

U.S. - Russia
Joint Commission
on POW/MIAs



Joint Commission Support
Directorate (JCSD)

16th Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs

OPENING SESSION OF 16th PLENUM OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON PRISONERS OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION (NOVEMBER 9, 1999)

The Opening Session of the 16th Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Prisoners of War/Missing in Action convened on November 9, 1999 at 10:30 AM at the *Malyy Zal (Little Hall)* at the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, *Staraya Ploshchad' (Old Square)*, Moscow.

Principal U.S. Attendees:

- Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.) Roland Lajoie, U.S. Co-Chairman, USRJC and acting Co-Chairman, Vietnam War Working Group
- Mr. Denis Clift, Joint Military Intelligence College, Co-Chairman, Cold War Working Group
- Mr. Robert Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs
- Mr. Michael McReynolds, National Archives, Co-Chairman, World War II Working Group
- Mr. Norman Kass, Executive Secretary, U.S. Side, USRJC and acting Co-Chairman, Korean War Working Group
- Dr. James Connell, Chief, Joint Commission Support Directorate, Moscow Office
- Mr. Nick Sorokin, Interpreter, U.S. Department of State

Also present: Mr. Albert Graham, Lt Col Scott Cerrone, Mr. Roger Schumacher, Major Woodman Page, Major Jean MacIntyre, Mr. Danz Blasser, CMSgt Carol Dockham, SMSgt Bernard Brown, SFC Michael Lunini, SFC Joya Gooden, Mr. Robert Bishop, and Lt Col Anthony Foti (Mr. Jones' Military Assistant). Also present from the Marshall Center, Garmisch, Germany: Captain(P) David Chapman, and Captain(P) Matthew Kristoff.

Principal Russian Attendees:

- General-Major Vladimir Antonovich Zolotarev, Co-Chairman, USRJC
- Mr. Valentin Alekseyevich Sobolev, Russian Federation Security Council
- Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Nikiforov, Institute of Military History, Co-Chairman, World War II Working Group
- Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov, Federal Security Service, Co-Chairman, Cold War Working Group
- Colonel Aleksandr Semenovich Orlov, Institute of Military History, acting Co-Chairman, Vietnam War Working Group
- Mr. Sergey Olegovich Panin, Foreign Intelligence Service
- Mr. Vladimir Vasilyevich Sokolov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Archives
- Colonel Valeriy Alekseyevich Filippov, Military Memorial Center
- Colonel Konstantin Viktorovich Golumbovskiy, Presidential Administration, Dept of POWs, Internees, and MIAs

Also present: Rear Admiral Boris Gavrilovich Novyy; Vladimir Ivanovich Korotayev, Deputy Director, Center for the Storage and Preservation of Historical Documents; Captain 2nd Rank Sergei Yur'evich Kazachenko, Gatchina Archives; Ms. Natal'ya Mikhaylovna Levina, Executive Secretary, Russian Side, USRJC; Captain 1st Rank Valeriy Nikolayevich Vartanov, Institute of Military History; Captain 1st Rank Waldemar Nikolayevich Shevchenko, Institute of Military History; Ms. Mar'ya Ivanovna Lotareva, Department of POWs, Internees and MIAs; Col. Leonid Ignat'yevich Biryukov, Federal Council of Veterans; Mr. Dmitrii Dmitriyevich Vorobyev, Foreign Intelligence Service; Mr. Aleksandr Petrovich Cherepkov, Federal Security Service; FNU Komorarov, Security Council.

Introductory Remarks:

General-Major Zolotarev opened the 16th Plenum by welcoming the participants. He expressed his hope that constructive work could be accomplished during the session. He introduced Mr. Sobolev, who spoke on behalf of President Yeltsin and the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Sobolev said that, since its inception in March 1992, the U.S-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs (USRJC) has achieved positive results and is considered an important communication channel between our two countries. The Presidential Administration and the Security Council of the Russian Federation follow the Commission's work and support its efforts. Mr. Sobolev wished the Commission success in its endeavors during the plenum.

Remarks by the U.S. Side:

Lajoie noted this was his first formal plenary session. He thanked the Russian side for inviting the U.S. side of the Commission to Moscow to carry out the work that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have asked us to do. He said he hoped to review the major issues so that both sides of the Commission would be able to chart a course of action for the new millennium. He introduced the U.S. members of the delegation who were seated at the table. Lajoie apologized for the absences of Senator Bob Smith and Congressman Sam Johnson, both of whom had to remain in Washington to complete a Congressional Session. The U.S. Chairman

said that Senator Smith had agreed that he, Lajoie, would chair the Vietnam War Working Group in his place and that Congressman Johnson had asked Norman Kass to act as Co-chairman of the Korean War Working Group. Lajoie then turned to Denis Clift and asked him for his opening comments on the Cold War Working Group.

Clift said he looked forward to working with his Russian counterpart, Vinogradov. He thanked the Russian side for its support of the work undertaken in the Central Naval Archives at Gatchina (Saint Petersburg). He noted, in particular, his appreciation for the efforts made by Russian Rear Admiral (Ret.) Novyy at the Gatchina repository and in the Murmansk and Severomorsk regions of Russia to determine the fate of Major Eugene Posa, USAF, (MIA since 1 July 1960).

Clift noted that the U.S. side had encountered an individual with extensive GULag experience who indicated that he had traveled widely within the former Soviet Union and had kept detailed memoirs with information about U.S. prisoners held there. Entries in the memoirs encompass the period from the 1950s to the 1980s.

Clift said that the memoirs cite three (3) instances of detained American military personnel from World War II; a list of twenty-two (22) American names from the Korean War; information about the Soviet shootdown on the 13 June 1952 of a United States Air Force RB-29 over the Sea of Japan, and the alleged capture of the ten (10) airmen from that shootdown. He noted that the journal is detailed, believable, straightforward, and contributes to our common knowledge. As a next step, he called on members of both sides of the Commission to review the document.

Lajoie called on Mr. McReynolds to provide opening comments at this point. McReynolds remarked that at times it seemed the work of the World War II Working Group had been completed, but that is not the case. New documents and evidence have appeared that must be taken into account. Parts of the memoirs just referenced by Lajoie and Clift deal with World War II cases. In addition, an airplane crash site has recently been discovered on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Russian Far East which may be that of a U.S. Navy World War II-era PV-1 or PV-2 aircraft. Also, there are 37 U.S. servicemen who may have been under the control of the former Soviet Union and whose fates are still unknown to us. McReynolds also noted that, at the last plenum, the Russian side had asked for documentation on the subject of U.S.-Soviet clashes that had occurred at the end of World War II. Some such documents were uncovered and would be presented during the working group's afternoon session.

Lajoie then introduced Robert Jones, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs. Jones thanked the two Chairmen and pointed out that this was his first trip to Moscow. He stated that he measured success in terms of locating missing Americans. In recent weeks, Jones recalled that he had gone to Beijing to discuss forty-four (44) cases. He had personally participated in the repatriation of World War II remains from China. On October 5, he had flown on the first American military aircraft to land in Pyongyang since the Korean War and had repatriated four sets of American remains. He noted that the Defense Department had successfully conducted operations in North Korea and that there would be six more operations next year. In addition, archival work similar to that in Podol'sk would be carried out.

Jones said he had also visited the Southeast Asian capitals of Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane in the past year and that the U.S. had received excellent cooperation in those places. One of the successes was the oral history program. He was very pleased to visit Russia and to expand the archival work being conducted there. He noted that three (3) Southeast Asia cases had recently been further clarified as a result of an interview conducted by Commission representatives. Jones went on to cite the importance of access to Russian archival records as they may well assist in case resolution. In particular, he highlighted the potential value of documentation retained in Border Guard holdings.

Jones said he had to leave the next day, Wednesday, because he had to be invited by the White House to a ceremony Thursday in honor of Veterans' Day. He assured members of both sides of the Commission that President Clinton was interested in the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office's activities and would receive Jones' report on this meeting of the USRJC.

Jones commented that this year's Veterans' Day ceremony in the U.S. is particularly important because it marks the beginning of a number of events commemorating the Korean War's fiftieth anniversary. The U.S. Congress, veterans, and families will be interested in hearing about DPMO's efforts in Korea. He concluded by saying he was pleased to be present in Moscow at what was a short but important visit.

Lajoie gave the floor back to Zolotarev, who expressed his regret that Senator Smith and Congressman Johnson could not be at the Plenum and asked that his best wishes be conveyed to them.

Remarks by the Russian Side:

Zolotarev pointed out that some regrouping had to be done in the absence of Senator Smith and Congressman Johnson. He said that Nikiforov would chair the World War II Working Group on the Russian side and that Professor Stepan Andreyevich Tyushkevich, General-Major (Ret), would also participate in the group's discussions. Captain First Rank Vartanov and Captain First Rank Shevchenko would preside over the Korean War Working Group on the Russian side. Orlov would join Zolotarev in co-chairing the Vietnam War Working Group, while Vinogradov would remain in his role as chairman of the Cold War Working Group for the Russian side.

Zolotarev then asked Vinogradov to make a few remarks about the Cold War Working Group. Vinogradov said the main emphasis of the Cold War Working Group for the past year had been on the Central Naval Archives at Gatchina since many of the losses under the group's purview had occurred at sea. He observed that the Russian side has not lost hope for recovering the remains of U.S. Air Force Major Eugene Posa. Vinogradov said he had been studying the testimony of witnesses and, in that regard, was particularly interested in locating a lieutenant present at Posa's burial. However, lack of information was making this a difficult task. Vinogradov also remarked he was continuing to look for information about U.S. Air Force Major Samuel Bush, who was shot down over the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952. Interestingly, he noted the Russian side's assumption that information about the loss may be contained in the

journal that Clift had described. While cautioning that he and his colleagues could not make any judgments before they had assessed the accuracy of the journal's contents, Vinogradov did pledge that the Russian side would use all available resources to examine and validate that material.

Vinogradov said he had studied the documents which the U.S. had provided to the Russian side regarding the Soviet K-129 submarine loss in the Pacific Ocean in 1968 and would like to discuss the incident in the Cold War Working Group. In summary, he offered the view that, despite the difficulties encountered, the working group was pursuing a correct course of action which it should continue to follow.

The gavel then passed to Nikiforov, who was asked to comment about the World War Two Working Group. Nikiforov noted that a number of issues to be explored in the working group's deliberations had rendered premature an earlier view that all remaining questions having to do with World War Two losses had been exhaustively examined and resolved. He looked forward to an exchange of information on a range of topics which he did not further define and expected that the group's work would benefit from productive discussions in a collegial environment.

Zolotarev then turned to Orlov and asked that he make some general comments about both the Korean and Vietnam War working groups. Orlov began by welcoming the members of both working groups. He said that the fates of eighty (80) American airmen and fifty-four (54) Soviet military personnel had been clarified in connection with the Korean War and that approximately four hundred (400) Soviet participants of the Korean and Vietnam wars had been interviewed.^{1[1]} The U.S. side of the Commission has been provided with thousands of documents dealing with the Korean War period. Researchers from the U.S. side have been permitted to work at both the Central Military Archives in Podol'sk and the Central Naval Archives at Gatchina for the past three years. In his review of previous initiatives, Orlov also noted the inquiry undertaken at the U.S. side's request to determine whether any POW/MIA-related information could be gleaned from the process by which Soviet forces transported back to Moscow an F-86 Saber jet and a SAR helicopter captured during the Korean War.

