able to identify Captain Oliver Rom and Lipay Blehk using the casualty lists or related personnel-type records from World War II. Additional searches are being conducted with the National Archives, Brigham Young University Genealogy Department, and Army Air Force historical files for Rom and Blehk.

There are many consistencies that lead us to believe that there is some merit to this case. They are:

1. The area around Fort Francis had a sizable population of immigrants from the former USSR.
2. Gold mines were and still are prevalent in the Fort Francis area.
3. The description of the area of Fort Francis as told to in the letter matches the actual terrain - confirmed by Henry Ossachuk, an immigration officer in Fort Francis.

4. A similar name, "Romyn" is associated with a gold mine in the Fort Francis area.
5. Gold mines were prevalent in pre-war Minnesota.
6. A search of CAF records found a record for "Oliver Romuk". However, the record is located in a building undergoing asbestos removal and access to this record is not possible at the present time.
7. According to a map survey, the description of the route taken in the Karelo-Finskaya SSR is accurate.
8. A mine is located approximately 12 km from the town of Plotina in the Republic of Karelia.
9. The craftsmanship and materials connected with Rome's ring are consistent with the war years.

We requested that a search be conducted in Russian archives for cardfiles or additional information from the Rudnika-Plotina Camp on Rom and Blehk. Also, records should be available at Zelenaya Sobka where Rom is allegedly buried.

The "Dak Doil" case

Service.

Serial Number.

Date Captured/Missing.

Current Status. Leads being followed in Russian archives.

Remarks. Vladimir Vladimirovich Starikov, a Militia Lieutenant in Magadan, recently answered a Task Force Russia advertisement. Lieutenant Starikov reported that while on a 1990 patrol down a foot path in the Amurskaya Oblast he found a lone wooden grave marker. On the grave marker was the inscription "Dak Doyl", wing insignia, and the comment that the buried individual was a "good Communist". Lieutenant Starikov produced the wings for Task Force Russian and they greatly resemble the insignia denoting a US aviator.

Task Force Russia personnel attempted to locate the grave site to acquire as accurate a rendition of the insignia as possible. We have searched our casualty data and have found five or six names

that could be derived from the name "Dak Doil". We will continue our research at the National Military Personnel Records Center in St. Louis to see if any of these individuals could possibly be the person buried in the Amurskaya Oblast. We requested our Russian colleagues search there sources to see if they have any information on "Dak Doil" in the Amurskaya Oblast.

The "Stanley" Case

Service. US Navy

Serial Number.

Date Captured/Missing.

Current Status. Leads being followed in Russian archives.

Remarks. On 19 May 1995, Task Force Russia received a letter from Boris Yakovlevich Kotlovsky, a Russian citizen who was in the GULAG during 1949 and 1950. While there, he says that he had contact with an American submarine Commander by the last name of "Stanley".

When Task Force Russia interviewed Kotlovsky on 10 August 1995 in Kiev, he said he was in the "Udarnik" goldmine near Susuman when he met Stanley. He stated further that Stanley was a about 35-37 years old and was a Lithuanian-American, who spoke both Russian and English.

We searched the list of World War II dead and could not find a Navy officer, whose last name was Stanley. We also conducted a search of the submarine losses of WWII at the Navy Department Library at the Washington Navy Yard. As far as we were able to determine, there were no Navy submarine officers lost whose first or last name was Stanley. There was only one submariner lost during World War II named Stanley. This was Gunner's Mate Second Class (GM2) Jason Stanley (2623066), who was lost on board USS Argonaut.

We have requested that our Russian colleagues search their archives for information on the Udarnik Gold Mine and any reference to GM2 Stanley.

APPENDIX X: THE JOSEPH A. FRIEDL CASE

In a 1993 PhD dissertation Patricia Wadley states that Joseph Friedl was one of thousands of Americans liberated by the Soviet Army from German POW camps, never returned to US military control, and held against their will in Soviet prisons. But Friedl was different, she states, because eventually he did return in April 1946, probably as result of Soviet efforts to use Allied POWs as blackmail against Washington and London into continuing forcible repatriation of Soviet citizens. The source Wadley cites for this account is: "Information from James Sanders, 17 January 1992."

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Joseph A. Friedl (37466700) was a staff sergeant from Sioux City, Iowa, serving with the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion, 14th Armored Division, when captured by the Germans on 28 November 1944. He was sent to Stalag III-B at Furstenburg. His name appears on the master list of POWs of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau and is annotated as "RMC" (returned to military control). Friedl likely was liberated by Soviet troops from Stalag III-A, Luckenwalde, where in March the Germans had marched most of the Allied POWs from Stalag III-B. But contrary to the information Sanders supplied to Wadley, Friedl returned to the United States on 18 June 1945, and was discharged from the Army on 30 November 1945.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Patricia Louise Wadley, "Even One Is Too Many: An Examination of the Soviet Refusal to Repatriate Liberated American World War II Prisoners of War," Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1993, pp. 231-32, especially footnote 106.