Orlov said that the Russian side continues to present documents to the U.S. side, and he added that the Russians were expanding access to the documents of the Krasovski group that was in China during the Korean conflict. He also noted the Russian side's efforts to verify information obtained from recently interviewed witnesses. He mused that, as is the case with any war, many myths came out of the Korean and Vietnam engagements. Drawing upon Winston Churchill's observation that the truth gets enveloped by lies and fact and fiction get mixed together in war, Orlov called for a thorough review of all information received from eyewitnesses to events of those times. As if to underscore the tentative nature of that information, Orlov opined that the factual accuracy of much of the reporting acquired to date cannot be ascertained.

Orlov noted that Volkogonov's testimonial in his posthumously published memoir *Etyudi o vremeni* (*Etudes on Time*) has recently been an interesting topic for both sides of the Vietnam War Working Group. He said that the Russian side had a great deal to say about this memoir,

and it wanted to place it on the agenda for the Vietnam War Working Group to discuss.

Zolotarev then introduced Colonel Konstantin Golumbovskiy to speak briefly about the work of the Russian Presidential Department on Prisoners of War, Internees, and Missing in Action. Golumbovskiy said that the Russian side of the Commission had created a Special Task Force in December 1995 to deal with the problem of POWs and MIAs from the war in Chechnya. He pointed out that in the past four years a thousand Russian servicemen had been freed from captivity in Chechnya. Golumbovskiy also noted that about two hundred hostages, who were captured and held in Chechen territory from 1997-1999, had been freed and that about twenty of these hostages were foreign nationals. He added that presently there were no POWs from the 1994-1996 conflict being held in Chechnya. The efforts of this task force were currently directed toward exhuming and recovering remains from the 1994-1996 conflict for identification. In that context he thanked the U.S. side for providing Russia with DNA technology to assist with the identification process.

Zolotarev said he also wanted to thank the U.S. side for its moral support in regard to problems that have arisen in Angola lately. At present, nineteen Russian citizens were being held in Angola; one was dead, and his remains would have to be located. Although the situation was not entirely clear, Russia had been given assurances that six hostages would be returned. Zolotarev said that if there were no more issues to be addressed, he would recommend that the Commission adjourn and commence with the working group sessions in the afternoon.

Lajoie then requested the floor again, saying he would like to offer the traditional closing remarks and that he would like to respond to Orlov's reference to Winston Churchill. He noted that Americans often quote Clausewitz's "fog of war" when referring to the mixing of fact and fiction during wartime. The U.S. side was aware of this, and this was its frustration. Lajoie recalled that as a young captain in Vietnam, he and the other staff officers often found the first report from the field was wrong and that frequently the second report was, too. This was a fact of life, not the arrogant judgment of young staff officers. Often, the U.S. side is frustrated that it cannot confirm many of the numerous reports that it receives. The Commission's challenge is to deal with all information, including that which is presented by well-meaning sources but which may occasionally be mixed with myths and half-truths. The U.S. side did not have the luxury of dismissing any of the information received on issues within the Commission's scope of activity. As an example, Lajoie cited the transfer issue. The U.S. objective is to get to the bottom of the issue, not to embarrass the Russian Government. Lajoie said that he and Jones must stand in front of American families of POW/MIAs and tell them they are doing everything in their power to resolve this issue.

Lajoie said that since the last meeting of the Joint Commission, the U.S. side had acquired a memoir that presented cases of American servicemen being held captive in the former Soviet Union. He acknowledged that the memoir is not a perfect scientific document but, based on the level of detail in it, does seem credible and warrants further investigation. At this point, Lajoie passed a copy of the text to Zolotarev and requested the latter's concurrence for the memoir to be discussed in greater detail during the working group meetings. Zolotarev readily concurred.

Lajoie thanked the Russian side for the expanded access to the Podol'sk Military Archive.

This, he noted, has resulted in acquiring information which has contributed to clarifying the fates of Korean War MIAs. The data acquired has been shared with family members of those who are missing. Given this success, the U.S. side seeks further access to documents from the Korean and Vietnam wars in the hope that they will shed light on the fates of even more MIAs.

Lajoie noted that several weeks ago U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen and Russian Minister of Defense Sergeyev met in Moscow and discussed archival cooperation, including expanded U.S. access at the Podol'sk Military Archive. Lajoie said that Secretary Cohen followed up this discussion with a letter that was being passed officially to Minister Sergeyev through the embassy channels. The U.S. side of the Commission did have a copy of the letter, and a Russian translation was being prepared. (NOTE: At this point Lajoie passes a copy of the letter to Zolotarev). Lajoie observed that it helps when the Secretary of Defense knows about and approves what you are doing, and he was sure it was the same situation with the Russian Defense Minister. Lajoie concluded by saying a primary motivator for what the U.S. side was doing was pressure from American families, and he urged that the Commission be as aggressive as possible in its work on behalf of these families.

Zolotarev said the Russian side was in agreement, since all of the Commission membership has met with relatives of the missing and appreciates the importance which they place upon the Commission's work.

At this point, Generals Zolotarev and Lajoie declared the opening session adjourned.

^{2[1]} It should be noted that over 400 Soviet veterans have been interviewed just in connection with the Vietnam War. It is likely that at least another 400 have been interviewed in connection with the Korean War.

WORLD WAR II WORKING GROUP (WW II WG)

Working Group Proceedings:

The World War II Working Group of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs met at the Hotel National in Moscow, November 9-11, 1999. The Russian side of the WW II WG included Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Nikiforov, expert on the Commission and Co-chairman of the WW II Working Group; Vladimir Ivanovich Korotayev, Deputy Director of the Center for the Storage and Preservation of Historical Document Collections, and General-Major (Ret) Stepan Andreyevich Tyushkevich. The U.S. side of the WW II WG included Michael McReynolds, Commission member and Co-chairman of the WW II Working Group, and Albert Graham, Deputy Director, Joint Commission Support Directorate-Washington. Yuriy Katsnelson served as translator.

The Russian side presented the U.S. side with summary data on two American servicemen, PFC Rudolph Frisch and Cpl Glenn E. Byers, whose names appeared on a U.S. War Department List of 39 American POWs freed from German camps by Soviet troops. As of December 1945, none of these 39 men had been returned to U.S. military control.

According to Colonel Nikiforov, the Russian side did not have any additional information from the List of 39. He pledged to continue and broaden the search for information on the remaining thirty-seven (37) individuals. The Russian Co-chairman specifically mentioned the need to search through the Convoy Troops Archives on a case-by-case basis. He added that this research is very labor- and time-intensive, but that any information uncovered will be immediately turned over to the U.S. side.

The U.S. Co-chairman provided his counterpart with one hundred and eleven (111) pages of documents relating to U.S - Soviet aerial engagements during the last weeks of World War II, with special emphasis on those battles which took place over the skies of Yugoslavia. These documents were found in the National Archives Collection entitled United States Military Mission to Moscow, Subject File, 1943-45, "Incidents," Box 10, Record Group 334, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, U.S.A.

Colonel Nikiforov requested that the U.S. side try to locate eyewitnesses or American airmen who took part in an April 2, 1945 P-38 attack on a group of Soviet planes from the 264th Air Division of the 5th Air Corps near Vienna, Austria. The Russian Co-chairman related that relatives of the pilots who died in this operation are seeking more information about the attack. McReynolds agreed to search through National Archives' records for any information on the incident.

Colonel Nikiforov informed the U.S side of an anniversary commemorating the Battle of Poltava in the year 2000. He asked if it would be possible for a U.S. representative to attend this event and present the family of deceased Colonel Mikhail Ivanovich Smil'skiy with the medal he was supposed to receive from the American Government for his exploits at Kharkov in 1942. McReynolds suggested and Nikiforov agreed to work with Connell in the JCSD-Moscow office on this issue.

Colonel Nikiforov again raised the issue of obtaining information on the millions of Soviets who became Displaced Persons [DPs] and often wound up in the West, having lost all contact with relatives behind the "Iron Curtain." He said the Russian Commission on POWs, Internees, and MIAs receives daily a large number of letters and electronic inquiries seeking help in finding long-lost relatives. Nikiforov noted that, unfortunately, the Commission can do little more than refer the relatives to organizations in Germany which monitor WW II losses; the Central Archives of the MOD at Podol'sk; the Russian Special Archives, which holds the WW II GUPVI POW records; the U.S National Archives and Records Administration, and the Library of Congress.

McReynolds replied that, due to the privacy issues involved, the U.S. side can only provide the names of agencies in the West to contact. He also suggested contacting the International Tracing Service of the American Red Cross since this organization was responsible for aiding

and assisting DPs after WW II. In a similar vein, McReynolds mentioned the Immigration and Naturalization Service's [INS] files from St. Albans, Vermont. He noted that since many DPs came to America from third countries via Canada, their records from INS entry points along the Canadian border might yield some information. The U.S. Co-chairman added, however, that it would be very tedious for a researcher to search for a single individual since these records are not computerized and are only available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Both sides agreed to continue to work on some methodology to address this humanitarian issue.

Lastly, in response to a previous request by the Russian side, McReynolds confirmed that, as far as he can ascertain, the United States does not possess a list of Russian citizens who died in U.S. or British detention camps.

The U.S.Co-Chairman provided the Russian side with the summary of the "memoirs" of a credible source living outside of the United States who claims that 73 U.S. citizens perished between 1941-1943 at the *Bezimionlag* Camp in Kuybyshev. Furthermore, this source asserts that Americans liberated from both German and Japanese prison camps at the end of WW II were taken to the former Soviet Union. More specifically, the source contends that American servicemen liberated from Nazi concentration camps ended up in the Soviet camps called *Rybak* and *Strelka*, where they ultimately perished. The source adds that, in November and December of 1945, six groups of American servicemen liberated by the Soviet Army from camps in Manchuria [*Dunfanhoon* and *Chan Chun*] were taken via Chita and Ulan Ude to *Bodaibo* in Northern Siberia, where they were subsequently executed. Reports obtained refer to a group of fourteen (14) Americans liberated by the Soviets from a *Harbin* camp who ended up in a camp in Kolyma. The group was said to include a doctor named GERTSIG [HERTZAG] and another individual named GELDOLF. The source also mentions that WW II -era Americans named ETTLI [ATTLEY] and FREDERKING or FREDERLING were at the *Peveka* camp.

McReynolds requested that the Russian side conduct an archival search for the names of any American citizens who may have been confined the camps mentioned in the memoirs. Colonel Nikiforov promised to search thoroughly all appropriate Russian archives for any information on American citizens interned in Soviet camps during and after World War II. He also requested the U.S. side look through its records for any additional details on Mr. ETTLI [ATTLEY], since this individual was the only one mentioned above with an English-sounding name.