¹⁶³ "Final Payment Worksheet," 28 November 1945, and "WD AGO Form 53," 28 November 1945 (signed by Friedl); copies furnished by Records Reconstruction Branch, National Personnel Records Center.

APPENDIX XI: RUSSIANS BURIED IN ALASKA FROM THE WORLD WAR II ERA

Strict observation of neutrality with the Japanese Empire was a major concern to the Soviet Union prior to the Soviet declaration of war on Japan. This is amply illustrated by the famous Doolittle Raid on Japan. One concern of the planners of this mission was the range of the aircraft. If the plan was flawlessly executed, Doolittle's aircraft would have just enough fuel to safely reach and land at Chinese controlled airstrips. An alternative to this plan was to approach the Soviets and see if they would accept Doolittle's aircraft as a Lend-Lease shipment, thus allowing the aircraft to land at Soviet air bases after bombing Japan. Even though the Soviets relished the idea of receiving a squadron of new B-25 bombers early in the war, they would not agree to this proposal because of the extreme sensitivity surrounding their neutrality with Japan¹⁶⁴.

The Soviet Union maintained a technical services detachment in Alaska during World War II. The group was primarily responsible for the Soviet coordination and acceptance of Lend Lease supplies destined for the Soviet Union. All Lend Lease aircraft flown from Alaska to the Soviet Union were flown by Soviet Air Force pilots. Soviet reflagged Lend Lease freighters transported non-armament supplies through Japanese waters to Vladivostok. This large scale presence of Soviet personnel in Alaska invariably resulted in a number of accidental deaths, most were from aircraft accidents.

At least eleven Soviet servicemen and one civilian died and were buried in Alaska during World War II from various causes. These people and all known information are:

1. Stepan Stepanovich Bokarev, Junior Lieutenant, Soviet Air Force. Died as a result of a compound skull fracture received from an airplane crash on 13 June 1943. Lieutenant Bokarev was initially buried in the Ladd Field Cemetery, Alaska, but his remains were later moved to the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska where they remain. Lieutenant Bokarev was married at the time of his death.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴Otis Hays, Jr., Home From Siberia: The Secret Odysseys of Interned American Airmen in World War II (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1990), 28-29.

¹⁶⁵ Individual Deceased Personnel ("293") Files, box 739, Accession 92-70-1, RG 92, Washington National Records Center.

2. Boris V. Kisel'nikov, Major, Engineer Assistant to the Chief Engineer, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 7 December 1942 at Ladd Field, Alaska. Major Kisel'nikov was initially buried in the Ladd Field Cemetery, but his remains were latter moved and interred at the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska where they remain. Major Kisel'nikov was married at the time of his death to Nina V. Kisel'nikova.¹⁶⁶
3. Aleksander N. Savinkin, Senior Lieutenant, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 14 March 1945 at Nome, Alaska. Lieutenant Savinkin was initially buried in the Post Cemetery Number 2, Nome, Alaska, but his remains were latter moved and interred at the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska on 22 October 1946 where they remain. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁶⁷
4. Muberet Nurievich Nuriev, Captain, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 14 March 1945 at Nome, Alaska. Captain Nuriev was initially buried in the Post Cemetery Number 2, Nome, Alaska, but his remains were latter moved and interred at the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska on 22 October 1946, where they remain. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁶⁸
5. Mikhail K. Murav'ev, Lieutenant, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 14 March 1945 at Nome, Alaska. Lieutenant Murav'ev was initially buried in the Post Cemetery Number 2, Nome, Alaska, but his remains were latter moved and interred at the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska on 22 October 1946, where they remain. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁶⁹
6. Ivan Nikolaevich Moiseev, Captain, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 27 June 1943 at Golovin, Alaska. Captain Moiseev was initially buried in the Post Cemetery Number 2, Nome, Alaska, but his remains were latter moved and interred at the Fort

¹⁶⁶ibid., box 4910, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁶⁷ibid., box 8348, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁶⁸ibid., box 6820, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁶⁹ibid.

Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska on 22 October 1946, where they remain. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁷⁰

7. Stepan Ivanovich Shchekachikhin, Sergeant, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 27 June 1943 at Golovin, Alaska. Sergeant Shchekachikhin was initially buried in the Post Cemetery Number 2, Nome, Alaska, but his remains were later moved and interred at the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska on 22 October 1946, where they remain. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁷¹
8. Aleksei Dmitrievich Skorednev, Lieutenant, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 27 June 1943 at Golovin, Alaska. Lieutenant Skorednev was initially buried in the Post Cemetery Number 2, Nome, Alaska, but his remains were latter moved and interred at the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska on 22 October 1946, where they remain. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁷²
9. Konstantin Iosifovich Zareumba, Lieutenant, Soviet Air Force. Died as result of a plane crash on 27 June 1943 at Golovin, Alaska. Lieutenant Zareumba was initially buried in the Post Cemetery Number 2, Nome, Alaska, but his remains were latter moved and interred at the Fort Richardson National Cemetery, Alaska on 22 October 1946, where they remain. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁷³
10. Fedor Maksimovich Dikov, Warrant Officer, Soviet Navy. Died as result of coronary thrombosis on 8 September 1945. Mr. Dikov is buried in the US Army Cemetery at Fort Randall, Cold Bay, Alaska. At the time of his death, he was survived by his wife, Elena Vasilevna Dikova of Mikhailov, Kalinin Oblast.¹⁷⁴
11. Evtikhii Emilyanovich Arelski, Chief Petty Officer, Soviet Navy. Died on 13 April 1945 as result of a skull fracture received from slipping on a ship's gangway. Chief Arelski is buried in

¹⁷⁰ibid., box 6205, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁷¹ibid., box 8450, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁷²ibid., box 8197, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁷³ibid., box 10328, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁷⁴ibid., box 2291, RG 92, WNRC.

the US Army Cemetery at Fort Randall, Cold Bay, Alaska. No information available on his next of kin.¹⁷⁵

12. Yatskevicha, civilian daughter of Engineer Major Yatskevich. The only information available on this person is that she was buried in the Civilian cemetery in Fairbanks.¹⁷⁶
13. All military graves are maintained in American fashion; each has a marble tombstone and each is decorated with crossed American and Russian flags on Memorial Day. Each body is buried with records sealed in metal canisters. Should the Russians decide to repatriate the remains, they will be easy to locate.

¹⁷⁵ibid., box 65, RG 92, WNRC.

¹⁷⁶TFR 133-33, List of Air Technical Personnel Buried on the Territory of Alaska.

APPENDIX XII: THE "AG 704" FILES

In the War Department Decimal File System, the records filing scheme nearly universally used by the Army during the World War II-era, the number "704" was the subject designation for "casualties, wounded, and wounds." In fact, documentation on all manner of casualties was filed under "704," including records of individual cases of missing in action, prisoner of war, and killed in action. Consequently we examined systematically nearly two hundred boxes of "704" files from the records of the Adjutant General's Office (TAGO), the War Department "office of record" for matters relating to personnel administration, among other responsibilities war. This appendix describes our research methodology and findings.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ The records we examined came from the several chronological and other subseries of the AG Central Decimal File, RG 407. They included the following chronological segments, file designations, and boxes:

1. AG 704-Dead;
 - 1945, boxes 4105-25
 - 1946-48, boxes 1553-74
 - 1949-50, box 992
2. AG 704-Dead (Security Classified)
 - 1945, boxes 3238-67
 - 1946-47, boxes 3544-48
3. AG 704-Casualty
 - 1945, boxes 4066-90
4. AG 704-Missing (Security Classified)
 - 1945, boxes 3291-3304
5. AG 704 (Classified)
 - 1945, boxes 3116-47
6. AG 704
 - 1946-48, boxes 1524-52.

Benjamin L. DeWhitt, Records Relating to Personal Participation in World War II: American Military Casualties and Burials: Reference Information Paper 82 (Washington: NARA, 1993), pp. 30-33, provides a good description of the Central Decimal File, in general, and the records under AG 704, in particular. The differences between the several AG 704 subseries and subfiles are mostly subtle. For instance, determinations of death of individuals previously in MIA status can be found filed under AG 704 Dead, AG 704 Missing, and AG 704. Nor are the distinctions between the security classified and the unclassified portions obvious. The chronological subseries are the more important consideration, particularly since determinations of death under the Missing Persons Act normally were made twelve months after the person went missing. With persistence, it sometimes is possible to locate the case on a specific individual by searching the relevant AG

The Adjutant General's Office had technical supervisory responsibility over and provided services to War Department headquarters and all major echelons of the Army for a variety of Army-wide administrative, communication, records management, and personnel matters. As a result, TAGO central decimal files for World War II "are probably the most comprehensive single body of important documentation of the activities of the War Department and Army during the war...." The central decimal files are large in volume (nearly 5,000 cubic feet for the period 1940-54) and nearly comprehensive in the subject matter they document.¹⁷⁸ For our work, those portions relating to personnel administration and casualties were the most significant.

The Casualty Branch of TAGO received notices about military personnel who were casualties in the United States and overseas, prepared notifications to their next of kin, handled related correspondence, supervised casualty reporting methods used throughout the Army, and reviewed findings and actions in cases of Army personnel reported as MIA. As a result of this work, the branch created important records, now part of the TAGO Central Decimal File, relating to policy and procedures for casualty reporting and the casualty resolution process, that were of value to our understanding these subjects. But for us the most significant documentation was that relating to the reviews and determinations of individual cases under the Missing Persons Act.

Within each of the chronological subseries and decimal subfiles of AG 704 (as listed in footnote 177) the "reviews and determination of status," "subsequent reviews," and "reports of death" are arranged by date, usually the date the casualty resolution board which examined the case rendered a determination. Although some determinations were made throughout the war, particularly under Section 5 of the Missing Persons Act, far more came as hostilities drew to a close and continued into the postwar years; the bulk of the files useful to us, therefore, was dated 1945 to 1948. As the process continued after VE Day and additional information was uncovered,

704 files dated approximately one year after the disappearance. The dates of death listed in the American Battle Monuments Commission Register of World War II Dead Interred in American Military Cemeteries on Foreign Soil... (Washington: AMBC), also can provide clues to possible file locations.

¹⁷⁸ Departmental Records Branch, Guide to Records of the Adjutant General's Department, 1940-45: Record Group Summaries 207.12-207.90 (Washington: TAGO, 1950).

“determinations of death” rendered earlier under Section 5 often were changed to “reports of death” under Section 9. But the growing number of cases filed in the chronological subseries dated after VE Day was not simply a matter of the twelve month provision in the law. More and more sources of information to assist in resolving individual casualty cases became available as Allied forces occupied territory formerly controlled by the German enemy. Significant among these were liberated POWs, captured German records, and actual burial sites. As the AG 704 files reveal, the effort was truly massive and comprehensive.

The process involved resolving both cases of MIAs and of known POWs who did not return to military control. The discrepancies relating to most individuals in each of these categories eventually were resolved as either determined dead or reported dead. The Casualty Branch received much information through normal War Department channels, such as Missing Aircrew Reports, findings of Graves Registration Teams, and lists of known POWs. But it also sought out information to assist in resolving individual cases from less likely sources. For example, on cases of known POWs who were missing after liberation or of aircrew who were MIA, it routinely would contact survivors (from the POW camp or aircraft of the missing individual) who might know about the circumstances of the disappearance. Occasionally it would request information from the next of kin. It used the Federal Bureau of Investigation and scientific/medical sources to assist in fingerprint, dental, and other pathological means of identifying bodily remains. It sought information from aircraft manufacturers, such as serial numbers of parts and equipment, that were aboard a particular plane believed involved in an incident involving an MIA or unidentified remains. It also got information on possible burial sites from churches, municipal government, and other sources in Germany and the countries of formerly occupied Europe, which further helped to resolve individual MIA cases.

The documents relating to individual “reviews and determination of status,” “subsequent reviews ...,” and “reports of death” contain information about casualties resulting for several types of incidents. The largest number of the reports relate to aircrews from the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, which were missing after being shot down in operations over Germany, Austria, and other areas of Nazi-occupied Europe. Infantrymen overrun by German attacks, as at Kasserine Pass (Tunisia) in February 1943 or in the Ardennes (Belgium) in December 1944, or lost in American

offensive operations conducted in rough, isolated terrain, such as along the Rapido River (Italy) in January 1944 or in the Huertgen Forest (Germany) during the autumn of 1944, also constitute a sizable portion of these files. Because these reviews under the Missing Persons Act normally were done twelve months after a person was missing, records relating to numbers of individuals lost in a specific major operation, such as the "Big Week" bombing missions of February 1944 or the Normandy landings in June 1944, often can be located together (filed, that is, under the same or nearly the same AG 704 file date). These records also contain a substantial amount of information on American POWs held by the Germans, including prisoners who died during captivity, who were killed in bombing raids or while Allied forces attempted to liberate them, or who went missing on the evacuation marches when the Germans moved the camp populations.