McReynolds revealed that an independent Russian researcher and expert on Lend-Lease named Ms. Alla Puparno, had come across skeletal remains at the crash site of a WW II U.S. Navy plane located 2 hours by helicopter from Petropavlovsk. Preliminary research by American analysts of six photos showing various equipment identification plate numbers from the plane suggests the aircraft was a Navy PV1 or PV2, possibly from the 131st, 135th or 136th and 139th Patrol Bomber Squadron of the 4th Bomber Wing, which flew from the Aleutian Islands to bomb Japanese positions in the Northern Kuriles. American analysts are fairly certain that this downed 6-man aircraft was not a Lend Lease plane because the crash site is outside the Lend Lease air route and because the U.S. Navy did not lend PV1/PV2 aircraft to the Soviet Union. The Russian Co-chairman of the working group agreed to look into this matter once the U.S. side provides more precise coordinates of the crash site. If it turns out that this is a downed WW II

American-manned aircraft, Nikiforov has agreed to undertake a joint expedition to the crash site during seasonable weather in July or August of 2000 to identify the plane and search for possible remains.

The session closed with both sides expressing their continued support for the humanitarian work of the Commission.

KOREAN WAR WORKING GROUP (KWWG)

Summary Remarks:

The group's work focused on expanding the current arrangements at Podol'sk and developing a plan to research reports of Korean -War -era American servicemen held in Soviet prison camps. A proposal was forwarded to Gen-Col Manilov to allow Russian researchers to review classified material for information pertaining to U.S. missing, submit pertinent items for declassification and subsequently pass them to the U.S. side. This proposal received his approval.

Concerning the memoirs, the Russian side agreed that the main objective is not just to study the material itself but to use it to help clarify the fate of missing Americans. The U.S. side pointed out that the memoirs are only one piece of a larger collection of material and presented a map of 19 places where American servicemen from Korea were reported in the former Soviet Union. It was noted that individually each report does not have enough information to identify an individual, but, in the aggregate, they suggest that further investigation is required. Capt. Vartanov proposed that Commission members could travel to these locations, research any documentation on site, and interview former staff living in the area. The U.S. side agreed in principle to this proposal and suggested that the Russian side review the material and propose a concrete plan with a time line and cost estimates.

In a reciprocal gesture, the U.S. side provided a partial list of Soviet casualties from the Korean War compiled in the process of archival work at Podol'sk. For its part, the Russian side requested information clarifying the fate of Soviet pilots lost in Korea, information concerning a MIG-15 engine captured by U.S. Rangers in 1952, and additional contact with the Sabre Pilots Association.

Working Group Proceedings:

Following the opening session of the 16th Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, held at the National Hotel, Moscow, Russia, November 9-11, 1999, the Korean War Working Group met to discuss the results of its recent activity and the direction of its efforts in the months ahead.

Kass opened the session by suggesting that group re-examine the scope of archival research currently under way at the Ministry of Defense's archives at Podol'sk. He noted approvingly the fact that previous obstacles to archival research resulting from differences over the Balkan campaign earlier this year, have been removed. Kass also voiced satisfaction with the expanded

schedule of access under which U.S. researchers have been able to double to eight the number of days each month that they are authorized to conduct research at Podol'sk. To maximize the value of the archival program, Kass presented to his counterpart, Captain First Rank Valerii Vartanov, a list of *dela* (personal files) from the *fond* (document collection) of the 64th Fighter Air Corps (FAC) that the U.S. side believes should be consulted to further the inquiry into missing American servicemen. The list was submitted together with a request for the Russian side's assistance to locate and, as required, declassify the files as a first step toward permitting U.S. researchers to examine them. Kass pointed out that both sides stand to gain from a robust archival program as evidenced by the recent discovery at Podol'sk of information regarding Soviet casualties suffered during the Korean War. That information, which U.S. researchers had unexpectedly come across, has been compiled into a document that Lajoie would present to Zolotarev during this week's discussions.

Captain Vartanov responded by expressing his gratitude to the U.S. side for its impressive efforts in compiling the list of Soviet Korean -War losses. He noted that the work is very useful and important and that the names will be included in a ten-volume work soon to be published by the Institute of Military History entitled *In Memory of Our Fallen Servicemen Before and After the War*.

Colonel Filippov noted that the protocol for foreign access to Russian military archives has not changed and that the U.S. side has not had difficulty in accessing repositories. He added that all unclassified documents relating to the 64th FAC have been made available to the U.S. side. A complicating factor surfaces with regard to classified materials since, according to Filippov, Podol'sk lacks adequate staff personnel with the competence and training required for reviewing and declassifying sensitive holdings. To overcome this difficulty, Filippov reiterated a proposal he offered at the working group's last meeting, namely, that a group of Russian archivists with appropriate clearances be impaneled to review documents at Podol'sk and declassify only those portions containing information about missing American servicemen. Such an initiative, Filippov asserted, would need to be launched through official channels, specifically through General-Colonel Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

Exploring Filippov's suggestion a step further, Kass proposed that both sides agree to prepare a request to Manilov in which they seek his support for establishing a group of two or three Russian archivists who would be charged with reviewing Podol'sk's classified holdings and ensuring the declassification of any materials that they discover relating to the fate of American servicemen. The proposal won the concurrence of the Russian side, and draft text in both English and Russian was prepared for review by the Commission's co-chairmen. Acceding to the Russian recommendation that the request be initially confined to a single topic of inquiry, Lajoie accepted the draft with the understanding that other topics of interest to the U.S. side would be submitted in subsequent iterations.

[N.B. The request was then signed by Lajoie and Zolotarev and presented to Manilov that same evening. The latter endorsed the proposal without reservation, noting the value of cooperation on the POW/MIA issue as a "strategic" element in the two countries' overall relationship. Of no less importance to the Commission, Manilov agreed to issue "without delay" instructions calling

for a working group to be established and for all POW-MIA documentation to be identified and considered for declassification.]

Kass emphasized that a successful archival search embodied in the request to Manilov could be assured only if there is close and consistent coordination between Russian archivists engaged in the review process and U.S. Commission representatives interested in the topics to be reviewed.

Captain Vartanov responded that the coordination structure of the Commission is already in place and that Orlov should maintain this contact. He also noted the people working in the archives have procedures whereby information is collected by the researcher, sent first to a department chief, then to the chief of the archives, and ultimately to the General Staff.

Jones noted that the successes we have in accounting are dependent upon access to the country, the country's people and the documents relating to loss incidents. He recognized that the letter to Manilov is very significant to the work of the Commission because it establishes a process, an implementation mechanism. He noted that there will be a tremendous focus on the Korean War in America for the next three years and that Congress and the American people will look to us to provide answers about the fate of those unaccounted-for from that war.

Captain Vartanov observed that the Korean War Working Group's documentation shows that the group has interviewed more than 400 witnesses from the Korean War but that there were in fact some 40,000-50,000 soldiers representing the former Soviet Union involved in that conflict. He stated that the Institute of Military History had held an international conference on the Soviet Union's role in the Korean War and that many Soviet-era veterans had been contacted in connection with that event. In reference to Jones' remark on the Korean-War focus in the United States, Vartanov suggested that the Commission publish a collection of materials, including veterans' memories, photographs, maps, etc. He stated that through this mechanism, the Commission would become known not only to the families but also to the community at large in both countries, thereby increasing its role, authority, and importance.

Jones noted that the main enemy is time. He emphasized the importance of both sides accessing veteran organizations and recording their histories. He agreed it is very important that the Commission renders a report of its activities and that he would discuss the matter with his Chief of Staff upon his return to Washington.

Kass then introduced the memoirs mentioned by Lajoie in the opening session. He passed out a copy for each member and asked that the Russian side read the materials, focusing in particular on the Korean-War-related section (Part B). This would hopefully allow the group a chance to develop a common approach for examining the material in detail when it met the next day.

Kass began the next day's session by noting that the information that was distributed at the previous day's meeting falls squarely within the competence of the Commission. The current session was intended to respond to whatever questions the Russian side may have about the material and then proceed to develop an agreed-upon course of action to investigate the specific sightings of Americans as contained in that material.

Captain Vartanov agreed and raised several questions which the Russian side had concerning the source's access to information cited in the memoirs, level of education, and role in society. He expressed the view that his colleagues and he did not believe that the text had been written by a native Russian speaker. Vartanov also noted his belief that, given the lack of chronological order, the material appeared to be excerpts of a larger work rather than memoirs. Since very few people in the former Soviet Union spoke English at the time the material was compiled, Vartanov considered it odd that the reported source of the names in the memoirs--a cleaning lady in a prison camp--would have been able to communicate with American prisoners.

Kass stated that U.S. side's intent is to present the information as we had received it and to work with the Russian side to develop a course of action that will optimize the chances of determining the accuracy of the data presented. He acknowledged that the materials may have come from a larger work than a diary but were most certainly provided by the author in Russian. Kass had no additional information about the list of names, other than the highly significant fact that at least one of them correlates exactly with the name of an American serviceman unaccounted for from the Korean War.

Upon hearing that at least one of the names corresponds to a missing American serviceman, Captain Vartanov stated that he had revised his view about the significance of the material. He also noted approvingly that the material did not implicate the Soviet Ministry of Defense in the handling or treatment of the American POWs identified. With this as his line of reasoning, Vartanov concluded that the most likely repositories of relevant information are the archives of the former KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), not those of the MOD. As a final point, he stated that the Russian side considers the memoirs an official document that was presented through official channels and is prepared to study and evaluate its contents.

Colonel Filippov agreed, noting that the reference in the material to military escort and convey operations and to Marshal Zhukov suggests that the archives at Admiral Martanov 29 and the Presidential Archives would be relevant sources to consult. Filippov further volunteered that he would personally examine the archives of the Central Apparatus for any documentation indicating that the senior military leadership had any role in decisions relating to detained American servicemen.

Kass observed that the U.S. side has compiled a list of 19 locations in Russia where a various reports indicate American servicemen from Korea War had been detained. Drawing on the concept of a preponderance of evidence, he noted that, while no single document is conclusive, the recurrence of reporting and the aggregate impact of the information acquired simply cannot be ignored.

Captain Vartanov expressed his interest in receiving copies of the reporting materials identifying the 19 sites and suggested that letters be sent to the regional headquarters of the MVD and the Federal Security Service (FSB) in those areas where the sightings were reported. The letters would seek access to the regional MVD and FSB archives for researchers from the Russian side. As part of this initiative, Russian researchers would visit the sites, work

with archival information, and interview former staff there. Vartanov noted that the Russian side has qualified people to travel, but that material support would have to come from the US side.

Kass suggested the Russian side develop an action plan with a specific schedule and cost estimates, which would allow the U.S. side to examine possibilities for providing financial support. As a first step in the process, it was agreed that the U.S. side would compile and translate into Russian relevant reporting materials that will enable members of the Russian side to become familiar with the sightings of American servicemen that have been reported to date.

At the working group's final meeting during the Sixteenth Plenum, Kass suggested that the following highlights of discussion be presented before the full Commission the following day: the letter by Lajoie and Zolotarev to Manilov regarding declassification at the Podol'sk archives; the proposed plan to examine the materials having to do with sightings of Korean -War-era US servicemen in the former Soviet Union, and the list of Soviet Korean -War casualties found at Podol'sk.

Captain Vartanov produced a number of additional items: the working group's successes to date in clarifying the fate of unaccounted-for American servicemen; the value of publicizing the work of Commission in pursuing a shared goal of seeking to clarify the fates both Soviets and Americans unaccounted for; a request for information on the MiG-15 engine captured in 1952, and a desire for increased contact with the F-86 pilots association.

Each side concluded by expressing its appreciation to the other in assuring productive discussions and establishing goals and objectives for the working group's future activity.

VIETNAM WAR WORKING GROUP (VWWG)

Summary Remarks:

The VWWG engaged in a lengthy dialogue about the Volkogonov memoirs, which allege that a KGB plan existed in the late 1960s to "deliver knowledgeable Americans to the USSR for intelligence purposes." The Russian side pointed to evidence that seems to indicate that Volkogonov did not believe a transfer of American POWs to the former USSR took place, while the U.S. side insisted that archival searches and interviews to advance the Volkogonov inquiry should continue. U.S. representatives were permitted to interview two former chiefs of the Soviet KGB, V.Y. Semichastnyy and V.A. Kryuchkov.

The U.S. introduced an entirely new area for Joint Commission work, presenting evidence that Soviet officials participated directly in the interrogation of some American POWs. The Russian side promised to research this issue, to reinvigorate other American requests for Vietnam War-era archival materials, and to seek access for Vietnam War researchers to the Central Archive of the Russian Defense Ministry at Podol'sk. In conjunction with the latter request, a meeting between U.S. Joint Commission officials and the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Colonel V.L. Manilov, may have advanced the working group's effort to gain access to the Podol'sk archive.

Working Group Proceedings:

The Vietnam War Working Group, co-chaired at this Plenum by Major General, USA (Ret.) Roland Lajoie, substituting for Senator Bob Smith, and Colonel (Ret.) Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov, met in three lengthy sessions during the 16th Plenum. All of the working group's highest priority issues were discussed in detail, and the U.S. side introduced one new issue that will occupy the working group's attention in the future.

The working group's current highest priority remains the issue of the Volkogonov memoirs. The Russian side presented a letter written by Volkogonov to Russian President Yeltsin in which Volkogonov told Yeltsin that the Russian side has concluded that no transfer of American POWs to the former USSR took place. This letter was written only ten days after Volkogonov wrote the passage from *Etudes on Time (Etyudi o vremeni)* describing his discovery of the KGB plan. The Russian side insisted that the letter to President Yeltsin is at least as credible an indication of Volkogonov's thinking on the issue of transfer as is Volkogonov's short mention of the KGB plan in his memoir. The U.S. side acknowledged this argument but offered other possible explanations for Volkogonov's seemingly divergent views on this issue. The American side insisted that archival searches and interviews in conjunction with this inquiry should continue. The Russian side agreed.

In further support of the Volkogonov inquiry, the U.S. side was permitted to interview two former KGB chiefs, V.Y. Semichastnyy and V.A. Kryuchkov. Both denied that a KGB plan as described by Volkogonov existed. Semichastnyy did confirm, though, that a still unidentified KGB officer interrogated an American POW (also as yet unidentified) during the Vietnam War.

Regarding access for Vietnam War researchers to the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense (Podol'sk), the U.S. side detailed the various Vietnam War-era materials it believes are held at Podol'sk that would be of interest to the Joint Commission. These include: detailed aircraft shoot down information; the historical records of the air defense regiment at Bryansk that deployed to North Vietnam in the war's earliest stages; the GRU's acquisition and exploitation of captured American combat equipment; and reports from the interrogation of American POWs. The working group agreed to monitor the progress of the Korean War Working Group in widening its access at Podol'sk. Both sides agreed that broadened access to Podol'sk for Korean War researchers would establish a strong precedent for Vietnam War access as well. General Lajoie's meeting with General Colonel V.L. Manilov, the Russian General Staff officer responsible for all military archives, may have significantly enhanced this prospect as well. The American side put the Russian side on notice that it will continue to seek access to Podol'sk on a level at least equal to that now afforded Korean War researchers from the Joint Commission.

The U.S. side presented a formal, two-hour briefing laying out the evidence found so far indicating that Soviet officials participated directly in the interrogation of more American POWs than has so far been understood. The evidence was taken from the testimony of former American POWs, Joint Commission interviews with former Soviet officers who claim to have participated in interrogation sessions, and the reporting of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The U.S. argued that Russian archives should contain reports of these interrogation sessions and that American access to these reports might contribute to accounting for missing Americans from the

Vietnam War. The Russian side agreed to examine this issue closely and to search for archival evidence to support this view. The U.S. side will continue its research into this area and report its findings to the Russian side. This is a new direction for research that is supported by both Russian and American sides of the Joint Commission.

The Russian side promised to reinvigorate its effort to gain U.S. access to a number of important documents, including the reports of the GRU *spetsgrupp*a that collected captured U.S. combat equipment in North Vietnam and various GRU intelligence reports and Central Committee records. The latter include two documents purportedly authored by Vietnamese General Lieutenant Tran Van Quang, purported author of the so-called "1205 document." The Russian side promised that it would reexamine the U.S. request for access to these materials. The working group's representative from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service offered to consider favorably a new request by the American side for a search of Russia's foreign intelligence archives.

COLD WAR WORKING GROUP (CWWG)

Summary Remarks:

The Cold War Working Group (CWWG) met in 3 half-day sessions, November 9-10, 1999, to discuss the priorities, issues, and future work of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission (USRJC) on POW/MIAs. Mr. A. Denis Clift and Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov co-chaired the working group. Specific discussion topics included: (1) Admiral Novyy's status report on the progress and future requirements on the investigation on the fate of U.S. Air Force Major Eugene Posa, following the Soviet shootdown of the RB-47 over the Barents Sea on July 1, 1960; (2) Commission approval to provide Admiral Novyy with official credentials as a bone fide researcher on behalf of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission; (3) Discussions and clarification on the transfer of Soviet Northern Fleet special materials and documents from various Russian archives to Lubyanka in Moscow; (4) Status reports and discussions on the progress and direction of future requirements for the unresolved Cold War shootdown incidents; (5) The memoir of a former Soviet citizen regarding alleged American POWs held in the Gulag of the former Soviet Union; (6) Mr. Connell's status report on the progress and future outlook for the investigation of the April 8, 1950 shootdown of the U.S. Navy PB-4Y2 over the Baltic Sea near Liepaja, Latvia; (7) U.S. contributions to the determination of the fate of five Russian MIAs from the war in Afghanistan; (8) U.S. inquiry and questions on the case of John William Adkin; (9) Russian questions and doubts regarding U.S. information and salvage on the Soviet K-129 that sank in the Pacific in 1968; (10) Results of the U.S. re-examination of its diplomatic and intelligence reporting in support of Russian MIA accounting from the war in Afghanistan, and (11) Discussions about developing a cooperative investigative mechanism between the Commission and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that emulates the U.S. Coast Guard's and FSB's cooperative engagement program.

Working Group Proceedings:

The Cold War Working Group (CWWG) began its deliberations on November 9, 1999, with a traditional exchange of welcoming remarks and introductions by the group's co-chairmen, Mr.

Clift and Colonel Vinogradov, both of whom noted that a year had passed since the USRJC and the CWWG had met.

Colonel Vinogradov reported that the Russian side recently determined the fate of 5 Russian MIAs from the war in Afghanistan. He noted with appreciation that the information provided by the U.S. contributed significantly to the determination of these Russian MIAs. He then passed a new list of 9 former Soviet POWs from the war in Afghanistan and requested U.S. assistance to locate them. Clift accepted the list.

Next, Admiral Novyy provided a comprehensive report regarding the investigation into the fate of U.S. Air Force Major Eugene Posa, who disappeared following the Soviet shutdown of his RB-47 aircraft on July 1, 1960 over the Barents Sea. He recounted the shutdown, the rescue of Majors Olmstead and McKone and the recovery of Major Palm's remains. He said that over several years, he had interviewed more than 70 people regarding the incident. His research had identified 19 people who he believed could shed additional light on Major Posa's fate. Recently, his investigative research has pursued two lines of inquiry based on the interviews and recollections of the Northern Fleet's former Chief of Medical Services and Chief of Staff.

According to the first approach, Major Posa may have been buried in the Murmansk region at the Severomorsk-II or Safonovo cemeteries near the Navy Hospital 1018 in Rosta. Admiral Novyy spent two days researching burial records in these cemeteries. He conducted site surveys, and he interviewed grounds keepers. He also traveled throughout Murmansk and Severomorsk to pursue investigative leads, but, unfortunately, he did not locate Major Posa's grave.

Novyy reported numerous anomalies. He said that his investigation had uncovered only a partial chain of custody for Major Posa's remains. Records indicated that a Soviet fishing trawler (SKR-28) recovered Major Posa's body on October 14, 1960, three months after the shutdown. Also, a second trawler, SKR-56, retrieved parts of the American RB-47 aircraft's wings. On October 15, 1960, Major Posa's remains and the recovered wing wreckage were transferred to SKR-56 and transported to Severomorsk. Archival reports and an interview with the SKR-56 captain and 2 crewmen indicate that Major Posa's remains were offloaded in Severomorsk on October 19, 1960, shortly after 8:00AM. Beyond that, the chain of custody is uncertain. The investigation has not found any log entries or release documents to confirm Major Posa's removal from SKR-56 or to indicate where his remains were brought, stored, examined or buried.

Soviet communication logs indicate that a speedboat was ordered to transport Major Posa's remains and the RB-47's wing wreckage from Severomorsk to Murmansk. The speedboat departed Severomorsk for Murmansk on October 20, 1960 with the wing wreckage aboard, but it is not clear if Major Posa's remains were aboard or if they had been transported elsewhere separately.

Although not a certainty, Novyy concluded that Major Posa's post mortem forensic examination probably was performed at the 1815th Naval Hospital and Morgue in Rosta. KGB communications and interviews with medical personnel support this conclusion.

According to the second line of inquiry, Novyy reported that Major Posa could be buried on Kildin Island. Thus, he chartered a speedboat and went there to conduct a site survey. He surveyed and photographed three graves, any one of which may contain the remains of Major Posa. However, he did not have any authorization to excavate the graves.