Obviously we could not reconstruct all of the casualty resolution cases prepared by the War Department during and immediately after the war. But we selectively reviewed portions of the TAGO central decimal files that contained documentation on those cases, identified those segments that contained the chronologically and geographically relevant material, and then systematically and carefully reviewed case files relating to POWs and MIAs who might have had some contact with Soviet forces. From this research we gained a depth of understanding of how the casualty resolution process worked, how evidence was gathered, and how the analysis was done that led to determination of final casualty status. Our review was not only useful for a general understanding of the process, but also for uncovering information on specific cases, including individuals who had come into Soviet Army custody from German POW camps or who had or might have had contact with the Russians at the end of the war. In addition, we found information on individual cases we already had developed, such as for some names on the "207 List" and for discrepancy case like Reitz and Thompson. Our AG 704 file search yielded documentation on these and other matters in great quantities.

The most interesting information uncovered fell into several often overlapping categories:

1. American POWs known to be in German custody who were reported killed at about the time Soviet forces liberated their camps, such as those at Stalag III-C, Kustrin (all individuals already known to us).

2. POWs reported to have died or been killed on the evacuation marches;
3. POWs reported to have died during German captivity whose remains were never recovered (BNR).
4. Americans who were MIA in proximity to Soviet forces who were declared dead and whose remains were not recovered.
5. Other "interesting" cases, such as of individuals originally reported as POWs but who it was determined later had been killed in action and were never in German custody (such cases are an especially dramatic example of the "fog of war" problem discussed earlier in our report and one which caused unfortunate expectations among the next of kin).
6. Notable individual cases (Reitz, Thompson, et al). Documents relating to these categories have been copied and organized for our ongoing work in developing additional case studies and problems to examine.

APPENDIX XIII: ARCHIVAL SOURCES EXAMINED

Although we believe our research and analysis have resolved a number of issues, raised new questions about other issues, and uncovered new and valuable sources of information about the American World War II prisoner of war experience, we do not believe our account is the last word on the subject. With that knowledge firmly in mind, we have endeavored to provide accurate citations to the documents and series of records which we have used. We anticipate, even welcome, other researchers examining the documentation we have utilized.

Electrostatic copies have been made of virtually all of the original documents cited in the footnotes of this report; the copies generally have been arranged to correspond to the organization of the report. The copies and other working papers accumulated in preparing the report will be available to researchers at the National Archives. The copies have been annotated to indicate the file, box number, record series, and record group, where the original document can be located. The footnote citations in the report also provide that information.

Two publications provide an invaluable starting point to researching the vast World War II records holdings of the National Archives relating to the POW experience:

- Ben DeWhitt and Jennifer Davis Heaps (compilers), American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees: Records Relating to Personal Participation in World War II: Reference Information Paper 80 (Washington: NARA, 1992).
- Benjamin L. DeWhitt (compiler), American Military Casualties and Burials: Records Relating to Personal Participation in World War II: Reference Information Paper 82 (Washington: NARA, 1993).

The following record groups, series, and files were especially valuable for our work, although the list is by no means exhaustive of all the materials in the National Archives that we examined.

- Record Group 331; Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF);
- Secretary General Staff, G-1, and G-1 PW Executive Branch correspondence;

- Records relate to planning for POW recovery, liaison with allies (including Soviets), tracking POW population in German camps, reports on recovery of Allied POWs.
- Record Group 332; European Theater of Operations (ETO);
 - a. Provost Marshal General; administrative correspondence relating to recovery of POWs and transport out of the ETO back to the US; also includes nominal rolls of POWs returned to military control (RMC) arranged by POW camp or transport point;
 - b. ETO MIS-X Branch; intelligence reports on POWs in German custody and debriefs of those RMC.
- Record Group 334; US Military Mission to Moscow; especially see the "POW" entry in the Subject File; relates to diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets, activities of the Wilmeth team in Poland and the contact team in Odessa, and inquiries about and passing of information relating to individual American servicemen believed to be POW and MIA in the Soviet zone.
- RG 389; Provost Marshal General's Office;
 - a. Prisoner of War Information Bureau (PWIB) records include the master lists of POWs, whether RMC or died in captivity;
 - b. PWIB Subject File contains a variety of significant entries relating to POWs, including debriefs of those RMC, intelligence reports relating to the evacuation of German camps, and information on the repatriations from Rumania and Bulgaria; Reference Information Paper 80 contains an extensive file listing of this series.
- RG 407; Adjutant General Central Decimal Files, 1940-48;
 - a. under AG 383.6 policy documentation and reporting on the recovery of POWs;
 - b. under AG 704 [with variations] casualty recovery, resolution, and clearance policy;
 - c. especially significant are those files under AG 704-Dead for individual cases of MIAs determined or known to be dead (This is perhaps the most important new body of documentary evidence uncovered in the course of our work, to help understand both the policy relating to

POW recovery and casualty clearance, but also to see how individual discrepancy cases fit into that policy.).