Novyy said that he reported his findings and recommendations to Admiral Rossoko on his trip to the Kola Peninsula and Kildin Island when he returned to St. Petersburg. He recommended excavation of the Kildin Island graves in the spring during good weather. In the interim, he suggested that the Commission direct its focus on archival research at the Gatchina Archive. He offered the following plan of action:

1. Locate a list of the 1815th Naval Hospital and Morgue personnel in Rosta for 1960.
2. Locate and interview former Rosta Garrison Komendartura personnel, including Lieutenant Andropov and Warrant Officer Repet regarding Major Posa's chain of custody.
3. Locate the deck logs for Soviet fishing trawler SKR-56.
4. Request the KGB communications logs between Moscow and Murmansk, including the order for the speedboat transport of the wing wreckage to Murmansk and possibly to clarify Major Posa's chain of custody and disposition.
5. Locate and interview the former lieutenant of the speedboat, Yuriy Mikhailovich Antonov, and his communications/codes officer, who transported the RB-47's wing wreckage and possibly Major Posa to Murmansk.
6. Contact the firm that has built coffins for the Northern Fleet since before the 1960s to determine if they made a coffin for Major Posa.
7. Research records at the 2 NORFLT naval bases (Belomorskoye and Severodinsk/Arkangel'sk).

However, Novyy noted the Russian side does not have a centralized database that can be searched. Thus, all inquiries must be made individually to the local authorities and Commissariats, a procedure which could make the investigation very time- and labor-intensive.

In his personal assessment, Novyy noted that many people who may have known about Major Posa's fate have already died over the past 40 years since the shutdown. However, he emphasized that there must have been a formal chain of custody and documentation of events. He recalled that Major Palm's (RB-47's pilot) chain of custody was uncovered, and he believes that Major Posa's can be too. Despite the challenges, Novyy strongly encouraged the Commission to keep hope alive and not to give up the search. He also said that the Commission should not view its inability thus far to locate Major Posa as a failure because it has closed out and eliminated several possibilities, which ultimately represents progress. Clift concurred and thanked Novyy for his dedicated research and encouraged him to press ahead on this and other unresolved Cold War shootdowns.

In a final point, Novyy requested that the Commission provide him an official letter of credentials as a bone fide researcher for the Commission. Clift encouraged the Russian side to provide Novyy with the proper credentials for him to continue his research unabated. He added that Novyy's investigative leads must be followed and that the U.S. side would like to work with

Novyy to follow up with excavation on the Kildin Island site survey. Later, Vinogradov reported that Zolotarev also concurred and that the Russian side would take immediate steps to provide Novyy with the requested credentials. Clift thanked Novyy for his meticulous report, which he said was grounded squarely in scientific method and professionalism.

Turning to the confusing transfer of archival documents, Clift said that prior to 1966, files from the Soviet Central Naval Archive files at Gatchina were transferred to Moscow. He asked if the Russian side knew where they went. Vinogradov clarified that materials from special departments of the Soviet Navy were transferred to Lubyanka in Moscow. Clift commented that it was difficult to understand and follow the transfer of some documents to Lubyanka, Podol'sk, or other archives from Gatchina, and we looked forward to further explanation.

Vinogradov turned to Mr. Cherepkov to expound on the transfer of special Navy documents and their search of Special Department files of the Soviet Northern Fleet (NORFLT). Mr. Cherepkov said the reason that the Special Department materials of the NORFLT had been moved was to comply with security regulations and directives. However, he clarified that the FSB reviewed and searched for the NORFLT's special naval materials on Major Posa in two stages - 1992 and 1996. They determined that, according to regulations, supervisory documents were kept in Moscow, while general investigative documents remained in Murmansk. However, he noted that all special materials and documents -- supervisory, personnel, general and NORFLT -- remain under the overall control of the Headquarters, Federal Security Service, to facilitate oversight and supervisory control of the NORLT investigation.

Clift commented that sometimes the most obvious points are missed. He said that Majors McKone and Olmstead were brought to Lubyanka Prison in Moscow and asked if the Russian side had explored all special files about their imprisonment with respect to Major Posa's fate. They were held for nearly 8 months. The files must be enormous and maybe information on Major Posa's fate was moved into those special files to consolidate the holdings on the incident, Clift suggested.

Cherepkov replied that the Russian side had considered this possibility and that its investigation also was moving in this direction. However, he said that the McKone and Olmstead files are not so extensive and that the Russian side had been going through them to correlate the information. Thus far, there are no records of any interrogations of Major Posa or answers regarding his fate. Cherepkov noted Major McKone's observation that Major Posa had been killed during the shutdown attack. Major Olmstead said that he had seen a parachute. Neither officer could offer any information regarding Major Posa's recovery. Cherepkov concluded that there was not a single hint about Major Posa's fate reflected in the McKone and Olmstead files.

Cherepkov also reported that the Murmansk Division of the Special Materials Fond (collection) requested information from the case management section of the Central Murmansk Archive on Major Posa's burial. He said that, unfortunately, they did not find any information on the details regarding his burial. They also interviewed veteran officers of the Special Department in Murmansk and Severomorsk, with no additional results. He concluded that all findings had been sent to the Commission previously. Thus, Cherepkov said that the

Commission's investigation does not require additional searches of the former Communist Party, FSB, or Special Material Fond. He noted the Russian side has done all that is possible on investigating the fate of Posa.

Vinogradov added that the KGB reviewed and studied all special coded messages and documents related to this incident, including those from the Murmansk region. He commented that it might be possible for the U.S side of the Commission to gain access to these special documents on behalf of the Commission through General Zolotarev.

Mr. Jim Connell reminded Vinogradov of the longstanding U.S. request for declassified access to these special documents and asked Vinogradov to check with Zolotarev on the status of the request.

Next, Clift provided the working group with a short overview of the progress on the following six Cold War incidents that he viewed as having the highest potential for accounting and resolution:

1. The RB-47 shootdown on July 1, 1960 involving Major Posa.
2. The PB-4Y2 shootdown on April 8, 1950 over the Baltic Sea.
3. The PV-2 shootdown on November 6, 1951 over the Sea of Japan.
4. The RB-29 shootdown on June 13, 1952 over the Sea of Japan..
5. The RB-50 shootdown on July 29, 1953 over the Sea of Japan.
6. The RB-47 shootdown on April 17, 1955 over the Bering Sea.

Clift commented that research on the April 17, 1955 shootdown clearly indicated Soviet Security Service involvement and that the Aviation Air Defense Forces (APVO) conducted the shootdown, not naval units. The Commission's research on this case should therefore be directed at the Podol'sk rather than the Gatchina Archive, he noted. Clift then remarked that the former Soviet Union did not appear to have played any role in the U.S. RB-50 aircraft lost over the Pacific Ocean on September 10, 1956, but that new information always would be welcomed. A similar request for further assistance was made in the case of the RB-47 aircraft lost over the Black Sea on December 14, 1956, about which little has been learned so far.

With regard to the July 29, 1953 shootdown Clift noted that one crewman survived and was rescued by a U.S. destroyer. He said that there was substantial evidence that the Soviet Union also conducted a major search and rescue operation and that Admiral Rossoko had commanded one of the search and rescue units at that time. Also, references from the Gatchina archive have established communications between the Soviet Navy and KGB Border Guards regarding the incident. Next, he expressed his hope that the Russian side would expand access by Commission researchers to specified Russian archives for this and other cold war incidents.

Vinogradov commented skeptically about the materials that Clift claimed to possess regarding the July 29, 1953, as well as the Russian search and rescue effort. He asked if the Russian side could see and read these materials with their own eyes because to his knowledge there were no such witnesses. Clift agreed and said that the U.S. side would pass the materials that he had requested through the Commission's Executive Secretariat.

Turning to the "anonymous" memoir, Vinogradov expressed significant skepticism. He questioned the allegations and where the eyewitnesses of past events have been all this time. He concluded that the memoir gives significant cause for caution and discounted it as series of allegations by imaginative people based largely on personal conversations and not subject to verification. Vinogradov said the Russian side intends to read the memoir with great care and under close scrutiny. He expressed serious misgivings regarding the references to Major Samuel Bush and the alleged registration of foreign POWs. He discounted and discredited the memoir as a fantasy and likened it to an ancient fairy tale.

Vinogradov proclaimed confidently that, in general, the Russian side does not believe that American servicemen were held as POWs in the former Soviet Union. He said that he and his Russian colleagues believe that, during the Cold War, U.S. military aircraft were shot down but that personnel and remains were always returned. Clift listened and thanked Vinogradov for his candor, assured him that the U.S. does not invent such documents from archives, and insisted that the Russian side seriously examine the memoir in detail and respond to issues it raises.

Vinogradov also asked the U.S. side to identify the author of the memoir. He said that the Russian side is not interested in the source for any reason other than to verify his claims and relationship to the events and places cited in the memoir. He criticized the secrecy of the author's identity as games of, "We know, but won't tell you." He also labeled the composition of the memoir as "quite clumsy."

The Russian Co-chairman commented that there is no reason for the Russian side to conceal anything. He said that information about the former communist regime of the Soviet Union is well known, and the Russian side is not hiding anything. He concluded that the Russian side would fulfill the Commission's request, although it is not sure about how or where to begin. Clift stressed his interest in the Cold War discussion of the memoir and said broader issues should be discussed and decided by Generals Zolotarev and Lajoie. In response, Vinogradov reiterated his request for whatever supporting documents the U.S. side possessed on the aircraft losses, including records from U.S. search and rescue operations, and transcripts of conversations.

Clift then recounted several of the specific accounts described in the memoir regarding the June 13, 1952 shootdown. He noted several recurrent themes in the memoir as well as the alleged activities and events in Svobodnyy near Blagoveshchensk and the Zeya River. Clift also sought further clarification about the June 13, 1952 shootdown and the specific references to the fates of Major Busch and MSgt Moore as noted in the memoir.

Clift stated that this was a new account of the incident and that we understood the Russian side's concerns. He said that the U.S. side valued the Russian side's research and assistance. He also cited Admiral Novyy's remark that the author of the memoir had offered several credible points that could and should be considered.

Vinogradov agreed and said the Russian side also would check the information against camp records. Connell commented that the labor camp records, maps and locations are still classified and that the U.S. side would like to have the Russian map of the camp's locations. Vinogradov replied that the Germans had been given the locations and information on the camps but there

were no Americans in them. Connell clarified that we had received the map of the "GUPVI" system of camps, which can be referenced in the book, The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentrations in the Soviet Union by Avraham Shifrin. However, the U.S. was interested more in the maps and records of the camps for political prisoners and criminals, which are not addressed in Shifrin's book and do not correlate to the GUPVI system of camps. Vinogradov commented that it would not be too difficult for him to check this information and he concluded that if the information exists, it would not be impossible to access it.

However, Vinogradov claimed that it would have been impossible for American POWs to be interned in the same Soviet camps with felons and convicts. He was sure that the camp system was organized very well and that the reference to transporting prisoners aboard slave ships also was impossible. He said that these stories reminded him of old U.S. movies about the Soviet GULag, which also were fantasies. However, Vinogradov promised that the Russian side would investigate the allegations.

Turning to the K-129 incident, known in the U.S. as the Golf-class submarine incident, Vinogradov said that he did not understand the Commission's difficulties on this issue. He said this inquiry had taken on the psychology of a criminal that had been caught and now claimed that guilt must now be proved. He commented that, although the Russian side was grateful for all the answers it had received thus far, Russian experts still had doubts. He noted that a televised documentary had been done on the K-129 incident and it also expressed similar doubts.

Clift answered that the U.S. had provided Russia with a full explanation of the incident. He added that it would be difficult to say more. He recalled that last year the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had reviewed its files again to be absolutely sure that there was no more information on this incident, and that during the 15th Plenum he had passed to the Russian side the CIA's response in a letter dated September 18, 1998. Clift recounted that in 1994, Ambassador Toon formally address the Commission on this issue. Further, Former CIA Directors Gates and Woolsey met with Russian President Yeltsin to review the information that we had passed to the Russian side on the K-129 incident. Clift also noted that he had participated with Ambassador Toon and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) representatives in the proceedings during which the K-129's bell was returned to the Russian side. Citing the remarks made by General Lajoie at the Plenum's Opening Session, Clift reiterated that the U.S. side has exhausted its research and resources regarding the K-129 incident.

Novyy commented that a special memorial service was held last year in St. Petersburg for the K-129 loss. He said several U.S. naval officers attended the memorial service. He noted that it was a sensitive and emotional church service that included family members from the Russian K-129 and U.S.S. Thrasher submarine losses.

Next, Connell updated the working group on the current investigation and research on the April 8, 1950 Soviet Cold War shootdown of the U.S. Navy PB-4Y2 aircraft over the Baltic Sea near Liepaja, Latvia. He explained that the Latvians uncovered three sets of unknown remains in the Liepaja cemetery in July 1999. Circumstantial evidence indicated that they might have been part of the 10-person U.S. Navy PB-4Y2 crew. As a result, the Latvian Government, the U.S.

Ambassador to Latvia and the Commission asked the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI) to participate in a joint U.S.-Latvian forensic examination. A CILHI team went to Latvia to examine the remains and the burial site. It also brought the dental records for each of the 10 missing crewmen. The joint forensic examination determined that, based on dental records and other physical characteristics of the skeletal remains, the unidentified remains could not be those of the American crewmen. Connell commented that, although the U.S. side was disappointed, it remains hopeful. He concluded that other witnesses have come forward, and not all leads on this incident have been exhausted.

In response, Vinogradov requested copies of the U.S. documents regarding the U.S. investigation of the April 8, 1950 shutdown. He praised the U.S. side's efforts, which he said serve as a model for the Russian Government and people. Connell commented that most of the documents related to this investigation have come from Russian archives and sources but that he would put together a package for Zolotarev. He noted that Commission investigators continue to search for the underwater divers who were involved in the initial Soviet search and rescue operation on the PB-4Y2 in 1950.

Next, Connell provided the working group with an update and point paper on the John William Adkin case (file number 74943 in the St. Petersburg Archive of the Federal Security Service). He reported that he had discussed this case with Zolotarev, Novyy, and Mr. Edward Purdue of Massachusetts during lunch and that he also had passed the point paper to Zolotarev. Vinogradov commented that the Russian side had sent the photographs and passed the information already, but the recipient had not received it yet.

Turning to Gatchina, Clift said that he hoped more could be developed through Novyy's and Kazachenko's work in the archive. Kazachenko commented that decisions about research priorities for Gatchina should be established and followed. He recommended that the Commission request a directed search of certain files by specific people in order to coordinate the working group's combined activities.

Clift commented that he would direct Lt Col Cerrone and Mr. Connell to develop a draft proposal with a specific plan of action in response his recommendation. Additionally, Clift identified the July 29, 1953 shutdown near Vladivostok as a definite priority for intensified research and investigation. He said that files had been transferred from the Gatchina Archive to the Podol'sk Archive and that records indicated that three Soviet ships - The Polyarnik, BO-122 and BO-123 - were in the area during the incident; yet no one had been able to locate any deck logs for those vessels. Kazachenko acknowledged that deck logs were missing but clarified that the business of the Gatchina Archive generally is not analysis.

Regarding Russian losses in Afghanistan, Clift said the U.S. side went back and re-examined its diplomatic and classified intelligence reporting, with special attention to voluminous reporting from Kabul. The results of this review were to reaffirm that the U.S. side already had passed everything it possessed on the subject to the Russian side. Vinogradov replied that the Russian side had undertaken a similar approach to declassify archival information and that it could also request intelligence information and Border Guard records. He commented that there are no limitations on requests for humanitarian information.

In response, Clift proposed that the Commission develop a new cooperative effort similar to the Russian Federal Security Service - U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cooperative engagement program. He said that he had been encouraged about the concept during his conversation with the head of the USCG, Admiral Loy. With this in mind, Clift said that he would send Vinogradov a letter with the updates on the six cases we are following so that the Commission could pass them to the Border Guards.

Vinogradov noted proudly that it was the FSB Border Guard's report which led the Commission to Captain Dunham's recovery on Yuriy Island. He added that the Security Service routinely participates in these events following the downing of an aircraft. Thus, he encouraged Clift to forward to him the proposed letter with updates on the 6 cases for further investigation and inquiry, as well as his concept for a Commission - FSB cooperative engagement program. Clift replied that the U.S. side would provide Vinogradov with as much information as possible.

In closing, Vinogradov commented that Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Kalinin's future role in the Commission would be very limited and that, although he would be missed, the Commission's work would continue. He said that his new work does not include archival research and that he is now dealing with Russia's current internal problems.

With that, Colonel Vinogradov and Mr. Clift agreed to adjourn the working group.

**CLOSING SESSION OF 16TH PLENUM OF
THE U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON
PRISONERS OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION,
(NOVEMBER 11, 1999)**

The Closing Session of the 16th Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Prisoners of War/Missing in Action was convened on November 11, 1999 at 9:15 AM at the National Hotel, Moscow, Russian Federation.

Principal U.S. Attendees:

- Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.) Roland Lajoie, U.S. Chairman, USRJC, and acting Co-chairman, Vietnam War Working Group
- Mr. Denis Clift, Joint Military Intelligence College, Co-chairman, Cold War Working Group
- Mr. Michael McReynolds, National Archives, Co-chairman, World War II Working Group
- Mr. Norman Kass, U.S. Executive Secretary of the USRJC and acting Co-chairman, Korean War Working Group
- Dr. James Connell, Chief, Joint Commission Support Directorate, Moscow Office
- Mr. Nick Sorokin, U.S. Department of State Interpreter

Also present: Mr. Al Graham, Lt Col Scott Cerrone, Mr. Roger Schumacher, Major Woodman Page, Major Jean MacIntyre, Mr. Danz Blasser, CMSgt Carol Dockham, SMSgt Bernard Brown, SFC Michael Lunini, SFC Joya Gooden, Mr. Robert Bishop, and Lt Col Anthony Foti (Mr. Jones' Military Assistant). Also present from the Marshall Center, Garmisch, Germany: CPT(P) David Chapman, and CPT(P) Matthew Kristoff.

Principal Russian Attendees:

- General-Major Vladimir Antonovich Zolotarev, Russian Chairman, USRJC
- Mr. Valentin Alekseyevich Sobolev, Russian Federation Security Council
- Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Nikiforov, Institute of Military History, Co-chairman, World War II Working Group
- Colonel Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov, Institute of Military History, acting Co-chairman, Vietnam War Working Group
- Mr. Sergey Olegovich Panin, Foreign Intelligence Service
- Mr. Vladimir Vasilyevich Sokolov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives
- Colonel Valeriy Alekseyevich Filippov, Military Memorial Center
- Colonel Konstantin Viktorovich Golumbovskiy, Presidential Administration, Department of POWs, Internees, and MIAs

Also present: General-Major Stepan Andreyevich Tyushkevich (Ret.), Rear Admiral (Ret.) Boris Gavrilovich Novyy; Vladimir Ivanovich Korotayev, Deputy Director, Center for the Storage and Preservation of Historical Documents; Captain 2nd Rank Sergey Kazachenko, Gatchina Archives; Ms. Natal'ya Mikhaylovna Levina, Russian Executive Secretary of the USRJC; Captain 1st Rank Valeriy Nikolayevich Vartanov, Institute of Military History; Captain 1st Rank Waldemar Nikolayevich Shevchenko, Institute of Military History; Mar'ya Ivanovna Lotareva, POW/MIA; Colonel Leonid Ignat'yevich Biryukov, Federal Council of Veterans; Dmitriy Dmitriyevich Vorobyev, Foreign Intelligence Service; Aleksandr Petrovich Cherepkov, Federal Security Service; [FNU] Komorarov, Security Council.

Introductory Remarks:

Lajoie noted his satisfaction with the course of his first Plenum. He deferred to Zolotarev and the Russian side to begin their reports. Zolotarev said he would take a traditionally chronological approach, and he asked Nikiforov to give his report for the World War II Working Group.

Remarks by the Russian Side:

World War II Working Group: Nikiforov thanked McReynolds for his cooperation as Co-chairman of the World War Two Working Group. Nikoforov said that they shared similar opinions, and they had reached consensus in their discussions about the course of current and future work in the working group. He noted that the work of this working group had become much broader and more complex. He reported on the downed WWII PV1/PV2 aircraft on the Kamchatka Peninsula near Petropavlovsk and agreed to examine the matter more closely after the U.S.side has provided more precise coordinates on the crash site. Once this data is received,

Nikiforov suggested conducting a joint fact-finding and preliminary recovery expedition to the crash site during good weather in July or August 2000.

Regarding the memoirs that Lajoie passed to the Russian side at the opening session of the 16th Plenum, Nikiforov said that the Russian side must do a more thorough analysis of these memoirs so as to conduct a more efficient search for names. He promised to continue the search for information on the remaining 37 Americans from the 207 list.^[1] He requested that the U.S. side try to find out what it could from anyone who took part in or witnessed a 2 April 1945 P-38 attack on Soviet planes near Vienna, Austria. In conclusion, Nikiforov stated that work will continue on WWII issues.

Korean War Working Group: Captain 1st Rank Valeriy Nikolayevich Vartanov, acting Co-chairman of the Korean War Working Group, turned to Colonel Filippov to deliver the closing report and to speak on archival issues. Filippov said the Russian side had suggested and agreed to co-draft a letter to the Russian First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General-Colonel Manilov, to request that a working group be established to review classified documents at the Russian military archive at Podol'sk from information about Korean-War-era American prisoners of war. The working group jointly drafted the letter, which was then reviewed and approved by the Commission's Co-chairmen and passed to Manilov on November 10, 1999 during their meeting with him. Manilov responded positively, ordering a working group be established to initiate the review requested in the Commission's letter. Filippov said that the Russian side believed this effort would prove helpful, as it would permit relevant information from individual documents to be declassified and presented to the U.S. side without the time-consuming processing of examining entire groups of documents.

Filippov discussed Russian views on the memoirs presented by the American side at the Opening Session and discussed in detail in the working group. He said that the Russian side expressed its initial doubts about the veracity of these memoirs, and it has many questions concerning the documents. Filippov noted, however, that the name of at least one Korean War missing in action American serviceman was included in the materials, a point that justified the need for further research. Filippov stated that, if the fate of even one American could be established, the work will not have been in vain.

Orlov raised the issue of reports concerning U.S. Army Rangers taking a MiG-15 jet engine from Korea for exploitation. This issue also was raised at the 15th Plenum in November 1998. Kass responded that the U.S. side had requested this information from Sikorsky Corporation but had not received a response. Lajoie said that he was unfamiliar with this issue, and he wanted to know if the Russian side was interested in the return of military hardware in this case. Orlov responded that the Russian side is not necessarily interested in the return of military hardware. However, since the pilot had not been recovered, data regarding the aircraft wreckage--which had been disassembled and taken away--could possibly provide insights into his fate.

Vietnam War Working Group: Orlov, who had served as acting Co-chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group, noted this was his first time with this working group. He thought there had been a useful exchange of information and analysis by both sides, as well as discussions about the group's direction and future activities. Orlov said he thought Vietnam

presented the most complicated issues of all the working groups. Also, he thought the Vietnam War Working Group is making progress, and its issues are in the limelight today.

Orlov commented favorably about the presentation made by several U.S. staff officers during this Plenum.[\[2\]](#), which he characterized as very thorough and useful. He noted, however, that the Russian side did not agree with all the points, and he thought more research and information were required on several points. Nonetheless, he believed the report provided a very good basis for future work.

Regarding the Volkogonov memoirs, Orlov said that, as with any memoirs, they could not be treated strictly as documentary evidence, especially as they excluded other documents, such as Volkogonov's letter to President Yeltsin, that should have been included as part of his memoirs.[\[3\]](#)

As for the anonymous memoirs (passed to the Russian side at the Opening Session on November 9, 1999), Orlov said he would refrain from giving any analysis. He noted that Vinogradov and his colleagues would like to examine the memoirs more closely. However, from Orlov's perspective, there are not many points for specific follow-up. Of course, the memoirs should be checked and followed up on thoroughly, because they might contain information relating to American prisoners of war, he said.

Orlov said that both sides of the Vietnam War Working Group had identified and agreed upon the working group's priorities. One priority is to test the likelihood of former Soviet contact with American prisoners of war in Vietnam by searching for relevant documents. Additionally, the Russians would also look at the points in the report containing allegations of delivery of equipment to the Soviet Union using Korean War Working Group's experience.[\[4\]](#) Any intelligence information, as well as information relating to Vietnam and the Vietnamese People's Army, would have to be dealt with by competent agencies because of inherent complications, he said.

In conclusion, Orlov thanked Lajoie for his participation and cooperation in working group deliberations, stating that his presence, and that of Zolotarev, attested to the importance being given to issues of the Vietnam War Working Group.

Cold War Working Group: Zolotarev announced that Vinogradov, Russian Co-chairman of the Cold War Working Group, could not attend the Closing Session of the 16th Plenum because of an unexpected circumstance at his work place. Zolotarev said that Vinogradov is thorough and professional, and Vinogradov agreed that Zolotarev should provide the Cold War Working Group's closing remarks for the Russian side.

Zolotarev praised the Cold War Working Group's solid reputation and success in pinpointing issues. He said that Vinogradov had hoped that General Deyneka, Commander of Russian Naval Aviation, could have participated in the Plenum. Unfortunately, Deyneka was on a military business trip, and the Russian side hopes that Deyneka can join the working group in the future.

Since the last Plenum, the Cold War Working Group has completed a considerable amount of research: a visit to the Central Naval Archives at Gatchina, several other site visits, and numerous interviews, Zolotarev said. Of particular note have been the site visits to the Murmansk and Severomorsk regions by Admiral Novyy and Connell in the search for information about USAF Major Eugene Posa. They have been searching all possible leads and archives, Zolotarev noted, and the working group is looking forward to receiving Admiral Novyy's most recent report in the near-term.

Turning to the anonymous memoirs that Lajoie passed to the Russian side on November 9, 1999, Zolotarev said that all the factual details in the memoirs will be reviewed carefully and checked by independent experts outside the Commission.

Regarding Russian MIA concerns, Zolotarev said that there are about 90 families still waiting for information on the Soviet K-129 submarine loss in the Pacific Ocean in 1968. These families are anxious to receive information. Unfortunately, the Russian side still has doubts about this incident, Zolotarev said.

Remarks by the U.S. Side:

Lajoie thanked the Russian side for its thorough report and called on the U.S. Working Group Co-chairmen to offer their comments.

World War II Working Group: McReynolds agreed with Nikiforov on the cooperation and success of the World War Two Working Group during the 16th Plenum. McReynolds praised his two Russian Working Group colleagues, General-Major Stepan Andreyevich Tyushkevich (Ret.) and Mr. Vladimir Ivanovich Korotayev, Deputy Director of the Russian Center for the Storage and Preservation of Historical Documents, for their participation, contributions, and cooperation. McReynolds also pledged that work on WWII issues would continue. He said that the U.S. side would search its records for more information on the issues raised by both sides during the meeting. He agreed to make a trip to the PV1/PV2 crash site during the summer of 2000. He noted that the U.S. side handed over one hundred and eleven (111) pages from the National Archives to the Russian side on U.S.-Russian conflicts at the end of WWII. McReynolds concluded by pledging to search the National Archives for information about the incident that took place near Vienna, Austria, on April 2, 1945, which was mentioned by Nikiforov. In response to a working group request, McReynolds passed to Nikiforov a copy of a U.S. paper on Russian displaced persons who ended up in the West after World War Two (see Working Group minutes). This paper had been passed to the Russian side at an earlier Plenum.

Korean War Working Group: Kass stated that during the previous two days of meetings, the Korean War Working Group had covered a number of important issues defining its future agenda. Both sides focused on the work being done at the MoD archives at Podol'sk. The working group noted its satisfaction with the current arrangement, permitting researchers eight days of access every month. This has led to the discovery of information clarifying the circumstances of loss for one hundred and thirty-nine (139) unaccounted-for Americans.

Kass also said that the working group recognizes the difficulties facing its researchers in accessing documents of potential value because they are still classified. He noted that a joint letter had been prepared for General-Colonel Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and signed by Lajoie and Zolotarev. The letter, which was given to Manilov during the visit of the two Co-chairmen on November 10, 1999, requests his support for establishing a working group to identify American POW/MIA-related documents that could then be declassified. Manilov readily endorsed this initiative and underscored that he will direct a prompt and thorough review of the classified holdings at Podol'sk. This will be done so that relevant information can be identified, declassified, and shared with the Commission. A coordination mechanism made up of working group members of both sides will monitor subsequent progress, including requests for access to specific documents requested by Commission researchers.

Kass mentioned the detailed discussion of the memoirs Lajoie referred to in the Opening Session and the Russian side's questions pertaining to the material's factual accuracy. He stated that certain details were clarified and a plan of action developed. The U.S. side will provide the Russian side with information concerning numerous reports acquired over the years that allege the presence of U.S. servicemen from the Korean War in the Soviet GULag. This data will be examined to establish specific sites, which, under the plan, will be visited by working group members. The Russian side has also identified a number of ministries whose archives may contain information relating to the memoirs, including the archives of the former KGB and MVD. An official request to these agencies for cooperation in reviewing their archives will be prepared, Kass noted.

The working group discussed ways to further the inquiry into Soviet losses during the Korean War. In response to the Russian side's request, the U.S. members agreed to facilitate contact with organizations representing U.S. Korean War pilots. The U.S. side also undertook to intensify its search of U.S. archives for information about Soviet losses.

Kass expressed his appreciation for the support, cooperation, and the serious approach of the Russian side of the Korean War Working Group during the session.

Cold War Working Group: Clift welcomed and thanked Captain 2nd Rank Sergey Yur'evich Kazachenko, Deputy Chief of Gatchina Archives, for his participation and contributions to the Cold War Working Group during the 16th Plenum. Clift then reported that the working group had discussed six of the nine unresolved Soviet shoot-downs of U.S. aircraft during the Cold War. He also reported that the sides had agreed to double their archival research efforts at the Central Naval Archives at Gatchina and to begin a fresh approach to exploring the Russian Border Guard Archives of the Federal Security Service (FSB).

Clift reported that the working group received a detailed report from Russian Rear Admiral Boris Gavrilovich Novyy (Ret.) on two possible burial sites of Major Eugene Posa, USAF, MIA since 1 July 1960. Both sides agreed that Admiral Novyy's work would be greatly enhanced by a Commission or Ministry of Defense letter of credentials to bolster his *bona fides*. Additionally, Clift said that the U.S. side encourages the Russian side to invite Admiral Novyy to participate in the Commission more regularly.

With regard to the memoirs that Lajoie passed to the Russian side on November 9, 1999, Clift reported that the Cold War Working Group thoroughly reviewed and discussed its portion, which specifically addressed the June 13, 1952 Soviet shoot-down of a U.S. RB-29 aircraft and its crew of ten airmen over the Pacific Ocean. Clift said that the Russian side provided its assurance that planning was under way to address the memoir's allegations and issues.

In support of Russian concerns, Clift reported that the working group had discussed Soviet soldiers missing from the war in Afghanistan, and he had accepted for inquiry by the U.S. side a new Russian list of nine former Soviet soldiers who may now reside in the United States and may be able to shed additional light on the fate of Soviet servicemen missing in Afghanistan.

Vietnam War Working Group: Lajoie noted that he would make comments on the activities of the Vietnam War Working Group in his capacity as the acting Co-chairman of that working group, as well as comments on the overall results of the Plenum in his capacity as the Co-chairman of the Commission.

Lajoie said the Vietnam War and American losses there have remained one of the Commission's most sensitive concerns, which is why the Volkogonov memoirs remain at the center of U.S. attention.^[5] Lajoie thanked the Russian side for arranging meetings with former KGB directors Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastnyy and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov,^[6] despite Russian misgivings about continued U.S. interest in the Volkogonov issue. Lajoie characterized his meetings with both men as interesting, and he gave short summaries of those meetings.

The meeting with Semichastnyy took place at the American Ambassador's residence - Spaso House--on Tuesday evening, November 9, 1999, during the U.S. reception in honor of the 16th Plenum of the USRJC. The Russian side arranged for Semichastnyy's presence at the reception in response to a U.S. request for a follow-up meeting with him.^[7] The meeting was actually a private conversation between Lajoie and Semichastnyy. Lajoie noted that, although he would have preferred to hold this meeting in a more business-like setting, it did give him the opportunity to discuss with Semichastnyy certain key issues of interest to the U.S. side.

Lajoie characterized Semichastnyy as pleasant, but their discussion contained no surprises. Semichastnyy said that he had no recollection of the document referenced by Volkogonov in his memoirs, although this did not mean that the document did not exist. Semichastnyy admitted that during the Cold War, information on the American military was important, but the KGB was interested mainly in political and scientific issues.

Lajoie said he felt that he and Semichastnyy were traversing ground previously covered during discussions about KGB contact with American POWs during the Vietnam War. During his 15th Plenum testimony in 1998, Semichastnyy recounted a meeting between a KGB officer and an American POW that the Chinese had interrupted. According to Lajoie, Semichastnyy was aware of a meeting in early 1973 between a KGB officer named Nechiporenko and an American POW in Hanoi. Lajoie said he was not certain whether Semichastnyy understood clearly that they were talking about two different meetings. Lajoie said that he concluded there

were two KGB contacts with American POWs, but this hardly should be a shock to the Commission.

Lajoie also asked Semichastnyy about the possibility of transfer of American POWs during the Vietnam War. Semichastnyy ruled out this possibility entirely. He admitted that some U.S. military officers and specialists might have had knowledge of temporary value to Moscow but that, within a few months, all their knowledge would have been collected. Then the problem of what to do with these individuals would arise. Asked to speculate about the way a transfer program would have been organized, Semichastnyy agreed with Lajoie's comment that there could have been different categories of people involved: those who could have been brought against their will and in whom the U.S. side is very much interested, and those who might have come willingly, including, possibly, some military personnel.

Lajoie then summarized his meeting with former KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, which took place on the evening of November 10, 1999, at the National Hotel. This meeting took place in a more formal and organized setting, and Kryuchkov was very pleasant and accommodating. He answered all questions posed by the U.S. side without polemics although he could not refrain from statistics allegedly citing the number of homeless people in America as well as those without health insurance. All in all, it had been a friendly and useful exchange, Lajoie said.

The questions posed to Kryuchkov were similar to those asked of Semichastnyy, and Kryuchkov's responses were similar as well. Kryuchkov stated that, if Americans had been transferred to the Soviet Union, he would have known about it, since he sat at the head of Soviet intelligence services for so long. However, there was no interest in American military personnel, Kryuchkov claimed, since in the greater scheme of things, the POWs were "small fries." Kryuchkov also asserted that Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) could not have had its own program to acquire U.S. POWs. He said that military counterintelligence was the responsibility of the KGB, so no GRU plan could have been initiated or carried out without the knowledge of the KGB.

Kryuchkov confirmed that the Vietnamese had been difficult allies. Although the U.S. side has been told this before, Lajoie said, Russian interlocutors always expressed this fact with a sense of frustration. Interestingly, Kryuchkov indicated he respected the Vietnamese for their independence, Lajoie noted.

In summary, two major interviews had been conducted on a subject of extreme importance to Senator Smith and to the U.S. side, Lajoie said. The U.S. would still like to speak with former Prime Minister Primakov, although it understands that the current Russian presidential campaign continues to occupy Primakov's time. Lajoie suggested that the U.S. side might meet with Primakov during the next Plenum.

Lajoie then turned to general commentary regarding the work of the other working groups. With regard to the World War II Group, he said the new business with the PV-1 or PV-2 aircraft wreckage that was discovered in the Far East is very interesting and promising. Locating the aircraft would be a major undertaking that could be done with the cooperation of the Russian side. If the remains of the pilot and crewmen could be found, it would be good publicity for the

Commission's work. Lajoie said he would ask the U.S. side to make this a priority. The U.S. side could look through its library of satellite imagery to see if the aircraft turned up in any holdings, he suggested.

Lajoie offered congratulations to the Co-chairmen of the Korean War Working Group. He expressed amazement at how the letter to General-Colonel Manilov had been conceived, written, approved, signed, and transmitted to Manilov in only one day. Lajoie said he wished all of the Joint Commission's work could go so smoothly.

With regard to the anonymous memoirs, Lajoie characterized them as an intriguing artifact which could prove to be very factual. Addressing Russian doubts, Lajoie said that the Russian side must realize that the U.S. side, too, is skeptical when it receives such information. Much information is received that does not pass the credibility test, Lajoie noted. The Internet provides access to information and names, access that could sometimes be a source of such information or misinformation, Lajoie observed, but the Commission must carefully examine each new discovery (like these memoirs) and give it serious consideration.

As for the Cold War Working Group, Lajoie commented that Cliff had given a good summary. Lajoie said, however, that he would like to add something about the Soviet K-129 submarine. When he learned from Kass that this was an issue pursued by the Joint Commission, Lajoie said he called the CIA and asked for a briefing to see if there was anything new he could pass to the Russian side as a gesture of goodwill. Lajoie stated that he had received the CIA's complete briefing on the K-129 incident and is persuaded that the Russian Government has been provided with all available information about its missing crew members. The CIA briefing provided a description of an impressive technical operation in which there was a catastrophic failure at a critical moment, Lajoie continued. While the claws of the American recovery ship were lifting the Soviet submarine, one of the claws broke, and two-thirds of the submarine broke off and fell back to the sea floor. What the CIA retrieved was far less than expected, and this was a major disappointment. There was little information on the submarine's missing crewmen, and there would be no reason for the U.S. to conceal such information or deny it to the families of missing Russian sailors. Lajoie assured the Russian side that the American side had already passed all relevant information on the K-129 incident.

Turning to Orlov's report, Lajoie said his summary of the deliberations of the Vietnam War Working Group had been quite accurate. As Orlov had mentioned, the U.S. side presented a comprehensive briefing on the subject of Soviet contact with American POWs during interrogation. Lajoie added that the sources for this report had been the debriefings of former American POWs after they returned from captivity, interviews with former Soviet citizens in the FSU, and declassified intelligence reports. Six of these reports had been passed to the Russian side during the working group's session.

Lajoie noted that Orlov had recommended the Commission forget about the Volkogonov memoirs as a basis for our work and concentrate instead on interviews and archives. Speaking unequivocally, Lajoie said that the U.S. side is not prepared to dismiss the Volkogonov memoirs. However, Lajoie agreed that the Commission needs to give additional emphasis to interviews and archives.

Orlov interrupted to say that he did not mean the Commission needed to forget about the Volkogonov memoirs, just that they needed to be treated like the testimony of any other witness.

Lajoie continued by stating that the archives are paramount to success, and he hoped his meeting with Manilov would bear fruit. The approach of the U.S. side is an open one without secrets, Lajoie said. The U.S. side currently has access to Korean War operational records, and it would like to expand this access to other historical Korean War files, as well as to Bryansk (Vietnam-War-era) files and to GRU archival documents that have relevance to our work. Lajoie maintained that the U.S. side has no hidden agenda, but he said that once he had his foot in the door (of the Podol'sk archive), he intended to open that door wider. This was because the files of interest to the U.S. side are historical documents with no intelligence value. Lajoie reiterated his request for U.S. access to these files and to information it needs to clarify the fate of MIAs so that these cases can be closed and the families of MIA Americans can be at rest.

Lajoie added that while working at Podol'sk, U.S. researchers had also found and written down information on Soviet losses during the Korean conflict. As this point Lajoie passed to Zolotarev a list of Soviet losses copied from Podol'sk files, noting that valuable information is often overlooked in one's own archives.

Orlov returned again to the subject of the K-129 submarine. He said that Russian naval engineers expressed doubt the submarine could have broken at the place claimed by the U.S. side while it was being lifted. These engineers had done a technical study and concluded that a larger portion of the submarine must have been lifted. This would mean that more Russian crew remains would have been recovered, Orlov noted, and Russian naval engineers desire a technical response from the U.S. side.

Lajoie responded that, having admitted that the U.S. mounted this operation, the American side has no reason to lie. He noted that Russian naval engineers might be wrong. The CIA would not disclose technical details of the operation to salvage the Soviet submarine, since that might reveal sources and methods. Beyond what had already been given to the Russian side, Lajoie said there was nothing more to give. The U.S. side understands that Russian marine engineers would like a technical response or reaction to their comments, but the U.S. side of the Joint Commission is here to discuss missing servicemen, not marine engineering. If Russian naval engineers want technical details about the operation from CIA naval specialists, they would have to try another approach.

At this point, Clift commented that Ambassador Toon had already addressed the issue of the K-129 submarine in great detail at the 10th Plenum of the Joint Commission in September 1994. This was after the U.S. side had conducted a very thorough review of the case. At that point everything available had been turned over, and the U.S. side had nothing further to add.

Zolotarev thanked Lajoie and other Commission members for their detailed reviews of working group proceedings. He said he agreed with the assessments in general and in all the details. He was pleased the U.S. side would continue work on World War II issues. He agreed with the progress that was being made in the Korean War Working Group. He said that over the past four years, he had also met with many families of missing American servicemen. Zolotarev

pledged to follow up with detailed discussions on the Manilov meeting and letter of November 10, 1999.

Turning to the Cold War Working Group, Zolotarev said the Russian side would continue to work to resolve all of the issues discussed, including the promising leads on the Posa case. As for the K-129 submarine, he noted that no further discussion on this topic is required.

Zolotarev promised to work on setting up interviews requested by the U.S. side, including the interview with Zarudin. Zolotarev said that he had spoken with Zarudin's family, and if his health did not permit a face-to-face meeting, perhaps the General could provide written testimony in response to specific questions, Zolotarev suggested.

Zolotarev said he did not think the two sides had any serious disagreements. He asked Lajoie to give his regards to Senator Smith, Congressman Johnson, and Ambassador Toon. Zolotarev expressed his hope there would be more meetings with Smith and Johnson in the future. The two sides exchanged gifts, and the Closing Session of the 16th Plenum was formally concluded.

[1] The "207 List" was compiled by the U.S. War Department on or about December 1945 (report is not dated). The "207 List" is a list of soldiers reported to have been held as POWs by the Germans and had not yet been reported as returned to military control of their native land.

[2] This refers to the briefing given on the morning of November 10, 1999 by Roger Schumacher, Major Woodman Page, and Chief Master Sergeant Carol Dockham on the subject of Soviet contact with American prisoners of war during interrogation. See working-group session notes for more detailed information.

[3] Colonel Orlov evidently was making reference to the letter written by General Volkogonov to President Yeltsin dated September 5, 1994 and shown on page 360 in Volkogonov's posthumously published book, *Etudes on Time (Etudi o vremeni)*. See the minutes of the first session of the VWWG for the Russian argument on this point.

[4] The briefing packets that were given to the Russian side at the special November 10 briefing included copies of TFR 136, which is a Soviet memorandum concerning the work of the Soviet *spetsgruppy* in studying American military equipment in the early years of the Vietnam War. The Russian side passed this document to the U.S. side several years ago. The memorandum states that from May 1965 to January 1, 1967, the *spetsgruppy* had collected more than 700 pieces of American combat equipment and shipped them to the Soviet Union.

[5] The U.S. side of the Commission first became aware of the possible existence of a KGB plan to "deliver knowledgeable Americans to the USSR for intelligence purposes" in February 1998 when it discovered an autobiographical sketch by Volkogonov in his collection of personal papers now held at the U.S. Library of Congress in Washington D.C. Volkogonov's memoirs, *Etudi o vremeni*, which contain this autobiographical sketch with some slight differences, did not appear until the early fall of 1998. Strictly speaking, the U.S. side is basing its inquiry on

Volkogonov's autobiographical sketch in manuscript form, not on the passage as it appears in the book.

[6] Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastnyy headed the KGB from 1961 to 1967. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov was the KGB chief from 1988 to 1991.

[7] Semichastnyy's first appearance before the USRJC took place at the National Hotel, Moscow, on November 10, 1998 at the 15th Plenum. Ambassador Toon and Senator Bob Smith conducted that interview with Semichastnyy at a Vietnam War Working Group session.